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Let  me  start  with  an  anecdote.  When  I  decided  to  apply  for  a  PhD,  I  experienced  a situation  that  I  think  exemplifies  the  idiosyncrasies  of  rights  regimes  and  the vicissitudes  of  citizenship  and  legal  status.  Having  acquainted  myself  with  the procedures for the application, I assembled the necessary documents and made myself on the way to the place at the University where, as I was told, I was supposed to turn in my application. The place was not a general “admissions centre” or the like, as I would have  expected,  but  a  specialized  office  to  deal  with  “foreign  applicants  with  foreign diplomas”. Funny, I thought, naively ignoring what lay ahead of me. In any case, having lived abroad in several different countries for most of my adult life, I definitely fell into that category. When I arrived there, what I found seemed a bit as if cut out of a movie. A woody and dusty counter in the basement of a century‐old building with a line of people standing before it that seemed as if they had been waiting there for just about as many centuries  as  the  building was  old.  The  opening  times must  have  been  something  like Tuesdays and Wednesdays 10 to 11. Printed out forms were stapled in the corners, and an  all‐mighty  lady  was  standing  inside  the  woody  counter,  examining  the  diplomas presented  to  her,  and  telling  people  what  to  do.  The  setting  was  so  perfectly bureaucratic, it could have been anywhere in the world. But of course, precisely because it was  so  ideal‐typically  bureaucratic,  one  could  immediately  guess,  as  I  am  sure  you have by now: it was in Austria. After some time of waiting it was eventually my turn to present my diplomas to the lady at the counter. She looked at them, confirmed where I was  from, where  I  had  studied,  etc.  and  concluded  categorically: my  foreign diplomas were worthless; they were not recognized in Austria. I had to go back to Brazil, she said, apply to go to university there for the same area I wanted to study in Austria, and once I had been accepted, I could have this acceptance recognized in Austria and would then be allowed to study here. Of course not a PhD! But at least I would be able to enroll for an undergraduate degree (at the time: Magister). Needless to say she wouldn’t hear that I already had  a bachelor,  and  a post‐graduate,  and  a master. That  all  doesn’t  count; we cannot  accept  it,  she  said.  Ok,  but  I  cannot  go  back  to  Brazil  and  apply  for  university there,  I  said,  because  in  order  to  enter  University  in  Brazil  you  have  to  take  a whole battery  of  tests  that  extend  over many months  and  cover  all  subjects  taught  in  high‐school, including chemistry, biology and all that other stuff that as a good social scientist I have by now dutifully erased from my mind! Nope, she wouldn’t hear it. That was the 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only way.  Puzzled  and  hopeless  I  collected  by  foreign  diplomas  from  the  counter  and moved to the side, while still trying to fully realize what the lady had just told me. The girl who was behind me in the line was now spreading her diplomas on the counter. The girl had Turkish diplomas and wanted to study in Austria. I looked at the young girl and thought: poor thing, now she is going to be told the same I was told. And in fact the lady explained  the  same  thing  to  her:  foreign  secondary  school  leaving  certificate,  so  you have  to  go  back  and  apply  for  university  in  Turkey,  bla  bla  bla.  But  then  something happened. The lady asked her if she worked. She said no. Then the lady asked her if her father was also a Turkish citizen, and if he lived in Austria and worked. The girl said yes. Oh well, in that case, her diplomas were all recognized and she could start this semester. What,  I  thought,  is  this  a  joke?!  But  it  was  no  joke,  it  was  the  Turkish  Association Agreement, which granted equal  treatment to Turkish workers and their  families with citizens of European Member States  in a number of areas,  including  the recognition of diplomas.  I was, as  they say  in German, paff. Could  that be?  Just  like  that? What  if her father were not a Turkish worker? Then her diploma, the very same diploma, would not be  valid  anymore?  But  there  is  no material  difference—it  is  the  same  diploma!  Some time  later,  the  same  thing  would  happen  to  me.  I  married  an  Austrian  citizen  and, suddenly,  I was  allowed  to  attend  university without  having  to  go  back  to  Brazil  and pass  all  those  dreadful  exams.  I  was  now  gleichgestellt,  meaning  that  I  had  equal treatment rights with citizens. The road from this first attempt to start a PhD until the completion of this thesis has been a long one. (In fact, ironically, it was much more difficult to get my university degree  from Georgetown University  recognized  than  to  surpass  that  initial  hurdle).  It was  not  until  years  later  that  the  topic  of  this  dissertation  became  related  to  the membership  rights  of  third‐country  nationals,  and  I  chose  it  for  a  number  of  reasons that  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  events  narrated  above.  Nevertheless,  deep  in  me,  I guess  my  interest  for  the  topic  has  also  to  do  with  my  amazement  at  how  much importance a passport can make in a person’s life, and not make in another’s; and with the even more puzzling and bewildering web of mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that emerges when citizenship ceases to be the main determinant of equal treatment, as I think that the anecdote above nicely illustrates. 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1.1. Topic and research question:  This dissertation is about European Union policies that govern the membership rights of legally  resident  third‐country  nationals.  Continuous  inflows  of  immigrants  to  Europe have created large numbers of people that live more or less permanently in the territory of  the  European Union  but  do  not  have  the  citizenship  of  any  of  its Member  States—“third‐country  nationals”.  In  2005,  there  were  more  than  19  million  third‐country nationals  residing  in  the  European  Union,  which  accounts  for  4.2%  of  the  total population  (SEC  (2007)  1408).1  Third‐country  nationals  do  not  enjoy  the  rights  of European Union  citizenship, which  is  a  status  conferred on  “every person holding  the nationality  of  a  Member  State”  (Article  17(1)  TEC).2  Rather,  regulating  the  rights  of third‐country nationals was long an area of exclusive competence of the Member States. Nevertheless,  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  in  1999  the European  Union  has  acquired  competence  to  adopt  supranational  policies  on  the “conditions of entry and residence of third‐country nationals” (Article 63(3) TEC). This development  was  accompanied  by  a  political  commitment  to  adopt  policies  granting legally  resident  third‐country nationals  “a  set of  rights as close as possible  to  those of European citizens” (Tampere Presidency Conclusions, 15‐16 October 1999). Against this background,  the aim of  this dissertation  is  to  investigate how, why and to which extent supranational  policies  of  the  European  Union  grant  membership  rights  to  legally resident third‐country nationals.                                                            1 Throughout the dissertation, primary documents will be identified by document numbers and/or shortened titles. The full references can be found in the Bibliography at the end of the dissertation. 2 The status of European Union citizenship was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and comprises a number of rights including the right to freedom of movement within the territory of the Union, the right to vote and stand in elections for the European Parliament, the right to vote in local elections in any Member State of residence, and the right to petition the European ombudsman, as well as the right not to be discriminated on the ground of nationality. 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1.2. Terminology and scope  As  in  every  empirical  study,  the  scope  of  this  dissertation  has  been  limited  by constraints of  resource and  time. This dissertation concerns  itself only with European Union  policy  adopted  between  1999  and  2009  that  regulates  the  rights  of  legally resident third‐country nationals. The term “legally resident third‐country national” is a policy  term  that  refers  to  persons who do not  have  citizenship  status  of  any Member State of the European Union and reside within the territory of the Union on the basis of a visa or residence permit issued for purposes other than humanitarian protection. I will use  the  term  in  this  sense.  In  other  words,  this  dissertation  does  not  investigate  the rights  of  persons  who  are  asylum  seekers,  recognized  refugees,  beneficiaries  of temporary  or  subsidiary  protection,  tourists,  or  residents  within  the  territory  of  the Union without an official authorization or permit (i.e. “irregular migrants”). Moreover, this dissertation also does not investigate the rights of legally resident third‐country nationals that benefit from special treatment due to bilateral agreements between  the European Union  or  the Member  States  and  specific  third‐countries.  Such special  agreements  include,  in  particular,  the  European  Economic  Area  Agreement (Council  and  Commission  Decision  94/1/EC,  ECSC),  and  the  Association  Agreements with Turkey (Council Decision 64/732/EEC), Algeria (Council Decision 2005/690/EC), Morocco (Council and Commission Decision 2000/204/EC, ECSC), and Tunesia (Council and Commission Decision 98/238/EC, ECSC). Finally, the focus of the dissertation does not include the regulation of rights of third‐country nationals whose rights are derived from  those  of  a European Union  citizen,  in  particular  the  rights  of  family members  of Union citizens exercising his or her right to freedom of movement.   The  next  set  of  terms  that  needs  clarification  are  the  terms  “citizenship”, “membership” and “nationality”, which are all of key relevance for this dissertation. The concept of  citizenship  is usually used  to  refer  to  two different  things:  a  legal  status of being a member of a polity (usually  identified by a passport), and the bundle of rights and obligations  that are associated with membership  in  the polity.  In  the  literature on citizenship,  these  two  aspects  of  citizenship  are  referred  to  as,  respectively,  “formal citizenship” and  “substantive  citizenship”  (Castles 1994, 3‐4). The distinction between formal  and  substantial  citizenship  is  a  very  important  one  for  this  study.    As  Rainer Bauböck (1994a, 202)  points out: “the status of citizenship, by which a state recognizes an individual as its member, is not a formal legal concept lacking any particular content; 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it  implies substantial  rights  to protection, as well as  those against  interference, by  the state.” In this dissertation, I will refer to the rights that constitute substantial citizenship as “membership rights”. I prefer the term “membership rights” to “citizenship rights” in order to avoid depoliticizing the concept of citizenship, because the policies analyzed in this  dissertation  that  govern  the  rights  of  non‐citizens  practically  do  not  touch  upon rights of political participation. Throughout  the  dissertation,  I  will  use  the  word  “citizen”  to  refer  to  those  in possession  of  formal  citizenship.  Conversely, when writing  about  residents  of  a  polity that do not have  formal citizenship of  that polity,  I will use  the  term “non‐citizen”.3  In general,  I  will  avoid  using  the  term  “nationality”  to  mean  formal  citizenship  status. Nevertheless, the relationship between citizenship and nationality is a very ambiguous one,  and  some  overlap  is  unavoidable.  In  principle,  I  understand  nationality  as membership in a nation—a community of people that share common origins, traditions, language or any other feature upon which the national community is based. However,  in  the  ideal‐type  of  the  nation‐state,  membership  in  the  political community  (citizenship)  and membership  in  the national  community  (nationality)  are conflated  (see Chapter 2). For  this  reason,  the  term “nationality”  is very often used as synonymous with  citizenship  status,  and  citizens  are  often  referred  to  as  “nationals”. Such  usages  of  the  term  are  sometimes  so  deeply  ingrained  in  the  legal  and  political institutions and the dominant discourse in a policy field, that it becomes impossible (or impracticable) to diverge from the common usage. This is the case with two terms that I want  to  clarify  here.  First,  in  European  Union  legislation  and  political  jargon,  “third‐country nationals” is the term used to refer to persons who are citizens of a country that does  not  belong  to  the  European  Union.  Secondly,  “discrimination  on  the  ground  of 
nationality”  is  a  term  used  in  European  Union  legislation  to  refer  to  rules  that discriminate  on  the  basis  of  possession  of  the  legal  status  of  citizenship.  Conversely, “equal treatment with nationals” is the term used in the European Union to mean equal treatment  with  citizens  of  the  country  of  residence.  For  reasons  of  consistency  and practicality,  when  discussing  European  Union  law  and  policy  I  will  also  adopt  this terminology.                                                          3 The term non‐citizen is chosen here for practical reasons, even though I am aware that it is not an ideal term. In reality, the persons I refer to as „non‐citizens“ are not stateless, but rather have the citizenship of a country in which they do not reside. 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1.3. Theoretical background  The  theoretical  background  to  the  research  question  lies  in  a  body  of  literature  that focuses  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship  in  the  context  of  globalization  and  rising international migration. According to Stephen Castles, rising migration and globalization have “disrupted the nexus between power and place upon which the concept of nation‐state citizenship was based” (Castles 2007, 21). He argues that modern industrial society was premised on the narrative that  the political, economic, social and cultural spheres were all congruent with the nation state, but this is no longer the case. By disrupting this assumed coincidence,  globalization and  immigration have  important  consequences  for our understanding of citizenship. As Seyla Benhabib argues: We  are  at  a  point  in  the  political  evolution  of  human  communities when the unitary model of citizenship that bundled together residency on  a  single  territory  with  subjection  to  a  common  bureaucratic administration  representing a people perceived  to be  a more or  less cohesive entity is at an end. We are facing today the ‘disaggregation of citizenship’. (Benhabib 2006, 45)  One important aspect of the “disaggregation of citizenship” is the decouplement of entitlement to membership rights from the possession of citizenship status. Yasemin Soysal  contents  that  the high  level of  social,  economic and civil  rights granted  to non‐citizens  in  Europe  reflect  “the  changing  structure  and  meaning  of  citizenship  in  the contemporary  world”  (Soysal  1994,  136).  Policies  that  grant  membership  rights  to foreign residents have “blurred the boundaries” (Bauböck and Rundell 1998) between citizens  and  aliens,  thus  undermining  the  very  foundations  of  the  idea  of  national citizenship. The supranational policies of the European Union that make up the topic of this dissertation can be understood as one example of such policies that, by redefining who is entitled to membership rights and under which conditions, influence the lines of inclusion  and  exclusion  within  a  polity  and  contribute  to  the  transformation  of citizenship.   The  theoretical  literature on  the  transformation of  citizenship  in  the  context  of globalization and migration is very rich and multifaceted. The focus of this dissertation relates  primarily  to  those  works  that  take  a  more  analytical  perspective  and  seek  to explain the process of expansion of rights to non‐citizens. This literature is divided into two  strands,  one  that  focuses  on  the  role  of  norms  in  propelling  the  expansion  of 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migrants’ rights, and one that points to the existence of setbacks in the process of rights expansion,  the  creation  of  rights  hierarchies  between  categories  of  immigrants  and  a general trend to the “revaluation” of citizenship (Schuck 1997).  Earlier  studies  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship  have  identified  a  general trend towards the expansion of migrants’ rights in several liberal immigration countries (Hammar 1990; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996), and recently also in the European Union (Walker 2008).  In  the case of European nation‐states,  the most  influential explanation given to this phenomenon focused on the role of norms. Thus, a number of authors have argued  that  commitments  to  human  rights  norms  and  liberal  norms  ingrained  in national  constitutions  constrain  the  discretion  of  states  in  regulating  the  rights  of migrants  and  lead  to  the  adoption  of  policies  that  expand membership  rights  to  non‐citizens (Hollifield 1992; Soysal 1994; Joppke 2001). However,  a  second  strand  of  literature  argues  that  the  expansion  of  migrants’ rights does not always progress linearly in the direction of ever‐greater entitlements, as suggested  by  the  explanation  based  on  norms.  On  the  contrary, migrants’  rights  have become highly politicized and contested, and in several countries restrictive trends can be observed  (Schierup et al. 2006;  Joppke 2007a).  Important  studies have  shown  that the  expansion of  rights  to non‐citizens  is  not  taking place  equally  for  all  categories  of immigrants, and not for all types of rights, which results in a system of civic stratification (Morris  2002).  Also  in  the  case  of  the  European  Union,  the  supranational  policies adopted  in  the  last  decade  with  the  aim  of  expanding  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals  have  been  severely  criticized  for  failing  to  fulfil  the  political  commitment  of equal  treatment  and  for  creating  rights  hierarchies  between  different  categories  of migrants  (Carrera  2005;  Gross  2005;  Halleskov  2005;  Perchinig  2006b;  Guild  et  al. 2009). Thus,  the  literature  that  focuses  on  the  role  of  norms  ignores  the  partial, ambiguous  and non‐linear way with which  the  expansion of migrants’  rights  is  taking place.  Nevertheless,  the works  that  indicate  lacunas  and  setbacks  in  the  expansion  of migrants’ rights have so far failed to produce an alternative explanatory framework. In that  context,  the  main  challenge  remains,  first,  to  understand  what  leads  to  these ambiguous outcomes and, second, to analyse where the new boundaries of entitlement are  being  drawn.  This  dissertation  aims  to  help  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature  by conducting  empirical  research  on  the  policy  process  leading  to  these  ambiguous outcomes  in one particular case, namely supranational policies governing the rights of 
  20 
third‐country  nationals  in  the  European  Union.  One  of  the  main  contentions  of  this dissertation  is  thus  that  the  policies  of  the  European Union  that  expand  the  rights  of third‐country  nationals  are  redefining  membership  by  significantly  displacing citizenship status and nationality as the main criteria for the concession of rights, while at the same time creating new lines of division and mechanisms of exclusion.   
1.4. Analytical approach  In  order  to  explain  the  development  of  supranational  policies  on  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals, the dissertation draws on an analytical approach that emphasizes the role  of  political,  ideational  and  institutional  factors  in  the  policy  process.  To  put  it differently,  the  approach  taken  in  this dissertation  is premised on  the  contention  that discourse, politics and  the  institutional  setting  in which decisions are  taken cannot be studied in isolation. Rather, it is the interaction of these different factors that is crucial to explaining the development of a particular policy field. This  approach  is  influenced by  the  constructivist  turn  in  European  studies  and the ideational turn in policy analysis (see, among others: Christiansen et al. 2001; Diez 2001;  Fischer  2003;  Risse  2004;  Schmidt  and  Radaelli  2004;  Wiener  2007;  Schmidt 2008). The main thrust of the constructivist turn is the conviction that ideational factors such as ‘ideas’, ‘norms’ and ‘frames’ can constitute explanatory factors in policy analysis. The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation is therefore attentive to the role of ideas,  norms  and  frames  in  the  policy  process,  in  particular  human  rights  norms,  the guiding  ideas  of  “equal  treatment”  and  “non‐discrimination”,  and  the  frame  of “integration”. Further,  any  analysis  of  supranational  policies  must  take  into  account  the particular  institutional  setting of  the European Union. The European Union  is a highly complex  polity  of  a  sui  generis  nature.  The  division  of  competence  between  the European Union and the Member States, as well as the way in which the legal basis for Community action evolved over time influence the policy‐making process. Moreover, the institutions  and  actors  within  the  policy‐making  process  in  different  fields  of supranational action vary, as do the procedures that govern their interaction. These and other  “institutional  determinants  of  EU  policy  making”  are  important  explanatory 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factors taken into account in this dissertation when analyzing the process that leads to the adoption of policies governing the rights of third‐country nationals. In  addition  to  focusing  on  the  role  of  ideational  and  institutional  factors  in  the policy process, the analytical framework of this dissertation places great importance on the  role  of  party  politics  and  other  political  factors  in  defining  the  preferences  of national governments and of supranational actors such as the European Commission. In fact,  one  of  the  most  important  contributions  of  this  dissertation  is  to  show  how intensely political the process of supranational policy‐making on the rights of migrants’ is, and to highlight the crucial role of political agency in the formulation and adoption of these measures.  
1.5. Research design and plan of the dissertation  The aim of this dissertation is to investigate empirically how the process of expansion of migrants’  rights  is  taking  place  in  the  European  Union,  why  it  is  taking  place  in  this particular  way,  and  what  the  remaining  limitations  to  the  goal  of  equal  treatment between  third‐country  nationals  and  Union  citizens  are.  In  order  to  do  so,  the  core empirical work undertaken  in  this dissertation consists  in a policy analysis  that  traces the  policy‐making  process  at  the  supranational  level  between  1999  and  2009  in  the policy  areas  of  “legal  migration”  and  “immigrant  integration”,  and  analyses  the  most important  policies  adopted  during  this  period  that  govern  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals.    Chapter  2  presents  the  theoretical  background  to  the  dissertation  and  embeds the  research  question  within  the  literature  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship.  The empirical  part  of  the  dissertation  that  follows  is  divided  into  four  chapters.  The  first empirical chapter of the dissertation, Chapter 3, focuses on the institutionalization of the policy  field  for migration  policy  and  immigrant  integration  at  the  supranational  level, and  the  establishment  of  European Union  competence  to  regulate  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals.  In  order  to  understand  how  and  why  the  process  of  expansion  of membership  rights  to  third‐country  nationals  is  taking  place  it  is  necessary  to understand  who  governs  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals,  based  on  which institutional framework and by which modes of governance. Chapter 3 therefore focuses on  how  certain  features  of  the  organization  of  the  European  Union  polity  impacts  on supranational policy towards third‐country nationals. It seeks to identify the legal basis 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for European Union policy on third‐country nationals, the procedures used in this field, and  the main  actors  and  institutions  involved.  The  analysis  of  this  empirical material teases out a number of “institutional determinants” of supranational policy‐making that are likely to impact on the policy‐making process.    The empirical  core of  the dissertation  is without doubt Chapter 4. This  chapter reviews  the  policy‐making  process  at  the  supranational  level  on  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  from  1999  to  2009.  This  time  frame  corresponds  to  the  period between the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon. The analysis  draws  on  the  concept  of  “policy  cycle”,  and  distinguishes  between  three relevant phases of policy‐making  that occur at  the supranational  level: agenda setting, policy  formulation,  and decision‐making.  In  the decade between 1999 and 2009  there have  been  two  cycles  of  policy‐making  on  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals,  each with  its  own  agenda‐setting,  policy  formulation  and  decision‐making  stages.  These cycles are analyzed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of Chapter 4, respectively.   The  analysis  of  the  policy‐making  process  carried  out  in  Chapter  4  provides detailed empirical evidence that shows how the  interaction of political,  ideational, and institutional  factors  led  to  the  creation  of  ambiguous  policy  outcomes.  The  main argument developed is that the combination of conflicting dynamics have contributed to the  adoption  of  a  policy  framework  characterized  by  the  predominance  of  two phenomena  that  I  call  “restrictive  rights”  and  “politics  of  categorization”.  “Restrictive rights”  refers  to  a  situation  where  membership  rights  are  granted  to  third‐country nationals  in  principle,  but  actual  entitlement  remains  subject  to  very  restrictive conditions. “The politics of categorization” refers to how politics and the law ”construct” a multiplicity of categories of immigrants, and subject each category to a different rights‐regime, thus contributing to the creation of rights hierarchies. Both of these phenomena have the ambiguous effect of enabling the expansion of membership rights to non‐citizens, while at the same time creating new lines of division and mechanisms of exclusion. The imposition of restrictive conditions on the acquisition of  rights  allows  the  Member  States  of  the  Union  to  maintain  a  certain  degree  of discretion  and  control  over  who  is  granted  membership  rights,  thus  creating  the necessary conditions for a political agreement at the supranational level on policies that expand migrants’  rights. At  the  same  time,  to  the extent  that  supranational  legislation allow national governments to  impose strict conditions on the actual enjoyment of the rights  foreseen by European Union policy,  limitations on equal  treatment are  likely  to 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remain. Similarly,  the adoption of  legislation tailored to specific categories of migrants facilitates  agreement  at  the  supranational  level  by  allowing  supranational  policy  to proceed  step‐by‐step  in  expanding  migrants’  rights,  starting  with  those  categories where  there  is  least  political  disagreement  between  the  governments  of  the  different Member States. At  the same time,  this strategy contributes  to  the persistence of rights hierarchies between the different categories of migrants and thus to the creation of new lines of division between those with more or less membership rights. Whereas  the  analysis  of  the  policy  process  allows  us  to  see  how  and why  the expansion of the rights of third‐country national proceeds in an ambiguous manner,  in order  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  EU  policy  creates  rights  hierarchies  between categories of migrants and understand where the new lines of division are being drawn it is necessary to look at the policy output. Thus, Chapter 5 examines and compares the rights granted to legally resident third‐country nationals by European Union legislation adopted  between  1999  and  2009,  as  well  as  the  rights  that  would  be  granted  if  a legislative  proposal  that  is  currently  being  negotiated  would  be  adopted.  The  rights granted  to different  categories  of  third‐country nationals  are  further  compared  to  the rights of EU citizens moving within the European Union. In total, the following pieces of legislation  are  analyzed:  the  “Long‐Term  Residents  Directive”  (Council  Directive 2003/109/EC),  the  “Family  Reunification  Directive”  (Council  Directive  2003/86/EC), the “Blue Card Directive” (Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009), the “Proposal for a  Proposal for a Single Permit Directive” (COM (2007) 638 final), and the “European Citizenship Directive”  (Directive 2004/38/EC).4 The  rights granted by  these directives are along two analytical dimensions: entitlements in principle and conditions placed on entitlement. The result of  this comparison shows that  these  legislations produce as many as 15  different  categories  of  immigrants  whose  entitlements  to  membership  rights  are subject  to  different  conditions.  One  important  finding  is  that  the  lines  of  divisions between the categories are mainly of an economic and humanitarian nature. Moreover, the analysis of the different conditions placed on entitlement provides some insight into the  implicit  logic  for  differentiating  between  the  categories.  The  main  grounds  for differentiation seem to be related to economic concerns for the protection of the welfare                                                         4 These are shortened names used for reasons of practicality. The official names and references of the directives (or proposed directive) can be found in the Bibliography. 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state and the labour market on the one hand, and the drive to maintain some degree of sovereignty over who  is  entitled  to membership  in  the  face of  humanitarian  concerns that weaken state discretion on  the other hand. Notably,  the often‐raised assumptions that  limitations  on  equal  treatment  are primarily  driven by  the  “securitization”  of  the migration field and by “cultural anxiety” do not find expression in the conditions placed on rights. Nevertheless, some conditions are very vaguely formulated, and therefore offer a very large degree of discretion to national and local governments in applying them. The most  notable  example  is  the  provision  that  allow  Member  States  to  require  third‐country  nationals  to  comply with  “integration  conditions  in  accordance with  national law”  in  order  to  have  access  to  the  rights  foreseen  in  the  Directives.  Due  to  the vagueness of the formulation, the possibility of imposing “integration conditions” on the acquisition  of  membership  rights  enables  national  governments  to  significantly  limit equal treatment by applying these provisions in a very exclusionary fashion. In order to find out the extent to which the imposition of “integration conditions” really  affects  the  possibilities  of  third‐country  nationals  to  enjoy  membership  rights, Chapter 6 of this dissertation shifts the focus of attention to the national and local levels. It  investigates how “integration conditions” on  the acquisition of rights originated and how they are implemented and practiced in Austria and Vienna, which have been chosen as exemplary case studies. Clearly,  the analysis of only these cases cannot provide any generalizable  findings  for  the  whole  European  Union.  Nevertheless,  the Austrian/Viennese cases serve as  important  illustrations of how the complex interplay of  political,  institutional  and  ideational  factors  impacts  also  on  the  implementation  of policies governing the rights of migrants. This  investigation  shows  that  the  adoption of  policies  at  the national  level  that impose  “integration  conditions”  on  third‐country  nationals—in  the  Austrian  case attendance  of  a  language  and  civic  integration  course—was  a  political  project  of  the Austrian far‐right party FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), and did in fact take place within the context of an exclusionary discourse. Nevertheless, the actual practice of how these policies are implemented does not correspond to the restrictive message that the policy sends out. In a favourable political setting for migrants’ interests, such as Vienna, these  measures  even  helped  to  strengthen  pro‐migrant  actors  at  the  local  level, providing  opportunities  for  these  actors  to  carry  out  empowering  programmes  for migrants. Thus, the analysis concludes that the imposition of “integration conditions” in 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Austria can be better understood as an instance of “symbolic politics”, rather than as an exclusionary mechanism to limit non‐citizens’ rights.   
1.6. Data and method  In order to carry out the empirical work outlined above, the dissertation relies on three types of data: secondary literature, primary documents and interviews. For the part of the  dissertation  that  concentrates  on  the  supranational  level,  the  primary  documents include  several  different  kinds  of  documents  produced  by  European  institutions  and other political actors  (European Council Documents, Communications of  the European Commission, policy plans, reports, position papers,  judgements by the European Court of Justice, etc.).  In particular, the analysis of the agenda setting, policy formulation and decision‐making phases of the policy process conducted in Chapter 4 relies strongly on primary  documents  produced  by  European  institutions,  including  in  particular  the minutes  of  the  Council  meetings  that  discussed  the  relevant  policy  proposals.  These minutes were  collected  through a  simple  search of  the Registry of Council Documents using  the  name  and/or  number  of  the  legislative  proposal  being  negotiated  as  the parameter.5  In  addition  to  these  types  of  documents,  the  text  of  the  most  important legislative documents also constituted an important source for the analysis, in particular the four Directives and one proposal for a Directive compared in Chapter 5. A detailed description and analysis of the provisions of each of these legal documents that served as the basis for the comparison undertaken in Chapter 5 can be found in Annex I. In addition to these primary documents and to secondary literature, the analysis of all stages of the policy process at the supranational  level also relied very heavily on interviews carried out in Brussels with participants active in the policy field. For those accustomed  to  following  national  policy  debates,  it  is  striking  how  much  secrecy  is involved in the negotiation of supranational policies, especially concerning negotiations in  the  Council.  Thus,  although  they  give  out  important  information,  the  minutes  of meetings of lower level Council working groups are highly synthetic and seldom include the  rationale  for  the  position  of  individual  actors.  At  a  higher  political  level  the negotiations are  even more  secretive,  so  the minutes of negotiations  in COREPER and                                                         5 The Registry of Council Documents is available online at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ 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press  releases  of  meetings  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  are  completely  devoid  of  any politically relevant  information  that could help  identify  the position of different actors on  a  particular  issue.  For  this  reason,  personal  interviews  with  individuals  who  are active participants in the policy process have constituted an extremely important source of information. I have personally carried out 25 interviews in Brussels with 24 respondents (one respondent was interviewed twice). Each interview lasted for approximately 1 hour. The interviews were conducted during two field trips to Brussels in January and April 2009. Some of the interviews were ‘semi‐structured’ others were ‘open’ qualitative interviews. Whenever  there  was  consent  from  the  respondent,  the  conversation  was  recorded. Interviews were conducted in four different languages and, whenever recoding had been allowed, were transcribed in full by myself. The respondents were representatives from the  following organizations (the number of  interviews conducted by organization  is  in brackets):  European Union Institutions 
• Council Secretariat (2) 
• European Economic and Social Council (1) 
















• Finland (1)  For  the  case  study  on  Austria  and  Vienna,  legislative  documents  defining  the parameters for the application of “integration conditions” have been analysed, as well as official  publications  from  the  City  of  Vienna  and  statistical  material  provided  by  the Austrian  Integration  Fund  or  presented  by  the  Austrian  Interior  Ministry  as  reply  to several  parliamentary  inquiries.  In  addition,  the  examination  of  these  documents  and statistics  has  been  coupled  with  an  analysis  of  parliamentary  debates  in  the  Lower Chamber of  the Austrian Parliament on  the occasion of  the  adoption of  the  legislative packages  that  introduced  the  requirement  that  third‐country  nationals  comply  with integration conditions. The analysis of the parliamentary debates was useful in order to gain insight into the framing by the government of the problem being addressed and of the  policy  being  proposed.  Moreover,  I  conducted  two  semi‐structured  interviews  in Austria  with  one  representative  of  the  Austrian  Integration  Fund  (Österreichischer 
Integrationsfonds)  and  one  representative  of  the  City  of  Vienna  –  Department  for Integration and Diversity (MA‐17 Magistratsabteilung für Integration und Diversität). The analysis of the empirical material was qualitative. The interviews served two functions. In part, as mentioned above, the interviews were used to gather information on  the policy process  and  complement  the data  collected  through  analysis  of  primary documents. In addition, and most importantly, the interviews were also used as a major source of data  for  the  identification of explanatory  factors and analytical  categories  in order  to  explain  the  policy  process  at  the  supranational  level.6  For  that  purpose,  the analysis  of  the  interviews  was  based  on  the  "grounded  theory"  methodology  as developed  by  Juliet  Corbin  and  Anselm  Strauss  (2008).  This  is  an  inductive  and interpretative  method  that  consists  in  a  meticulous  and  detailed  analysis  of  the interviews and texts with the aim of developing analytical concepts and categories out of the raw data. According to this inductive method, the development of the categories is a work of interpretation on the part of the analyst who, based on the raw data and always                                                         6 The two interviews conducted in Austria were only used to collect information. 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keeping to the information provided by respondents, brings the data to a higher level of abstraction by making connections between concepts in order to integrate them into an explanatory framework. The result of this interpretative work is laid out in the chapters that follow.   






 This  dissertation  analyses  the  development  of  supranational  European  policies  that regulate and expand the rights of third‐country nationals who are legally resident in the European Union.  To  the  extent  that  these  policies  grant  third‐country  nationals  equal rights  as  EU  citizens  in  the  civic,  social,  and  economic  spheres  of  life,  they  are  in  fact changing the criteria for membership in the supranational policy. Thus, at a very general level  of  abstraction,  this  dissertation  is  concerned with  the  regulation  of membership into the body politic—that is, the question of who is included and who is excluded from having rights in a democratic polity. The boundaries between members and non‐members of a polity are not ‘natural’ or based on any essential differences, but rather the product of political decisions made in a contested terrain. As such, democratic boundaries are never fully fixed, but rather always opened to possible reconfigurations with respect to membership. Many scholars have  pointed  out  that  in  recent  decades  the  rise  in  international  migration  and globalization  have  triggered  precisely  such  a  process  of  reconfiguration  (see,  among others: Bauböck 1994a; 1994b; Castles 1994; Bauböck and Rundell 1998; Castles 1998; Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles 2007). The boundaries between members and non‐members  are  shifting,  and  the  meaning  of  the  institution  of  citizenship  is  being transformed. The aim of this chapter is to embed the topic of the dissertation within the larger theoretical debate on  the  transformation of  citizenship  in  the era of migration,  and  to show  how  the  dissertation  will  contribute  to  this  theoretical  literature.  The  chapter starts with a discussion of what I understand under citizenship, and argues that policies that expand membership rights to non‐citizens can be considered a phenomenon from the  perspective  of  the  transformation  of  citizenship.  The  next  section  turns  to  the broader  theoretical  debate  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship  in  the  literature  and identifies the key issues within this debate that are of relevance for this dissertation, in particular  the  expansion of  rights  of migrants. The  following  section  then  reviews  the 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literature  that  deals  specifically  with  the  expansion  of  membership  rights  to  non‐citizens, and presents  the most  important explanatory accounts and  interpretations of this phenomenon. Following this review, remaining puzzles that challenge the dominant explanations  are  identified  and  discussed.  It will  be  argued  that  existing  explanations cannot account  for  the  fact  that  the expansion of membership rights  to non‐citizens  is taking place in a partial, non‐linear, and ambiguous way. Finally, I suggest that carefully conducted  empirical  research  on  the  political  process  that  leads  to  these  ambiguous outcomes might be able  to  contribute  important  insights  to  the  theoretical discussion, and elucidate how the empirical research carried out for this dissertation will attempt to fill this gap.   
2.2. Citizenship  The  concept  of  citizenship  is  very malleable  and  carries  high  symbolic  value,  so  it  is often  difficult  to  ascertain  its  exact  meaning  in  an  abstract  way.  It  is  precisely  this malleability  and  adaptability  that  gives  the  concept  its  emancipatory  character,  and allows  it  to  be  used  by  social movements  throughout  the world  in  the most  different political  and  social  contexts  as  a  banner  of  the  fight  against  subordination.  In  my understanding,  there  are  two  elements  that  comprise  the  core  of  what  citizenship represents,  and  that  can  be  found  in  different  accounts  across  time  and  space: citizenship is first and foremost a political concept, and it implies the ideal of equality. Citizenship  is  membership  in  a  political  community—a  polity.  In  a  democratic polity, citizenship is moreover inextricably linked to the idea of popular sovereignty, and one of  its most  important components  is  the right to vote and stand for election. Even though  there  are  always  categories  of  citizens within  the polity who  are more or  less temporarily  disenfranchised  (the  most  obvious  example  today  being  children),  the legitimacy of a democracy depends on its capacity to give its citizens a political voice. Of course, historically few democracies can claim to be entirely true to this ideal. For a long time, property and literacy were required of citizens  in order to be allowed to vote,  in many countries Blacks and ethnic minorities were disenfranchised, and it was not until the  1970s  that women  acquired  the  right  to  vote  in  all  ”western”  democracies.  These exclusions  today are no  longer considered democratically  legitimate precisely because the right to political participation is a pivotal right of democratic citizenship. Therefore 
  31 
one must be careful to avoid over‐using the term citizenship to designate any status that does  not  involve  political  rights,  at  the  risk  of  “de‐politicizing  democracy”  (Randeria 2007)  and  promoting  and  a‐political  understanding  of  citizenship  that  hollows  the concept of its fundamental core. Secondly, democratic citizenship also carries  in  itself  the  ideal of equality. Here, again, reality often falls short of the ideal. Within the tradition of ‘western‐style’ liberal democracies, based as they are in the idea of the autonomy of the individual, this ideal has  been  historically  translated  into  the  tenet  of  formal  equality  before  the  law.  As Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson (2000, 12)  point out, in a reference to Rawls: “in liberal  theory, all  citizens are meant  to be  free and equal persons, who as citizens are homogeneous individuals. This requires a separation between a person’s political rights and obligations,  and  their membership of  specific  groups,  based on ethnicity,  religion, social class or regional location. The political sphere is one of universalism, which means equality  and  abstraction  from  cultural  particularity  and  difference.”  This  particular understanding of equality has come into sharp criticism. Feminists, multiculturalists and anti‐racists  have  argued  that  formal  equality  before  the  law  is  not  enough  (or  not adequate)  in  order  to  achieve  the  ideal  of  full  equality  between  citizens.  Substantial equality, they argue, might require special treatment of certain groups of citizens who, by virtue of previous oppression and subordination, are not in a comparable situation to that of citizens of the dominant majority (Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995). Formal equality before the law is thus the most basic enactment of the ideal of equality that citizenship embodies,  but  there  are many  alternative  conceptions  of what  this  ideal might  imply (Phillips  1999;  Fredman  2006).  What  remains  uncontroversial,  however,  is  the  main ideal  of  citizens  as  equals,  and  the  tenet  that  democratic  societies  should  attempt  to translate this abstract equality into a tangible reality. Political  membership  and  equal  treatment  are  thus  at  the  core  of  democratic citizenship. But citizenship involves much more than these two elements. As powerfully argued by T. H. Marshall (1964), in order for all members to be able to act as sovereign on an equal basis, they also need a number of civic, political and social rights which must be  institutionalized  and  guaranteed  by  the  public  bodies  of  a  polity.  In  Marshall’s account  these  three  sets  of  rights  are mutually  dependent.  In  particular,  social  rights such  as  education  and  minimum  welfare  are  the  basic  precondition  for  the  full enjoyment of civil rights, such as the right to justice and to freedom of speech, as well as for  active  participation  in  the  political  sphere.  In  addition  to Marshall’s  triad,  there  is 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another sub‐category of citizenship rights that often get neglected in the discussion (but see: Bauböck 2009).  I would  like  to call  these “settlement rights”, which  includes both freedom of movement  rights  such  as  the  right  of  admission  and  readmission  into  the territory  of  the polity,  and  residence  rights,  including  the  right  to  stay  and protection against  expulsion.  These  rights  tend  to  be  neglected  partially  because  they  are  so ingrained  in  our  conception  of  citizenship  that  it  seems  needless  to  even  mention them—we  tend  to  think  that  it  is  “obvious”  that  citizens  have  the  right  to  enter  and reside  in  the  territory  of  the  polity  of  which  they  are  citizens.  Nevertheless,  with globalization  and  mobility,  these  rights  are  becoming  increasingly  important.  In  the European Union,  free movement  rights  coupled with  the  principle  of  equal  treatment have been the cornerstones of the development of European citizenship, together with the  right  to  vote  and  stand  for  elections  of  the European Parliament,  and  the  right  to vote in local elections in any Member State. Thus, although it is not possible to conceive of full democratic citizenship without the  political  element,  it  is  nevertheless  possible  to  think  of  citizenship  as  a  bundle  of rights, of which political rights are only one element  in the bundle,  together with civil, social  and  settlement  rights.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  to  differentiate  between  formal citizenship, meaning the legal status, and substantive citizenship, meaning the complex bundle of rights and responsibilities which are attached to membership in a community (Castles  1994,  3‐4).  Nevertheless,  formal  and  substantial  citizenship  also  need  not coincide. Substantive rights of citizenship may also be possessed by persons who are not legally recognized as citizens, as in the case of permanent resident migrants who do not have  citizenship  but  enjoy  a  number  of  civil,  social  and  in  some  cases  even  political rights. In addition, the bundle of rights that were woven into substantial citizenship are also increasingly unravelling. As Benhabib (2004, 146‐156) points out, there has been a disaggregation of citizenship rights—it  is possible  to have some without  the others.  In particular, migrant populations without formal citizenship status of the country where they  reside  are  increasingly  granted  civil  and  social  rights  without  or  with  limited political rights. The disaggregation of citizenship  into  its constituent parts and the fact the elements are becoming detached from one another can be understood as a process of  transformation  of  citizenship.  Without  wanting  to  promote  an  apolitical  vision  of citizenship, it is still possible to see the expansion of social, civil and settlement rights to persons  without  citizenship  status,  especially  when  casted  in  the  language  of  equal 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treatment—as  is  the  case with  supranational  policies  of  the  European Union  towards third‐country  nationals—as  a  phenomenon  that  deeply  affects  our  understanding  of citizenship. Whereas  easing  naturalization  laws  is  arguably  the  only  unambiguous  path towards  full  political  membership,  from  a  theoretical  perspective  the  extension  of membership rights towards non‐citizens is a more interesting phenomenon. Facilitating naturalization laws means that the boundaries of membership in a polity become more porous, but it does not change the criteria for full membership, namely the possession of citizenship status. It is only the criteria for acquiring citizenship that change, and in the process certain particular understandings of citizenship or of the nation, but not the role of  national  citizenship  status  as  the  necessary  condition  for  membership  in  a  polity (understood as “the right to have rights”). It is therefore a phenomenon that leaves the substance of citizenship as a concept intact. The expansion of citizenship rights towards non‐citizens,  by  contrast,  truly  changes  the  criteria  for  membership  in  a  polity,  not indirectly by changing the criteria for acquisition of formal citizenship status, but rather by displacing citizenship status itself as the condition for membership. How this process of transformation occurs, what it consists of, and its relevance for theorizing citizenship will be analyzed in more detail below.   
2.3. The transformation of citizenship  Citizenship  is  a  primarily  positively  connoted  concept,  and  it  carries  the  symbolic  of inclusion and equality. The democratic discourse is one of universal citizenship. “We the people” is a universal statement that portrays the image that all persons in a country are citizens and all citizens are equal. In the ideal type of the democratic nation‐state, there is a coincidence between nationality, membership in society, and citizenship. However, the political reality of specific nation‐states has always differed to varying degrees from this  ideal  type.  Linda  Bosniak  captures  this  inherent  ambiguity  of  citizenship  in  the following  quote:  “The  idea  of  citizenship  is  commonly  invoked  to  convey  a  state  of democratic belonging or inclusion, yet this inclusion is usually premised on a conception of  community  that  is  bounded  and  exclusive.  Citizenship  as  an  ideal  is  understood  to embody a commitment against subordination, but citizenship can also represent an axis of subordination itself.” (Bosniak 2006, 1) 
  34 
Democratic polities are marked not only by external (territorial) borders but also by internal (civic) boundaries. There have always been groups that are part of society, but  are  not  in  possession  of  membership  rights,  either  because  they  do  not  have citizenship  status  or  because  they  have  formal  citizenship  status  but  lack  full membership  rights.  Historically,  women,  slaves,  and  ethnic minorities—despite  being members  of  society  and  residing  within  the  territorial  boundaries  of  the  democratic polity—either  did  not  have  any  rights,  or  only  a  very  limited  set  of  rights.  In modern liberal  democracies,  however,  formally  discriminatory  rules  of  membership  based  on ascriptive  criteria  such  as  race  and gender  are no  longer deemed  legitimate  and have been  largely  abolished.  Needless  to  say,  however,  the  abolishment  of  formally discriminatory rules does not  imply the achievement of  true equality, as  feminists and multiculturalists  rightly  stress  (Young  1990;  Taylor  1994;  Kymlicka  1995). Nevertheless, despite persisting hidden or structural barriers to equal treatment,  in all liberal democracies women and ethnic minorities are entitled to formal citizenship and have  acquired  full  rights  of  membership.  In  liberal  democratic  polities,  defining membership  on  the  basis  of  criteria  such  as  gender  and  race  is  neither  legal  nor legitimate. Instead,  the  distinction  between  members  and  non‐members  in  a  modern democratic polity  is  formally made on the basis of the possession of the legal status of citizenship.  In  the  ideal‐type  of  the  European  nation‐state,  however,  citizenship  is conflated with membership in the national community. As Castles points out, citizenship as  an  institution  has  always  been  marked  by  an  ambiguity  between  citizenship  and nationality: “A citizen is always also a member of a nation, a national. So citizenship  is meant to be universalistic and above cultural difference, yet it exists only in the context of a nation‐state, which  is based on cultural specificity: on the belief  in being different from  other  nations”  (Castles  1998,  230).  Although  it  is  possible  for  non‐nationals  to “naturalize”—that  is,  to acquire citizenship despite not being members of  the national community—in this ideal‐type conception of the nation‐state naturalization is supposed to  be  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  This  as  expressed  by  the  very  term “naturalization”, which, as Castles and Davidson point out, seems to imply assimilation “into  an  order  that  is  ‘the  only  natural  one’  for  the  place  concerned”  (Castles  and Davidson 2000, 15).  This  ideal  type  has  influenced  the  way  in  which  European  nation  states  have historically organized access to citizenship status and the attendant membership rights. 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Thus, in European nation‐states inclusion into the realm of entitlement and membership in  the  national  community  were  conflated.  As  a  result,  for  centuries  nationality  and citizenship  have  functioned  as  the  main  criteria  setting  the  borders  of  inclusion  and access to civic, social, economic and political rights. Within the hegemonic discourse, the Nation was posited as a coherent and stable entity, the borders of which were also the legitimate borders for discrimination. The fact that non‐nationals and non‐citizens were not  entitled  to  the  same  rights  as  citizens  was  “only  natural”.  The  “discourse  of  the Nation” achieved an extraordinary degree of hegemonic consensus, to the point that for a long time it was not possible to imagine any legitimate grounds for the concession of rights other  than  the possession of  citizenship  status  and membership  in  the national community.  The  extent  of  this  consensus  reached  all  the way  from  legal  and  political discourses  to  popular  culture  and  even  the  social  sciences,  which  have  only  very recently  become  aware  of  the  dangers  of  “methodological  nationalism”  (Wimmer  and Glick Schiller 2002). In other words, the “imagined community of the Nation” (Anderson 1983)  and  the  role  of  nationality  and  citizenship  in  delimiting  the  borders  of  the community  of  rights  became  “objectivated  social  constructs”  (Berger  and  Luckmann 1967) and entered into the realm of common sense. However,  in recent decades  the process of European  integration and the rise  in international migration have started to destabilize this picture. For one,  the process of regional integration in Europe has increasingly disrupted this discursive construction of the Nation. The creation of a supranational polity  is gradually changing the criteria for inclusion  and  exclusion  into  the  body politic  and  creating  a  system of  rights  in which nationality and citizenship status no longer define the limits of the realm of entitlement in  the same way as  it used to. Within the single market, supranational  law prohibiting discrimination  on  the  basis  of  nationality  between  European  citizens  in  the  areas  of employment, education, social services, and many other  fields has significantly eroded the  role  of  nationality  and  citizenship  as  the main determinants  for  the  concession  of rights.  For  that  reason,  it  has  been  argued  that  European  citizenship  “embodies postnational  membership  in  its  most  elaborate  legal  form”  (Soysal  1994,  148). Nevertheless,  the  prohibition  of  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  nationality  only applies  to  citizens  of  the  European  Union,  which  is  conditional  upon  possession  of citizenship of a Member State. This shows that although European integration is a factor contributing to the transformation of the role of citizenship in the acquisition of rights, not to its elimination. 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Secondly, immigration from third‐countries is another factor that is contributing to  the  redefinition  of  the  boundaries  of membership  in  the  European  Union.  In most European counties, increased immigration from developing countries and other parts of the world has created large groups of alien residents who are, for the most part, devoid of  citizenship  status  from  the  country where  they  live.  To  the  extent  that  these  non‐citizens are permanent residents and therefore an integral part of society, one is  faced with  a  situation  in  which  the  boundaries  of  society  do  not  match  the  boundaries  of membership  in  the  democratic  polity.  Although,  as  transnationalists  have  argued, migrants  live  in  a  social  field  that  “crosses  geographical,  cultural  and  political boundaries” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992, ix; see also: Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Levitt and Jaworsky  2007),  citizenship  remains  largely  tied  to  territorial  borders  and  legal jurisdictions.  Thus  the  increased  immigration  which  is  characteristic  of  our  times creates  what  Rainer  Bauböck  calls  “disjunctures  of  political  membership”,  that  is, disjunctures that arise “between the sets of persons formally recognized as citizens of a state  and  those  who  are,  or  who  ought  to  be,  covered  by  basic  rights  in  liberal democracies” (Bauböck 1994c, 20). These  disjunctures  pose  important  challenges,  both  from  the  point  of  view  of liberal democratic theory and from a political perspective. In a series of works in which he  analyses  these  disjunctures  through  the  lens  of  normative  political  theory,  Rainer Bauböck  (1994a;  1994c;  2009)  argues  that  the  presence  of  resident  aliens  in  a democratic  polity  who  lack  membership  rights  contradicts  the  main  tenets  of democracy, in particular the principle that all those affected by political decisions should be included in the democratic polity. Moreover, besides being normatively undesirable from  the point of view of  liberal democratic  theory,  the  “disjunctures of membership” identified  above  can be  a  serious obstacle  to  social  cohesion  and  to  the  integration of migrant populations. When a significant portion of the resident population of a country is excluded from social, economic and political rights, this situation is bound to lead to the economic marginalization and social exclusion of this group. Faced with  these  challenges,  European  states  have  adopted  policies  in  the  last decades that seek to counter the problems created by the disjunctures of membership. For instance in several countries, trends towards the facilitation of naturalization (Weil 2001) and the toleration of dual citizenship can be observed (Faist 2007a; 2007b; Faist and Kivisto 2007). Nevertheless, naturalization policy alone cannot resolve the problem. A  large  number  of migrants  does  not  naturalize,  and  remains  subject  to  the  laws  and 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policies  of  a  country  of  which  they  are  not  formal  citizens.  As  a  result,  in  several countries—and  more  recently  also  at  the  supranational  level—policies  have  been adopted  that  expand membership  rights  to  non‐citizens.  Borrowing  from  old  English, Tomas Hammar (1990) coined the word “denizen” to refer to those foreigners who are permanent residents in a country of which they do not have formal citizenship, but who, due to their permanent status, have a number of privileges and rights customarily only granted  to  citizens.  In  other  words,  citizenship  status  is  being  decoupled  from  the substance of what it means to be a citizen—namely the possession of social, economic, and political rights on condition of equality (Benhabib 2004; 2006). This phenomenon is particularly noticeable with respect to social and economic rights. Several authors have shown  that,  in  the  postwar  era,  European  states  have  largely  extended  their comprehensive  welfare  apparatuses  to  former  guestworkers  and  their  descendants despite  lack  of  citizenship  (Brubaker  1989;  Hammar  1990;  Hollifield  1992;  Soysal 1994). The same trend has also been observed in other liberal democracies faced with large numbers of permanent resident migrants, especially in the United States (Jacobson 1996;  Spiro  2008).  At  the  supranational  level,  since  the  European  Union  acquired competence  to  regulate  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  in  1999,  a  number  of policies  have  been  adopted  that  aim  at  approximating  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals  to  those of Union  citizens,  thus  creating a kind of  “EU denizenship”  (Walker 2008).  At the same time, however, this trend towards the expansion of citizenship rights to non‐nationals is not without its setbacks. Policy changes that facilitate naturalization and expand membership rights to non‐citizens have only been taking place in a partial, non‐linear  and  ambiguous  way.  Whereas  liberal  policies  have  often  been  adopted  at both the national and supranational levels, in the last two decades they have often been accompanied  by  their  opposite—namely  by  measures  that  restrict  the  access  of migrants to citizenship status and to membership rights. Thus, although there has been a  tendency  to  move  away  from  reliance  on  jus  sanguinis  and  towards  an  increasing toleration of dual citizenship (Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Kivisto and Faist 2007, 102‐121), which can be considered as a liberalization of naturalization rules, throughout Europe  there  has  been  a  parallel  tightening  of  citizenship  through  for  instance  the introduction  of  new  requirements  such  as  civic  integration  tests  and  language proficiency (Joppke 2007a; Wright 2008; de Groot et al. 2009). In terms of the policies that  regulate  the  rights  of migrants,  whereas  there  is  a  trend  towards  expanding  the 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membership  rights  of  permanent  residents,  there  seems  to  be  a  concomitant  trend  in towards  the proliferation of non‐permanent statuses with only partial access  to  rights (Morris  2002;  Benhabib  2004;  Bosniak  2006;  Goldring  et  al.  2009).  Also  at  the supranational  level,  the  policies  adopted  that  regulate  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals have often been criticized as failing to achieve the goal of equal treatment and creating  rights  hierarchies  between  different  categories  of  migrants  (Carrera  2005; Gross 2005; Halleskov 2005;  Lavenex 2006; Perchinig 2006b). Thus,  the  expansion of rights  to  non‐citizens  is  partial  because  it  does  not  affect  equally  all  categories  of migrants  and  all  types  of  rights,  it  is  non‐linear  because  liberal  trends  are  often intercalated with restrictive trends, and it is ambiguous because the it can lead to rights hierarchies and civic stratification. We see how globalization (more specifically regional integration in the case of the European Union) and increased migration have led to a general erosion of what I have called  “the  hegemonic  discourse  of  the  Nation”,  that  is,  of  the  idea  that  the  conflated concepts  of  nationality  and  citizenship  can  function  as  the  defining  criteria  regulating access  to  civil  and  socio‐economic  rights.  European  citizenship,  anti‐discrimination policies  prohibiting  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  nationality  between EU  citizens, and  the expansion of membership rights of non‐citizens are policies  that decouple  the entitlement  to  rights  from  membership  in  the  national  community  and  from  the possession  of  formal  citizenship  status  of  a  nation‐state,  thereby  altering  the  very foundations  of  the  idea  of  national  citizenship.  In  this way,  globalization,  immigration and European  integration have  “blurred  the boundaries”  (Bauböck and Rundell 1998) between  citizens  and  aliens,  emptying  nationality  of  its  political  contents  and contributing  to  the  erosion  of  the  ”discourse  of  the  Nation”.  Empirically,  liberal democratic  states  in  Europe  have  been  dealing  with  these  problems  through  the enactment of law and policy that expand membership rights to non‐citizens. However, it would be wrong to assume a progressive and linear dynamic of inclusion. A restrictive trend  can  also  be  observed  in  a  number  of  aspects  of  the  policies  that  regulate membership  in  European polities,  both  at  the  national  and  at  the  supranational  level. The expansion of membership  rights  to non‐citizens  is marked by a  strong ambiguity. The boundaries of entitlement are shifting  in Europe, but they are shifting  in a partial, non‐linear and ambiguous way. Many  scholars  have  been  interested  in  these  processes  of  transformation  of citizenship,  and  have  sought  to  explain  their  roots  and  causes,  as well  as  the  precise 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mechanisms by which they occur, and the normative consequences they have for liberal democracy.  In  the  following,  I  will  review  the  literature  on  the  transformation  of citizenship  through  the  extension  of  membership  rights  to  migrants,  with  a  view  in particular to identifying possible explanations for how and why this process occurs.   
2.4. Explaining the expansion of rights  The  literature  that  seeks  to  analyze  and  explain  the  expansion  of  migrants’  rights  is divided  into two strands. On the one hand,  there  is a group of authors who argue that migrants’  rights  are  bound  to  expand  due  to  the  liberal  norms  embedded  in  liberal democratic  regimes  as well  as  the  commitment  to human  rights  and  the  ‘discourse of universal  personhood’  (Soysal  1994),  both  of which  constrain  the  ability  of  sovereign states  to  control  immigration  and  limit  the  rights  of  non‐citizens  (Hollifield  1992; Jacobson  1996;  Joppke  2001;  2005;  Hollifield  2008;  Spiro  2008).  On  the  other  hand, recent  works  have  pointed  out  that  the  decouplement  of  membership  rights  from citizenship status does not occur equally for all categories of migrants. Several authors have emphasized  the emergence of  illiberal  trends  in  the  immigration and  integration policies  of  liberal  democracies,  arguing  that  the  regulation  of  migrants’  rights  is characterized  at  best  by  the  ‘civic  stratification’  (Morris  2002)  of  society  and  the prevalence of rights‐hierarchies, at worst by acts of ‘illiberal liberalism’ (Joppke 2007b) aimed  at  the  forceful  cultural  assimilation.  These  two  strands  of  literature  will  be reviewed below.  
The role of norms In the 1990s, several studies were published that examined the ways in which different liberal  democracies  dealt with permanent migrant  populations.  These  studies  showed that the patterns of incorporation of migrants in different countries varied according to historically  institutionalized  patterns  of  policy‐making  and  long‐standing  national conceptions of liberalism and of the nation, adding up to what Adrian Favell has called “public philosophies of integration” (see also: Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994, 29ff.; Favell 2001  [1998]).  Nevertheless,  despite  the  difference  in  patterns  of  incorporation,  these studies also  identified a general  trend  towards  the expansion of membership rights  to non‐citizens  in  several  liberal  democratic  countries  of  immigration  (Brubaker  1989; 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Hammar 1990; Hollifield  1992;  Soysal  1994;  Jacobson 1996).  This  puzzle  generated  a number  of  works  that  sought  to  explain  the  expansion  of  membership  rights  with reference to the role of liberal norms. The most  important  contribution  to  this debate  came  from sociologist Yasemin Soysal  (1994).  Her  main  thesis  is  that  the  national  model  of  citizenship,  which  is anchored  in  territorialized  notions  of  cultural  belonging,  has  been  replaced  by  a  new model of membership, which  she  terms postnational,  in which membership  rights  are normatively derived from deterritorialized norms of universal human worth, or,  in her terms, “universal personhood”. Although the incorporation of migrants follows different patterns  which  are  conditioned  by  national  institutions  and  national  discourses  on membership, there is a general tendency which transcends national specificity towards the expansion of  the  rights of non‐citizens  legitimized by a global discourse of human rights. For  Soysal,  human  rights  amount  to more  than  formal  arrangements  and  laws. Rather “they constitute a binding discourse, according  frameworks that render certain actions  conceivable  and  meaningful  (…)  human  rights  is  a  world‐level  organizing concept”  (p.43). Hence,  the main  explanation  for  the  erosion  of  the model  of  national citizenship  is  what  Soysal  calls  the  “discourse  of  universal  personhood”.  In  the postnational model, unlike with national citizenship, the source of legitimate claims for equal treatment is no longer shared nationality, but rather the principle of human rights that ascribes a universal status to individuals and their rights. “In the classical model, shared nationality  is  the main source of equal treatment among members. (…) In the postnational model, universal  personhood  replaces  nationhood;  and  universal human  rights  replace  national  rights.  The  justification  for  the state’s  obligations  to  foreign  populations  goes  beyond  the nation‐state  itself.  The  rights  and  claims  of  individuals  are legitimated by ideologies rounded in a transnational community, through  international  codes,  conventions,  and  laws  on  human rights, independent of their citizenship in a nation‐state.” (Soysal 1994, 142)  Soysal’s position is shared by a number of authors who also stressed the power of human  rights  in  the  expansion  of  migrants’  rights,  and  who  are  often  referred  to  as “postnationalists”  (Jacobson  1996;  Koenig  2007;  2008;  Spiro  2008).  Nevertheless,  the focus  on  human  rights  does  not  mean  that  the  national  arena  has  ceased  to  be important.  Soysal,  for  instance,  highlights  that  although  the  basis  for  legitimation  of 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membership  rights  is  no  longer  located  within  the  nation‐state,  the  organization  of membership  itself—the  conferral  and  implementation  of  rights—is  still  organized nationally. She argues that it is still the nation‐state that regulates access to the realm of entitlement,  and  nation‐states  are  still  organized  according  to  the  national/territorial principle  of  sovereignty.  In  her  view  it  is  this  dichotomy  that  explains  some apparent paradoxes of  the postnational  rights regime such as  the centrality of  residency  for  the acquisition of several rights (Soysal 1994, 143). Thus, nation‐state sovereignty has not been completely overcome as agents determining the rights of migrants. Rather, there is a  dialectic  relationship  between  national  sovereignty  and  universal  principles.  In  an elucidating passage, which is worth quoting at length, Soysal writes: The concurrent invocation, in nation‐states’ rhetoric and praxis, of  national  sovereignty  and  universal  human  rights  engenders paradoxical  correlations.  This  means,  for  one  thing,  an incongruity between  the normative and organizational bases of rights. While  the source and  legitimacy of  rights  is  increasingly located  in  the  transnational order,  individual  rights continue  to be  organized  differentially,  country  by  country,  and  bear  the imprint  of  policy‐specific  forms  of  membership  and incorporation.  (…)  This  apparent  contradiction  precipitates around  the  constructs  of  the  bounded,  territorialized  nation‐state and universal, deterritorialized rights, creating a dialectical tension. Nation‐states and their boundaries persist as reasserted by  regulative  immigration  practices  and  expressive  national identities,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  universalistic  rights  of personhood  transcend  these  boundaries,  giving  rise  to  new models and understandings of membership. (Soysal 1994, 8)  Thus, for Soysal, we live in a new global era, in which the sovereignty of nation‐states is constrained by rules and principles determined at the transnational  level. She attributes  this dichotomy  to  the underlying dynamic of  the post‐war global  system,  in which attempts by nation‐states  to  secure  their borders and assure  control over  their territory coincide with  the spread of  forms of membership anchored  in a discourse of universal  personhood  that  “transgresses  the  national  order  of  things”  (Soysal  1994, 159). For Soysal this also explains what she sees as a dynamic of incremental expansion of migrants’ rights. Migrants and their advocates point to the contradiction between the persisting  inequalities  in their rights‐status and the discourse of universal personhood in order to claim more rights. So the discourse of universal personhood legitimates the migrants’ claims for more and more rights. 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An alternative approach to postnationalism is given by scholars who emphasize the role of liberal norms ingrained in national institutions in explaining the expansion of migrants’ rights. Christian Joppke (2001; 2005; 2007b; 2007a), for instance, rejects the claim  that  international  human  rights  are  the  cause  for  the  expansion  of  citizenship rights towards aliens and argues instead that this expansion is the product of expansive interpretations  of  domestic  legal  principles  by  national  courts;  often  against  the manifested  will  of  political  actors  (see  also:  Weil  2001;  Aleinikoff  2003).  As  to  the question of why this is happening in several countries at the same time, Joppke argues for  what  could  be  called  “bottom‐up  convergence”.  His  argument  is  that  several countries are adopting similar strategies in immigration, integration and naturalization policies  out  of  self‐interest.  They  are  driven  by  domestic  processes  as  well  as  by “diffusion and demonstration effects” (Joppke 2001, 362), rather than by the spread of international norms. Thus, in an article that traces Court decisions concerning the rights of migrants in the  United  States,  Germany  and  the  European  Union,  Joppke  (2001,  340)  argues  that “the main sources of rights expansion for migrants are legal and domestic”. Whereas the expansion of  citizens’  rights depends mostly on political mobilization and  the work of social  movements,  in  the  case  of  migrants,  rights‐expansion  occurs  despite  political mobilization  against  it.  This  is  possible,  according  to  Joppke,  because  domestic  courts are shielded from electoral pressure and democratic accountability. Moreover, he argues that the legal sources of migrants’ rights are to be found in the liberal norms ingrained in domestic constitutions. Thus Joppke shows how the development of migrants’ rights (especially social rights) in the United States originated with court decisions that forbid discrimination of aliens on the basis of the “personhood principle” according to which all persons in society deserve to be treated equally and have a right to equality before the law. Similarly  in Germany the Constitutional Court  interpreted the guarantee of access to  “free  development  of  personality”  ingrained  in  the  Constitution  as  a  fundamental right  and,  based  on  this,  has  ruled  that  long‐term  aliens  should  have  access  to membership rights. In a similar vein, Hollifield (1992; 2004; 2008) argues  that European states are trapped in a “liberal paradox” between a logic of openness propelled by liberalism and globalization on the one hand, and a logic of closure which results from the political and legal  organization  of  national  welfare  states.  Drawing  on  the  concept  of  “embedded liberalism”  (Ruggie  1982),  Hollifield  argues  that  “any  international  order  (or  regime) 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contains within it the values or social purpose of the hegemonic states” (Hollifield 1992, 26).  Thus,  in  the  postwar  era,  the  international  order  reflects  the  ideas  of  liberalism, including in particular liberal notions of rights. As a consequence, Hollifield argues, the pressures for closure within nation‐states are countered by “the pervasive and equally powerful rights‐dynamic in the liberal democracies” (Hollifield 2004, 897). In this point, he  concurs with Gary Freeman, who argues  that,  “there  is  in  general  an  expansionary bias in the politics of immigration in liberal democracies” (Freeman 1995). Thus, despite the fact that welfare states are “by their nature meant to be closed systems” (Freeman 1986, 52),  liberal principles formalized into constitutional and legal provisions, as well as  the  particular modes  of  policy‐making  that  prevail  in  liberal  democracies,  prevent states from adopting illiberal policies and facilitate the liberalization of immigration and migrant policies, including the access of migrants to social entitlements.  
Ambiguous dynamics The works reviewed above point to the existence of a progressive dynamic of inclusion within liberal democratic regimes that constrain the power of nation‐states and propel the expansion of migrants’ rights. This is a powerful explanatory framework capable of accounting for the trend to extend membership rights towards non‐citizens observed in several European states since the 1990s. Nevertheless,  this  explanation  implies  a  linear  and  gradually  progressive  trend towards  inclusion.  By  contrast,  a  number  of  recent  studies  have  shown  that  the regulation of membership rights  for migrants does not always progress  linearly  in  the direction  of  ever‐greater  entitlements.  On  the  contrary, migrants’  rights  have  become highly  politicized  and  contested,  and  in  several  countries  restrictive  trends  can  be observed  (Schierup  et  al.  2006;  Joppke  2007a).  A  number  of  political  factors  have contributed to making immigration policy one of the most highly polarized issues of our times.  Particularly  worth  mentioning  are  the  fear  of  terrorism  and  the  increasing securitization  of  migration  (Bigo  2001;  Sasse  2005;  Geddes  2008),  protectionist interests with regards to the welfare state and the labor market (Geddes 2003a; 2003b; Schierup et  al.  2006),  and  the  impact  of  far‐right parties  as well  as negatively  leaning public  opinion  towards  migrants  (Kessler  and  Freeman  2005;  Schain  2006;  Howard 2009). Moreover,  as  Benhabib  (2004)  points  out,  the  decoupling  of  formal  citizenship from substantial citizenship is not occurring in the same way for all types of migrants. In 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the European Union, for instance, migrants from within the Union and from associated countries benefit  from more  rights  than  labour migrants  from  less developed parts of the  world.  For  Benhabib,  “the  progress  of  Union  citizenship  has  given  rise  to discrepancies between those who are foreigners and third‐country nationals, and those who  are  foreign  nationals  but  EU  members:  A  two‐tiered  status  of  foreignness  has evolved”  (Benhabib  2004,  153).  Increased  immigration  from  third  countries  to  the European  Union  has  created  large  numbers  of  non‐citizen  residents  who  are,  for  the most  part,  devoid  of  citizenship  status. With  the  exception  of  EEA  and  Swiss  citizens, third‐country nationals residing in the European Union are not entitled to privileges of European  Union  citizenship  and  are  also  excluded  from  EU  anti‐discrimination legislation on the ground of nationality within the common market (Evans 1994). Thus, in a critique of the postnational argument, Geddes contends: The  form  of  ‘post‐national  membership’  created  by  European integration  has  been  circumscribed  by  the  emphasis  on acquisition  of  nationality  for  those  who  are  not  citizens  of  a Member State. Discussions of EU citizenship prompt  invocation of ‘inclusion’. It is rather ironic that the creation of EU citizenship appeared  to  reinforce  the  exclusion  of  TCNs,  by  affirming  the importance of prior acquisition of nationality  for access  to  free movement  rights  and  access  to  social  entitlements  that  at national  level  did  not  depend  upon  acquisition  of  nationality. (Geddes 2008, 58‐59)  Discrepancies  in  the  level  of  rights  among  migrant  categories  have  also  been observed  in  the  national  context.  In  a  thought‐provoking  book,  Lydia  Morris  (2002) shows  how  in  several  European  countries  concomitant  dynamics  of  closure  and inclusion  have  lead  to  a  highly  complex  picture  in  which  different  rights  regimes combine to form a system of civic stratification characterized by the existence of several different degrees of partial membership. Focusing on the situation on the rights of third‐country  nationals,  she  shows  how  in  several  European  countries  human  rights commitments,  EU  legislation,  national  immigration  rules,  labour  market  policies  and social  policies,  as  well  as  their  discretionary  implementation,  combine  to  create  “an elaborate hierarchy of statuses with varying attendant rights, not easily captured by any single  political  dynamic”  (Morris  2002,  6).  The  law  and  the  administration  of  the  law classify  and  categorize  migrants  into  “different  legal  statuses  of  belonging”,  thus constituting  “devices  of  inclusion  and  exclusion with  respect  to  rights”  (Morris  2002, 146). Rather than a progress towards ever‐more rights for non‐nationals, Morris claims 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that we are experiencing the emergence of “a nascent structure of inequality built upon the differing rights conceded by the state” (Morris 2002, 6). Through her detailed empirical research of  three European case studies, Morris shows  how  at  the  national  level  policies with  respect  to  third‐country  nationals  vary widely  in  all  respects  of  social,  economic  and  political  life.  Often,  national  legislation regulating  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  makes  distinctions  between  different categories  of  migrants  according  to  the  purpose  of  stay  at  the  time  of  entry.  Thus, migrants who enter a Member State as workers will be awarded another  set of  rights than  those  of  a  person  entering  through  family  reunification.  The  rights  of  those entering through family unification, in turn, will vary depending on whether this is the spouse of an EU national or the spouse of a third‐country national. Moreover, climbing up  the  ladder of  rights  takes a different amount of  time and  is dependent on different conditions for different categories of migrants, and may be even completely barred for some types of migrants (Morris 2002, 39). By pointing  to  these remaining  inequalities and  rights  hierarchies,  the  work  of  Morris  challenges  the  postnational  account  of  a simple linear progression towards expanded membership rights for migrants (see also: Thomas 2006; Goldring et al. 2009).   
2.5. Remaining challenges  The  rich  literature  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship  discussed  above  makes important  contributions,  but  it  still  leaves  some  major  lacunae.  In  particular,  the dominant  explanation  drawing  on  the  role  of  norms  for  why  migrants’  rights  are expanding  ignores  the  fact  that  the  expansion of membership  rights  to non‐citizens  is taking place in a partial, non‐linear, and ambiguous way. By contrast, those works that point  out  the  emergence  of  civic  stratification,  illiberal  trends  and  rights  hierarchies have  so  far  failed  to  provide  a  thorough  explanatory  account  of  how  and  why  such hierarchies  emerge.  In  the  following,  I  will  identify  the main  remaining  challenges  in theorizing  the  expansion  of  membership  rights  to  non‐citizens  and  propose  an alternative way of approaching the issue. The  review  of  the  literature  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship  undertaken above  showed  that  many  interesting  studies  have  been  published  that  point  out disjunctures of political membership caused by these phenomena, identify mechanisms that  lead to these disjunctures, or normatively assess the  impacts of  these phenomena 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for democratic legitimacy. In terms of studies that focus on the extension of membership rights  to  non‐citizens  and  adopts  a  more  analytical  approach,  we  have  seen  that  the literature  is  divided  into  two  strands.  The  first  strand  stresses  the  role  of  norms  as variables  that  can  explain  the  progressive  concession  of membership  rights  to  aliens, although there  is a divide between those who emphasize human rights and those who focus  instead  on  liberal  norms  ingrained  in  domestic  legislation.  The  second  strand focuses  on  the  ambiguities  of  the  process  of  expansion  of  rights  and  shows  that restrictive trends are leading to the civic stratification of migrants. The approach of taking norms as a variable that  influences policy‐making is the strongest  analytical  framework  elaborated  so  far  in  order  to  explain  the  expansion  of rights  to  non‐citizens.  However,  the  focus  exclusively  on  liberal  norms  of  equal treatment  and  inclusion  fails  to  explain  variation,  ambiguity  and  backlashes  in  the process  of  rights‐expansion.  The  claim  that  Europe  is  experiencing  a  dynamic  of unlimited expansion of migrants’ rights due to the rise of a discourse of human rights or domestic  liberal  norms  is  unconvincing  if  taken  as  the  sole  explanation  of  the phenomenon because it does not match the empirical reality, as the work of theorists of civic  stratification  has  shown.  One  important  point  raised  in  the  postnationalist literature is that the work of liberal norms is still constrained by the territorial principle because, despite the justification for rights being universal norms, rights continue to be organized  at  the  level  of  the nation‐state. This  is  an  important  insight,  but  it  can only explain  differences  in  the  level  of  rights  granted  to  migrants  between  countries,  not between different categories of migrants with more or less precarious statuses.  The postnational approach is also limited because its view of norms triggering an endless  expansion  of  rights  neglects  the  intrinsically  bounded  nature  of membership. The  concept  of membership  also  always  implies  its  opposite,  that  is,  the  existence  of non‐members. Any redefinition of membership is bound to create new lines of inclusion and exclusion, since it necessitates new criteria to define who is entitled and who is not entitled to rights. Understanding where and why the new boundaries of entitlement are drawn is a key issue in the transformation of citizenship in the face of migration, and it is an issue that remains largely unaddressed. Recent works on migrants’  rights have been acutely aware of  the emergence of new lines of division, but have not theorized the process by which these new boundaries are  created.  The  critique  of  postnationalism  by  Benhabib,  Morris  and  others  calls attention  to  an  important  aspect  of  the  current  processes  of  transformation  of 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citizenship, namely that the development of migrants’ rights in European states does not proceed  in  a  homogeneous  and  increasingly  inclusive  way  but  rather  through ambiguous processes  that are  conducive  to  the creation of multiple  statuses of partial inclusion/exclusion.  However,  these  authors  fall  short  of  developing  a  theoretical framework  for  the explanation of  the emergence of  this system of  rights stratification. Although Morris (2002, 146) recognizes that “the interesting question is not (…) how to weigh  national  closure  against  post‐national  rights,  but  how  the  management  of conflicting forces is being negotiated and with what additional implications and effects”, her  analysis  limits  itself  to  a  thick  description  of  the  actual  existence  of  a  number  of “outsider statuses” and degrees of “partial membership”, without really digging deeper into the question of how and why these discrepancies are created. In  sum,  the  reconfiguration  of  membership  rules  is  premised  upon  a  dialectic relationship between the discourse of liberal norms of equality and democratic inclusion on  the  one  hand,  and  the  principle  of  national  sovereignty  on  the  other  hand. Nevertheless, the precise functioning of this dialectic has not been fully understood and analysed  yet.  In  my  opinion,  the  main  challenge  remains  to  explain  the  ambiguous nature  of  this  process  of  expansion  of  membership  rights  to  non‐citizens  (or  of substantive  citizenship  beyond  formal  citizenship).  The  initial  insight  that  the relationship  between  national  belonging,  citizenship  status,  and  the  possession  of membership rights is being fundamentally transformed by the combined phenomena of globalization  and  migration  is  by  now  widely  acknowledged.  The  key  questions  for future  research  now  are:  Under which  conditions  are  rights  expanded?  To whom  are they  extended  and  why  (i.e.  under  which  conditions  are  they  expanded  to  which categories)?  Where  are  the  new  boundaries  of  membership  drawn  (i.e.  if  citizenship status no longer defines entitlement to rights, what does)? Who is still excluded and how are persisting exclusions/inequalities justified and legitimized? These  questions  cannot  be  answered  by  mere  theoretical  investigation.  In  a recent  article,  Rainer  Bauböck  and  Virginie  Guiraudon  call  for  a  “pragmatic reconciliation  of  theory  and  empirics”  in  order  to  move  beyond  the  limitations  of current  debates  on  the  transformation  of  citizenship  (Bauböck  and  Guiraudon 2009)(p.441).  I  agree  with  these  authors  that  a  more  fruitful  use  of  empirics  can contribute  to  this  theoretical  discussion.  More  precisely,  I  believe  that  in  order  to explain  the  ambiguities  in  the  process  of  expansion  of  membership  rights  to  non‐citizens, it is important to carry out empirical analysis on the policy process that leads to 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these ambiguous outcomes. The question of where new boundaries are being drawn, in turn, requires a careful analysis of the policy outcomes themselves that deconstructs the intricate web  of  complex  legal  and  political  regulations  that  affect migrants’  rights  in order to reconstruct the logic that lies behind the emergence of rights hierarchies. In this dissertation, I propose to make a contribution to the theoretical debate by analyzing one particular case, namely that of European Union policies that regulate the rights of third‐country nationals.   
2.6. Embedding the research question  EU policies  that extend civic, social and economic rights  to  third‐country nationals are one  example  of  processes  that  lead  to  the  above‐mentioned  reconfiguration  of membership. Whereas there have been no attempts to coordinate naturalization laws at the level of the European Union or to transfer powers to the Union in this area, the same is  not  true  for  the  expansion  of membership  rights  to  non‐citizens.  At  least  since  the Treaty of Amsterdam the Union has explicit competence in the area of the conditions of life and residence of third‐country nationals and there have been concrete instances of supranational  coordination  in  this  area  (see Chapter 3).  Thus,  in  the European Union, the  meaning  of  the  concepts  of  nationality  and  citizenship  are  being  currently rearticulated through the enactment of policies that regulate the membership rights of third‐country nationals, in a process of political struggle over the definition of the inner boundaries  of  the  emerging  polity.  Studying  empirically  how  these  policies  are negotiated, adopted, and practiced can give us insights  into the larger question of how the transformation of citizenship is taking place and why. It can help us identify the main factors that play a role in the expansion of citizenship beyond the confines of nationality, as well as the factors that still hinder a total decouplement of the two. The European Union  is a particularly  interesting case  through which  to analyze this phenomenon because it represents a unique instance of construction of a new kind of democratic polity where nationality by definition does not play the same role in the construction of membership as in nation‐states. But what role does it play then? On the one  hand,  the  creation  of Union  citizenship  seems  to  indicate  that  the  break with  the nexus between nationality and citizenship would not be very severe, since supranational citizenship  is nevertheless dependent upon national citizenship  in a Member State. On 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the  other  hand,  the  expansion  of  substantive  rights  of  EU  citizenship  to  third‐country nationals  through  supranational  legislation  that  establishes  equal  treatment  between Union citizens and third‐country nationals throughout the territory of the Union points to a truly ground‐breaking detachment of membership rights from nationality and even from residency in a nation‐state’s territory. Moreover,  the  context  of  creation  of  a  new  polity  is  an  unusually  favourable moment for empirical analysis of processes of boundary drawing because it provides us with the rare occasion of scrutinizing empirically how membership boundaries are set in  a  politically  contested  field  and  reconstructing  analytically  concrete  instances  of changes  in  the  criteria  for  membership  in  a  polity.  Political  theory  tells  us  that boundaries are neither essential nor natural; they are social and political constructions. However, the exact process by which boundaries are set or reset is often obliterated by the passage of time and by the work of legitimizing discourses. The social scientist is left with  what  he  or  she  knows  is  the  outcome  of  a  contested  process,  without  however being  able  to  reconstruct  the  struggle  that  led  to  a  particular  outcome.  However, whereas  in  traditional  nation‐states  the  political  moment  of  decision  that  lies  at  the origin of rules of membership is far back in history so that the rationale for the setting of boundaries  becomes  institutionalized  in  the  form  of  norms  and  values  in  a  way  that hides  their  political  character,  the  European  Union  is  an  example  of  polity  (in  the making) where the question of who is included/excluded is still being negotiated. In  sum,  in  the European Union,  the meaning  of  the  concepts  of  nationality  and citizenship  are  being  currently  rearticulated  through  the  enactment  of  policies  that regulate the rights of third‐country nationals, in a process of political struggle over the definition of  the  inner boundaries  of  the  emerging polity.  The process  of  definition of these new boundaries takes many forms, and one of them is through the enactment of legislation  on  the  rights  of  migrants.  Studying  empirically  how  these  policies  are negotiated, adopted, and practiced can give us insights  into the larger question of how the transformation of citizenship is taking place and why. It can help us identify the main factors that play a role in the expansion of citizenship beyond the confines of nationality, as well as the factors that still hinder a total decouplement of the two. Clearly, this empirical analysis must be one that is attentive to the role of norms in  the  policy  process,  but  also  of  more  mundane  interests  that  might  be  cast  in  the language  of  concerns  for  liberal  values.  Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  an approach that recognizes the inherent ambiguity of norms and values and is sensitive to 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3.1. Introduction  The aim of this chapter is to "map the field" of migrant integration and the regulation of rights of third‐country nationals at the supranational level. Since 1999, several policies have  been  adopted  at  the  supranational  level  governing  the  access  of  third‐country nationals  to membership  rights.  By  regulating  the  access  to membership  rights,  these policies contribute to a re‐delineation of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the Union.  In  order  to  study  how  this  process  of  re‐articulation  of membership  is  taking place,  it  is  necessary  to  first  understand  how  this  domain  of  EU  policy  is  organized, identify the main actors, and discern the rules that govern their interaction. Moreover, it is important to understand how the legal basis has developed that enables supranational policy on the rights of third‐country nationals in the Union, since this is the institutional foundation upon EU action is built. The Treaties  that govern  the European Union provide a complex  legal basis  for EU policy  in  the  field of  immigration and mobility. When analyzing  the  legal basis and the principal institutions and actors in this policy field, it is important not to get lost in the intricacies of this legal framework. Consistent with the topic of this dissertation on the  erosion  of  nationality  through  the  expansion  of membership  rights  to  “denizens”, this  chapter  concentrates  on  those  provisions  that  provide  the  Community  with competence  in  the  regulation  of  the  rights  and  conditions  of  residence  of  “legally resident third‐country nationals”, as defined in the Introduction.7. As  we  shall  see,  the  legal  basis  for  EU  policy  in  this  area  was  only  firmly established with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. After a long period of uncertainty, the Treaty of Lisbon was finally ratified and entered into force just as this dissertation was being completed. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the                                                         7 As already mentioned in the introduction, this legal basis is different than the one that regulates the rights of other categories of legal migrants such as: short‐term visas (i.e. tourists), irregular migrants, EU citizens migrating within the Union, and policies that grant rights to third‐country nationals due to a special relationship to the Union, such as third‐country workers posted within the framework of a Union company offering cross‐border services, family members of EU citizens, and special bilateral agreements, refugees and asylum seekers. These categories are not under consideration here. 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legal  and  institutional  basis  for  EU  action  in  the  area  of  migrants’  rights  has  been substantially  modified.  EU  action  in  the  area  of  migrants’  rights  has  so  far  been characterized  by  a  special  institutional  arrangement,  the  predominance  of intergovernmental  cooperation,  and  unanimous  decision‐making.  This  only  partial communitarization of the integration agenda has resulted in a skewed balance of power in  favour  of  non‐reformist  interests.  The  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon will “normalize” this area of EU action by bringing  it  in  line with the rest of  the first pillar, and  is  likely  to  constitute  a  milestone  in  the  development  of  EU  immigration  and integration  policy.  In  the  wake  of  such  a  major  breakthrough,  it  seems  all  the  more important to look back into a decade of exceptionalism in EU integration policy. In order to map the field of EU action with regards to the rights of third‐country nationals,  the chapter  starts by  reviewing  the emergence of  legal basis  for  community action  and  discusses  the  procedures  that  govern  policy‐making within  this  particular field.  The  next  section  identifies  the main  actors  and  institutions  involved  in  the  field and  analyzes  their main  characteristics  and  the  balance  of  power  between  them.  The aim of this analysis will be to tease out a number of “institutional determinants” of EU policy in the domain of immigration and integration that are relevant for the analysis of the  development  of  EU  policy  towards  third‐country  nationals.  The  five  main institutional  determinants—partial  communitarization,  uncertain  legal  basis,  legacy  of intergovernmentalism,  skewed opportunity  structures  for  interest  representation,  and mechanisms  of  rhetorical  entrapment—will  be  summarized  and  analyzed  in  the  last section of the chapter. Before moving on to a more substantive discussion of the field, it is necessary to define some concepts which are used to refer to different areas of policy‐making. In the context  of  the  European  Union,  “migration”  is  used  in  the  field  as  a  term  that  refers exclusively to policies related to third‐country nationals, as opposed to “free movement of  persons”, which  is  the  term  used  for  policies  that  govern migration  by  EU  citizens from one Member State to another. These are policy terms, and they reflect the different legal bases for Community action in each one of these policy areas. In policy terms, the area  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  includes  “migration”,  “asylum”,  and  “judicial cooperation  in  civil  and  criminal  law”.  “Migration  policy”  is  divided  into  three  broad categories: “legal migration”, “irregular migration”, and “visas and border controls” (for a detailed description of each of  these  fields see: Peers 2006). The areas of  interest  to this dissertation fall under the category of “legal migration”. “Legal migration” includes 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both  the  regulation  of  the  conditions  and  procedures  for  admission  of  third‐country nationals into the territory of a Member State and the conditions of residence of third‐country nationals already residing in the territory of the Union, including their rights. In the EU jargon, “legal migration” is considered to be of three kinds: “family reunification”, “economic  migration”,  and  migration  for  “other  purposes”  notably  by  students, volunteers  and  persons  who  do  not  exercise  a  remunerated  economic  activity.  It  is important to note that according to this classification, asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international or subsidiary protection are not included in the policy area referred to as “legal migration”. Throughout the dissertation, I will use the policy terms “Justice and Home  Affairs”,  “migration  policy”,  “legal  migration”,  and  “economic  migration”  in  the sense described above.   
3.2. Legal Basis  The  EU  has  been  active  in  regulating  migration  flows—broadly  understood  as  the movement of persons across boundaries and their conditions of stay abroad—since its very  origins.  Thus,  one  of  the  fundamental  objectives  of  the  European  Community already  inscribed  into  the  Treaty  of  Rome  was  the  abolition  of  obstacles  to  the  free movement of persons (Article 3(c) EEC). Nevertheless,  the content and the  form of EU action  in  this  area  have  changed  substantially  over  the  years,  and  so  have  the institutional framework and the legal basis within which this action takes place.8 Until  the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/99),  there was no real competence of  the European  Union  in  the  area  of  external  migration  and  migrants’  rights.  Instead,  EU action  was  mostly  restricted  to  the  regulation  of  internal  movement  between  EU Member  States,  posted  third‐country  workers  moving  within  the  framework  of  a Community  company,  and  special  bilateral  agreements  between  the  European Community  and  third  States  guaranteeing  a  number  of  rights  for  nationals  of  these countries  living  in one of  the Member States  (see: Peers 2006, 260‐262; Geddes 2008, 52‐55).  Despite  the  importance  of  these  agreements  for  some  major  migrant communities  in  Europe,  they  too  were  not  part  of  an  effort  to  create  a  common Community  policy  on  external  migration,  but  rather  ad  hoc  bilateral  agreements.                                                         8 For a detailed description of the legal framework of the pre‐ and post‐Amsterdam phases see: (Papagianni 2006) 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Although there were attempts by the European Commission already in the mid‐1980’s to  undertake  a  coordinated  approach  to migration policy  using  a  legal  basis  on  social policy,  these  remained unsuccessful  (see Papagianni 2006: 6‐8).  Clearly,  there was no political will on the part of the Member States to coordinate this policy area at that point in time. Since  the  mid  1980’s,  with  the  Single  European  Act  (1986/87)  and  the development  of  the  Schengen  system,  a  number  of  Member  States  taking  part  in  the Schengen  Convention  started  to  cooperate  on  the  issues  of  border  control  and  visa policy linked to the creation of an internal area without frontiers. This cooperation was purely intergovernmental and did not imply a transfer of competence to the Community. The  migration‐related  measures  agreed  upon  during  this  period  were  not  part  of  a genuine  effort  to  develop  a  common  community  policy  in  the  area  of  migration,  but rather security‐oriented “flanking” or “compensatory” measures aimed at compensating for  the  abolition  of  frontier  controls  (Papagianni  2006,  13‐16;  Peers  2006,  10). Nevertheless,  intergovernmental  cooperation  for  the creation of Schengen contributed to  the  creation  of  a  network  of  working  groups  outside  the  community  framework where public  servants met  to discuss  immigration  issues. As Guiraudon  (2003) points out,  these  groupings were dominated by  law and order personnel, who were  the  first ones  to  ‘go  transnational’  in order  to avoid constraints at  the national  level. When  the Treaty  of  Amsterdam  incorporated  Shengen  into  the  community  acquis,9  the  parallel structures  created  for  intergovernmental  cooperation  during  this  time  were  also incorporated  into  the Council.  As  a  result,  the mentality  and  the  institutional  setup  in this area in the Council were marked by a strong link between immigration, policing and security. The Maastricht Treaty (1992/93) was a major step in the creation of community competence  in  the  area  of  migration  because  it  formalized  the  already  existing structures of cooperation, such as the informal working groups of national civil servants from interior ministries that had been set up during the 1970s and 1980s, brought them into the Community institutional framework, and created a legal basis for cooperation in the  area  of  Justice  and Home Affairs,  including  inter  alia migration policy  and  asylum policy among issues of “common interest” (Peers 2006, 6).10 This was done through the                                                         9 United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark were given opt‐outs. 10 The nine areas of common interest that made up the Justice and Home Affairs cooperation were: asylum, external borders, immigration policy and policy regarding third‐country 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introduction of the so‐called “third pillar”, that is, a special title of the Treaty which was governed  by  different  decision‐making  procedures  and  characterized  by  a  different institutional  balance  of  power  than  the  fully  communitarized  areas  in  the  first  pillar. Within  the  third  pillar  the  Commission  had  to  share  its  right  of  initiative  with  the Member States,11 the Council decided by unanimity, the European Parliament was only entitled  to being  “informed” and  “consulted” by  the Member States,  and  the European Court of Justice had no mandatory jurisdiction (Papagianni 2006, 18‐19; Peers 2006, 12‐20). Moreover, the instruments foreseen under the Maastricht Treaty for the third‐pillar were  “joint  actions”  and  “joint  positions”,  that  is, mainly  soft  law  instruments,  rather than  the  usual  supranational  instruments  such  as  Directives  and  Regulations  (Peers 2006, 12‐17). In  reality,  the cooperation between Member States on  Justice and Home Affairs issues remained predominantly intergovernmental during the period between 1993 and the agreement on the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Due to dissatisfaction with its weak institutional  position  coupled  with  lack  of  leadership  and  resources,  the  Commission refrained  from  proposing  almost  any  initiatives  (Uçarer  2001).  Thus,  most  initiatives adopted  during  this  period  were  initiated  by  the  Member  States,  had  a  non‐binding character,  and suffered  from a complete  lack of  transparency,12 while  the Commission was relegated to the role of helping in the implementation and the European Parliament was hardly ever consulted (Peers 2006, 12‐13). It was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam that a solid legal basis for Community actions  in  the  area  of  migration  policy  and  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  was introduced.  The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  represented  a  true  watershed  for  the development of supranational migration and integration policy in the EU. It established the creation of “an area of freedom, security and justice” (Art. 61 EC)13 as an aim of the European Union and established Community  competence by  transferring  the  issues of borders, visas, immigration, asylum and civil law to the first pillar.14 The transference to the  first pillar meant  that  these areas ceased  to be merely areas of  “common  interest”                                                         nationals, combating drugs and fraud, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, customs cooperation, and policy cooperation (Article K TEU). 11 Except for criminal and judicial cooperation, customs cooperation and police cooperation, where the Member States had exclusive rights of initiative (K3(2) TEU) 12 Until 1999 the Council did not even publish most of the measures it had adopted (Peers 2006) p. 20. 13 Subsequently, the unit of the European Commission and other organizational units previously named “Justice and Home Affairs” were renamed “Justice, Liberty and Security”. 14 The exceptions are policing and criminal law, which remained in the third pillar. 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and  became  areas  where  Community  legislation  could  be  adopted  in  the  form  of  the usual supranational instruments—Directives, Regulations, etc.—which have direct effect and precedence over national law. Nevertheless, despite being  transferred  to  the  first pillar,  these  issues were not fully communitarized due to the reluctance of some Member States to lose power in this sensitive  area.  Rather,  they were  placed  under  a  new Title  (Title  IV)  and  subject  to  a special  regime  that  gave  more  power  to  Member  States  than  to  supranational institutions. Thus, measures adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty were to be adopted by  unanimity  in  the  Council  subject  only  to  consultation  of  the  European  Parliament, and, what  is most unusual,  the Commission had to share  its right of  initiative with the Member States.15 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was also  limited,  since  under  Title  IV  only  the  highest  national  courts  could  submit  a question  or  request  a  preliminary  ruling  from  the  ECJ,  as  opposed  to  every  national court or tribunal as in the rest of the first pillar (Article 68(2) line 1 TEC).16 This special regime  was  supposed  to  last  for  five  years  until  1  May  2004,17  after  which  date  the Council was  supposed  to make  a  unanimous decision  to  transfer  these matters  to  the normal procedure and the Commission would automatically acquire a monopoly on the right of initiative.18 The possibility of an automatic transfer to qualified majority voting had been considered in the Inter‐Governmental Conference that prepared the Treaty of Amsterdam,  but  was  vetoed  by  Germany  (Uçarer  2001,  11;  Geddes  2008,  115‐122). Furthermore, a provision was  included  in  the Treaty stating  that measures adopted at the  supranational  level  did  not  prevent  the  Member  States  from  maintaining  or introducing national provisions in the areas of migration policy and residence of third‐                                                        15 With the exception of measures concerning a uniform visa format and visa lists, which could be adopted by QMV in the Council and where the Commission had the monopoly of initiative (Art 67 (3) TEC). 16 By “highest courts” it is meant courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law. These are, however, required to submit preliminary questions if this is necessary to enable the national court to give judgement (see: Hailbronner 1999, 18‐19). For an analysis of the problems that this limited jurisdiction of the ECJ causes and a discussion of the different possible interpretations of this complex legal construction see: (Peers 2006, 37‐41). 17 The date of the Enlargement to 25  Member States. 18 See the so‐called passerelle clause in Article 67 (2) TEC, allowing the European Council to decide unanimously to replace unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers and consultation with the European Parliament with qualified majority voting (QMV) and co‐decision in the areas of asylum and immigration without the need for a Treaty revision. The right of initiative changed automatically to the usual Commission monopoly after the 5 year period expired, although the Commission would have to “examine any request made by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council”. 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country  nationals,  as  long  as  these  were  compatible  with  the  Treaty.19  This  unusual arrangement  effectively  assigned migration policy  as  a domain of  competence of  both the Member States and the Community simultaneously (Hailbronner 1999, 14). The actual provisions within Title IV which establish competence for Community legislative action in migration policy are Article 61(b) and Article 63(3) and 63(4) of the EC Treaty, which read as follows: 
Article 61   In order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and justice, the Council shall adopt: (…) (b)  other  measures  in  the  fields  of  asylum,  immigration  and safeguarding the rights of nationals of third countries, in accordance with the provisions of Article 63  
 
Article 63 The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article  67,  shall,  within  a  period  of  five  years  after  the  entry  into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, adopt: 1. (...) 2. (...) 3. measures on immigration policy within the following areas: (a) conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for  the  issue  by  Member  States  of  long‐term  visas  and  residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion, (b)  illegal  immigration and  illegal  residence,  including  repatriation of illegal residents; 4.  measures  defining  the  rights  and  conditions  under  which nationals  of  third  countries who  are  legally  resident  in  a Member State may reside in other Member States.   It is noticeable that in Article 61 TEC, which introduces Title IV and the “area of freedom, security and justice”, the safeguarding of the rights of third‐country nationals is explicitly mentioned as one of the main objectives. The actual legal basis for legislative action  is  however Article  63 TEC, which  uses more  general wording  referring  only  to “the conditions of entry and residence”. It follows that all measures in the area of legal migration which attempt to harmonize the rights of third‐country nationals do so under                                                         19 The original wording is: ”Measures adopted by the Council pursuant to points 3 and 4 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and with international agreements.” (Article 63 TEC) 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the  rubric  of  regulating  the  “conditions  of  entry  and  residence”  of  third‐country nationals. Although at the time immediately following the entry into force of the Treaty of  Amsterdam  it  seemed  clear  that  the  intent  of  the  legislator  when  drafting  these provisions was to tackle the issue of migrant integration,20 at a later stage the wording of Article 63 TEC has proven to be a somewhat controversial  legal basis  for regulating the rights of third‐country nationals independent from immigration policy strictu sensu, that  is,  the conditions of entry and acquisition of a  relevant status or permit of  stay.21 Moreover,  whereas  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  have  in  fact  been  regulated under  this  legal  basis  in  a  number  of  instruments,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  other aspects of migrant integration are not covered by this legal basis. Thus, most initiatives in this  field have been taken on an  intergovernmental basis, particularly as part of  the creation of a “European Framework on Integration” (see Chapter 4). The Treaty of Amsterdam also established Community competence in the area of anti‐discrimination through the introduction of Article 13 TEC. Article 13 (1) reads: 
 
Article 13 Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the  limits  of  the  powers  conferred  by  it  upon  the  Community,  the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after  consulting  the  European  Parliament,  may  take  appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.  While  this  provision  is  not  directly  related  to  migration,  it  is  commonly understood as an important tool in the development of a concerted approach to migrant integration, since discrimination on the basis of racial/ethnic origin and religion/belief are  problems  that  particularly  affect migrants  and  their  descendents. Moreover,  anti‐discrimination has historically played a very important role in the EU. It was on the basis of Article 12 TEC preventing discrimination on the basis of nationality between citizens of the Member States that many areas of EU competence have developed. The symbolic importance  of  Article  13  TEC  in  terms  of  expanding  EU  competence  in  non‐discrimination  is  emphasized  by  its  particular  location  in  the  Treaty.  Not  only  is  this Article placed under “Principles” (Part 1), but it also comes directly after Article 12 and                                                         20 This is evidenced by the Tampere Presidency Conclusions, which will be discussed in detailed in Chapter 4. 21 See Chapter 4. In particular the issue was brought up in the negotiations of the Single Permit Directive. 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mirrors  its provisions. Article 12 TEC prohibiting discrimination of EU  citizens on  the basis  of  nationality  is  generally  considered  as  a  cornerstone  of  Union  citizenship. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that nationality is not mentioned under Article 13 TEC as one of the grounds on which the Community may take action to prevent discrimination. As shall be seen later, this has given way for Member States to include a provision in the two anti‐discrimination Directives adopted under Article 13 stating that discrimination on  the  ground  of  nationality  is  explicitly  not  covered  by  the  Directive,  and  that  the Directives  are without  prejudice  to measures  adopted  in  the  area  of migration  policy (see Chapter 4). The Treaty of Nice (2001/03) did not change the legal basis for migration policy and the rights of  third‐country nationals.22 During  the  IGC that prepared the Treaty of Nice,  the  question  of  applying  qualified  majority  voting  (QMV)  to  all  migration  and asylum  issues  was  considered,  but  failed  to  find  consensus,  especially  due  to  fierce opposition by Germany, which did not want to give up its veto power (see: Papagianni 2006,  91‐93,  esp.  fn.  255).  Thus,  the  five‐year  transitional  period  established  by  the Treaty  of  Amsterdam  remained  in  force.  In  fact,  after  the  fulfillment  of  a  five‐year transitional period  in 2004,  the Council did adopt a Decision to  invoke the co‐decision procedure with  qualified majority  voting  for most  areas  in  Title  IV  (Council  Decision 2004/927/EC).23 However,  the  area  of  legal migration  remained  subject  to  unanimity and consultation, again due to the insistence of Germany.24 In 2006, after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the Commission and a number of Member States tried again to use  the  two passerelle clauses  in  the Nice Treaty  to be able  to apply QMV  to  issues of legal migration and transfer the remaining issues in the third pillar to the first, but also 
                                                        22 It did, however, make some changes to other areas of Title IV. In particular, the new Articles 67(5) and 63(2)(b) established, respectively, the immediate application of co‐decision to civil law matters except family law, and to all asylum matters except “burden‐sharing”. This last point was qualified, however, by the somewhat ambiguous requirement that “the Council had first adopted community legislation defining the common rules and basic principles governing these issues”. (see: Peers 2006, 24‐26) 23 These areas include internal border controls, external border controls, freedom to travel, asylum burden‐sharing, and irregular migration, which because subject to QMV and co‐decision as of 1 January 2005. 24 Council Decision 2004/927/EC, Recital (7) states: “Pending the entry into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Council should continue to act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament when adopting measures in the field of the legal migration of third‐country nationals to and between Member Sates referred to in Article 63(3)(a) and (4) of the Treaty.” 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this  attempt was  doomed  to  failure.25  The Nice  Treaty  did,  however,  introduce  a  new Article  on  judicial  review  that  had  important  implications  for  the  area  of  Justice  and Home  Affairs.  Article  230  EC  gave  the  European  Parliament  (among  other  EU institutions)  the  power  to  challenge  Community  measures  “on  grounds  of  lack  of competence,  infringement of an essential procedural requirement,  infringement of  this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers“. This newly acquired  competence  was  later  used  by  the  Parliament  to  challenge  the  Family Reunification Directive on the grounds of infringement of human rights, as we shall see below. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, introduced major  changes  to  the  current  institutional  framework  and  legal  basis.26  Most importantly,  it  introduced  co‐decision  with  the  European  Parliament  and  qualified majority voting in the Council in the area of legal migration and clarified the legal basis for the regulation of migrants’ rights (Article 79(2) TFEU).27 It also provided a clear legal basis  for  cooperation  in  the  area  of  migrant  integration,  although  excluding harmonization (Article 79(4) TFEU).28 Moreover, the European Court of Justice acquired normal  jurisdiction  on  all  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  issues  except  for  policing  and criminal  law.29  The  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  will  certainly  mark  the                                                         25 At the occasion of the review of the implementation of the Hague programme, the European Commission proposed the use of the passerelle clauses in its Communication COM(2006)331: Implementing the Hague Programme: the way forward. Despite the support of the finish presidency, the proposal met with serious resistance in the informal meeting of JHA Council in Tampere in September 2006 and the possibility of using the passerelle clause was accordingly dismissed by the European Council in December (see: Report by the House of Commons HC86, p. 39‐40). available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/86/86.pdf) 26 Former Title IV TEC became Title V of the „Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union“ (TFEU). The provisions of former Article 63(3) and (4) TEC were included in a new revised Article 79 dealing with the creation of a common immigration policy.  27 In addition to the provision on the „conditions of entry and residence“ which became Art. 79(2)(a), a new paragraph was added, Art. 79(2)(b), stating that measures shall be adopted on „the definition of the righst of thirc‐country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement and residence in other Member States“. 28 Art. 79(4) TFEU reads: „The Eruopean Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to prmoting the integration of third‐country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.“ 29 See the analysis of the relevant provisions in the Reform Treaty by Steve Peers available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu‐refrom‐treaty‐jha‐anal‐1‐ver‐3.pdf 
  61 
beginning of a new era in EU migration policy, which is beyond the scope of this study, however. This thesis is concerned with the decade between the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam and  this new major  turning point, during which  time EU  immigration and integration policy were governed by nonstandard procedures. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam brought some groundbreaking improvements to  the  legal  basis  for  EU  action  in  the  area  of  migration  policy,  all  the  limitations  in Community competence mentioned above resulted in an only partial communitarization of immigration policy. As they were the outcome of very difficult political compromises, the qualification on EU competence in the area of immigration policy—and especially in legal  migration—add  complexity  to  an  already  intricate  institutional  framework, contributing  to  the  creation  of  a  situation  that  some  authors  have  critically  termed “modified intergovernmentalism” (Peers 2006, 21). As the next chapters will show, the tensions  between  supranationalism  and  intergovernmentalism  present  in  the  legal provisions  of  the  Treaty  are  also  reflected  in  the  relationship  between  the  different supranational  institutions,  as  well  as  in  the  actual  instruments  adopted  the  area  of migration policy.   
3.3. Institutions and actors   
The European Council The  European  Council—the  periodic  summit  meetings  of  heads  of  state  or government—has played a particularly prominent role in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, especially in the years immediately following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam  (see:  Papagianni  2006,  215  ff.;  Peers  2006,  21  ff.).  Besides  its  role  of negotiating  major  institutional  and  Treaty  reforms,  the  European  Council  sometimes also  takes  a  central  political  leadership  role  by  providing  the  political  impetus  and commitment necessary to developing a particular area and by inviting the Commission to propose policy initiatives (Hix 2005, 35‐36). This was especially the case in the early days of EU competence in Justice and Home Affairs, which can be explained due to the intergovernmental  background  of  this  policy  area,  as  well  as  by  the  high  degree  of sensitivity  of  the  issues  at  hand,  which  are  strongly  related  to  national  sovereignty. Moreover, in the aftermath of Amsterdam the role of the European Council was certainly strengthened by the fact that this was a new area of EU competence, since in this context 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there were a number of fundamental political questions that needed to be addressed. As Wallace  points  out,  in  such  situations  the  European  Council  provides  a  venue  for deciding  at  the most  senior political  level  the  “big  and more  strategic questions  to do with  the  core  new  tasks  of  the  EU  and  those  that  define  its  ‘identity’  as  an  arena  for collective action” (Wallace 2005, 64). Thus,  besides  its  usual  function  of  providing  general  political  guidelines  and negotiating institutional changes, the European Council has played a vital agenda‐setting role by establishing concrete policy goals and drawing detailed  lists of measures to be promoted and adopted in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. To illustrate this point, it is  remarkable  that  the  single  most  important  document  for  the  development  of  a common European immigration and integration policy are the ‘Presidency Conclusions’ of  the  European  Council  held  in  Tampere  (Finland)  in  1999,  the  so‐called  “Tampere Milestones” (Tampere Presidency Conclusions, 15‐16 Oct. 1999) (see Chapter 4).  Nevertheless, after the end of the five‐year transitional period in 2004, and with the  growing  institutionalization  of  Community  competence,  the  influence  of  the European  Council  has  been  progressively  waning  for  most  Justice  and  Home  Affairs issues,  including  legal  migration,  even  though  the  communitarization  of  this  area remains incomplete. For example, the Commission and the Council played a much bigger role in the preparation of the second multi‐annual program for Justice and Home Affairs of  2004,  the  so‐called  “Hague  Programme”,  designed  to  follow‐up  on  the  Tampere Programme.  Although  the  final  document  was  officially  adopted  by  the  European Council  in  Brussels  in  November  2004,  this  time  around  the  EU  leaders  were  only “rubber‐stamping”  a program  that had already been drawn up by other  actors,  rather than taking the lead in setting the agenda as they had done in Tampere (Peers 2006, 22). Despite  this general waning of  the role of EU heads of state and government  in controlling the agenda of European integration in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, at critical junctures it nevertheless continued to ‘compete’ with supranational institutions for  the  definition  of  the  main  policy  priorities.  An  example  of  this  was  the  recent initiative  of  the  French  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy  to  draw  up  a  “European  Pact  on Immigration and Asylum”, which was  finally endorsed by  the European Council on 15 October 2008. As the Hague Programme drew to a close, the French move to adopt an “European  Pact”  setting  up  priorities  for  future  action  in  this  area  was  clearly  an intergovernmental initiative that proceeded in parallel to, and in clear concurrence with, the concomitant supranational efforts to prepare a new multiannual program within the 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framework of a broader consultation mechanism, namely  the  “Stockholm Programme” (see: Carrera and Guild 2008; Collett 2008). This incident is illustrative of tensions that characterize  this  policy  field—between  the  pressure  for  supranationalization  and communitarization  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  intention  of  European  leaders  to  keep  a firm grip on these politically sensitive issues on the other hand.  
The Council Although  the  heads  of  state  and  government  have  often  taken  the  lead  in  setting  the political agenda of EU Justice and Home Affairs, the main decision‐making body remains the  Council  of  the  European  Union  (hereafter:  “the  Council”).  As  is  well  known,  the Council is organized sectorally. In the case of migration policy, the relevant Council is the Justice and Home Affairs Council—composed of (mostly) interior ministers from all EU governments30—and  its  attending  institutions.  As  Simon  Hix  points  out,  sectoral Councils  are  the  functional  equivalent  of  parliamentary  committees.  They  are specialized on one policy domain, composed of actors with shared functional and fiscal interests, and with an established esprit de corps (Hix 2005, 82). This arguably facilitates legislative  decision‐making,  especially  under  difficult  conditions  such  as  highly divergent  national  interests  and,  in  the  case  of  legal  migration,  the  requirement  for unanimity.  Nevertheless,  it  is  also  a  source  of  criticism.  Thus,  although  the  Council represents  the  interests  of  the  Member  States,  its  sectoral  nature  means  that  the position  of  the ministers  is  also  tainted  by  particular  party‐political  and  institutional preferences. The former is especially relevant in coalition governments, where different parties  control  different ministries  and  sectorization may  disproportionally  empower the  coalition  partner  holding  the  portfolio.  The  latter  is  especially  problematic  in  the case of cross‐sectoral and interdisciplinary matters, as is the case with migration policy. Thus, it is an often‐raised criticism that the allocation of migration issues to the Justice and Home Affairs Council—dominated as it is by interior ministers traditionally focused on  public  security  and  national  sovereignty  issues—contributes  to  an  over‐securitization  of  the  migration  agenda  and  a  predominance  of  intergovernmental interests over supranational ones (Guiraudon 2003).   The actual process of legislative decision‐making within the Council is a long one involving several actors.  It  is  important  to note  that although “the Council”  is  formally                                                         30 Some countries have migration ministers. 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treated as one institution, it is in reality composed of several different organizations. The highest of these is the Council of Ministers, which is the decision‐making body formally empowered to negotiate and adopt legislative instruments. Nevertheless, in reality, most of  the  negotiations  and many  decisions  are  not  taken  at  the ministerial  level.  Rather, legislative  decisions  are  prepared  by  a  network  of  Council  working  groups  and committees,31 supported by Justice and Home Affairs Counsellors   (national officials of the  interior  ministries  of  the  Member  States  permanently  based  in  Brussels),  and coordinated  by  the  rotating  Council  Presidency  acting  together  with  the  Council Secretariat. The internal decision making process of the Council  follows a hierarchical  logic. After  the European Commission presents  its  legislative proposal,  it  goes  to  the  lowest level of the hierarchy, the working groups (sometimes also called working parties), to be discussed. Working groups are one of the most influential decision‐making body of the Council, with scholars estimating that somewhere between 31% (Häge 2008) and 70% (Wallace 2005, 58) of all Council decisions are taken at the level of working parties (see also:  Häge  2007).  Issues  related  to  migrants’  rights  are  dealt  with  by  the  Admission configuration of the Migration and Expulsion working party.32 If an agreement cannot be found at this level, the file is forwarded to the next level in the hierarchy, which is either SCIFA  or  COREPER  II.  SCIFA  (Strategic  Committee  for  Immigration,  Frontiers  and Asylum)  is a body  that meets  four  times a year  in Brussels and  is  composed of  senior interior  ministry  officials  with  the  rank  of  Directors‐General  sent  directly  from  the capitals.33  COREPER  II  is  the  highest  Brussels‐based  Council  body  composed  of  the Ambassadors  of  each  Member  State  to  the  European  Union  (called  Permanent                                                         31 For a list of all working parties and Council preparatory bodies as of January 2008 see CD 5525/08. 32 The fact that denizens’ rights are dealt with by a working party with such a name is quite striking. When asked about this, none of my interviewees could explain the name, except by pointing out that this is the consequence of the historical development of this policy area. In my interpretation, regardless of its origins this name in fact attests to the strong conflation between integration and immigration issues within the EU institutional setup/policy domain. Nevertheless, this working party will be renamed to “Working Party on Free Movement of Persons, Integration, Migration and Expulsion” as a consequence of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. See: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/sep/eu‐jha‐working‐structures.pdf (visited 28.10.2009) 33 See CD 6370/00, in which the function of the newly created SCIFA Committee is discussed. In addition, and in parallel to SCIFA, there is also the high level group on migration and asylum, which is an inter‐pillar group that also deals with issues of legal migration. However, this group is mainly focused on issues that concern the relationship between the EU and third‐countries, and is therefore of less relevance for the topics addressed by this study. 
  65 
Representatives). The existence of this double structure, with one high level committee composed of senior national civil servants (SCIFA) that mirrors the more supranational forum of the Brussels‐based ambassadors in COREPER is once again a reflection of the intergovernmental  legacy  that  permeates  the  migration  policy  domain.  If,  after negotiations  in  SCIFA  and  COREPER,  an  agreement  still  cannot  be  found,  the  issue  is placed at the agenda of the Council of Ministers as a “B‐item”. The Ministers then hold a political discussion on the subject and may either reach a political agreement, or refer the  matter  back  for  more  discussions  at  lower  levels.  At  any  stage  of  the  process,  if political  agreement  is  reached,  the piece  of  legislation  is  placed  as  an  “A‐item” on  the agenda of the next Council Meeting to be adopted without debate.   Given the rule of unanimity and the consultation procedure that characterize the legislative  procedure  in  the  areas  of  immigration  and  the  regulation  of  the  rights  of third‐country  nationals,  the  institutional  setup  on  this  domain  produces  a  skewed balance of power among EU institutions that clearly favors the Council, at least when it comes  to  the  negotiation  of  legislative  proposals.  Within  the  Council,  the  legacy  of intergovernmentalism  strengthens  the  role  of  national  bureaucracies  participating  in the network of Council working groups, who tend to be primarily composed of officials from the interior ministries of the Member States. This in turn creates a bias in favor of control  and  security‐oriented  preferences  within  the  decision‐making  process. Moreover, this setup contributes to the lack of transparency of legislative activity in this area, since decision‐making within the Council is notorious for its secrecy and isolation from public scrutiny. 
  
The Commission Under  the  consultation  procedure,  the  European  Commission  (hereafter:  “the Commission”)  is  the most crucial actor within EU policy‐making after  the Council. The absence of the European Parliament in the negotiation process strengthens the agency of  the  Commissioner  and  his  or  her  staff  in  the Directorates‐General, who  become de 
facto  the  only  possible  locus  of  institutional  opposition  to  the Member  States.  This  is particularly  important when  the political orientation of  the Commissioner  in charge  is different  from  the majority  in  the  Council,  as  has  been  the  case  for  most  of  the  first period  of  policy‐making  after  the  communautarization  of  immigration  policy  (1999‐2004).  Moreover,  under  the  consultation  procedure  the  Commission  is  also  the main 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interlocutor for organized civil society seeking to influence European policy making. One author described  the scope of  influence of  the Commission as  follows:  “the  role of  the Commission has  traditionally been one of  initiator of policies, depository of  legislative information, manager and executor of Union policies, safekeeper of community acquis, mediator and broker, as well as mobilizer for new policy initiatives and spheres” (Uçarer 2001, 1). This is not a modest list of tasks. Nevertheless, the role of the Commission in the area of Justice and Home Affairs has not always been so strong. Rather, it has slowly developed from an observer of intergovernmental cooperation to an autonomous agent, in  a  process  that  went  along  with  a  restructuring  of  its  institutional  setup  and  the emergence of  new  sub‐organizational  actors. The  structure of  the Commission  and  its development in the field of migrant integration will be described below. The Commission  is  the main executive body of  the Union, and  it  is organized  in much the same way as a national government. Commissioners are therefore much like national  ministers,  each  holding  a  specific  portfolio,  and  charged  with  his/her  own cabinet  and  bureaucracy.  At  present  there  are  27  Commissioners,  one  from  each Member State, and each is responsible for a specific portfolio.34 The administrative units of the Commission are the Directorates‐General, commonly referred to as DGs, of which there  are  currently  36.  According  to  Hix  (2005,  46),  “the  DGs  are  the  organizational equivalent of government ministries in domestic administrations and they fulfill many of the  same  functions:  policy  development,  preparation  of  legislation,  distribution  of revenues, monitoring of legislative implementation, and provision of advice and support to the political executive”. There are two Directorates General which are of importance for the policy field of migrant  integration  and  the  regulation  of  migrants’  rights  —namely  the  Directorate General  for  Employment,  Social  Affairs  and  Equal  Opportunities  (DG  EMPL)  and  the Directorate General  for  Justice, Freedom and Security  (DG  JLS),  each corresponding  to the portfolio of a specific Commissioner. The main responsibility for the issue of migrant integration and  the  rights of  third‐country nationals  lies with DG  JLS, but DG EMPL  is responsible for non‐discrimination and social inclusion, which are closely related fields. Whereas  in  the  beginning  these  two  DGs  competed  for  competence  in  the  area  of migrant  integration,  this  competition  has  in  the meantime  been  somewhat mitigated, and  the  predominance  of  DG  JLS  has  been  clearly  established.  This  division  of                                                         34 The rule that each Member State is entitled to one Commissioner shall change with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
  67 
competence was the result of a slow process of  institutionalization of  immigration and integration  as  an  independent  supranational  policy  field,  and  it  had  interesting consequences for the framing of migration and the definition of the subjects of EU policy. On  the one hand,  this  shift meant  that  social  and civic  rights of both migrants and EU citizens are no  longer only  seen  through  the prism of employment and economics. On the other hand,  it has  inscribed a rigid division between EU citizens and third‐country nationals, between internal ”mobility” and external migration, contributing to a framing of ”integration” as a problem that only affects third‐country nationals (Interview 5). As we have seen, until the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht all cooperation on issues related to migration was carried out within a strictly  intergovernmental setting. With  the  Treaty  of Maastricht,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  issue were  included  into  the third pillar, meaning that the Commission was brought into the policy process, although in  a  rather  marginal  position,  with  only  a  shared  right  of  initiative  and  ‘soft’  policy instruments.  The  organizational  structure  of  the  Commission  in  the  period  post‐Maastricht  seemed  to  mirror  this  ambiguous  position.  Instead  of  a  full‐fledged Directorate General, only a small Task Force for Justice and Home Affairs was created in 1992  within  the  Council  Secretariat  to  deal  with  the  issues  of  immigration,  asylum, external  borders,  drug  control,  and  judicial  cooperation.  Until  then,  issues  related  to third‐country  workers—which  were  mainly  concerned  with  employment  and  social security—came within the ream of DG EMPL. At the time, DG EMPL was in charge of all aspects  related  to  “migrant  workers”,  a  term  which  was  used  indistinctively  for  EU citizens and third‐country nationals (Interview 22). Only  in  1995  was  the  first  Commissioner  for  Justice  and  Home  Affairs inaugurated  under  the  Santer  Commission,  but  the  appointed  Commissioner  was inexperienced,  had  little  powers,  and  lacked  a  corresponding  DG  with  enough supporting  staff  (Uçarer  2001).  Moreover,  the  Santer  Commission  was  weakened  by accusations of mismanagement, which eventually  led  to  its  resignation. Thus, until  the entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  in  1999  and  the  inauguration  of  a  new College,  the  many  constitutional  and  institutional  constraints  mentioned  above—ambiguous  mandate,  weak  leadership,  lack  of  resources—prevented  the  Commission from becoming an important agent in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. After  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  the  situation  started  to change.  The  Commission  finally  acquired  more  competences,  and  with  it  came  the necessary  resources. The Task Force was  turned  into a  full‐fledged DG  for  Justice and 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Home Affairs  and  tripled  its  staff within  one  year  (Uçarer  2001).  The  Commissioners appointed  since  then—Mr.  Antonio  Vitorino  and  Mr.  Franco  Frattini—were  strong personalities  and  experienced  politicians,  and  both  were  at  the  same  time  appointed vice‐presidents of  the Commission, which shows  the high  importance accorded  to  this area of policy since 1999.35 Thus,  we  see  how  the  institutional  structure  and  internal  organization  of  the Commission  evolve  as  a  consequence  of  changes  in  the  legal  basis  and  in  the  relative importance  of  the  policy  area.  For  the  period  studied  in  this  dissertation,  the  most important  change was  the  emergence  and  strengthening  of  DG  JLS.  The  creation  of  a specific DG and the consolidation of Commission competence in the field of Justice and Home Affairs were at once a reflection of, and a factor contributing to, the re‐delineation of the migration field itself. Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the  subsequent  shifting  of  competences  to  the  newly  created  DG,  migration  and integration  issues were  considered mostly  from  an  economic  or  employment  point  of view. Restrictions  on  the mobility  of workers were  considered  as  a  hindrance  for  the completion  of  the  common  market  and  tackled  as  such.  With  the  creation  of  EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 the framing already started to change, and competence  for  both  EU  citizenship  and  external  migration  started  to  shift  from  the employment portfolio to Justice and Home Affairs, but it is the Treaty of Amsterdam that completed the transformation.    
The Parliament The formal possibilities for the European Parliament (hereafter: “the Parliament” or EP) to  influence  the  supranational  regulation  of  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  has been  severely  limited  by  the  use  of  the  consultation  procedure  for  the whole  area  of legal migration. Under  the consultation procedure, although  the Council  is  required  to seek  the  opinion  of  the  Parliament,  it  is  under  no  obligation  to  take  the  amendments                                                         35 With  the entry  into  force of  the Treaty of Lisbon,  the Barroso  II Commission has brought about a re‐structuring  and  the  Justice  and Home Affairs  portfolio  has  been  divided  into  two.  The  former  Swedish Minister  for  EU  affairs  and  former  MEP  of  the  Liberal  Party  Group,  Cecilia  Malström,  took  office  in February  2010  as  the  new  Commissioner  in  charge  of  Home  Affairs  (including Migration,  Asylum  and Security),  while  judicial  cooperation,  fundamental  rights  and  European  citizenship  have  been  placed under a separate portfolio held by Ms Viviane Reding, who was at the same time appointed vice‐president of the Commission. Under this new division of portfolios the Commissioner responsible for migration (Ms. Malström) is no longer vice‐president, and there has been a stronger decouplement of the governance of the rights of third‐country nationals from the rights of EU citizens. 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proposed by  the Parliament  into account. According  to my  interviews, during  the  first period  of  EU  competence  in  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  between  1999  and  2004,  the opinion of the European Parliament was seldom considered by the Council (Interviews 1, 13, and 14). Nevertheless, despite its lack of formal powers, the Parliament has always taken a proactive attitude in trying to influence policy‐making in the area of immigration and in particular of migrants’ rights. Thus, even under these very unfavorable decision‐making rules, it was able to use its institutional prerogatives to indirectly influence the development of the policy field to a certain extent. The  period  of  interest  for  the  policies  studied  in  this  dissertation  includes  two parliamentary terms:  the  fifth  legislature (1999‐2004) and the sixth  legislature (2004‐2009).  The  list  of  party  groups  represented  and  the  composition  of  the  incoming Parliaments for these two legislatures are shown below.  
            In both terms, the EPP‐ED was the largest party in the Parliament followed by the PSE.  In  many  cases,  these  two  groups  vote  together,  in  which  case  they  decide  the 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outcome of the vote by a  large majority. When that  is not the case, the votes  in the EP tend to break down along the left‐right continuum. Also in the field of migration, studies have  shown  that  the  positions  of  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  (MEPs)  are determined by  their  ideological positions along  the  left‐right  cleavage,  rather  than  the political preferences of Member States or the economic interests of their constituencies (Hix and Noury 2007). In the last two legislatures, which are the period relevant to this study, the political constellation has been such that there is no clear majority of left‐wing or right‐wing party groups in the Parliament. Rather, there are two big political blocks that  often  vote  together,  and  both  have  a  chance  of  majority  on  any  given  vote, depending  on  the  position  of  the  Liberals  (ALDE,  see  tables  above). On  the  one  hand, there  is a  right‐wing block composed of EPP‐ED,  IND/DEM, UEN, and  the  far‐right. On the other hand, you have a left‐wing block composed of PSE, Greens/EFA, and GUE/NGL. If  the  vote  on  a  given  issue  splits  this  way,  which  is  the  most  common,  the  Liberals become a pivotal actor, being the decisive force that determines who has the majority. This  political  setup  is  of  crucial  importance  for  the  area  of  Justice  and  Home Affairs because of the role played by the liberals. In most issues, particularly in economic policy, the Liberals vote with the centre‐right EPP‐DE and the other right‐of‐centre party groups, thus forming a winning conservative coalition. Nevertheless, in issues related to the protection of individual rights and liberties, the Liberals take a socially progressive position  that  places  the  liberties  of  individuals  above  concerns  for  security  and sovereignty. As a result, in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, the Liberals tend to vote with the centre‐left PSE and the other left‐leaning party groups, thus forming a left‐wing winning coalition. This allows  the EP committee  in charge of  Justice and Home Affairs issues—the  Committee  on  Civil  Liberties,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (LIBE)36—to  take very  strong  positions  and  challenge  the  Council  on  certain  occasions.  There  were  in particular  two  very  important  cases  in  which  this  happened:  the  investiture  of  the Barroso I Commission in 2004, and the passage of the Family Reunification Directive in 2003.  In  2004,  the  designated  President  of  the  Commission,  Mr.  José  Manuel  Durão Barroso, appointed Mr. Rocco Buttiglione as Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. The Commission as a whole  is accountable  to  the European Parliament, which has  the power  to  censure  the  college by  a double majority:  an  absolute majority of MEPs and                                                         36 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/homeCom.do?body=LIBE (visited 28.04.2010). 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two‐thirds  of  the  votes  cast.  Moreover,  in  practice,  the  threat  to  censure  the  whole Commission has been used by the Parliament as leverage in order to acquire a de facto veto power on individual Commissioners (Hix 2005, 61). Thus, although the EP cannot officially  vote  on  each  individual  Commissioner,  it  can  threaten  to  reject  the  whole Commission if certain individuals are not removed from consideration. During his hearing before  the LIBE Committee of  the European Parliament,  the nominated  Commissioner  for  Justice  and  Home  Affair,  Mr.  Buttiglione  expressed discriminatory  views  on  homosexuality  and  on  the  role  of  women  in  society.  Among other  comments, Mr.  Buttiglione  stated  that  he  believed  “homosexuality  is  a  sin”,  and that  “the  family  exists  in  order  to  allow  women  to  have  children  and  to  have  the protection  of  a  male  who  takes  care  of  them”  (BBC  News  11.10.2004;  The  Times 28.10.2004).  On  the  basis  of  these  controversial  statements,  the  Civil  Liberties Committee  voted  to  reject  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Buttiglione,  following  which  the Socialist  group  in  the  Parliament  made  clear  that  it  would  vote  to  reject  the  whole Commission if Mr. Buttiglione were in  it.  In an unprecedented show of strength by the Parliament,  the  nominated  Commission  President,  Mr.  Barroso,  saw  no  other  option than to withdraw his team of Commissioners on the very day that the vote was due to take  place.  Mr.  Barroso  was  then  forced  to  find  an  alternative  candidate,  which eventually was Mr. Franco Frattini. Thus we see how the Parliament was able to use its instititutional  prerogatives  in  order  to  indirectly  influence  the  direction  of  EU immigration and integration policies. A similar display of Parliamentary engagement  for  fundamental rights occurred in 2003, when the Parliament challenged the legality of certain provisions of the Family Reunification Directive before the European Court of  Justice, alleging that  they did not comply with fundamental human rights. Although the Parliament was not successful in annulling the provisions of the Directive which it considered to be against fundamental rights,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  Member  States  were  obliged  to  implement  these provisions in conformity with human rights obligations, in particular with the European Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  (see  Chapter  4  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  this  case).  Thus,  the  Parliament  was  able  to  indirectly  influence  policy  outcomes  through  the strategic  use  of  norms‐based  arguments  that  were  able  to  curtail  the  discretion  of Member States when implementing this Directive.   From 2004 onwards, during the sixth legislative term, the passage to co‐decision of  issues  of  illegal  migration  and  asylum  contributed  indirectly  to  an  increase  in  the 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importance  of  the  Parliament  even  in  the  area  of  legal  migration  through  the  use  of policy  linkage.  Whenever  similar  proposals  are  being  negotiated  concomitantly,  one under co‐decision and the other under consultation, the Parliament tries to bundle these proposals  together.  By  threatening  to  block  an  agreement  under  the  co‐decision procedure,  it  manages  to  be  taken  seriously  by  the  Council  also  in  the  consultation procedure  (Interview 16). Secondly, whenever  the Council has an  interest  in a  speedy negotiation, the Parliament acquires increased political leverage because it can threaten to delay  the  adoption of  the measure by holding back  its  own opinion. Ever  since  the European  Court  of  Justice  made  clear  that  it  would  annul  any  legislative  measures adopted by the Council before the official consultation of the Parliament, the Parliament has gained “the power of delay” (see: Hix 2005, 78). If there is a strong political interest in the fast adoption of a legislative initiative, it might be in the interest of the Council to take the amendments proposed by the Parliament into account in exchange for a speedy procedure (see the example of the Blue Card Directive in Chapter 4). Thus,  given  the  specific  political  composition  of  the  parliamentary  committee dealing with migration  policy,  it  is  likely  that  the  limited  formal  role  of  the  EP  in  the decision‐making  process  contributed  to  producing  less  liberal  outcomes  than  would have been the case under co‐decision. The limited formal role of the EP also reinforces the lack of transparency and civil society participation in this area. Nevertheless, despite its weak  institutional position,  the Parliament has managed to  impact policy outcomes by using  its  institutional  powers outside  the decision‐making process  to  influence  the overall  political  direction  of  the  field,  and  compel  Member  States  to  abide  by international  and European human rights norms,  and by engaging  in policy  linkage  to increase its political leverage.  
The European Court of Justice  European Union politics is characterized by a high degree of “judicialization”—meaning the  process  by  which  courts  act  as  quasi‐legislators,  making  what  are  essentially political decisions on matters that are of utmost importance and impact on the evolution of  the polity  itself  (Stone Sweet 2004; Hirschl 2008). The  importance of  the European Court of Justice (hereafter: ECJ)  in promoting European integration has been so strong that  scholars  even  talk  of  European  integration  being  essentially  “integration  through law” (Easson 1994; Weiler 1994). Judicialization of politics has been particularly strong in  the European Union due  to  the unfinished nature of  the  supranational  legal  system 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and the ambiguous character of many provisions, which together with the large degree of institutional insulation of the ECJ from Member State control, creates a wide “zone of discretion” for the ECJ when interpreting the Treaties (Stone Sweet 2004, 23‐27).    The judgments of the ECJ have been particularly important in the area of freedom of movement and the construction of a common market. The most important impacts of judicialization  have  been  twofold.  First,  judicialization  worked  to  expand  the supranational character of the EU and increase harmonization of the laws of the Member States, often beyond the level that Member States would have preferred (Easson 1994; Weiler  1994;  Stone  Sweet  2004).  Second,  judicialization  in  the  European Union  has  a strong deregulatory character. As Stone Sweet points out, one of  the main motivations for litigation involving EU law is that actors engaged in transnational economic exchange would  ask  judges  to  remove  national  laws  and  administrative  practices  that  obstruct their activities (Stone Sweet 2004, 15). Thus the ECJ has consistently upheld principles of  economic  freedom  against  the  will  of  Member  States  to  preserve  protectionist national legislation. The impacts of this deregulatory character of judicialization are manifold, and are of particular importance for migration policy. One the one hand, the activist stance of the Court  has  had  problematic  consequences  for  the  preservation  of  national  systems  of social protection, which tend to be based on the distinction between members and non‐members  and  on  the  control  of  market  forces  by  governments  for  the  sake  of  social justice (see: Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Scharpf 1999; Poiares Maduro 2000; Leibfried 2005).  In  terms  of  migration  policy,  however,  the  deregulatory  character  of judicialization  has  had  the  consequence  of  strengthening  individual  freedoms  against the discretion of national  governments  to  impose protectionist  barriers  to  freedom of movement  and  to  the  enjoyment  of  transnational  citizenship  rights.  Thus,  the ECJ  has repeatedly  defended  the  fundamental  rights  of  individuals  against  the  prerogatives  of Member  States  to  control  their  borders  and  their  welfare  systems,  in  particular  by linking  the  concept  of  European  citizenship  to  the  prohibition  of  discrimination enshrined in the Treaties (see: Bell 2002; Ellis 2005; Caporaso 2006). For example, the rights  granted  to  mobile  EU  citizens  and  their  families  in  the  European  Citizenship Directive are very  far‐reaching  in great part because  this Directive  is not a product of legislative decision‐making alone, but rather amends existing legislation by codifying a 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series of ECJ judgments that greatly expanded the rights of EU citizens.37  By  contrast,  the  role  of  the  ECJ  in  the  area  of  legal migration  and  the  rights  of third‐country nationals has been very limited due to the only partial communitarization of  this  policy  field.  Although  the  powers  of  the  ECJ  increased when  immigration was transferred to the first pillar, a special arrangement was created so that the ECJ was not granted  full  jurisdiction.  In particular,  in  the area of  Justice and Home Affairs only  the highest national courts (from which no judicial remedy is possible) can make references to  the ECJ and refer questions  for preliminary rulings (Peers 2006, 37). Thus,  if under the  normal  procedure  bringing  a  case  before  the  ECJ  is  already  difficult  and  costly, taking an average of 18 months until a decision is taken (Hix 2005, 119), in the area of Justice  and Home Affairs  this  process  is  even  longer  and much more  costly,  since  the case has  to go  through all national  instances before reaching  the ECJ. Considering  that the power to make preliminary rulings is the main mechanism for the ECJ to influence policy outcomes, one sees how the political role of the ECJ in the area of legal migration is severely limited by this exception (Peers 2007).  Despite  its  limited  formal  jurisdiction  in  the  area of  legal migration, during  the period between 1999 and 2009, the ECJ has issued important judgments in the past that affect certain specific categories of third‐country nationals, primarily family members of EU citizens (whose right is derived from the EU citizen) and beneficiaries of Association Agreements. In these cases, the ECJ has followed the same line of protecting individual rights against the prerogatives of states that characterizes its attitude towards the rights of  EU  citizens  (For  recent  examples  see  the  cases Metock  (C‐127/08)  and  Sahin  (C‐551/07)).  This  disparity  in  the  role  of  the  ECJ  concerning  different  categories  of migrants  has  contributed  to  imbalances  and  ambiguities  in  the  framework  of  rights governing  the  conditions  of  residence  of  each  of  these  categories.  Expansive  ECJ judgments  often  institutionalize  rules  that  go  against  the  will  of  the  legislator.  The generous rights framework now in place in the European Union in the area of freedom of movement    (including  for  family members  of  EU  citizens)  is  largely  the  product  of non‐legislative decisions taken a posteriori by the ECJ, and without the express consent of  the  Member  States.  When  negotiating  legislation  on  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals  in  the  framework  of  the  newly  acquired  competence  in  the  area  of  legal migration  under  Title  IV,  Member  States  were  able  to  use  the  knowledge  acquired                                                         37 See Chapter 5 for an analysis of this Directive. 
  75 
through previous judgments in their interest—be it to harmonize treatment or precisely to avoid an undesired harmonization by the ECJ. In many cases, their intention was the latter (Guild 2007). The sole exception to the very limited role of the ECJ in the area of immigration and  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  were  two  cases  involving  the  Family Reunification  Directive.  The  first  one  was  the  already‐mentioned  case  C‐540/03  in which the ECJ judged on the legality of certain provisions of the Directive. The second is a very recent case (C‐578/08) concerning the application of the income requirement in the Netherlands, where migrants must show that they earn up to 120% of the minimum salary in order to qualify for family reunification. The case was received in 2008 by the ECJ, who issued its judgment on 4 March 2010. The ECJ ruled in favor of the litigant, Ms. Chakroun, a woman of Moroccan nationality who was denied family reunification with her  husband  because  he  did  not  fulfill  the  income  requirement.  The  ECJ  decided  that Member States may not adopt rules that result in family reunification being refused to a person who  has  proved  stable  and  regular  resources,  and  that  the  level  of  resources required may  not  be  set  above  the  level  that would  qualify  the  person  for  long‐term social  assistance  in  the  Member  State  concerned.  The  legislation  in  force  in  the Netherlands was thus deemed as in violation of Community law.   In sum, the ECJ has been extremely important in the area of internal mobility and anti‐discrimination  between  EU  citizens.  The  activist  stance  of  the  ECJ  in  defending individual  liberties  and  promoting  European  integration  has  been  particularly important  in  the area of  freedom of movement. By contrast,  the  influence of  the ECJin the area of migration and integration policy has been curtailed by its limited jurisdiction over migration  policies. Nevertheless, whenever  it  had  the  opportunity  to  rule  on  the rights  of  third‐country  nationals,  it  has  followed  its  liberal  stance.  In  the  future,  the influence of the Court in this area is bound to expand, especially given the fact that the legislation adopted in the area of legal migration contains many ambiguous formulations that  leave  much  room  for  interpretation,  and  the  recent  “normalization”  of  ECJ jurisdiction in this area after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
Civil Society Historically,  the  expansion  of  citizenship  rights  has  been  strongly  conditioned  by  the emergence  of  social  movements  that  give  a  voice  to  marginalized  groups  and  put pressure for political change—one thinks for instance of the women’s movement or the 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civil  rights movement  in  the USA.  In  the case of migrants, however,  the structural and organizational  difficulties  have  largely  prevented  the  emergence  of  strong  ethnic mobilization.  Thus,  at  the  EU  level  pro‐migrant  civil  society  groups  are  often  seen  as “offering only weak weapons for the weak” (Geddes 2008, 154), and their impact in the policy‐making process as rather limited.  Nevertheless,  there  are  several  umbrella  organizations  and  think‐tanks  in Brussels that take strongly pro‐migrant positions, and who have been able to influence EU  policy  by  providing  EU  institutions  (particularly  the  Commission) with  counseling and  expertise.  In  particular  in  the  area  of  anti‐discrimination  the  mobilization  of expertise has been of crucial importance, and has enabled NGOs to directly influence the Commission’s  proposals  for  Directives  prohibiting  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of 
inter alia, race and ethnic origin, as well as religion or belief (Chopin 1999; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Case and Givens 2010). In the area of legal migration, the Commission has relied on the expertise of the Migration Policy Group—a think tank based in Brussels and  specialized  in  the  areas  of  immigration  and  anti‐discrimination—in  order  to develop  several  “soft”  tools  in  the  area  of  integration,  such  as  the  two Handbooks  on Integration  (Niessen  2004;  Niessen  and  Schibel  2007)  and  the  Migrant  Integration Policy  Index  (Niessen et al. 2007).  In addition,  the  social partners38 and  the European Economic  and  Social  Committee  (EESC)  are  also  involved  in  informal  processes  of consultation  and  are  often  able  to  influence  the  Commission’s  proposals  in  a  pro‐migrant way (Interview 4 and 21). The direct  representation of migrants’  interests  is,  however,  quite  limited. Two factors contribute to this weakness. First, it is in the nature of migration policy that the subjects of this policy are people with little or no access to political representation and limited  organizational  capacity.  Activism  by  migrants  themselves  is  therefore  largely inexistent at the European level. Secondly, because migration policy is a relatively recent area  of  EU  competence,  the  institutional  structures  of  organized  civil  society  and  the channels available for participation are still incipient, and do not compare to the degree of  organization  reached  in  older  areas  of  EU  competence,  such  as  for  instance  social policy. Thirdly, the intergovernmental character of decision‐making in migration policy hinders  the  work  of  civil  society  activists.  Many  NGOs  active  in  Brussels  concentrate their  lobbying  efforts  on  the  European  Parliament, which  is  an  easier  target  than  the                                                         38 The social partners are the European Confederation of Trade Unions (ETUC) and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE). 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other supranational institutions due to the higher degree of transparency in its working procedures (Interviews 10 and 12). However, in the area of legal migration, this option is not  likely to yield concrete results, given the limited formal powers of the European Parliament under  the  consultation procedure.  Following an  initiative by  the European Parliament,  in  1991  the  Commission  financed  the  establishment  of  a  transnational organization representing migrants throughout the EU—the European Migrants Forum. The European Migrants Forum was supposed to build a platform for migrants’ interests at  the  European  level  and  would  constitute  the  main  dialogue  partner  for  the Commission. However, the European Migrants Forum turned out to be a failure, first due to  internal  divergences  and  organizational  difficulties  and  later  due  to  accusations  of mismanagement and  fraud, which eventually  led  to  its dissolution (Geddes 2008, 156‐157) (Interview 8). Participation of NGOs in the policy process is mixed. A number of NGOs active in the  immigration  field  are  also  represented  in  Brussels,  often  in  the  form  of  umbrella organizations,  and are  regularly  consulted by  the Commission  in  the process of policy development.  However,  their  interests  are  diffuse,  and  they  lack  the  institutional  and organizational structures for intense cooperation, as is for instance the case of the NGOs active  in  the  field  of  social  policy  have  been  collaborating  for  years  within  the framework of the Social Policy Platform (Interview 10). Recently, however, following an idea proposed by the EESC, the Commission has supported the creation of a Forum for the Integration of Migrants, which was launched in 2009 and should provide a platform for  civil  society  organizations  interested  on  the  issue  of  migrants’  integration. Interestingly, this effort at  involving civil society has come at a time when EU policy is becoming increasingly focused on “soft” tools and mechanisms of cooperation between Member States, rather than binding supranational legislation (see Chapter 4). It remains to  be  seen whether  in  this  context  the  involvement  of  civil  society will  have  concrete effects, or whether it will primarily serve symbolic functions. In any case, it is relevant to note  that  the  Commission  has  actively  sought  to  facilitate  the  representation  of migrants’  interests  at  the  supranational  level,  as  evidenced  by  its  support  for  the European Migrants Forum and for the Forum for the Integration of Migrants.  
National Actors – Governments and Bureaucracy It  is widely  recognized  that  European  integration  has meant  an  increase  in  executive power  and  a  decrease  in  national  parliamentary  control,  as  critics  of  the  “democratic 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deficit” are quick to point out (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 534). More than that, given the fact that most decisions are taken at the lower level of the Council working groups and never reach the national ministers (Häge 2007; 2008), European integration has also led to a valorization of national bureaucracies within the policy‐making process. In  the  area  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  the  role  of  national  bureaucracies  has always been particularly strong given the predominance of intergovernmental modes of cooperation  (Guiraudon  2000;  2001).  Moreover,  the  role  of  national  bureaucrats, particularly within interior ministries, was further strengthened with the development of  informal means  of  cooperation  through  the National  Contact  Points  on  Integration, which were  set  up  in  2003  and were  instrumental  in  the  development  of  a  Common Framework on Integration (see Chapter 4). The National Contact Points on Integration is a network of experts, most of which are public officials  from the  interior ministries or migration  ministries  of  the  Member  States,  who  are  directly  involved  in  policy implementation and have a privileged channel of communication with the Commission that also impacts policy developments. It provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and best  practices  among  the  Member  States,  in  particular  with  reference  to  the implementation of integration programs (see Chapter 4). Finally,  national  governments  and  interest  organizations  organized  at  the national and local levels are also of crucial importance in the process of implementation of Community legislation into national law and practice. The power of national and local actors  to  influence  the  outcome  of  Community  instruments  on  the  ground  is  biggest where  harmonization  is  less  strong  and  EU  legislation  leaves  more  discretion  to  the Member States. This is precisely the case in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, where EU  legislation  tend  to  have  a  strong  degree  of  flexibility,  particularly  in  the  form  of ambiguous formulations and flexible provisions in EU Directives.     
 
3.4. Institutional determinants of policy­making:  This chapter has mapped the field of EU migration and integration policy. In doing so, it has  attempted  to  identify  who  governs  migration  at  the  supranational  level,  within which  institutional  framework, and by which modes of governance.  It was shown that the manner with which EU competence developed gradually over time has conditioned the  institutional  arrangement within  this  field  of  policy,  creating  a  skewed  balance  of power  in  favor  of  the  Council.  Moreover,  the  rule  of  unanimity  within  the  Council 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privileges  the Member  States with most  conservative  preferences  and  is  conducive  to minimum  harmonization.  Nevertheless,  it  has  also  been  remarked  that  the  gradual process of transfer of competences to the supranational level has been accompanied by a  strengthening  of  the Commission  as  a  key  actor within  the  policy  process,  and by  a slow pluralization of the actors involved in the policy‐making process. In particular, the European  Parliament  has  progressively  increased  its  role,  and  the  Commission  has established  new  forms  of  dialogue with  civil  society  and  national  bureaucracies.  This pluralization has come hand in hand, however, with a shift towards more flexible modes of governance and “softer” forms of cooperation. The analysis undertaken above enables us to  identify a number of “institutional determinants”  of  EU  policy  in  the  domain  of  immigration  and  integration  that  are relevant for the analysis of the development of EU policy in this field. These are: partial communautarization; uncertain legal basis; the legacy of intergovernmentalism and the “competition  for  competence”  between  the  Member  States  and  the  supranational institutions;  the  particular  opportunity  structures  for  interest  representation;  and  the existence of mechanisms of “rhetorical entrapment.”  
Partial Communitarization The  partial  communitarization  that  characterizes  the  institutional  setup  and  the decision‐making  process  in  this  policy  domain  has  the  effect  of  strengthening  the Council  and  the  Commission  within  the  legislative  process  to  the  detriment  of  the European  Parliament.  The  Commission  is  strengthened  because  it  becomes  the  only avenue  for  institutional  opposition  to  majorities  in  the  Council.  Moreover,  given  the secrecy of the working methods in the Council and its closure to outside influences, the Commission becomes the main avenue for civil society involvement in the policy‐making process,  which  takes  place  mainly  in  the  form  of  informal  consultations  prior  to  the presentation of legislative proposals. In  addition  to  strengthening  the  Council,  the  partial  communitarization  further privileges  those  Member  States  within  the  Council  that  are  most  reluctant  to  policy change.  This  constitutes what  Fritz  Scharpf  (1988)  has  termed  a  “joint  decision  trap” that  is conducive to minimum‐common‐denominator outcomes, and,  to  the extent  that compromise solutions are  found that  leave a wide degree of discretion to  the Member States, also to the fragmentation of the regulatory framework (Foblets 2009). 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Uncertain legal basis As  we  have  seen,  the  regulation  of  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  and  other measures  in  the  field  of  integration  are  taken  on  the  basis  of  provisions  that  call  for measures  on  the  “conditions  of  entry  and  residence  of  third‐country  nationals”.  This ambiguous legal basis is a determinant of EU policy‐making in this field because it again strengthens  those  Member  States  which  are  reluctant  to  transfer  competence  to  the European  level  and which  favor minimal  harmonization. Moreover,  together with  the difficulties of  legislating in the context of partial communitarization, the uncertainty of the legal basis creates a strong impulse for the adoption of “soft” modes of governance and “flexible” solutions. Because soft modes of governance are capable to accommodate divergent interests in better way than traditional authoritative legislation, they have the potential  of  enabling  coordination  of  national  policies  even  in  highly  contested  and politically  salient  issues,  but  they  are  also  instruments  that  produce  less  cohesive outcomes.  
Legacy of intergovernmentalism/ Competition for Competence The legacy of intergovernmentalism in this policy domain expresses itself institutionally in a tense relationship between supranational institutions on the one hand, and forums that  represent  the  interests  of  Member  States  on  the  other  hand.  The  existence  of parallel  structures  for  the  representation  of  national  interests  at  the  EU  level  such  as SCIFA that compete with more supranational for a such as the COREPER, and which are composed primarily of interior ministry personnel from the Member States is a case in point.  The  predominance  of  intergovernmental  forums  also  contributes  to  the  lack  of transparency and of public involvement in this policy field. The  development  of  this  policy  field  cannot  be  understood without  taking  into account  that  migration  and  integration  are  policy  areas  in  which  supranational institutions  (in  particular  the  Commission,  but  also  the  Parliament)  and  national governments  and  bureaucracies  represented  in  the  Council  are  fiercely  struggling  for competence. Supranational institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament had to carve a role for themselves, “competing for competence” in a setting dominated by a strong  pre‐existing  network  of  Council  working  groups.  Thus,  the  emergence  of  the Commission as a major actor happened only progressively and despite the resistance of a Council that was jealous of its institutional prerogatives. The intergovernmental legacy also manifested  itself  in  the  form of  a  strong policy  linkage between  immigration  and 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control within the Council, as well as a focus on the norm of national sovereignty.  
Involvement of civil society and other actors The  degree  of  involvement  of  civil  society  in  policy‐making  and  the  quality  of  this participation  are  crucial  determinants  of  policy‐making.  This  policy  domain  is characterized by a large degree of isolation of the policy process from legislative politics, the strong weight of national and supranational bureaucracies, and the relative  lack of direct representation of migrants’ interests and organizations within the policy process. The  opportunity  structures  for  civil  society  involvement  at  the  EU  level  in  the regulation of migrants’ rights are most favorable to technical and legal experts who can provide supranational institutions with specialized knowledge and resources, as well as to well organized umbrella NGOs, in particular those focusing on human rights, and the social partners. The predominance of legal experts and human rights NGOs contributes to  the  strength  of  legal  norms,  particularly  of  human  rights  and  anti‐discrimination, within this policy domain. The opportunity structures are less favorable for the representation of migrants’ organizations.  There  is  a  clear  lack of  direct  representation of migrants’  interests  and organizations  within  the  policy  process  at  the  EU  level,  which  is  mostly  a  result  of structural difficulties of organization at the EU level and the structurally weak position of migrants in political processes in general, as well as of the diffuse interests pursued by  migrants’  organizations.  The  opportunity  structures  are  equally  unfavorable  for nationalist  anti‐migrant  lobbies,  who  tend  not  to  organize  transnationally  and  are largely unrepresented among civil  society associations  in Brussels active  in  this policy domain. Finally, the secrecy and closure of the legislative procedures adopted in the field of immigration and integration policies in not conducive to a strong participation by civil society. Although consultation does exist, in particular in the agenda‐setting phase, it is mostly  ad  hoc  and  informal.  Institutionalized  forms  of  consultation  with  both  civil society and national bureaucracies are strongest where EU policy is characterized by the use of “soft” modes of governance.  
Mechanisms of “rhetorical entrapment” Despite  the only partial communitarization of  immigration and  integration,  the policy‐making context of the European Union produces several mechanisms capable of creating 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what Schimmelfennig  (2001)  calls  “rhetorical  entrapment”. The most obvious of  these mechanisms is judicialization, which binds Member States to commitments made in the past,  particularly  to  respect  for human  rights norms and basic principles of European law. Although most Member States strive  to be able  to  “upload”  their national policies and make  them  the  European  standard,  this  brings  with  it  the  danger  of  unwillingly bringing  existing  national  policies  under  supranational  scrutiny.  Another  factor  that increases the propensity to entrapment is the drive to compromise, which often leads to the  formulation  of  ambiguous  policies.  Entrapment  then  depends  on  the  capacity  of actors to enforce an interpretation of these ambiguous formulations that  links them to previous  rhetorical  commitments,  thus  forcing  norm‐abiding  behaviour.  In  sum, European immigration policy domain is conducive to “rhetorical entrapment” because of the strong degree of judicialization and the high importance of liberal norms, which can be  instrumentalized  by  pro‐migrant  actors  within  the  limits  of  the  institutional  and discursive context discussed above.  






4.1. Introduction:  After  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  established  the  necessary  legal  conditions  for  a more active  role  of  the  EU  in  the  regulation  of  migrants’  rights  (see  Chapter  3),  several initiatives were  proposed,  negotiated  and  adopted  at  the  EU  level  under  the  broader category  of  “legal  migration”  that  regulate  the  civic,  social,  economic  and  settlement rights  of  third‐country  nationals.  By  regulating  the  access  of  non‐nationals  to membership rights, the policies of the European Union towards third‐country nationals have the potential of shifting the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within the Union. Nevertheless,  the  policies  adopted  in  the  aftermath  of  Amsterdam  to  coordinate  the status  of  third‐country  nationals  have  been  severely  criticized  as  failing  to  grant  full equal  treatment  between  EU  citizens  and  third‐country  nationals,  contributing  to  the emergence of a fragmented system of civic stratification between different categories of migrants (see: Carrera 2005; Halleskov 2005; Lavenex 2006; Perchinig 2006b). As  argued  in  Chapter  2,  existing  theoretical  approaches  cannot  satisfactorily explain the ambiguous way with which membership rights are being expanded to third‐country nationals, thus calling for empirical research on the processes that lead to such a fragmented system of rights. The main goal of this chapter is precisely to fill in this gap by  investigating  how  the  interaction  of  different  factors  during  the  development  of supranational policy on the rights of third‐country nationals contributed to the creation of  ambiguous outcomes.  In order  to  answer  this question,  the  chapter will  review  the evolution of EU policy‐making in this area from 1999 to 2009—from the establishment of  supranational  competence by  the Treaty of Amsterdam until  the entry  into  force of the  Treaty  of  Lisbon.  This  period  corresponds  to  a  time  in  which  migration  was governed by a particular institutional framework, which I have described in Chapter 3 as “partial communitarization”. This era came to an end in 2009 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,  according  to which  the  “ordinary procedure” of decision‐making (QMV and co‐decision) will also apply to legal migration. 
  84 
The  analysis  of  the  policy‐making  process  undertaken  in  this  chapter  is structured  in  distinct  phases  that  build  upon  the  “policy‐making  cycle”  approach  (for general  introductions see: Parsons 1995, 77ff.; Blum and Schubert 2009, 101ff.). There are numerous versions of the policy cycle, the most elaborate of which tend to include at least  these  seven  phases:  (1)  problem  definition,  (2)  agenda  setting,  (3)  policy formulation,  (4)  decision‐making  process,  (5)  implementation,  (6)  evaluation,  (7) change and impact. Nevertheless, the division of the policy‐making process into discrete stages  is merely a heuristic device.  In  reality,  “phases and stages  tend  to blur, overlap and  intermingle”  (Parsons  1995,  xvii).  The  usefulness  of  the  policy  cycle  approach therefore consists  in adapting  the model  to one’s own purposes  in a way  that offers a scheme for reducing complexity and structuring the explanatory account of the policy‐making process within a particular field. For the purposes of  the analysis carried out  in this chapter, which concentrates exclusively  on  the  policy‐making  process  at  the  supranational  level,  only  the  earlier stages  of  the  policy‐making  process  will  be  analyzed,  that  is,  those  that  lead  to  the adoption of a particular policy output.39   The next chapter will  then analyse the policy outputs  themselves.  Taking  into  consideration  the  particular  characteristics  of  policy‐making  at  the  supranational  level,  it  seemed  useful  to  adopt  a  simplified  version  of policy  cycle distinguishing between  the  following  three  stages:  (1)  agenda  setting,  (2) policy formulation, (3) decision‐making. The agenda setting stage refers to the phase in which  a  political  commitment  is  made  to  tackle  a  particular  problem  through supranational  policies.  The  next  two  stages  are  somewhat  more  difficult  to  define because the boundaries between the policy formulation and the decision‐making stages are difficult to draw in the context of supranational policy‐making. Under the heading of “policy  formulation”,  I  will  concentrate  on  the  development  of  policy  plans  and  the process  of  definition  by  the  Commission  of  the  initiatives  that  it  intends  to  propose. Under the heading “decision‐making”, I will analyze the actual proposals put forward by the  Commission  and  the  negotiation  of  these  proposals  in  the  Council.  Problem                                                         39 This, of course, represents a major simplification of the policy‐making process, given that in a multi‐level system as the European Union supranational decisions are always premised on events and processes that take place at the national level. Nevertheless, given the sheer magnitude of such an undertaking, it would not be possible to conduct research within the framework of a dissertation on problem definition and preference formation in all Member States. An exception will be made in certain cases where an excursus in the preference formation of key Member States will be carried out. 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definition  will  not  be  considered  as  a  distinct  stage  because,  as  we  shall  see,  in  this policy field problem framing and re‐framing actually cut across all stages of the process.  
Methodology: The analysis is built on 25 interviews with persons active in the policy field, as described in  the  Introduction.  In  addition  to  interviews,  the  chapter  relies  heavily  on  the qualitative analysis of primary documents produced by European institutions and other important  actors  in  the  field.  In  different  phases  of  the policy  cycle,  different  types  of documents  provide  the main  source  of  data.  For  the  first  stages  of  the  policy  process (agenda  setting),  the  Presidency  Conclusions  of  the  European  Council,  as  well  as background documents that give insights into the position of the Member States and the main  institutions provide  the main  sources.  For  the  second  stage  (policy  formulation) the  main  data  are  the  relevant  Communications  and  Policy  Plans  published  by  the Commission.  For  the  third  stage  (decision‐making),  two  sets of documents will  be used. One the one hand, the original legislative proposals, as well as the accompanying explanatory memoranda and impact assessments submitted by the Commission will be analyzed. On the  other  hand,  all  available  minutes  of  Council  meetings  at  working  party  level  and SCIFA were  collected  using  the  search  engine  of  the  Council  register  of  documents.40 These documents were then systematically analysed in order to identify the position of the  individual Member  States  during  the  negotiations  and, wherever  this  information could be interpreted from the data, also to identify the reasoning behind the position of Member States. In addition, despite the fact that they do not give any information on the position of individual Member States, the Presidency Conclusions and press releases of the relevant meetings of the ministers at the JHA Council were also analysed as a source of  information  both  on  the  political  relevance  of  certain  questions  (only  the  most important questions are referred to the ministers), as well as a source of information on the nature of the compromises reached. Given  the  general  lack  of  transparency  of  negotiations  in  the  Council,  it  is  not always easy to fully grasp the justifications for the position taken by the Member States in  the  negotiations  from  the minutes  of  the  Council meetings.  Thus,  in  order  to  avoid homogenization, and in order to understand more fully the outcome of negotiations, an                                                         40 All Council Documents referenced throughout the text are available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ . 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effort has been made to delve further into the sources of Member States’ preferences by looking  into  the  preference  formation  process  at  the  national  level  for  certain  key Member States. This additional research had to be conducted within the constraints of time  and  space  that  limit  the  possibilities  of  such  a  potentially  vast  inquiry,  and  thus relies primarily on secondary literature. As  elaborated  in  the  Introduction,  the  analysis  of  the  empirical  material  was qualitative,  and  the  identification  of  explanatory  factors  and  analytical  categories was based on the "grounded theory" methodology as developed by Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss (2008). The analysis of the development of policy‐making on the rights of third‐country  nationals  undertaken  in  this  chapter  thus  did  not  consist  in  applying  a  pre‐established  explanatory  model  of  policy‐making  to  the  empirical  field,  but  rather proceeded  inductively  from  the  examination  of  the  field  to  the  development  of  an analytical account.  
Analytical framework Based  on  the  analysis  of  the  empirical  data  coupled  with  insights  from  academic literature,  it  has  been  possible  to  identify  a  number  of  explanatory  factors  that  are crucial  for  understanding  the  development  of  policy‐making  in  the  field  of  migrants’ rights in the EU during the period under scrutiny.41 I distinguish between three types of factors  that  can  be  considered  relevant  for  the  analysis:  political,  institutional,  and ideational. This distinction is an analytical one, because in reality these dimensions are often  deeply  entangled.  Thus,  ideas  and  norms  will  play  a  role  in  determining  the preferences  of  political  actors, whose  agency  in  turn might  be  crucial  in  using  certain institutional features of the field, for example in order to influence the course of policy‐making by activating certain norms in order to create “rhetorical entrapment”. We see how the reality of policy‐making is necessarily much more complex than any schematic representation might purport it to be. Nevertheless, for heuristic purposes it is useful to try to analytically dissociate the main explanatory factors, even though it must be kept in mind that they often intermingled.                                                         41 The aim of this section is not to develop a full‐fledged analytical model to explain policy‐making at the European level, but rather to present the most important explanatory factors that emerged out of the analysis, making references to the relevant academic literature that provides support for this interpretation. He approach taken in this dissertation has always been a problem‐oriented one, and has therefore not primarily aimed at applying or constructing an abstract explanatory model. 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The ideational factors include, in particular, the role of norms, ideas and frames. In emphasising the role of ideational factors in policy‐making, I follow the constructivist turn in European studies and the ideational turn in policy analysis (see, among others: Christiansen  et  al.  2001;  Diez  2001;  Fischer  2003;  Risse  2004;  Schmidt  and  Radaelli 2004; Wiener 2007; Schmidt 2008). The main thrust of this approach is the conviction that  “ideas”,  ”norms”  and  ”frames”  can  have  an  independent  impact  on  policy‐making and  may  sometimes  have  the  power  to  determine  “the  tracks  along  which  political action  travels”  (Fischer  2003,  viii).  Frames  are  understood  here  as  an  interpretative framework or scheme that people use to make sense of the world. Frames impact policy‐making  because  the  framing  of  a  phenomenon  influences  the  way  decision‐makers perceive reality and act upon it. Frames “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,  moral  evaluation,  and/or  treatment  recommendation”  for  a  particular policy  issue  (Entman  1993,  52).  Frame  analysis  thus  tries  to  explain  the  process  of “negotiation and (re)construction of reality by social/political actors through the use of symbolic  tools”  (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998, 1.2) and the  impacts of  this process on policy. In  addition  to  frames,  norms  and  ideas  are  also  key  to  understanding  policy‐making because they influence the preferences of political actors. From a constructivist perspective, norms and ideas can be seen as constitutive of the interests and preferences of actors, and their can influence their decisions to take one course of action rather than the other. As Risse points out, “the interests of actors cannot be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure. Rather political culture, discourse, and the ‘social construction’ of interests and preferences matter” (Risse 2004, 161). Concretely,  the  empirical  analysis  of  policy‐making  on  migrants’  rights  shows that the position of certain actors on this issue is not (merely) partisan or strategic but grounded  on  normative  principles  and  ideological  conviction.  The  preferences  of political actors can be placed along an axis from more to less “pro‐migrant” in the sense of being guided by an ideology or conviction that rights should be expanded to migrants for normative reasons—in particular based on the norm of equal human worth and the principle  of  equal  treatment  of  all  persons  and  members  of  society.  Actors  whose preferences  are  not  guided  by  such  normative  convictions might  still  be  in  favour  of expanding migrants’ rights in some cases, but this position will be determined by more utilitarian  or  pragmatic  ground—these  might  include  economic  interests,  the 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relationship  of  rights  to  immigration  (i.e.  as  a  “pull  factor”  that  might  attract  new migration), political strategy, or any other non‐normative ground.42 By adding a new  ideational dimension  to  the analysis,  the approach  taken here does  not  aim  to  deny  the  influence  of  other  factors  in  the  policy‐making  process, however. My analysis of how frames impact policy development is influenced by Vivien Schmidt’s  (2000)  concept  of  “discursive  institutionalism”,  although  I  believe  that  the concept  of  “frames”  describes  better  what  she  is  trying  to  explain  than  discourse. According  to  this  perspective,  the  role  of  ideas,  norms  and  frames  can  only  be  fully understood if analyzed in conjunction with other institutional and political factors that compose  the  highly  complex  puzzle which  is  policy making  at  the  European  level.  As Schmidt  and  Radaelli  point  out,  ideational  and  discursive  elements  “must  be  set  in institutional  context  (…)  as  one  factor  among a  range of  salient  factors”  (Schmidt  and Radaelli 2004, 184). This brings us to the next set of explanatory factors. Institutional  factors  are  generally  acknowledged  to  play  a major  role  in  policy‐making,  especially  at  the  European  Union.  At  least  since  the  emergence  of  the  “new institutionalisms”  in  political  science,  analysts  have  been  acutely  aware  that  the institutional  organization  of  the  polity  structures  political  conflict  in  a  way  so  as  to privilege  some  interests and actors while demobilizing others  (Hall  and Taylor 1996). For  this  policy  field,  the  institutional  setup  at  the  supranational  level  has  been extensively  discussed  in  Chapter  3.  In  particular,  the  following  “institutional determinants”  were  identified  that  are  likely  to  influence  the  policy‐making  process: partial  communitarization;  uncertain  legal  basis;  the  legacy  of  intergovernmentalism and  the  “competition  for  competence”  between  the  Member  States  and  the supranational  institutions;  skewed  structures  for  interest  representation;  and  the existence of mechanisms of “rhetorical entrapment” (see Chapter 3). Despite  the  importance  of  institutions  in  structuring  policy  processes,  it  is important to avoid the pitfalls of certain neo‐institutional studies of treating institutions                                                         42 Whether certain political actors take such ideologically based ‘pro‐migrant’ position or not might well correlate with party‐political ideology, might be based on individual belief, or it might be largely determined by the prevalent discourse at the national level in the country where this actor comes from. Thus, it is less likely that political actors representing the position of states with a citizenship regime based on jus sanguinis and an ethno‐cultural understanding of the nation will take such a normative ‘pro‐migrant’ position, whereas actors coming from countries that follow a more republican tradition might be more likely to do so. For the purpose of the analysis undertaken here, however, the most important point is to note that certain actors are guided by such normative grounds, rather than the reasons for this. 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as  unitary  actors  or  immutable  organizations.  Favell  and  Guiraudon  (2009)  have recently issued a plea for approaches that “flesh out” institutions when analyzing policy processes at the European level. As these authors note: “The theoretical value of studies that  ‘flesh out’ EU institutions is that they show power struggles between insiders and outsiders,  lines of cleavage and rules of entry and  interaction.  In brief,  they show how fields  are  institutionalized,  and  how  roles  are  therein  scripted,  instead  of  taking institutions for granted.” (Favell and Guiraudon 2009, 567) Political  factors  are  thus  of  great  importance  for  the  analysis  carried  out  here, which  takes  the  agency  of  political  actors  very  seriously.  In  particular,  the  political positioning  of  the  main  actors  within  the  two  key  institutions  in  this  field—the Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs and the governments of the Member States represented  in  the  Council—is  of  crucial  importance  for  understanding  the  policy‐making process. As the articles in the recent special issue edited by Bale (2008) clearly demonstrate,  “politics  matters”  in  determining  the  direction  of  immigration  and integration policy  in Europe. More precisely,  right‐of‐centre parties  are more  likely  to take  a  restrictive  approach  to  immigration  and migrant  integration  than  their  left‐of‐centre  counterparts.  This  divide  is  moreover  particularly  strong  for  the  issue  of migrants’  rights. Thus, Duncan and Van Hacke  (2008)  show  that  “differences between left and right are clearest on migrant  integration policy”, while control of borders and admissions issues (immigration policy strictu sensu) are more prone to be divisive. Thus, although the party in power is not a good predictor of restrictive immigration policies, partisanship does have a strong impact on the restrictiveness or expansiveness of laws that regulate the rights of resident migrants, with parties right‐of‐centre taking a more restrictive  position  than  those  left‐of‐centre  (Givens  and  Luedtke  2004;  Givens  and Luedtke 2005). The left‐right dimension is relevant for understanding the preferences of both the governments  in  the  Council  and  the  position  of  the  Commissioner  in  office,  whose political position is crucial for understanding the overall orientation of the Commission in  the  policy‐making  process.  The  importance  of  the  Commissioners  in  office  (rather than Commission administrators) in shaping the Commission’s legislative behaviour has been  recognized  in  recent  studies  that  analyze  preference  formation  within  the Commission (Egeberg 2006; Wontka 2008). Commissioners and their personal cabinets set  priorities  for  action  by  the  Directorates  General  and  define  the  overall  political orientation  to  be  followed when proposing  legislation.  Scholars  differ  on whether  the 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position  of  Commissioners  is  primarily  determined  by  national,  partisan  or organizational factors (see: Hix 2005, 27‐71; Egeberg 2006; Wontka 2008), although it seems  that  the  importance of  each  factor differs  significantly depending on  the policy area  (Egeberg  2006).  As  the  chapter  will  show,  the  empirical  data  collected  for  this study  suggests  that  the  party  affiliation  (left‐wing/liberal  or  right‐wing/conservative) and  ideological  orientation  (“pro‐migrant”  or  not)  of  the  Commissioner  in  charge  and the Commission’s high‐ranking staff (directors‐general and heads‐of‐unit), as well as of the governments in power were indeed highly significant.43 In  addition  to  this  substantive  dimension—restrictive  versus  expansionary policies  with  respect  to  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals—there  is  also  another dimension of actors’ preferences that are crucial for understanding the development of policy‐making  at  the  supranational  level.  This  second  dimension  refers  to  the preferences  of  political  actors  for  more  or  less  harmonization  of  this  issue  at  the supranational  level. The reluctance of certain Member States to surrender competence with respect  to certain aspects of  immigration and migrant  integration policy, and  the need  to  find  compromises  that  retain  a  large  degree  of  discretion  for  national governments  to  define  under  which  conditions  migrants  will  have  access  to  certain kinds of rights, is a very important factor that explains much of the ambiguity present in the pieces of supranational  legislation adopted  in  this area. This reluctance to  transfer competences is stronger, as we shall see, where the issue of migrants’ rights is entangled with immigration policy strictu sensu (control over who is entitled to enter and stay in the territory). Besides these two key explanatory factors, there are some elements that function as sort of “intervening variables”, indirectly influencing the position of political actors, in particular of national governments. One of these elements is the degree of politicization of  immigration and migrant  integration by far‐right parties.  In a recent examination of citizenship  policies  in  all  European  Union  countries,  Howard  (2009)  shows  that  the presence of strong mobilization against migrants by far right parties or migrants is the key factor that prevents liberalization of restrictive citizenship policies. This, as Howard shows,  is  independent  of  the  far‐right  party  being  represented  in  government  or  not,                                                         43 On the basis of the factors discussed here, throughout the text, I will call those actors that take a position for more restrictive policies or maintenance of the status quo “restrictive” or “conservative”, and those that take a position in favour of expansive harmonization of migrants’ rights “liberal” or “pro‐migrant”. 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since  the  negative  politicization  by  the  far‐right  “is  able  to  exert  disproportionate influence on the entire political spectrum” (Howard 2009, 194). A similar hypothesis has been  put  forward  with  respect  to  integration  policies  by  Givens  and  Luedke  who contend  that:  “when  the  political  salience  of  a  given  immigration  issue  is  high,  any harmonization  that  results  is  more  likely  to  be  restrictive  towards  migrants’  rights” (Givens  and  Luedtke  2004,  145).  Thus,  the  presence  of  strong  far‐right  parties  at  the national  level  and  the  degree  of  politicization  of  immigration  and migrant  integration are factors that impact on the preferences of political actors, moving their preferences in the direction of more restrictive policies on migrants’ rights. The  second  element  is  related  to  the  first,  and  consists  in  the power of  certain crisis events to shift public perception of a particular issues and contribute to a dramatic increase  in salience of  this policy  issue. As Boin et al.  (2009) point out, when societies are  confronted with major,  disruptive  emergencies,  this  often  leads  to major  political changes.  Crises  have  the  potential  to  dislocate  hitherto  dominant  social,  political  or administrative  discourses  and  are  often  conducive  to  policy  change:  “Disruptions  of societal routines and expectations open up political space for actors inside and outside government  to  redefine  issues,  propose policy  innovations  and organizations  reforms, gain popularity and strike at opponents. They create political opportunity windows for advocacy  groups  challenging  established  policies,  newly  incumbent  office‐holders  and other potential  change agents.”  (Boin et al. 2009, 82) As  the analysis of policy‐making undertaken in this chapter will show, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA (hereafter: 9/11)  and the assassination of the right‐wing politician Pim Fortyun in the Netherlands  represent  examples  of  such  crisis  events  that  had  important  political and discursive  consequences at  the national  level, which  in  turn were  reflected  in  the negotiations  of  policies  aimed  at  harmonizing  and  expanding  migrants  rights  at  the supranational  level  in  terms  of  providing  an  opportunity  for  the  reframing  of  certain policy issues.  
Structure of the chapter: The chapter will be divided into two sections. Section 4.2 will concentrate on the period between  1999  and  2004,  while  section  4.3  will  cover  the  period  between  2004  and 2009.  This  division  corresponds  to  two  clearly  distinct  periods  of  the  evolution  of migrant  integration  as  a  field  of  EU  policy‐making  characterized  by  different political and  institutional  settings.  In  fact,  they  will  be  considered  here  as  constituting  two 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different policy cycles, each containing  its own agenda setting, policy  formulation, and decision‐making stages. In political terms, these periods are marked by different policy priorities and by the predominance of different political actors. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,  Community  action  in  the  field  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  has  been governed  by  multiannual  programmes  covering  a  period  of  five  years.  These multiannual programmes are essentially policy plans adopted by the heads of state and government  that  set  the  agenda  for  the work of  the Commission and  the Council,  and define  the policy priorities  to be pursued. The  timeframe  for  implementation of  these programmes  is always set  in a way so as  to coincide with  the mandate of a particular College  of  Commissioners.  Thus,  the  implementation  of  the  first  multiannual programme—the  Tampere  Programme  (1999‐2004)—coincided  with  the  mandate  of the  left‐leaning  Prodi  Commission,  during  which  time  the  socialist  politician,  Mr. Antonio  Vitorino,  was  Commissioner  for  Justice  and  Home  Affairs.  By  contrast,  the implementation of the second multiannual programme—the Hague Programme (2004‐2009)—coincided with the mandate of the centre‐right Barroso I Commission, in which the  “Forza  Italia”  member  and  former  Italian  Foreign  Minister  under  Berlusconi,  Mr. Franco Frattini, was  the  responsible Commissioner until  8 May 2008,  followed by  the another centre‐right politician, Mr. Jacques Barrot, who replaced him until the end of the term.44  The  division  of  this  chapter  therefore  corresponds  to  the  period  of implementation  of  two distinct multiannual  programmes, which were  also marked by different political constellations. In  institutional  terms,  these  two  periods  differ  as  to  the  standing  of  the  main institutions  within  the  policy‐making  process  and  the  informal  rules  that  govern  the decision‐making  process.  In  the  first  period,  between  1999  and  2004,  supranational cooperation in the field of Justice of Home Affairs was in its infancy, and the relationship between institutions was still very heavily influenced by the intergovernmental forms of cooperation that had dominated this field in the past. Particularly worth mentioning are the strong role played by the European Council in agenda setting, the predominance of an  intergovernmental  mentality  in  the  Council,  the  formal  exclusion  of  the  European Parliament  from  the  decision‐making  process,  and  the  constant  competition  for                                                         44 Frattini resigned before the end of his term and was substituted by the then Commissioner for transport, Mr. Jacques Barrot. Given the very short time in which Barrot was in office, he did not make any changes to the strategy defined by Frattini and therefore his role as Commissioner will not be of major relevance for the theses elaborated in this chapter. 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competence  between  the  Council  and  the  Commission.  By  the  end  of  2004,  however, supranational competence in the area of immigration and migrant integration had been consolidated  in  all  but  economic  migration  policy.  The  Commission  had  successfully carved  a  strong  role  for  itself  as  a  legitimate  actor  in  the  field,  notwithstanding  the institutional  setup  that  hampered  more  ambitious  proposals.  The  period  of  2004  to 2009  was  therefore  no  longer  subject  to  the  strong  weight  of  the  intergovernmental legacy in the field, and the prerogatives of the Council as the most important institution had started to erode. In the following, each of these periods will be analysed in detail. The analysis will show  how  conflicting  dynamics  present  during  the  first  period  of  policy‐making interacted with one another and contributed to creating “restrictive rights”—namely the expansion of membership rights to third‐country nationals coupled with the imposition of  several  restrictive  criteria  on  the  acquisition of  these  rights. Moreover,  I will  argue that  during  the  first  period  of  policy‐making  the  concept  of  integration  underwent  a reframing  as  a  result  of  a  “framing  contest”  between  the  Commission  and  certain Member States which pushed for a more exclusionary understanding of integration. The  second  period,  on  the  other  hand,  is marked  by what  could  be  called  “the politics  of  categorization”.  By  “categorization”,  I  refer  to  the  differentiation  between migrants  according  to  several  criteria  (entry  purpose,  length  of  stay,  occupancy,  etc.) and the creation of a multiplicity of  legal statuses. The analysis of EU policy‐making in the  field  between  2004  and  2009  will  show  how  the  interaction  of  different  factors contributed to exacerbating this feature of EU law and policy towards legal migrants. It will be argued that  the politics of categorization has served an  instrument  to  facilitate the  achievement  of  consensus  on  the  adoption  of  supranational  measures  regulating migrants’ rights, while at the same time contributing to the creation of hierarchies. 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4.2. Form Tampere to The Hague: restrictive rights (1999­2004)   4.2.1. Agenda‐setting:  The  first  phase  of  policy‐making  in  the  field  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  after  the communitarization  of  immigration  started with  an  important  agenda‐setting moment. As  seen  in  Chapter  3,  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  expressly  called  upon  European institutions to adopt the necessary measures to implement “an area of freedom, security, and justice” in the European Union within five years (Art. 61 EC). In order to fulfill this demand,  it was  necessary  to  set  political  priorities  and  define  the main  actions  to  be pursued in the upcoming five years. Given the incipient nature of EU competence in this area,  it  was  the  European  Council  who  took  the  lead  in  elaborating  the  direction  of future cooperation in migration policy. Assisted by the Commission and the Council, the heads of state and government organized a series of meetings to discuss the direction of future Community action in Justice and Home Affairs, culminating in the adoption of the Tampere Presidency Conclusions during the European Council meeting held in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999. The Tampere Presidency Conclusions—also known as the ‘Tampere Milestones’—were essentially the first multiannual programme for the area of Justice and Home Affairs. This  section  has  two  main  aims:  firstly,  it  identifies  the  main  elements  of  the Tampere programme with  reference  to  the  treatment of  legally  resident  third‐country nationals;  secondly,  it  attempts  to  explain  the  conditions  that  led  to  these  particular policy priorities. As we shall see, the Tampere Presidency Conclusions established a very liberal and pro‐migrant agenda, setting a strong commitment to the principles of equal treatment  and  non‐discrimination.  It  will  be  argued  that  the  adoption  of  such  a progressive programme was made possible by the existence of political and  ideational factors  that  provided  favourable  opportunities  for  progressive  migration  politics,  in particular  the  predominance  of  left‐wing  governments  in  the  Council,  the  political context marked by high support for European integration, a strong commitment to the norms  of  human  rights  and  anti‐discrimination,  and  the  fact  that  left‐leaning governments wanted to send strong signals against the rise of  far‐right populism. This favourable political context strengthened the position of pro‐migrant actors—especially the  left‐leaning European Commission and  the  left‐wing governments  in  the European 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Council—to the detriment of the right‐wing governments of certain Member States and the conservative interior ministry officials in the Council.  
The Origins of Tampere The  preparations  for  the  development  of  a  policy  programme  for  the  new  “area  of freedom,  security  and  justice”  started  some months  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the Treaty of Amsterdam. At the European Council in Cardiff in 15‐16 June 1998, the heads of  state  and  government  charged  the  Commission  and  the  Council  with  preparing  an Action Plan on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of  freedom security and  justice  (Cardiff Presidency Conclusions, 15‐15  June 1998 §48).  An  analysis  of  this  action  plan  and  of  the  preparatory  documents  that  led  to  it enables us  to discern  the position of  the Commission and  the Council  as  to  the  future development of the field. As  these documents make clear,  the Commission was already at  this very early stage  exercising  its  agency  to  push  forward  a  pro‐migrant  agenda.  Thus,  in  a Commission Communication drafted in preparation for the Action Plan, the Commission makes clear that, in its understanding, the area of freedom, security and justice must go beyond promoting the free movement of persons across internal borders (COM (1998) 459). Freedom, according to the Commission, “must be complemented by the full range of  fundamental  human  rights,  including  protection  from  any  form  of  discrimination” (ibid 5). A key priority  in that respect was “the  integration of non‐nationals”, which  in the view of the Commission should be based on “a common understanding of the extent to which third‐country nationals and EU citizens should be treated equally” and on the principle that rights should increase with time of residence (ibid 6). This position of  the Commission was very different  from the discourse that had predominated until  then  in  the European Union.  It  is worth remembering  that despite the  lack  of  explicit  supranational  competence,  intergovernmental  cooperation  in  the area of  Justice and Home Affairs  long preceded the Treaty of Amsterdam (see: Geddes 2000;  Papagianni  2006).  The  main  actors  in  this  cooperation  were  national  and European public servants working within the framework of Council working groups or in  intergovernmental  forums outside the community  framework. As Guiraudon (2003) points out, these groupings were dominated by law and order personnel, who were the first ones  to “go  transnational”  in order  to avoid constraints at  the national  level. As a consequence,  the  migration  cooperation  within  the  Council  until  the  Treaty  of 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Amsterdam  had  been  primarily  concerned  with  issues  of  border  control,  crime prevention, and surveillance  technology, so  that a cognitive  link between  immigration, policing  and  security  was  very  strong  within  this  epistemic  community.  Thus,  the position of the Council was bound to be more conservative than that of the Commission. The  influence  of  the  Council  is  visible  in  the  final  version  of  the  Action  Plan adopted  by  the  European  Council  in  its  meeting  in  Vienna  in  11‐12  December  1998 (Vienna  Presidency  Conculsions,  11‐12  Dec.  1998).  Although  the  ideas  of  the Commission are taken up in the Introduction, when it comes to listing concrete policies to  be  pursued,  the  focus  is more  strongly  put  on  the  combat  of  illegal migration  and control  of  external  borders  (ibid).  The  notion  of  integration  does  not  come  up  in  the latter  part  of  the  document,  nor  does  the  idea  of  strengthening  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals. Nevertheless, the action plan does list the elaboration of measures on “conditions  of  entry  and  residence”  of  third‐country  nationals  as  a  priority  to  be achieved within five years, particularly the issuing of residence permits for the purpose of  family  reunification  and  the  conditions  under  which  legally  resident  third‐country nationals  could be allowed  to  settle and work  in any Member State of  the Union  (ibid §38(c)). Following these preparations, in the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in  October  1999,  the  actual  programme  was  adopted  in  the  form  of  the  Tampere Presidency  Conclusions.  The  Tampere  Milestones  were  drafted  during  the  Finish Presidency  and  adopted  by  the  European  Council,  that  is,  the  heads  of  state  and government assisted by their foreign ministers. At this time, of all 15 Member States, 11 had  social‐democrat/socialist  prime‐ministers,  including  all  the  big  Member  States except for Spain.45 In the conclusions, the position of the heads of state and government reflected clearly the ideas of the Commission on the integration of migrants. Moreover, the most important Member States in the European Council took pro‐migrant positions. In particular, during the preparations of the Tampere declaration, France and Germany had  joined  forces  in  pushing  for  a  more  proactive  migration  policy  with  a  stronger emphasis  on  integration  (Migration  News  Sheet  1999).  The  ideas  of  the  Commission resonated with the position of these Member States, who took a leading role in the then quite liberally oriented European Council. Thus, in the final declaration, the ideas of the 
                                                        45 The 11 countries were: FR, UK, DE, NL, AT, IT, SE, FI, PT, GR and DK 
  97 
Commission were clearly reflected and  the  issue of migrant  integration was  framed  in the language of equal treatment and citizenship rights.  
The Tampere Declaration The  Tampere  Milestones  are  widely  considered  as  a  very  ambitious  and  progressive document.  In  this  declaration,  the  heads  of  state  and  government  called  for  the development of “a common EU asylum and migration policy”, implying the political will to  achieve  a  high  degree  of  harmonization.  This  common  European  migration  policy should be composed of four elements: (1) “partnership with countries of origin”, (2) “a common European asylum system”, (3) “fair treatment of third‐country nationals”, and (4)  “management  of  migration  flows”  (Tampere  Presidency  Conculsions,  15‐16  Oct. 1999 point A,  §10‐27). Under  the  label  “fair  treatment of  third‐country nationals”,  the European Council  called  for  legislation  to be adopted on  four areas:  the  integration of third‐country  nationals,  the  fight  against  racism  and  xenophobia,  conditions  for admission  and  residence  of  third‐country  nationals,  and  the  rights  of  third‐country nationals that are long‐term residents. In particular, §18 stated: The  European Union must  ensure  fair  treatment  of  third‐country nationals who reside legally on the territory of  its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those  of  EU  citizens.  It  should  also  enhance  non‐discrimination  in  economic,  social  and  cultural  life  and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.  Further, §21 went on as follows: The  legal  status  of  third‐country  nationals  should  be approximated  to  that  of  Member  States’  nationals.  A person, who  has  resided  legally  in  a Member  States  for  a period of time to be determined and who holds a long‐term residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed  by  EU  citizens;  e.g.  the  right  to  reside,  receive education,  and  work  as  an  employee  or  self‐employed person, as well as the principle of non‐discrimination vis‐à‐vis  the  citizens  of  the  State  of  residence.  The  European Council  endorses  the  objective  that  long‐term  legally resident third‐country nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are resident. 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The  Tampere  Milestones  were  a  watershed  in  the  history  of  European cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, which had until then been primarily based on intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of border control and policing. The declaration represented a political statement at the highest  level  in which the Member States committed  themselves  to a common migration and asylum policy with a  strong focus on  fighting racism and xenophobia and granting equal  treatment rights  to  third‐country nationals. These very bold commitments are striking  for their  liberal and pro‐migrant  character,  framed  as  they were  in  the  language  of  equal  treatment  and  non‐discrimination—and this  in an area deeply entangled with national sovereignty, which had so  far been dominated by security  interests, and where Member States had highly divergent policies. In order to understand this remarkable outcome, it is important to keep in mind the  political  and  discursive  context  in  which  it  took  place.  The  time  surrounding  the signature,  ratification  and  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam was  a  time  of great  optimism  about  European  integration  and  the  future  of  the  Union,  strong commitments  to  the  norm  of  human  rights,  and  rising  concerns  about  the  spread  of xenophobia  and  far‐right  ideologies.  The  moment  of  ambitious  reforms  and  great confidence in the European project that had started in Maastricht—with the creation of the European Union, the establishment of Union citizenship, the introduction of the new pillar  structure  and  the  goal  of  adopting  a  common  currency—was  continued  by  the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, and later by the Convention for drafting a Treaty establishing  an  European  Constitution  (2001‐2003).  Enthusiasm  for  the  European unification  project was  coupled with  a  strong  commitment  to  anti‐discrimination  and human rights. Evidence of the strong commitment to human rights can be found in the setting  up  of  a  Convention  to  draft  a  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  for  the  Union  in 1999 and the creation of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in Vienna in the same year. In  addition,  this  was  also  a  time  of  high  concerns  among  European  governing parties  about  the  rise  of  far‐right  parties  in  Europe.  In  the  context  of  the  upcoming eastern  enlargement,  and  given  the  growing  support  for  far‐right  populist  parties, political elites feared an outburst of xenophobia. Thus, many governments in the Council supported  pro‐migrant  initiatives  that  framed  their  concerns  in  terms  of  anti‐discrimination and anti‐racism, also because they saw it as a strategy to counter the rise of  far‐right  parties  (Geddes  and Guiraudon  2004). Moreover, migrant  integration was 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not yet a highly politicized  topic, most attention being centred on  the  issue of asylum, which had  acquired  a new dimension  in  the 1990s due  to  the huge  influx  of  refugees fleeing the war in Yugoslavia. In this context, anti‐discrimination and the harmonization of  the  rights  of  non‐citizens  were  political  themes  with  which  the  ruling  centre‐left governments sought to counter the exclusionary discourse of far‐right parties.  In  sum,  the  time  surrounding  the  Tampere  Presidency  Conclusions  provided  a particularly  favourable  political  context  for  pro‐migrant  initiatives.  However,  as  the discussion of the policy‐formulation and decision‐making stages below will make clear, this particularly favourable moment would not last long. For one, the political situation in  Europe  changed  as  a  result  of  9/11,  the  success  of  right‐wing  parties,  and  the increasing  politicization  of  immigration  and  integration.  In  addition,  the  institutional context that characterized the process of agenda setting in Tampere was different than the  one  for  actually  implementing  it.  It would  not  be  the  heads  of  state  sitting  in  the European Council, but rather the law and order officials in the Council working groups that would  actually  have  to  negotiate  and  adopt  any  subsequent  legislative  proposals put  forward  by  the  Commission.  For  the  future  development  of  EU migration  policy, therefore, it would be the political contest between the Commission and the Council that would  prove  decisive  in  explaining  policy‐making.  Nevertheless,  as  we  shall  see,  the spirit  of  Tampere  continued  to  influence  the  strategic  positioning  of  actors  and  the political direction of policy proposals—by supplying the liberal frame of “fair treatment” and providing legitimacy for pro‐migrant interests—even after the conditions that had enabled such a bold and liberal commitment were long gone.    4.2.2. Policy formulation  Tampere had provided a mandate for action by the Commission and the Council in order to develop a common policy in migration and migrant integration within a period of five years,  between  1999  and  2004.  Following  this,  the  Commission  immediately  started preparing  a  number  of  legislative  proposals  as  well  as  a  couple  of  Communications, where it laid out its policy ideas. As we shall see, all the original ideas and proposals of the Commission were very ambitious and far‐reaching, both in their intention to achieve the maximum amount of harmonization possible, as well as in terms of granting a strong protection to migrants by establishing a high level of rights. 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In  its Communication on a Community Migration Policy,  the Commission called for a common policy that would focus on regulating migration flows rather than trying to reduce or stop them (COM (2000) 757). The aim was to regulate all three main types of  immigration  flows—family  migration,  humanitarian  migration,  and  economic migration—by  means  of  comprehensive  horizontal  instruments  that  would  establish common rules  for  the entry and residence of  third‐country nationals  for each of  these purposes,  and  regulate  their  rights  as  residents  of  the Union  (ibid). No differentiation would  be  made  between  subcategories,  so  as  to  avoid  differences  in  levels  of harmonization and provide for the biggest coverage possible. In  addition,  binding  legislation would  also  be proposed  in  order  to  achieve  the goal  of  “fair  treatment  of  third‐country  nationals”.  In  its  Communication  (ibid),  the Commission argued that Community action in this area should be guided by the concept of “civic citizenship”. The idea of civic citizenship was inspired by contemporary debates in academia, and also by  the political and  ideological position of  the  leading  figures  in the Commission at the time, who had a clearly “pro‐migrant” ideology. Talking about the policy  formulation at  that  time, a  representative of  the Commission noted:  “They were 
ideas that were around at the time in academic circles talking about them and so on, but 
what  you do, well  certainly what we did  in  those days,  because  it was a  completely new 
area,  there  was  no  other  experience  within  the  Commission  in  that  field.  We  talked 
amongst ourselves, of course, a lot of discussions within the unit, the head­of­unit had very 
clear  ideas  about  what  he  wanted  anyway,  he  had  been  behind  the  preparation  of  the 
Tampere Council…”(Interview 22 00:09 ff.).46 The  notion  of  civic  citizenship  reflected  the  wish  to  decouple  rights  from nationality  and  clearly  reflected  the  academic  ideas of  “postnationalism”.  In  a passage that  is worth quoting  at  length,  the  same  interviewee  from  the Commission, who was very intensively involved in the formulation of these policies, describes the ideas behind the concept of civic citizenship  in a way that clearly reveals the postnational nature of the concept and the “pro‐migrant” ideological orientation of the Commission at the time:  
It  [N.B.  the  concept  of  civic  citizenship]  related  very  much  to  the 
understanding  that  we  now  have,  that  we  now  know  that  most 
migrants live in cities, and you know, it... integration for a migrant, it 
means that they feel citizens of the city, and this is where the idea of 
civic  citizenship came  from, you don't have  to be a national  to be a                                                         46 The head of unit at the time to which the interviewee is referring was Jean–Louis de Brower. 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this  was  a  way  of  creating  a  status  which  provided  for  maximum 
rights and responsibilities and participation, without actually having 





go  to  a  country  to  become  a  national,  and  that  has  never  been  the 
case in Europe and... doesn't need to be the case in Europe, what we 
were  looking  for was another way of  creating  that  status of  feeling 
that you belong without going through the possession of nationality. 
And  it  is  helpful  in  terms  of  its  uses  on  the  ground  too,  I mean  the 
ultimate  goal  would  be  that  national  citizenship  becomes 
insignificant as  long as you have European citizenship, but we are a 
long way from that yet! (chuckles) (Interview 22, 00:58ff.) 
 Thus,  it was proposed that a common set of rights and obligations  for all  third‐country nationals  should be  established,  including  equality  in working  conditions  and access  to  services,  and,  for  permanent  residents,  also  political  rights  such  as  the possibility  to  vote  at  local  level  election.  The  set  of  rights  granted  to  third‐country nationals would be differentiated according  to  the  length of  stay, with  socio‐economic rights being granted first, civic citizenship including political rights being the next step, and finally culminating in the acquisition of nationality. The  binding  legislative  instruments  in  the  area  of  immigration  and  integration would be complemented by non‐legislative initiatives aimed at measuring the success of Member  States’  policies  and  developing  common  European  standards  and  practices. Specifically,  the  Commission  proposed  an  Open  Method  of  Coordination  (OMC) consisting of common European guidelines and national action plans on each aspect of the  common  policy,  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  existing  OMC  in  the  area  of employment  and  social  inclusion  (COM  (2001)  387).  Further,  soft  measures  such  as common  benchmarks  and  indicators  were  also  proposed  with  the  aim  of  better coordinating Member States’ integration policies. In terms of binding legislation, the preferred instrument of the Commission were Directives, as the “Communication on a scoreboard to review progress on the creation of area  of  ‘freedom,  security  and  justice’  in  the  European  Union”  makes  clear 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(COM/2000/167  final,  11‐13).47  Specifically,  the  Commission  planned  to  propose  two Directives on anti‐discrimination: one prohibiting discrimination on the ground of race and  ethnic  origin,  and  one  establishing  a  general  framework  for  equal  treatment  in employment  and  occupation.  These measures would  apply  equally  to  EU  citizens  and third‐country nationals, but they were considered to be particularly relevant for third‐country  nationals,  since  discrimination  and  xenophobia  disproportionately  affect persons of migrant origin. Further, the Commission planned to propose three Directives regulating  the  conditions  of  entry  and  residence  of  third‐country  nationals  for  the purposes of, respectively: family reunification, study or other unpaid activities, and paid employment  or  self‐employment.  These  three  Directives  were  meant  to  be comprehensive,  that  is, with  these  instruments  all  kinds of  legal  immigration  for non‐humanitarian  purposes  (i.e.  besides  asylum‐seekers)  would  be  regulated.  Finally, Directives would also be proposed on the status of third‐country nationals who are long‐term residents with the aim of approximating their rights to those of Union citizens, and on  the  possibility  of  extending  free movement  rights  to  legally  resident  third‐country nationals. All of this would be complemented by the OMC, as mentioned before. The  first  Directives  to  be  proposed were  the  Directives  on  anti‐discrimination, based on Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The two proposals were presented to the  Council  simultaneously  in  November  1999  and  were  conceived  of  as  a  package (COM(1999)566  and  COM(1999)565  respectively).  The  main  difference  between  the two  Directives  was  the  scope.  The  first  proposal  prohibited  discrimination  based  on racial  or  ethnic  origin  in  the  realms  of  employment48,  social  security,  education,  and access  to goods and services. The second proposal prohibited discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in the realm of employment only49. Although  the prohibition of discrimination  is anchored  in several  international human rights  instruments,  these  instruments  do  not  provide  direct  recourse  to  redress  for individuals who are victims of discrimination. The main objective of this Directive was therefore  to  give  teeth  to  the  Union’s  commitment  to  non‐discrimination  by  granting victims of discrimination a right to effective legal remedy and financial compensation.                                                         47 Only the most important instruments will be discussed here. A few other measures were also listed in the scoreboard and proposed by the Commission, but will not be discussed in any detail here. Please see the Scoreboard for a full list. 48 “The realm of employment” includes the following dimensions: access to employment, working conditions, promotion, vocational training, and membership in workers organizations. 49 Again including the following dimensions: access to employment, working conditions, promotion, vocational training, and membership in workers organizations. 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Both proposals were adopted within a  “world  record”  time  (Tyson 2001),  after only six months of negotiations in the Council and with relatively little modifications to the  original  proposal,  despite  being  subject  to  the  rule  of  unanimity.  The  adoption  of these Directives were  clearly  influenced by  the political  context of  the  time, which,  as mentioned  above,  was  still  marked  by  a  strong  commitment  to  the  ideas  of  human rights,  anti‐discrimination,  and equal  treatment. They were also negotiated within  the context of the Employment and Social Affairs configurations of the Commission and the Council, where these norms carried strong weight, and where supranational cooperation was very well established. Most elements of the proposal, such as the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination, were well‐established principles of EU legislation and long part  of  the  Community acquis,  since  anti‐discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  nationality and  gender  are  the  cornerstones  of  EU  social  policy  (Bell  2002;  Fredman  2002;  Ellis 2005). The anti‐discrimination proposals also profited from the action of well‐organized civil society at the EU level,  in particular by the more than 400 NGOs and experts who had joined forces in a network called “the Starting Line Group”, which had been lobbying for  a  stronger  EU  anti‐discrimination  policy  since  the mid‐1990s  (Chopin  1999;  Case and Givens 2010). Moreover, contextual events helped in getting these Directives so fast through  the  Council.  As  Guiraudon  and  Geddes  powerfully  argue,  the  key  factor explaining  the rapid pace of  the negotiations was  the entry  into  the Austrian coalition government  in  February  2000  of  Jörg  Haider’s  extreme  right‐wing  party  FPÖ,  which energized  action  against  racism  and  xenophobia  by  other  Member  States,  especially France, while also neutralizing conservative forces within the Council who did not wish to  be  associated  with  racism  (Guiraudon  2003;  Geddes  and  Guiraudon  2004;  Geddes 2008). However, the anti‐discrimination Directives did not touch upon the most crucial aspect  of  discrimination  towards  migrants,  namely  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of nationality and legal status. In fact, Member States were only willing to accept the anti‐discrimination  Directives  on  the  condition  that  their  prerogatives  in  the  area  of immigration  and  integration  policy would  remain  unchallenged  (see  CD  8454/00  and CD 8968/00). Fearing that differences in treatment based on nationality could easily be made  to  constitute  indirect  discrimination  on  the  ground  of  race,  the Member  States inserted a provision into the text of the Directive during the Council negotiation which clarified  that  the  exception  of  nationality  was  also meant  to  cover  the  entire  field  of 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immigration  policy,  and  any  policies  governing  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals. Thus, article 3(2) of the Race Directive states: “This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third‐country nationals and stateless persons on  the  territory  of  Member  States,  and  to  any  treatment  which  arises  from  the  legal status of the third‐country nationals and stateless persons concerned.“ While  the  social  affairs  officers  in  the  Commission  and  the  Council  were negotiating  the  anti‐discrimination Directives,  Commissioner Antonio Vitorino  and his team  in  the  DG  for  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  had  started  working  on  a  number  of legislative  proposals  in  the  area  of  legal  migration  and migrant  integration  based  on Articles 63 EC and 64 EC of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The very first proposal presented was  on  the  right  of  third‐country  nationals  to  family  reunification  (COM(1999)638 final), in December 1999, to be followed by a proposal on long‐term residence status in March  2001  (COM(2001)127  final),  and  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  economic migration in July 2001 (COM(2001)386 final). This  last  proposal would have  regulated  the procedures  and  conditions  for  the entry and residence of third‐country nationals for the purpose of employment and self‐employed  activities.  It  was  a  horizontal  Directive  that  intended  to  regulate  the procedures  for  admission  of  all  kinds  of  labour  migrants,  even  though  specific provisions  would  apply  only  to  certain  categories.50  In  addition,  the  Directive  would have  regulated  the  rights of  the  third‐country nationals admitted  for  labour purposes. Notably, the rights foreseen in the proposal would have included equal treatment in the following socio‐economic areas: working conditions; access to vocational training (after one  year);  recognition  of  diplomas;  social  security  (including  healthcare);  access  to goods  and  services  (including  public  housing  after  a  qualifying  period  of  3  years); freedom  of  association,  affiliation  and  membership  in  workers’  organizations;  and transfer of pensions. The proposed Directive  on  economic migration met with  extreme  resistance  in the Council, however. As the person in the Commission in charge of the proposal put it, there was not a single Member State that supported the proposal (Interview 17). As for the proposal of the Commission of establishing OMC for immigration policy, the Council                                                         50 In particular, the Directive foresaw special rules for “seasonal workers”, “au pairs”, “intra‐corporate transferees”, “trainees”, and “trans‐frontier workers”. Due to the temporary or specially limited nature of these activities, there were different rules for the acquisition and renewal of residence permits, as well as for access to other kinds of employment. 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“did  not  even  bother  ignoring  it  (…)  they  just  said:  this  is  an  incredible  amount  of bureaucracy  and  we  don’t  want  it!”  (Interview  17,  own  translation).51  The  lack  of interest  on  the  part  of  the Member  States was  such  that  the  issue  never  came  to  the highest  political  level,  being discussed only  at  the desk  level.  All  efforts went  into  the Family  Reunification  Directive  and  the  Long‐Term  Residents  Directive,  where,  as  we shall  see,  there  were  very  heated  debates  taking  place.  As  a  result,  the  economic migration proposal was eventually withdrawn by the Commission, who realized that it was better to end the fruitless exercise of trying to negotiate a proposal that clearly did not meet with enough support by the Member States in the Council. Although the main purpose  of  this  Directive  was  to  regulate  admissions,  its  failure  had  also  important consequences for  integration policy. Since the proposal of the Commission would have regulated both the conditions for entry and the rights attached to legal status, the failure of  the proposal meant  that  the  rights  of  labour migrants  during  the  first  five  years  of residence remained unregulated. By  contrast,  Family  Reunification  Directive  and  the  Long‐Term  Residents Directive were successfully adopted  in 2003, granting  third‐country nationals who are legally  resident  in  the  Union  and  fulfil  the  conditions  set  out  in  the  Directive  a  legal entitlement to a far‐reaching set of equal treatment, settlement and even mobility rights (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the Directives adopted were a much‐altered version of the original proposals, which was the result of difficult compromises made in the course of                                                         51 The original citations in German are: (1) referring to the open method of coordination: “Mitgliedstaaten haben das von Anfang an das strengst...nicht einmal ignoriert, auf wienerisch gesagt. Die haben gesagt: das ist eine unglaubliche Bürokratie; wir wollen das nicht! Die Kommission hat, wenn man es so sagen will, eine Watsche bekommen. Würde nicht einmal ignoriert der Vorschlag.“ (00:17ff) (2) referring to the economic migration Directive: “Das erstaunliche an den Vorschlag war, dass es lange Zeit überhaupt nicht an der Tagesordnung der Arbeitsgruppen des Rates kam, es würde einmal ignoriert (...)(00:04:36ff) kaum...nicht ein einziger MS der wirklich aktiv, den Vorschlag unterstutzt hat. Und das wurde dann tiefgekühlt, eingefrorne, es gab auch nie Diskussionen auf höhere politische Ebene, es ist nie auf COREPER oder Ratsebene gekommen, um eine politische Arbitration zu machen, das heißt, die ganze Verhandlungs‐Anstrengungen damals gingen in die Richtlinie Familienzusammenführung, wo wirklich viel in Bewegung war…” (00:05:43ff) This account was confirmed by another interviewee from the Commission, who noted on the OMC proposal: “…so I wrote that communication on the OMC, but it’s quite a…it involved quite a lot of administration, and reports, and programmes, and governments setting targets, and what have you, Member States didn’t want to, it is another one of those things, which, it was written, it was presented at Council, they said ‘yes very nice’ and indicated clearly that they didn’t want to go any further, so we let it drop”. (interview 22, 00:50ff.) 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several years of negotiations in the Council. In order to understand how and why it was possible  to  adopt  these  Directives,  and  the  nature  of  the  compromises  achieved,  it  is necessary to look deeper into the position of the main actors during the negotiations in the Council.    4.2.3. Decision‐making:  
The Family Reunification Directive The very first proposal presented by the Commission in the area of legal migration after the communitarization of Title IV was for the “Proposal for a Directive on the Right of to Family Reunification”,  in December 1999 (COM (1999)638  final). The decision to start with  the    Proposal  for  a  Family  Reunification Directive was  based  on  the  assumption that this would be the easiest Directive to put through, because, as a participant from the Commission put it: “everybody agreed that, you know, you needed to allow somebody who 
is living on a long­term basis in your country to bring his family in, and it was thought that 
this would be relatively easy as a first step. It turned out to be very wrong!” (Interview 22, 00:12ff.).  Inexperienced  in  the  difficulties  of  supranational  consensus  building,  and driven by an ambitious spirit and a strong commitment to a rights‐based approach, the Commission  miscalculated  the  political  conditions  for  supranationally‐driven  policy change. In reality, it took almost five years to get this Directive through the Council, and the  negotiations  were  so  difficult  that  the  Commission  had  to  withdraw  its  original proposal and submit a new version in 2002, fearing that otherwise no agreement would ever be reached (COM (2000) 624 and COM (2002) 225).  The  original  proposal  presented  by  the  Commission  in  December  1999  was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which the Commission spelled out its approach  to  family  reunification  (COM  (1999)638  final).  In  this  explanatory memorandum,  the Commission noted  that  the  right  to  family  life was  recognized  as  a human right  in  several  international  instruments and conventions, but  that  it was not guaranteed as a right in the law of all Member States. Moreover, in those Member States that  did  grant  family  reunification  on  a  non‐discretionary  basis,  the  conditions  for entitlement  varied  considerably.  For  instance,  whereas  some  Member  States  entitled migrants  to  family  reunification  immediately  after  entry,  others  required  a  waiting period of up to 8 years. Moreover, the Commission noted that family reunification was 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the main source of new immigration to the Member States. Against this background, the Commission  justified  the  need  for  a  Directive  on  two  grounds,  the  need  to  manage migration  flows,  and  the  need  to  protect  the  right  to  family  life, which was  seen  as  a major precondition for the successful integration of resident migrants. In  terms  of  framing,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  besides  human  rights  and migration management,  the notion of “integration“ played a very  important role  in the justification for the Directive from the point of view of the Commission. Integration was framed  positively,  and  family  reunification  was  seen  as  a  precondition  for  successful integration, as the citation below makes clear: Beyond the purely quantitative  importance of  this  form of  legal immigration,  family reunification  is a necessary way of making a 
success  of  the  integration  of  third­country  nationals  residing lawfully in the Member States. The presence of family members makes for greater stability and deepens the roots of these people since  they  are  enabled  to  lead  a  normal  family  life.“  ((COM (1999)638  final),  explanatory  memorandum  §2.2,  emphasis added)  When it reached the Council, however, the proposal met with widespread resistance by the  Member  States.  As  mentioned  before,  the  Member  States  had  very  different approaches  to  family  reunification,  and  it  soon  became  clear  that  none  of  them  was willing  to  significantly  alter  its  national  policies.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the negotiations  the Member  States  resisted  those  provisions  that would  have  required  a major change to their existing national policies. Moreover, some Member States notified the Commission during the first reading of the Directive that they were in the process of reviewing their national legislation on the subject. Besides the technical and political difficulties of agreeing on a common approach to family reunification, the institutional environment presented another obstacle to the success of the proposal. Most participants acknowledged that at this time the mentality in  the  Council  working  groups  responsible  for  immigration  was  extremely intergovernmental.52  The  participants  in  the  Council  working  groups  dealing  with                                                         52 Consider this passage of an interview with a representative of the Council Secretariat who was present during the negotiations of the Directives discussed here: “I think that the main factor of evolution is that in the beginning the mentality was very much intergovernmental, because before the Maastricht Treaty migration was still a third pillar issue, then the passage from third to first pillar was not easy.  So even in terms of mentality. The fact that the Commission was the main actor, so was proposing the Directive, so the Member States, just to make a joke I would say that, to swallow it took some time, and probably in terms of 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migration had been cooperating in the area of migration for years under the third‐pillar, that  is,  in  a  legal  framework  that  was  entirely  intergovernmental  and  where  the Commission was a mere observer. They  jealously guarded  their  competences,  and  the Commission  was  still  struggling  to  carve  out  a  role  for  itself.  In  the  words  of  one interviewee:  “The  fact  that  the  Commission  was  the  main  actor,  so  was  proposing  the 
Directive (…) for the Member States to swallow it took some time” (Interview 7).53 Thus, in contrast  to  the  anti‐discrimination  Directives,  the  negotiations  for  the  family reunification  and  other  legal  migration  Directives  were  carried  out  in  a  forum characterized  by  a  political  culture  of  intergovernmental  bargaining  among  sovereign national actors, rather than cooperation and consensus between partners in a common supranational endeavour. After several rounds of negotiations in the Council working groups, the Member States could still not find consensus on a number of key issues. The ministers discussed the  family  reunification  proposal  on  two  occasions,  in May  and  September  2001,  but could  not  reach  an  agreement.  The  negotiations  had  reached  an  impasse.  The discussions in the Council working groups were stalled and the ministers could not find a compromise. From September 2001 onwards no new meetings took place. Finding no other way to proceed in the negotiations,  the Commission finally withdrew its original proposal  and  submitted  a  modified  version  in  May  2002  based  on  a  new  approach intended to mitigate the controversies in the Council (COM (2002) 225 final). The new approach consisted of giving up the goal of full harmonization, and including a series of optional clauses and derogations that would give Member States some flexibility. Thus, differences between Member States would be allowed to persist in certain areas, but at least agreement would have been reached on a core of basic rules. The main overall changes to the original Proposal were: (i) the exclusion of Union citizens from the scope of the Directive; (ii) the general waiting period was extended to                                                         planning it was not wise to start with Directives such as family reunification and the Directive on admission for migration purposes. For a new competence, we had just started, to begin with such huge instruments and regulations was difficult, that is why also the task was extremely hard…” (interview 7, emphasis added) 53 This opinion, expressed by a member of the Council secretariat, is corroborated by another interviewee who participated in the negotiations of the Directives as a member of the Commission. On the proposal for a Directive on economic migration, the interviewee from the Commission stated that: “…das war ein absolutes ‚niet’ von Anfang an, der ganze Text. Wenn man den Text ließt, ist er gar nicht so revolutionär, wir verlangen nicht zu viel, es ist ja ein moderater...aber wir haben schon gesprochen, der Titel des Textes, allein das die Kommission so etwas vorschlagt wurde schon als offensiv gesehen…” (Interview 17 00:10:26ff, emphasis added) 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two years; (iii) the right of the family members to work would be coupled on the right of the sponsor; and (iv) Member States would be able  to choose whether  they wished  to extend  the  right  of  family  reunification  to  registered  partners  and  relatives  on  the ascending  line  or  not.  This  corresponded  to  the  most  controversial  issues  that  had remained outstanding before the negotiations in the Council reached a total stalemate in September 2001.54 In addition, a number of optional derogations were included to take into account the  situation  in  specific  Member  States.  In  particular,  two  optional  derogations  were included specifically to take into account the Austrian legislation, which was one of the countries with the most restrictive family reunification policies in the European Union. The first optional derogation concerned the possibility of a Member State requiring that the  application  for  family  reunification with  children be  filed before  the  child  reaches the age of 15 in case this was already present in national legislation (which was only the case  in Austria). The second optional derogation allowed the maximum waiting period to be extended to 3 years in countries that applied quotas for family reunification (also only the case in Austria).55 These concessions were made to Austria because during the previous  negotiations  in  the  Council  Austria  had  been  unwilling  to  compromise  and accept solutions that would have reduced its degree of control over who is admitted into the territory.56 
                                                        54 In particular Council Document 12022/01, of 24 September 2001, in which the presidency summarizes the points that had been most controversial in the negotiations of the Directive until then. 55 This is the (in)famous ‘quota’ derogation that exists in several EU Directives in the area of migration in order to protect legislation which establishes a maximum number of migrants (a quota) that can enter the territory per year on each type of visa or residence permit. It means that the application may not be denied to the third‐country national who fulfills all conditions, but it may be delayed in case the quota is already full for that particular year. Austria is the only country that applies a quota to family reunification, but many Member States apply quotas to other categories of migrants.  56 The following statement by the highest representative of the Austrian interior ministry in the permanent representation in Brussels is very revealing of the importance that the Austrian government attached to being able to control access to its territory. Asked about why Austria was so unwilling to compromise in the negotiation of the Family Reunification Directive he responded: “Je weniger ich Konditionen, je weniger ich überprüfbare Bedingungen und so weiter festschreibe, desto mehr, hum, desto weniger kann ich das was passiert, kontrollieren. (...) Jetzt muss ich natürlich als Regierung muss ich das bis zu einen gewissen Grad in Rechnung stellen, hum, (...) und daher hat Österreich den Ansatz, schauen wir, dass wir in diesen verschiedenen Rechts‐Instrumente, die wir verhandeln, sehr klare Bedingungen, sehr klare Definitionen, sehr klare Restriktionen hineinschreiben, damit wir nicht noch ein größeren Schub haben, dass wir 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the  threat  of  terrorism.  Member  States  were  also  generally  less  willing  to  transfer sovereignty  to  the European  level. The events of 9/11 had made Member States more aware of the need to be able to adapt their legislations in the face of unexpected events. Migration had become a highly salient issue in this context, and any rule that would bind the hands of Member  States  in  the  future,  or  reduce  their discretionary powers when deciding  who  to  accept  within  their  territory,  were  automatically  regarded  with suspicion. In  light  of  all  these  difficulties,  the  negotiations  of  the  revised  Proposal  for  a Family  Reunification  Directive  were  extremely  difficult.  Agreement  on  common  rules was  blocked  above  all  by  the  position  of  two Member  States  –  Germany  and  Austria. These  Member  States  were  unwilling  to  depart  from  their  national  positions,  which pushed  in  a  very  restrictive direction. Germany and Austria moreover  insisted  for  the inclusion of very stringent clauses on public security which would give Member States a greater  degree  of  discretion  when  refusing  to  grant  a  residence  permit  for  family members coming  from certain countries or  regions of  the world, or where there were grounds  for  suspicion  that  this  person  might  support  a  terrorist  organization.58 Germany also questioned the competence of the Union in regulating access to national labour markets, and  took  issue with  the definition of  family reunification proposed by the  Commission,  as well  as  the  level  of  income  requirement  and  several  other  issues. Austria  insisted  on  the  inclusion  of  an  additional  requirement  of  appropriate accommodation and on safeguards that would enable it to protect its labour market and its quota system. According to  the Austrian quota system,  the government stipulates a maximum  number  of  migrants  that  may  enter  the  country  on  the  basis  of  a  specific permit each year. Austria wanted to be able to delay the issuing of a family reunification permit  in  case  the  annual  quota  for  a  particular  year  had  already  been  reached.  The Netherlands  further  insisted  on  a  higher  age  limit  for  the  reunification with  spouses. Additionally, following a compromise agreed upon during the negotiations of the Long‐Term  Residents  Directive,  Austria,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  insisted  on  the inclusion of similar provisions stating that ”integration conditions” could be required as an  optional  condition  for  family  reunification  (CD  14272/02).  At  the  same  time,  the Commission  and  a  number  of  more  liberal‐minded  Member  States  strongly  opposed including new restrictive conditions into the Directive.                                                         58 Council documents 5508/03, 13968/02 (p.11) and MIGR 9/02 and MIGR 13/02. 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The result was a compromise solution that included the addition of several new conditions, however only as optional derogations. As a result of the negotiations in the Council several provisions were changed so as to grant more discretion to the Member States. Specifically, the wording of the public security clauses was watered down, some standstill  clauses  were  dropped,  a  more  ambiguous  formulation  of  the  income requirement  was  adopted,  an  additional  requirement  of  appropriate  accommodation was  added,  the  age  limit  for  family  reunification  with  spouses  was  raised,  and  the possibility  to  impose  integration  conditions were  included  (see Annex  I  for  details  on the adopted Directive). During  the  policy  formulation  and  the  decision  making  process,  the  most important  institution pushing  for migrants’  rights was  the Commission, whose agency was  instrumental  in  getting  the  proposal  finally  through  the  Council.  The  political pressure to adopt the Family Reunification Directive was very high, both because of the actual  importance  of  the  subject matter—family  reunification was,  after  all,  the main source  of  immigration  to  Europe  and  a  recognized  human  right—and  because  the Commission had  invested all  its  capital  into  this piece of  legislation. Participants have mentioned  that  the  Commissioner  himself  was  personally  involved  in  negotiations, speaking directly with  the ministers, especially of Germany, who was  the country  that presented  the most  opposition  (Interviews  17  and  22).  The whole  discussion,  as  one participant  put  it,  was  “very  emotional”,  and  there  was  “a  real  fight  with  the Commission”, for whom the Family Reunification Directive was a high political priority, and who was motivated  by  “a  very  ambitious  spirit”  and  a  “fundamentalist migrants‐rights  ideology”  that  was  in  conflict  with  the  priorities  of  certain  Member  States (Interview 17 00:23ff. and 00:9ff.). After the Directive was adopted, however, the European Parliament became a key player, using norm‐based arguments to try to modify the outcomes of the policy process. Given  the  fact  that  this Directive had been adopted under  the  consultation procedure, the  Parliament  had  effectively  no  direct  impact  on  the  outcomes  of  the  negotiations, even  though  the  Commission  had  made  an  effort  to  take  some  of  its  proposed amendments  into  account  (COM(2000)624  final).  After  the  Directive  was  adopted, however, the Parliament decided to use another weapon in order to get its voice heard, namely  the  possibility  granted  to  it  under  the  Nice  Treaty  to  start  an  annulment procedure against a law passed by the Council (Art. 230 EC). In doing so, the Parliament acted  as  a  strong  advocate  of migrants’  rights,  and used what  Schimmelfennig  (2001) 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calls  “rhetorical  action”  in  an  attempt  to  compel  Member  States  to  liberalize  family reunification  rules.  As  Schimmelfennig  (2001)  points  out,  in  an  institutional environment  like  the  EU,  actors  who  can  justify  their  interests  in  terms  of  the Community’s constitutive norms and values, and point to past rhetoric to support their arguments  can  sometimes  “rhetorically  entrap”  their  opponents,  who  are  forced  into norm‐conforming behavior in order not to lose credibility. As we shall see, although the outcome of the Court case initiated by the Parliament was ambiguous, it contributed to rhetorically entrapping Member States in terms of the way they apply the Directive. Upon the initiative of one member of the LIBE Committee, Ms. Adeline Hazan, of the European Parliament who was a  former  judge,  and  supported by an evaluation of experts  in  the  Parliament’s  legal  service,  the  Parliament  brought  a  case  against  the Council before the European Court of Justice (hereafter: ECJ) (Case C‐540/03).59 Under its newly acquired competences on the basis of Article 230 EC, the Parliament asked for annulment  of  the  final  subparagraph  of  Article  4(1),  Article  4(6)  and  Article  8  of  the Directive,  referring  to  three  optional  derogations,  respectively:  the  possibility  of requiring  that  children  over  12  years  old  comply  with  integration  conditions,  the possibility of rejecting applications by children over 15 years old, and the possibility of imposing  a waiting period of  up  to  three  years  on  the  sponsor before  granting  family reunification.  In  its  argumentation,  the  Parliament  claimed  that  these  provisions infringed fundamental rights.60 Further, the Parliament also argued that the criterion of integration  was  too  ambiguous,  and  that  it  was  discriminatory  to  require  such  a condition of children but not of spouses. The parties to the case were the EP, the Council, the Commission, and Germany. Every Member State is allowed to intervene, but in this case only Germany did because they  were  very  interested  in  exactly  the  provisions  that  the  European  Parliament considered to be  illegal,  in particular the possibility to  impose “integration conditions” on children above 12 years old.61 Germany argued that the final text of the Directive was the  result  of  a  compromise,  and  that  certain  Member  States  had  only  agreed  to  the                                                         59 The information on the role of Adeline Hazan comes from an Interview with a member of the secretariat of the PES (Interview 14 00:40ff.). 60 In particular of articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR on the right to respect for family life and the right to non‐discrimination on the ground of age, as well as several international instruments on the rights of children, especially the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61 The Federal Republic of Germany was represented before the European Court of Justice by A. Tiemann, W.‐D. Plessing and M. Lumma (Case C‐540/03). In the following, I will use the word “Germany” in order to refer to the position taken by the German state before the Court as represented by these agents. 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Directive precisely because these additional conditions were added to the final piece of legislation. Therefore, it argued that it was not possible to annul only these provisions of the  Directive without  invalidating  the whole  text.  Germany  knew  that  the  Parliament chose very deliberately not to ask for the annulment of the whole Directive for political reasons,  because  it  regarded  having  a  Directive  on  Family  Reunification was  a major step  forward  in  the  protection  of migrants’  rights  (Interview  15).  The  ECJ’s  Advocate General reviewing the case, Ms. Juliane Kokott, followed the German argumentation and expressed the opinion that the two provisions were in fact in violation of human rights, but that it was not possible to annul only specific provisions of the Directive because the Member States had only agreed to the Directive on the condition that these provisions were in it. The  ECJ  issued  a  rather  ambiguous  judgement.  The  ECJ was  careful  because  it knew that  this  judgement would have very serious political  implications.  It was, as an interviewee put it, “a political decision” (Interview 15). It did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General, setting aside the procedural question and ruling only the issue of whether  the  provisions were  in  conformity with  human  rights.  On  this  issue,  the  ECJ  decided  against  the  Parliament  on  all  counts,  ruling  that  the  provisions  gave  some margin  of  discretion  to  the Member  States  but were not  per  se  in  violation  of  human rights.  Nevertheless,  it  emphasised  that  the  provisions  had  to  be  implemented  in conformity  with  human  rights  and  taking  the  best  interest  of  the  child  into  account, citing  for  the  first  time  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  Union  and  the  UN Convention on  the  rights of  the Child  in  its  judgement as  sources of EU  law. This was considered a half‐victory for the European Parliament, who could nourish hopes that the Court would  interpret  these conditions narrowly  in case problems with  its application emerged, and would base any future decision on human rights.  In sum, the final text of the Family Reunification Directive adopted in September 2003 (Council Directive 2003/86/EC) was certainly a minimum‐common‐denominator Directive. The proposals of  the Commission had been significantly watered down, and several  additional  conditions  and  optional  derogations  had  been  included  to accommodate the demands of Member States. In both political and legal terms, the most polemic  aspects  of  the  Directive  were  the  requirement  of  having  to  comply  with “integration  conditions”  and  the  possibility  to  deny  family  reunification with  children older than 12 years old if they failed to fulfil  this requirement, which gave rise to very strong  criticisms  by  a  wide  range  of  legal  specialists  and  immigration  scholars.  For 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Cholewinski, the right to family reunification was “effectively rendered redundant by the conditions imposed upon this right” (Cholewinski 2002, 273). This critique is shared by Peers, who further argues that certain provisions of the Directive can be interpreted as violating  human  rights  principles  (Peers  2006,  213‐128).  In  a  similar  vein, Oosterom‐Staples  contends  that,  whereas  the  original  proposal  was  geared  towards  preserving family unit, the final text of the Directive “now primarily serves as a means to preserve Member States’ interests” (Oosterom‐Staples 2007, 487). Particularly concerning is the fact  that  “integration  conditions”  have  now  been  adopted  in  a  growing  number  of Member States where  this was previously not  the case  (International Organization  for Migration 2008). Nevertheless,  recent  studies  on  the  implementation  of  the  right  to  family reunification  recognize  that  despite  its  many  weaknesses  the  Directive  was  a  major achievement in terms of expanding the rights of third‐country nationals (Groenendijk et al.). First of all, it established a non‐discretionary entitlement to family reunification for all third‐country nationals who fulfil the criteria specified in the Directive. Secondly, as recognized  by  Groenendijk  (2006,  221)  when  codifying  the  existing  minimum denominator  of  the Member  States  as  common  Union  policy,  the  Directive  prevented further  deterioration  of  the Member  State  policies  in  the  future.  Thirdly,  some  of  the most problematic optional derogations introduced in order to take account of legislation in  force  in  specific Member States have now elapsed and are  as of now prohibited by Community  law,  due  to  the  successful  use  by  the  Commission  of  standstill  clauses  in some provisions (Groenendijk 2006). Finally, the ECJ showed that it would interpret the many conditions in the light of human rights commitments, should any cases arise with respect  to  the  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Directive.  In  fact,  as  mentioned  in Chapter 3, in a recent case concerning the application of the income requirement in the Netherlands,  the  ECJ  has  interpreted  the  income  requirement  narrowly,  thus  taking  a “pro‐migrant” position (Case C‐578/08). The  analysis  undertaken  here  suggests  that  there were  conflicting  dynamics  at work  in  the  EU  during  the  different  stages  of  the  policy  cycle  that  contributed  to  the creation of ambiguous outcomes. On the one hand, the liberal commitments made by the Member  States  in  Tampere  bound  them  to  goal  of  adopting  policies  that  expand migrants’  rights.  Pro‐migrant  actors,  in  particular  the  Commission  and  the  European Parliament have successfully engaged  in  “rhetorical action”  (Schimmelfennig 2001) by using the values and norms to which Member States have committed to in the past—in 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particular to the norms of equal treatment and respect for family life—in order to push for the adoption of legislation expanding the rights of migrants and prevent or minimize the adoption of provisions that would endanger the exercise of these rights. On the other hand,  a  number  of  factors  contributed  to  a  restrictive  trend  in  EU  integration  policy, chief among them the unwillingness of Member States to surrender sovereignty in this area,  the  great  anxiety  about  security  issues  that  dominated  the  early  2000s,  and  the strong preferences  of  certain Member  States  to  control  immigration  and prevent  new influxes  of  migrants.  As  the  discussion  above  has  shown,  these  conflicting  dynamics interacted within  the  European  field,  contributing  to  ambiguous  outcomes marked  by the predominance of what I would like to call ”restrictive rights”—a situation in which rights  are  indeed expanded  to migrants,  but  in  a  very  restrictive manner,  subject  to  a great number of conditions. As we shall see, the situation was very similar in the case of the Long‐Term Residents Directive.   
The Long­Term Residents Directive One of  the main objectives set out  in Tampere was  to grant  “near equal”  treatment  to third‐country  nationals  living  in  a  Member  State  on  a  permanent  basis  (Tampere Presidency Conclusions, 15‐16 Oct. 1999). The idea that rights should increase gradually with  time  of  residence,  and  that  long‐term  residents  should  be  entitled  to  nearly  the same  rights  as  nationals  was  moreover  the  cornerstone  of  the  concept  of  civic citizenship as conceived of by the Commission (COM (2000) 757 final). The Commission announced that it would pursue this objective by proposing a Directive to create a status of  “EU  long‐term resident” which would be harmonized throughout  the EU and entitle the holder to equal treatment and mobility rights, as well as to a secure residence status (COM  (2000)  167  final).  Thus,  the  “Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  concerning  the status of third‐country nationals who are  long‐term residents” (COM (2001) 127 final) was presented on 13 March 2001. The  original  Proposal  put  forward  by  the  Commission  covered  access  to  equal treatment  in  the social and economic spheres, as well as security of residence and the right  to settle  in a  second Member State on  the same conditions as EU citizens. As  for political rights, while the Commission had no competence to propose legislation in this area,  it  nevertheless  recommended  that  Member  States  use  the  opportunity  when implementing the Long‐Term Residents Directive to extend local voting rights to third‐country nationals and facilitate the conditions for their naturalization. According to the 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original  Proposal  the  status  of  long‐term  residents  should  be  made  available  to  all categories  of  migrants  staying  on  a  long‐term  basis  in  the  territory  of  the  Union, including  family migrants,  refugees,  labour migrants  (whether  highly  qualified  or  low skilled),  and  any  other  category  which  was  not  per  se  of  a  temporary  nature.  As evidenced by the explanatory memorandum, the Commission justified the need for such a  Directive  on  the  basis  of  normative  arguments  for  equal  treatment,  as  well  as  by concerns  for  integration.  In  the  view  of  the  Commission,  equal  rights  in  the  social, economic  and  political  spheres  of  life  were  the  main  preconditions  for  successful integration. This strong normative grounding in the principle of equal treatment is also evident from the replies given by the Commission to the concerns of the Member States during the first reading of the Directive in the Council, when it repeatedly referred to the principle of equal treatment to justify its positions (CD 10312/01).   If  the  position  of  the  Commission  was  driven  by  a  normative  commitment  to equal  treatment,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  all  Member  States  in  the  Council.  The analysis of the “travaux préparatoires” reveals that the most controversial discussions in the  Council  concentrated  on  a  handful  of  issues,  namely:  the  possibility  to  apply additional conditions to long‐term residents utilizing their right to mobility in order to settle in a second Member State; the applicability of the Directive to refugees; the range of  equal  treatment  rights  to be granted  to  long‐term residents;  and  the  conditions  for acquisition of long‐term resident status. One  of  the  most  controversial  aspects  of  the  Directive  was  the  provisions  on mobility,  that  is,  the  right  of  a  person who  acquired  long‐term  resident  status  in  one Member  State  to  settle  in  another  Member  State  with  equal  rights  as  EU  citizens, including  full  access  to  the  labour  market  of  the  second  Member  State  (see  CD 11702/01). As CD 8572/03 points out, by  the end of  the negotiations  there were  two fundamentally diverging positions among the Member States with regards  to mobility. On the one side, some Member States thought that a person who had acquired long‐term resident status in one Member State had already fulfilled enough conditions, and should be  granted  mobility  rights  unconditionally.  On  the  other  side,  some  Member  States called  for a more  restrictive approach  that would allow national  governments  to  limit the  right  of  residence  (for  instance  on  the  basis  of  quotas,  that  is,  the  fixation  of maximum limits of persons allowed to enter the territory per year) and also to impose limitations on  the access  to  the  labour market.  In particular, Germany and Austria put pressure  for  the more  restrictive  approach  to  be  adopted, while  France was  strongly 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opposed  to  the  imposition  of  new  conditions  (CD  9025/03).  This  question  remained controversial  up  to  the  very  last  stage  of  the  negotiations  and  was  forwarded  to COREPER/Council  in April 2003. Finally, after having been discussed at the ministerial level (CD 9118/03), the compromise was reached that new conditions were allowed as optional provisions (see Annex I). A  related  issue  was  the  applicability  of  the  Directive  to  refugees,  especially  in connection  to  the mobility  rights mentioned above.  Some Member States—specifically Spain, Germany, Austria and Greece—wanted to exclude refugees from the scope of the Directive (CD 11360/02). They were afraid of receiving a secondary  influx of refugees who,  after  acquiring  long‐term  residence  in  another  Member  State,  would  decide  to settle  in  their country. Spain was particularly concerned about  the  issue of  transfer of responsibility,  that  is,  the  question  of  whether  the  responsibility  for  the  asylum procedure would shift to another Member State in case the person made use of the right to  mobility  foreseen  in  the  Directive  (see,  especially,  CD  7393/1/03).  Given  Spain’s concerns, refugees were taken out on the condition that the Commission would make a separate  proposal  to  extend  the  provisions  of  the  Long‐Term Residents’  Directives  to refugees  within  one  year  (this  compromise  solution  was  agreed  upon  in  2003,  CD 9025/03). Several Member  States  had  reservations  on  the  rights  granted  to  third‐country nationals  after  acquisition  of  the  status  (see  CD  10698/01  for  initial  reservations,  CD 9025/03 for outstanding issues by the end of the negotiations). The Member States were concerned  that  extending  equal  treatment  in  the  social  sphere would  entail  “a  heavy financial  burden”  (as  clearly  expressed  by  Germany,  see:  CD  11360/02).  Moreover, Germany  was  against  the  strong  protection  against  expulsion  provided  for  in  the proposal, and argued that it was not justified to grant the same level of protection in this area to third‐country nationals as to citizens. In fact, Germany and Austria seemed to be uneasy  with  the  ambitious  proposal  of  the  Commission  of  granting  third‐country nationals equal rights solely due to the fact that they were  long‐term residents.  In one meeting  of  the  Council  working  party,  the  representative  of  Germany  expressed  this concern explicitly, pointing out critically that the long‐term resident status proposed by the  Commission  was  “too  similar  to  citizenship”  (CD  9636/02).  Despite  these  more extreme  positions,  mostly  the  demands  revolved  around  protecting  existing  rules  in national  legislation  that  reserved  certain  social  benefits  (social  assistance,  student grants,  access  to  education,  etc)  only  to  citizens.  Nevertheless,  the  norm  of  equal 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treatment  was  strong,  and  the  Commission  could  point  to  the  commitment  made  in Tampere,  so  in  the  end  a  very wide  range  of  equal  treatment  rights were  granted  to long‐term residents with only very few exceptions (see Annex I). Finally,  the overwhelming majority of problems during the Council negotiations were related to the conditions for acquisition of the long‐term resident status. A number of Member States wanted to add new conditions to the acquisition of long‐term resident status.  The  Commission  had  proposed  only  four  conditions—sufficient  income  not  to become a burden on the social assistance system of  the Member State, comprehensive health  insurance,  five  years  legal  residence,  and  not  constituting  a  threat  to  public security.  Besides  these,  Austria  wanted  to  include  proof  of  ”appropriate  housing”, Austria  and  Greece wanted  to  extend  the  length  of  residence  to  8  years,  and wanted more discretion to set higher income requirements. Spain wanted proof that the person had  complied with  tax  obligations.  In  addition, Austria,  Germany  and  the Netherlands were in favour of the introduction of an additional condition allowing Member States to “assess  the degree of  integration” of  the persons applying  for  long‐term residence (CD 10698/01). This turned out to be an extremely controversial demand. The Commission and certain Member States strongly rejected the inclusion of such a provision, pointing out  that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  measure  integration  (CD  11360/02).  The Netherlands, Germany and Austria responded to these concerns by presenting a paper in which they explained their position and argued that “the primary aim of integration is the promotion of the self‐sufficiency of so‐called ‘newcomers’, and one of the main part of integration policy is an integration programme” (CD 12217/02) They thus proposed inserting  the  following  clause  into  the  Directive:  "Member  States  may  request  third country  nationals who  are  long  term  residents  to  comply with  integration  conditions such  as  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  language  and  a  basic  knowledge  of  the  legal, cultural,  economic  and  societal  order  of  the  country  of  residence."  Integration  was therefore no longer framed as the outcome of a process of inclusion through equal rights and  improvement  of  the  structural  conditions  of migrants’  lives,  but  rather  as  a  basic precondition for subsistence in society. In  order  to  understand  the  position  of  these Member  States,  it  is  important  to keep  in mind concomitant developments at  the national  level. These three countries—Austria, Germany and the Netherlands—were in the midst of major legislative reforms at the national  level affecting their  immigration and integration policies brought about by important political changes. 
  121 
In Germany,  the  Red‐Green  coalition  between  the  Social‐Democratic  Party  SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had come to power in 1998 strongly determined to reform  the  immigration  and  citizenship  regimes.  After  a  successful  reform  that liberalized  the  citizenship  law  in  the  year  2000  introducing  limited  jus  soli  (see: Hailbronner 2009), the government decided to tackle immigration policy. On the basis of a  broad  public  consultation,  the  government  submitted  a  first  draft  to  parliament  in August 2001. The law would have liberalized Germany’s  immigration policy, especially for highly skilled workers, and given more attention to the issue of migrant integration. However,  as  Kurse  et  al.  (2003)  very  vividly  describe,  a  series  of  events  changed  the course  of  immigration  reform  in  Germany.  First,  the  negotiation  of  the  law  was interrupted due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which brought about a shift in priorities and political  climate  that had overarching  consequences  for  the  future of  immigration policy  reform. The negotiation  of  the  immigration  reform bill was  frozen  and priority was given to two legislative packages on security and the combat of terrorism. Second, when the immigration reform bill came back to the agenda in the beginning of 2002, it became  the  subject  of  a major  party‐political  dispute  (see:  Boswell  and  Hough  2008, 339‐341). The bill passed a first vote in the Lower House (Bundestag) on 1 March 2002, but when  it  came  to  the  Upper  House  (Bundesrat)  to  be  voted  on  22 March  2002,  it found no clear majority. In order to achieve majority, the government needed the vote of the province of Brandenburg, but the four representatives of this province (which was ruled by a grand‐coalition of  the centre‐right CDU62 and the centre‐left SPD) could not agree  on  a  common  action  and  split  their  votes,  which  allowed  the  government  to achieve majority by a margin of just one vote. The bill was first deemed adopted, but in Germany it is unconstitutional to split votes in the Bundesrat, so the opposition referred the issue to the Constitutional Court, which ultimately annulled it on procedural grounds in December 2002. The minister then reintroduced the draft unaltered. However, in the meantime mid‐term  regional  elections  had  given  a majority  to  the  centre‐right  in  the Bundesrat,  preventing  the  passage  of  the  law.  The  negotiations  that  followed  were extremely difficult and ended up in a reform package that by no means corresponded to the  original  intention  of  the  Red‐Green  coalition.  Immigration  and  integration  had become  incredibly  politicized  topics,  and  the  opposition  knew  that  it  had  the  upper                                                         62 CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) 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hand. Among other alterations, the new law now reduced the maximum age for children to  be  reunited with  their  parents  to  12  and  included  compulsory  courses  on  German language  and  culture  as  a  precondition  for  family  reunification  and  also  for  the acquisition of permanent residence by migrants already staying in Germany (see: Kruse et al. 2003; Stritzky 2009).63 In the Netherlands, which had been one of the countries with the most pro‐active integration  policies  in  Europe  during  the  1908s  and  1990s  (Bruquetas‐Callejo  et  al. 2007, 12), a similar shift occurred in the early 2000s towards more restrictive policies. A strong  debate  about  the  supposed  failure  of  the  Dutch  multicultural  approach  to successfully  integrate migrants  into Dutch  society  emerged  in  the  1990s,  leading  to  a first reform of the Dutch minorities policies by the Labour government in 1998 with the adoption of the “Integration of Newcomers Act”. This act institutionalized at the national level a policy that had been developed at the local level, namely civic integration courses for newcomers. However, at this time the civic integration program in the Netherlands did not foresee any penalties related to the acquisition or renewal of residence permits or  access  to  social  and  economic  rights.  In  other  words,  it  was  not  an  immigration measure  but  a  social  policy  measure  intended  to  improve  the  capacity  of  vulnerable groups in society to improve their socio‐economic situation (Besselink 2006; Bruquetas‐Callejo et al. 2007). However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the assassination of Pim  Fortyun  in  2002  just  before  the  national  elections  further  contributed  to  a polarization  in  the  country  around  the  issues  of  immigration,  integration,  and  Islam. Elections in 2002 brought about change of government to a centre‐right coalition led by Christian‐Democrats  and  saw  the  electoral  success  of  Pim  Fortyun’s  party.  The  new government designed a new approach to integration—the so‐called “Integration Policy New Style”, which was much more restrictive and included mandatory civic integration courses  as  a  condition  for  family  reunification  and  the  acquisition  of  permanent residence,  besides  exorbitant  fees  for  residence  permits  and  very  high  income requirements  for  family  reunification  (Vink  2005,  135).  The  new  policy was  strongly criticized for using the frame of “integration” instrumentally in order to enact measures that are actually aimed at reducing immigration (Besselink 2006; Human Rights Watch 2008; Besselink 2009). 
                                                        63 The bill was finally approved in 2004 and entered into force in January 2005. 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In Austria,  integration  had  become  a  strongly  politicized  issue  in  the  1990s,  in part  because  of  the  instrumentalization  of  this  issue  by  the  far‐right  party  Austrian Freedom  Party,  which  waged  strongly  anti‐migrant  campaigns.  After  winning  an incredible 26,91% of the votes in the 1999 national elections and becoming the second biggest  party  in  Parliament,  the  Austrian  Freedom  Party  joined  the  government  as  a junior  partner  in  a  coalition with  the  centre‐right  Austrian  People’s  Party.  One  of  the main  campaign  promises  of  the  Austrian  Freedom  Party  had  been  a  tightening  of immigration laws and a tougher handling of the integration problem. In 2001, during the preparations  of  a  comprehensive  amendment  of  the  Austrian  immigration  legislation, the FPÖ proposed the idea of requiring migrants to fulfill integration measures such as language training, civic education and vocational training as a precondition for access to social  benefits  and  to  the  renewal  of  residence  permits.  After  some  negotiations,  this measure was passed in 2002 and became part of the national legislation under the name of “Integration Agreement” (see Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of these measures). As  we  see,  in  all  these  Member  States,  major  political  changes—often accompanied  or  triggered  by  “crises  events”—had  led  to  a  strong  politicization  of integration,  which  was  primarily  framed  as  a  “problem”,  and  associated  with  lack  of social cohesion and cultural estrangement. The topic of integration had become a major source of political contestation in these nation states precisely during the time that the Family Reunification and  the Long‐Term Resident Directives were being negotiated  in the  Council.  It was  clear  that  after waging  fierce  political  battles  at  the  national  level over the issue of integration, these Member States were not willing to make concessions at the European level. To the contrary,  the negotiation of the Family Reunification and the Long‐term Residents Directive provided an opportunity for these Member States to fight  for  their  interpretation  of  integration  to  become  dominant  at  the  supranational level as well. In  a  recent  article, Boin et  al.  (2009) point out  that  the aftermath of  a  crisis or major disrupting event is often followed by “frame contests” between the various actors that seek to exploit this crisis‐induced opportunity to redefine issues and fight to have their  frame  accepted  as  the  dominant  narrative.  This  seems  to  be  precisely  what happened during the negotiations of the Family Reunification and Long‐Term Residents Directives, when Germany, Austria and the Netherlands sought to reframe integration at the  European  level.  So  far,  EU  policy  had  concentrated  primarily  on  the  structural dimension  of  integration,  and  policies  expanding  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals 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were seen as a necessary  instrument  in order  to achieve successful  integration.  In  the frame  proposed  by  these  three  countries,  however,  integration  was  primarily understood in cultural and social terms (language knowledge, civic education), and the relationship between integration and rights was inverted, integration now being seen as a precondition for access to rights. In this framing contest, the Commission and a number of progressively minded‐Member  States were  the main  opponents  of  change,  striving  to  defend  the  status  quo definition of integration. However, in an unfavourable institutional and political context, it  was  difficult  for  these  actors  to  counter  the  new  restrictive  trend.  As  the representative of a major Brussels‐based pro‐migrant NGO pointed out in an interview, the integration frame made it difficult for pro‐migrant actors to react, because it was in principle  a  positive  frame  and  a  goal  that  they wanted  to  support.  At  the  same  time, however, they realized that integration was now being used in an exclusionary manner. Whereas  integration  had  so  far  been  framed  as  a  concept  in  connection  with  equal treatment  and  anti‐discrimination,  it  was  now  being  used  in  connection  with  the possibility of denying rights (Interview 12).64                                                          64 Consider this very eloquent passage of the interview with a representative of the Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe, a Brussels‐based NGO very active in the area of immigration and anti‐discrimination: ...Da fängt eigentlich der Integrationsdiskurs an, ab 2001/2002, das hat mit den 11. September zu tun, aber auch das es in bestimmten Ländern (...) Wahlen von sehr Rechtsextremen mit‐gewonnen wurden mit einen sehr klassischen rassistischen Argumentationsbild, dass wir ab den Punkt eine Verschiebung der Politikdebatte daraufhin haben "hoppala, diejenige, die hier gekommen sind, und die noch kommen wollen, sollen sich gefälligst anpassen, sollen sich gefälligst integrieren, sonst nehmen wir sie nicht auf." Das heißt, es gibt eine Verschiebung, und in dem Bereich ist es uns, zu mindestens in der Anfangsphase, sehr schwer gefallen, hum, politisch Einfluss auszuüben.  (...) ...eine ganz massive Verschiebung der Argumentationsmuster im Umgang mit den Anderen, mit den Frenden, gegeben, wo von einen "wir müssen die, die hier dazu gehören, die hier sich ordentlich aufhalten, gleichstellen, und was gegen ihren Diskriminierung tun" hin zu einer Verschiebung mit "hoppala, sind das nicht genau die Leute, die uns dann ...ich sag mal....das World Trade Centre in die Ohren hauen" (lacht), also da gibt’s eine ganz ganz klare Verschiebung in dem Diskurs und wie gesagt auch wegen den Debaten in den verschiedenen MS "Integration ist gescheitert". Dieses Integrationsargument kommt ja.... und deswegen, obwohl wir, obwohl es ein wichtiges Thema Integration ist, haben wir auch immer ein bisschen Bauchsmerzen mit den Begriff Integration, weil es sehr oft eben nicht begriffen wird als etwas wo man fragt "was befördert Integration", sondern gesagt wird "halt, die und die Integrationsleistung muss erbracht werden, sonst sind die und die Rechte nicht zu gewähren“.  Das heißt also, Integration hat in vielen der öffentlichen Diskussionen eine Tendenz als ein exklusives Argument gebraucht zu werden und nicht als eins wo geschaut wird: das fördert Integration. Das Integration als Ziel etwas ist, das wir sofort unterschreiben, ist klar, aber es ist oft so der Verdacht so, dass Integration wird erst dann als Argument benutzt, wenn es darum geht, Leute zu sagen "ihr dürft nicht kommen", "ihr habt nicht das recht das und das zu tun". (Interview 12, 00.04 ff.) 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The  efforts  of  these  Member  States  to  reframe  integration  as  an  exclusionary concept  were  eventually  successful.  After  extensive  discussions  at  the  working  party level and at SCIFA, the issue was forwarded to the highest political level and brought to the  attention  of  ministers,  who  found  a  compromise  at  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs Council  of  15  October  2002  (CD  12894/02).  On  the  one  hand,  integration  conditions were included in the final version of the Directive as optional requirements in both the Long‐Term Residents  and  the  Family  Reunification Directives.  On  the  other  hand,  the Council adopted a declaration in which it restated its commitment to the Tampere goal of  approximating  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  to  those  of  EU  citizens  and fighting discrimination, while also calling for a stronger cooperation between the MS in the  area  of  integration—particularly  integration  conditions—in  order  to  create  a common European approach to the issue. This cooperation should include: exchange of information, drafting of best practices, setting up of national contact points, and possibly financing by the Community of concrete integration projects (CD 12894/02).  The Commission followed with the publication of a Communication in 2003 (COM (2003) 336 final) on immigration and integration, in which it acknowledges the debates surrounding  the  imposition  of  integration  conditions.  It  noted  that  the  consequences attached  to  failure  to  comply  with  such  conditions  had  been  a  key  issue  in  the negotiation of Directives, and pointed out that it was this debate that led to a recognition that there is a need to act collectively at the EU level by developing additional common instruments  to  deal  with  the  challenges  (COM  (2003)  336  final,  p.  8‐9).  Besides  re‐stating the need for a holistic approach to integration, and emphasising the importance of structural and political measures, the Commission announced that concrete measures would  be  taken  to  promote  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  the  area  of  civic integration.  These  measures  would  include  the  drafting  of  an  annual  report  on  the development  of  the  common  immigration  policy  and  the  setting  up  of  a  network  of national  contact  points  on  integration  with  the  aim  of  better  coordinating  national policies on programmes for newly arrived migrants, language training, and participation of migrants in civic, cultural and political life (COM (2003) 336 final, p.28ff). In  its  meeting  of  19  and  20  June  2003  in  Thessaloniki,  the  European  Council endorsed these new efforts by the Commission and called for greater cooperation in the area  of  integration.  Integration  should  remain  national  competence,  but  cooperation 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should  be  developed  “within  a  coherent  European  framework”.  During  2003  and  the first  half  of  2004  the main  elements  of  this  framework were  established,  namely  the network of National Contact Points on Integration, a small pilot fund to finance projects in the area of integration (INTI) and the first “Handbook of Integration” (Niessen 2004), which was drafted as a result of a series of technical seminars in which national officials involved  in  integration  policy  exchanged  best  practices.  Moreover,  in  2004  the Commission  published  its  first  Annual  Report  on  Migration  and  Integration  (COM (2004) 508 final). Even though in this report and in its Communications the Commission continued  to  call  for  a  holistic  approach  to  integration  and  remind Member  States  of their  commitment  to  equal  treatment,  the  focus  was  now  clearly  on  integration programmes and especially language training and civic education requirements. A new era had started in the development of supranational policy in the field of integration in which  the  dominant  themes  were  “soft  mechanisms  of  cooperation”  rather  than Directives and “civic integration” rather than rights. 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4.3. From The Hague to Stockholm: the politics of categorization (2004­2009)   The year 2004 represented a turning point in the development of the European Union. On 1 May,  ten new Member  States  joined  the Union,  in  the biggest  enlargement of  its history. Just a few months later, the representatives of all 25 Member States signed the Constitutional Treaty, which was meant to give the Union a new institutional setup that would facilitate decision‐making after enlargement and increase democratic legitimacy, while also strengthening  the  legal basis  for EU action  in a number of  important areas, particularly within Justice and Home Affairs. The  same  year  also  saw  the  appointment  of  a  new  College  of  Commissioners (Barroso I) and the start of a new parliamentary mandate. The new Commission had a troubled start with the Parliament vetoing the appointment of Rocco Buttiglione for the Justice and Home Affairs portfolio65 on the grounds that his views on homosexuality and on  the  role of women  in society were  incompatible with Europe’s  core values and  the European Union’s  commitment  to  fundamental  rights  (BBC News 11.10.2004,  see also Chapter  3).  After  this  initial  crisis  had  been  surmounted,  the  new  Commissioner  for Justice  and  Home  Affairs  became Mr.  Franco  Frattini,  who  had  been  acting  as  Italian Foreign Minister under the government of Silvio Berlusconi until then. The year 2004 also marked the end of  the “transitional period”  foreseen by the Treaty  of  Amsterdam  for  the  creation  of  “an  area  of  justice,  security  and  freedom”. Before the second phase of policies started, the Commission tried one more time to push for an institutional change in the area of legal migration. The Commission was conscious of the fact that the implementation of the Tampere programme had been very difficult. In  particular,  the  failure  of  the  proposed  Directive  on  economic migration  had  cast  a shadow on the ambitions of building a harmonized European immigration policy. Thus, in  a  Communication  published  in  June  2004  assessing  the  implementation  of  the Tampere  Programme,  the  Commission  plead  for  the  adoption  of  co‐decision  and qualified  majority  voting  in  all  areas  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  arguing  that  “the constraints  of  the  decision‐making  process  and  of  the  current  institutional  context preclude  the  effective,  rapid  and  transparent  attainment  of  certain  political commitments”  (COM  (2004)401  final,  4). Nevertheless,  lack of  support by  all Member                                                         
65 This portfolio had by then been renamed “Freedom, Security and Justice”. However, I will continue to use the term “Justice and Home Affairs” throughout the text for reasons of consistency. Moreover, the term Justice and Home Affairs seems to have a ‘sticky’ quality, so that participants in the field continue to refer to the portfolio under this name. 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States  again  prevented  a  move  towards  full  communitarization.  The  Council  took  a unanimous decision transferring practically all areas of immigration and asylum policy to  the  regular  legislative  procedure,  but  an  exception  was  made  for  legal  migration, which remained subject to the consultation procedure and the rule of unanimity in the Council (now with 25 veto‐players).  In this context, a new phase of supranational policy‐making in the area of Justice and  Home  Affairs  started  which  would  bring  important  new  development  for  the regulation  of  migrants’  rights.  As  we  shall  see,  the  most  important  political  factor impacting  policy‐making  in  this  phase  was  the  change  in  the  leadership  of  the Commission and the fact that the new Commissioner and his staff had a different party‐political and ideological orientation than their predecessors. The appointment of a new Commissioner  represented  a major  political  change  for  the  area  of  Justice  and  Home Affairs. Whereas the policies proposed by Commissioner Vitorino and his team had been guided  by  a  strongly  ideological  pro‐migrant  approach,  under  the  new  centre‐right Commissioner,  Mr.  Franco  Frattini,  the  Commission  would  adopt  a  much  more pragmatic  and  utilitarian  approach  to  immigration  and  the  regulation  of  migrants’ rights. Within  the  Council,  the  political  constellation  remained  determined  by  the predominance  of  centre‐right  governments  and  by  the  reluctance  of  certain  Member States  to  surrender  sovereignty  in  this  sensitive  area,  chief  upon  them  Germany. Nevertheless,  two Member  States which  had been  less  important  in  the  first  phase  of policy‐making now take on key relevance, namely France and Spain, the former pushing for  the  adoption  of  supranational  policies  that  enable  Member  States  to  ”select” migrants  (in  particular with  a  view  to  attracting  highly  qualified migrants),  the  latter taking  a  strongly  pro‐migrant  position  and  preventing  the  adoption  of  restrictive compromises. In  terms  of  institutional  factors,  the  main  institutional  determinants  of  policy‐making  in  this  area  remained  largely  the  same, with  the  important  exception  that  the Commission had by now clearly established itself as a major actor  in the field, and the legacy  of  intergovernmentalism  had  started  to  erode.  Importantly,  however,  the persistence  of  the  rule  of  unanimity  in  the Council  and of  an uncertain  legal  basis  for Community action continued to present obstacles to sweeping policy change and led to ambiguous  outcomes.  The  importance  of  the  framing  of  integration  continued  to  be  a major  ideational  factor  impacting  on  the  development  of  policy‐making  during  this 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phase.  Integration  acquires  great political  importance  and became a  ”leitmotiv”  in  the Council, which pushed  for  the development of new,  “soft” policies  and mechanisms of cooperation  in  the area of  Justice and Home Affairs. Nevertheless,  as we shall  see,  the term  remained  contested,  and  this  contestation  had  important  implications  for  the policies proposed and adopted in this phase. The main finding of this chapter is that EU policy towards third‐country nationals during  the  second  period  of  policy‐making  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of Amsterdam has been marked by what I have called “the politics of categorization”. This refers to the way with which EU policy categorizes legal migrants into a multiplicity of legal  statuses,  and  subjects  each  to  a  different  rights‐framework.  In  developing  the concept  of  “the  politics  of  categorization”,  I  have  been  inspired  by  the work  of Dvora Yanow. As Yanow  (2000,  48) points  out,  public  policies  often  create  or  invoke  sets  of categories to name groups of people who are the subject of governmental actions. In her work on racial‐ethnic categories used in the US census, Yanow (2000; 2003) shows how categories  used  in  public  policy  discourse may  be derived  from  and  at  the  same  time 
contribute  to  the  creation  of  “commonsense”  understandings  of  a  particular  social problem. The analysis of EU policies towards third‐country nationals conducted in this chapter and  the next will  show  that public policies may also  construct  categories  that are  “artificial”  in  the  sense  of  being  largely  detached  from  the  prevalent  social  and political understanding of the issue. In this case, categorization may function as a device or mechanism to achieve a political goal, rather than as a reflection of widespread social meanings. This  chapter  argues  that  in  the  second  phase  of  development  of  supranational policies governing the rights of third‐country nationals, the politics of categorization has served  as  a  mechanism  to  enable  the  achievement  of  political  compromises  and therefore the expansion of migrants’ rights. Given the difficulties in finding consensus on the expansion of rights to all migrants, policy‐making in this area is developing through the adoption of legislation tailored to specific categories of third‐country nationals, or by excluding certain categories from the scope of Directives that were originally  intended to be comprehensive  in order  to  facilitate consensus among decision‐makers. This has the  paradoxical  effect  of  enabling  the  process  of  expansion  of  migrants’  rights  to continue, while at  the same time  intensifying ambiguities  in  the rights  framework and contributing to the creation of rights hierarchies. 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4.3.1. Agenda‐setting  As the deadline for completion of the Tampere programme approached, the Commission and  the  Council  started  preparing  for  the  adoption  of  a  new  multiannual  policy programme setting the political priorities for EU action in the area of Justice and Home Affairs for the period between 2004 and 2009, to be known as the “Hague Programme”. Nevertheless,  the  aims  set  at  Tampere  had  not  all  been  achieved.  In  particular,  no progress had been made in the area of economic migration, given that the Proposal put forward by the Commission had met with an insurmountable degree of resistance in the Council.  As  a  corollary  of  the  lack  of  agreement  on  common  rules  for  admissions  of labour migrants, there was also no common supranational policy governing the rights of third‐country nationals entering the Union for economic purposes in the period between entry and acquisition of long‐term residence. This issue remained unregulated because the proposal of the Commission would have defined both the conditions of entry and the conditions  of  residence  of  economic migrants,  including  access  to membership  rights. Given the enormous discontent of the Member States with the Proposal for a Directive on  Economic  Migration  put  forward  in  2001  (COM(2001)386  final),  the  Commission decided  not  to  pursue  agreement  on  that  Proposal  anymore.  According  to  my interviews, the decision to abandon the 2001 Proposal was based on the consideration that withdrawing  the proposal would be  the best way  to avoid a  total blockade of  the economic migration agenda and allow  the process of harmonization  to go on.66  It was 
                                                         66 The following statements by two interviewees from the Commission give insight into the reasoning of the Commission leading to the decision to drop the economic migration proposal from 2001 and start a process of public consultation: “I mean the original idea was to have a horizontal approach. Hum, when it was clear that that was not going to be acceptable, and I...differ from most of my colleagues in this, hum, this was in the first phase, the first five years, I still think that we might have got an agreement on a horizontal approach on the labor migration Directive if there had been more time. (…) but that is my personal opinion, but it was clear by 2004 that this Directive in its current form would take a... I mean it could still have been pushed forward in the next phase, but I think, my opinion is, and I don't really know if this is the case, but I think that the Germans convinced Vitorino that it was not for him to push this thing forward, they certainly would oppose it, and there was sufficient lack of enthusiasm around the table for... and he was coming to the end of his mandate... for him to think: well, let's put this on one side (…) I think it was a political decision in the long run. Hum... Vitorino and his cabinet, I think they said: the Germans are really against this. One of the reasons why the Germans were not willing to discuss this was that they were in a process of developing their new migration law, you have the Süssmuth report and then you had the new immigration law and then you had the appeal, and until all that process was finished they didn't know what their law was going to say (…), so but I think that‘s basically that: it was 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decided  that  during  the  mandate  of  the  next  Commission,  which  took  office  on  22nd November  2004,  a  process  of  public  consultation  would  be  carried  out  in  order  to develop a new strategy for this policy area. Concerning the rights of  third‐country nationals and admission policy,  the most important  agenda‐setting  document  therefore  remained  the  Tampere  Programme. Nevertheless,  the  second  phase  of  policy‐making  would  bring  very  important developments  in  this area, only  that  they did not  take place during  the agenda setting stage  but  rather  during  the  policy  formulation  phase  as  a  result  of  the  public consultation and the adoption of a new strategy, which will be discussed below. Instead, during the preparation and adoption of the Hague Programme, attention was shifted to another topic, which had become of pivotal importance for many Member States, namely the  development  of  a  common  European  approach  to  “integration”  beyond  the concession of rights.  
The Hague Programme The Hague Programme (CD 16054/04) was adopted by the European Council under the Dutch Presidency of the European Union on 4 November 2004. The document was silent on the rights of legally resident third‐country nationals. It simply stressed the fact that the determination of volumes of admission of  labour migrants remained a competence of  the  Member  States,  and  welcomed  the  Commission’s  proposal  of  starting  a consultation process by launching a Green Paper on the basis of which a new policy plan                                                         the end of the mandate, Germans were against it, Vitorino didn't want to waste his time fighting something that he knew wouldn't go anywhere...” (Interview 22, 00:25ff) “...wenn Familienzusammenführung und Langfristigen Aufenthalt abgeschlossen waren, bemühte man sich dann wieder einen relaunch zu machen unter der italienische Präsidentschaft, es gab dann auch noch mal einen "summing up of the first reading" und einen Bericht an den Rat, da war aber klar, dass der Rat sehr negativ reagieren würde und die Kommission auch sagen würde, bitte stoppt das ganze, und um das zu verhindern, dass der Rat so was negatives sagt nahm man das ganze von der Tagesordnung, in den minutes findet man nur mehr "Council took note of the difficult state of negotiation", und die Kommission hat dann angekündigt, ja wir werden ein neues Green Paper vorliegen. Und das war dann sozusagen die neue, wenn Sie wollen, die Strategie der Kommission überhaupt den Schiff vor dem Sinken zu bewahren, dass man sagt, wir verfolgen die Taktik ‘réculer pour mieux sauter’ (...) …nach 3 Jahren äußerst frustrierende Verhandlungen war ich mehr den Ansicht, es wäre gut mal einen konkreten Feedback vom Rat zu bekommen, eine Aussage: wir wollen oder wir wollen es nicht. Auch eine Ende mit Schrecken ist besser als ein Schrecken ohne Ende. Endlich mal Klartext zu sprechen. Das würde aber nicht so gesehen von der Kommission von höhere Ebene, sondern war es besser man hat keine negative Aussage, nach diesen Motto vom ‘Radfahrer muss weiterfahren, sonst fällt das Radl um’, wir machen jetzt weiter, machen das Grünbuch, und sozusagen, ‘the story must go on’"… (Interview 17 00:06ff.) 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would be defined (CD 16054/04, 19). By contrast,  ‘integration’ was granted a separate heading, in which the heads of state and government argued that the “fair treatment” of third‐country nationals was not enough to ensure full participation in society, and called for  the  adoption  of  “effective  policies”  involving  the  local,  national  and  supranational level with the aim of creating “equal opportunities” for migrants and their descendents to  “participate  fully  in  society”  and  ensuring  “stability”  and  “cohesion” within  society  (CD 16054/04, 19‐20). Moreover,  the European Council also called  for the adoption of „common basic principles underlying  a  coherent European  framework on  integration” that  would  “form  the  foundation  for  the  future  initiatives  in  the  EU,  relying  on  clear goals  and  means  of  evaluations“,  and  listed  the  most  important  elements  that  these principles should contain  (ibid). These elements are expressed  in  the quotation below (CD 16054/04, 20).   The  European  Council  underlines  the  need  for  greater coordination of national  integration policies and EU initiatives  in this field. In this respect, the common basic principles underlying a  coherent  European  framework  on  integration  should  be established.  These  principles,  connecting  all  policy  areas  related to  integration,  should  include  at  least  the  following  aspects. Integration: 




• relies  on  frequent  interaction  and  intercultural  dialogue between  all  members  of  society  within  common  forums  and activities in order to improve mutual understanding; 
• extends  to  a  variety  of  policy  areas,  including  employment and education.  
 
The Common Basic Principles on Integration The Common Basic Principles on Integration (CBP) were adopted a couple of days later by  the  national  ministers  responsible  for  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  during  the  first Ministerial Conference on Integration organized by the Dutch presidency in Groningen on  10‐11  November  2004  (CD  14615/04).  It  became  the  founding  document  for  the development of a coordinated policy on migrant  integration; much in the same way as the  Tampere  declaration  had  been  the  founding  document  for  the  development  of  a 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common migration policy.67 They were conceived of as non‐binding guidelines aimed at identifying priority areas  for cooperation on migrant  integration at  the European level and assisting Member States  in the formulation of national policies (CD 14615/04, 15‐16).  The  focus  of  the  Hague  Programme  on  integration  and  the  adoption  of  the Common Basic Principles  represented  important  steps  in bringing  the area of  cultural and  civic  integration under  the  scope of  supranational  action. As we have  seen  in  the first  part  of  this  chapter,  the  “integration”  frame had become highly  politicized  at  the supranational  level  during  the  negotiations  of  the  Long‐Term  Residents  and  Family Reunification  Directives  due  to  the  inclusion  of  provisions  in  these  Directives  that allowed  Member  States  to  make  compliance  with  “integration  conditions”  a precondition  for  the  acquisition  of  membership  rights.  As  a  result  of  the  debates surrounding the inclusion of these provisions, the National Contact Points on Integration had been set up as a soft mechanism of coordination at  the supranational  level where representatives of  the Member States discussed  their policies and exchanged  ideas on issues  related  to  integration  conditions.  Integration  was  on  its  way  to  becoming  a separate  policy  field  for  EU  action,  detached  from  supranational  measures  adopted under  the  legal basis of  “conditions of  entry and  residence of  third‐country nationals” which  focused  on  admissions  policies  and  the  governance  of  migrants’  rights.  The separation  of  these  two  issue  in  the  Hague  programme  confirmed  this  trend  and provided a new impulse to deepen cooperation in this emerging policy field. As for the substance of the 11 Common Basic Principles on Integration adopted in Groningen,  they reflected the contested nature of  the concept of  integration. The focus on  cultural  aspects  of  integration  is  present  in  the  Common Basic  Principles  2  and  4, which stress that integration requires respect for European values and knowledge of the language  and  culture  of  the  host  society  (CBP  2  and  4).  Nevertheless,  this  focus  on cultural  elements  is  counterbalanced  by  other  Common  Basic  Principles  that  stress human rights (CBP 8) and the need to improve the structural situation of migrants—in                                                         67 This is the perception of actors in the field as well. As a person involved with integration at the Commission told me: “…Tampere started it and it was wonderful, but it was just a line in there, you know, on the need for a more dynamic integration policy and about approximating the rights of third‐country nationals to that of European citizens, but the Hague Program was the first one that had a section on integration and there was already the mention of creating a website…and then two days after The Hague, the Council adopted the Common Basic Principles. It is the major document adopted by the Council on integration, even though it is not a legislative document…” (Interview 19, not recorded ‐ statement reconstructed from field notes) 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particular in employment (CBP 3), education (CBP 5), access to institutions and services on the basis of equal treatment (CBP 6), and participation in the political sphere (CBP 9). In  addition,  the  first  Common Basic  Principle  contends  that  integration  is  “a  two‐way process” (CBP 1), meaning that it requires efforts both on the part of the host society as well as on the part of the migrant. Further, the document also states that the interaction between  migrants  and  citizens  should  be  promoted  (CBP  7),  besides  calling  for  the mainstreaming of integration (CBP 10) and for the development of goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms that can improve policy‐making (CBP 11). As  my  interviews  showed,  the  Dutch  Presidency  was  instrumental  in  the formulation  of  the  Common  Basic  Principles,  and  one  of  its  main  priorities  was  to promote and legitimize its model of integration, which, as we have seen, relied strongly on the use of integration conditions, in particular the obligation to prove knowledge of Dutch  language  and  culture  as  a  prerequisite  for  family  reunification  and  for  the acquisition  of  long‐term  residence  (Interview  9  and  19).  Moreover,  the  Ministerial Conference  in  Groningen  took  place  just  one  week  after  the  Dutch  assassination  of filmmaker  Theo  van  Gogh  by  an  Islamist  terrorist  and was  clearly  impacted  by  these events and the fear of cultural estrangement that they sparked in the Netherlands (see the  opening  speech  by  the  Dutch  Minister:  Verdonk  10.11.2004).  Against  this background,  the  Dutch  Immigration  and  Integration  Minister  who  was  hosting  the conference, Ms. Rita Vertonk, has been quoted as saying  that  the EU needed “tougher” integration  policies  to  ensure  that  migrants  learned  the  local  language  and  accepted Western  values  (Euractiv 12.11.2004). Nevertheless,  as  discussed  above, whereas  this position  is  reflected  in  some  of  the  Common  Basic  Principles,  the  document  also contains  references  to  structural  aspects  of  integration  and  stresses  commitments  to human rights. Thus, in the end, the Common Basic Principles were first and foremost a political declaration  that  served  to  give  impulse  to  the  integration  agenda  and  display  the commitment of Member States to pursue this agenda forward, but they were formulated so widely that, as one interviewee from a think‐tank put it, “you can read into it anything you  like”  (Interview  9).68  Nevertheless,  the  Common  Basic  Principles  on  Integration                                                         68 This opinion was expressed in different ways by many participants in the field, in particular representatives of NGO’s and think tanks that accompany the development of EU policies in this area. For example, consider these three statements: “I don’t think that at this point we are adding toward…or can say that the Common Basic Principles are a…for me the CBP is very much a soft tool still. It is a tool in the making. And that’s 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represented an  important  rhetorical  commitment and, as we shall  see, at a  later  stage they  enabled  the  Commission  to  influence  the  implementation  of  “integration conditions”  at  the  national  level  by  linking  concrete  measures  to  these  rhetorical commitments (see discussion of the Integration Fund below). In  addition  to  the  Hague  Program  and  the  Common  Basic  Principles  on Integration,  there were  a  number  of  less  important  agenda  setting  events  concerning integration throughout the policy‐making period. In particular, following the Ministerial Conference  in  Groningen,  two  other  Ministerial  Conferences  on  integration  were convened, one during the German Presidency of the European Union in Potsdam in May 2007 (CD 10267) and one under the French Presidency of the European Union in Vichy in November 2008 (CD 15251/08). These conferences represented a continuation of the agenda  set  in  Groningen  of  creating  a  common  framework  for  the  integration  of migrants.  The main  focus  in  Potsdam was  on  the  promotion  of  intercultural  dialogue. The  main  focus  in  Vichy  was  on  the  development  of  “integration  programmes”  for newcomers  including  above  all  language  training  and  information  about  the  values  of the  host  society  and of  the European Union. Also  the  adoption  of  a  European Pact  on Immigration  and  Asylum  (CD  13440/08)  in  September  2008,  under  the  French Presidency, represented an agenda setting moment  for  integration, and  it showed that integration remained a contested term throughout this whole cycle of policy‐making at the supranational level. During the negotiations of the Pact in the European Council, the French  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy  pushed  for  the  inclusion  of  a  recommendation  for Member  States  to  adopt  “integration  conditions”  and  compulsory  “integration programmes” for newcomers, but this was blocked by the Spanish Prime‐Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who vetoed the inclusion of any references to integration as a compulsory  requirement,  pushing  for  a  positive  framing  of  integration  instead 
                                                        also the problem. It is a tool in the making where we are missing for the moment benchmarking, evaluation…” (Interview 8) “For us…it won’t surprise you what I will say now but…for me…the CBPs…11 I think they are, right? hum…they are fine, I mean, I must admit, I don’t spend too much time looking at them and saying: this is the guide that brings you where we want to be.” (Interview 3) “The Common Basic Principles express a contradictory equilibrium that is characteristic of this policy area. The Member States that limit the rights of migrants in their policies find legitimacy for that in the Common Basic Principles, and those that have more inclusive policies towards migrants also find instruments in the Common basic Principles that can help them. I believe that the policy in this area will continue to be contradictory for the years to come.” (Interview 4, not recorded, statement reconstructed from field notes and translated by the author) 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elaborated  a  Green  Paper  on  economic migration  and  following  that  a  Policy  Plan  on legal  migration  that  represented  a  turning  point  for  the  development  of  EU  policy, because  they marked  a  shift  from  the  “horizontal  approach”  pursued  during  the  first phase to a “sectoral approach”, which consisted in adopting different legal instruments to  regulate  the  conditions  for  entry  and  residence  of  specific  categories  of  migrants (Interviews 8, 12, 6, 17, 22, 20). The following sections will show that this new sectoral approach  was  chosen  out  of  pragmatic  concerns,  as  a  strategy  to  facilitate  decision‐making and produce a gradual consolidation of supranational competence  in this area. As we shall see, Commissioner Frattini and his cabinet were the main architects of this new approach, which was guided by a much more instrumental view of immigration and of migrants’ rights than had been the case under Vitorino.  
The Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration As  the Hague Program already  foresaw,  the  Commission  started  the  process  of  policy formulation  by  publishing  a  Green  Paper  on  “an  approach  to  managing  economic migration“  (COM  (2005)  811  final), with which  it  launched  a  broad  process  of  public consultation.  Green  Papers  are  documents  published  by  the  European  Commission  to stimulate discussion on a given topic at European level by presenting a series of policy alternatives and inviting stakeholders to express an opinion on the  issues presented.70 In  the Green Paper  on  economic migration,  the Commission  started  the discussion by backing  up  from  its  original  intention  to  achieve  a  common migration  policy  through comprehensive instruments.  It acknowledged that given the sensitivity and complexity of  the  issue  at  hand,  a  common  policy  could  only  be  put  in  place  progressively,  and announced that supranational legislation put forward during the second stage would be conceived of as “first step legislation” that would seek to lay down common definitions and procedures while leaving the ultimate decisions to the Member States, in particular concerning volumes of admission (COM (2005) 811 final, 5). Further,  the  Green  Paper  presented  two  different  alternatives  to  how  EU legislation could progress. The first possibility would be to adopt a horizontal approach along  the  same  lines of  the 2001 proposal.  The horizontal  approach would mean  that one  instrument would cover  the conditions of entry and residence of all  third‐country nationals wishing to work in the EU. Specific provisions could deal with special needs of                                                         70 For a definition see: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/green_paper_en.htm (last visited 01.05.2010) 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certain categories, but the instrument would be comprehensive. The second alternative would be a “sectoral” approach. This would imply that the Commission would propose “a  series  of  sectoral  legislative  proposals,”  each  focusing  on  specific  categories  of migrants. The Green Paper already named possible categories, and stated that “this draft legislation could focus on seasonal workers, intra‐corporate transferees, specially skilled migrants (…), contractual service suppliers and/or other categories” (COM (2005) 811 final, 5). According to the Green Paper, the main advantage of this strategy would be “an easier adoption of common rules” (ibid), showing clearly that the reasoning behind such a  proposal  was  a  pragmatic  concern  for  overcoming  the  political  stalemate  in  the Council. After  presenting  these  possibilities  and  asking  stakeholders  to  give  a  general answer to which approach would be preferred, the Commission also asked a number of more  specific  questions  in  the  Green  Paper,  such  as  how  to  deal  with  the  concept  of Community  preference,  whether  a  job‐seeker  permit  should  be  created,  whether  a unified  single  residence  and  work  permit  should  be  established,  how  the  admission procedures  for  self‐employed should be coordinated, etc.  Importantly, under a  section entitled  “Rights”,  the Green Paper stated  that  “third‐country workers should enjoy  the same treatment as EU citizens  in particular with regard  to certain basic economic and social rights before they obtain  long‐term resident status” (COM (2005) 811 final, 10). This statement was followed by three questions to the stakeholders on the level of rights that  should  be  granted  to  third‐country  workers  before  the  acquisition  of  long‐term residence. In particular the Commission asked: what rights should be granted to third‐country  nationals  working  temporarily  in  the  EU;  whether  the  enjoyment  of  certain rights  should  be  conditioned  to  a  minimum  stay;  and  whether  there  should  be “incentives—e.g. better conditions for family reunification or for obtaining the status of long term resident—to attract certain categories of third‐country workers” (COM (2005) 811 final, 10). Despite the initial statement on the importance of assuring that migrant workers have basic socio‐economic rights, this last question—on the possibility of using rights as an “incentive” to attract certain categories of migrants—clearly reflects an instrumental view of rights that markedly differs from the approach taken by the Commission under Vitorino, where rights were seen as a part of the creation of “civic citizenship”.  In fact, the  pro‐migrant  notion  of  “civic  citizenship”  did  not  appear  in  the Green Paper  at  all, which clearly took a more pragmatic—as opposed to ideological—view of immigration 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and  of  rights,  which  were  now  even  considered  as  a  possible  instrument  in  the management of migration flows (i.e. by granting more rights as an incentive to certain categories, and presumably less rights as a deterrent to others). As one interviewee from the Migration Policy Group, an important think tank in Brussels remarked, the concept of  civic  citizenship  disappeared  from  the  agenda  during  the mandate  of  Frattini, who simply  “didn’t  run with  it”  (Interview 3).71 Thus, with  the Green Paper  it was  already quite clear  that  the Commission was going  to  take a different approach to  the  issue of membership  rights  for  third‐country  nationals  during  this  second  phase  of  policy‐making, even though the decision on precisely which legislative proposals to make was only  taken  later  with  the  publication  of  the  Policy  Plan  on  Legal  Migration (COM(2005)669  final),  which  resulted  from  the  evaluation  of  the  contributions presented as a response to the Green Paper.  
The Policy Plan on Legal Migration The Commission received 130 written contributions to this public consultation coming from  the  Member  States,  civil  society  and  academia  (Interview  6).72  In  addition,  the Commission  organized  a  public  hearing,  and  consulted  the  Member  States representatives also informally within the framework of the Committee for Immigration and  Asylum  (CIA)  (COM  (2005)  669  final,  1).  An  analysis  of  the  position  papers submitted by the main NGO’s  in  the  field shows that  the contributions  for civil society were  strongly  in  favor  of  a  horizontal  approach,  besides  condemning  the  “utilitarian approach”  to  migration  put  forward  by  the  Commission  in  the  Green  Paper  and unanimously stressing the need for a “rights‐based approach” to migration grounded on the  respect  for  human  rights,  equal  treatment  and  anti‐discrimination  (Amnesty International  15.04.2005;  Caritas  Europa  et  al.  15.04.2005;  Platform  for  International Cooperation  on  Undocumented Migration  (PICUM)  13.04.2005;  Platform  of  European                                                         71 The passage of the interview from which this statement was taken is quoted in full below: Interviewer: What happened to the concept of civic citizenship? Respondent: Vitorino was…very into this, and hum we were as well, but it didn’t pick up steam politically, and then Vitorino was gone, and the next Commissioner he br… he was a little bit crazy, but smart, he was a very smart man, Frattini, very smart, but of course for us after Vitorino that was a step back, and he didn’t run with it… (Interview 3) 72 All written contributions received by the Commission are available under: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/economic_migration/news_contributions_economic_migration_en.htm (last visited 01.05.2010) 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Social  NGO’s  2005;  Solidar  2005).  For  example,  the  so‐called  “Christian  Club”—an association  of  the main NGOs with  a  Christian  religious  background—condemned  the idea  of  differentiating  between  categories  of  migrants  with  respect  to  rights,  arguing that  “a  right  cannot be used as an  incentive”  (Caritas Europa et al. 15.04.2005, 8) and calling  for  a  horizontal  approach  in  order  to  avoid  creating  “first  class”  and  “second class” migrants (ibid, 3). Also the main workers organization, ETUC, argued for a rights‐based  approach,  asserting  that  EU  policy  should  “attribute  social  and  political citizenship  rights  to  migrant  workers  and  their  family  members”  (European  Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 2005, 6). Despite  these  strong  arguments  in  favor  of  a  horizontal  approach  and  a comprehensive  framework  of  rights  on  the  part  of  the  main  NGOs  and  civil  society organizations, it was clear that any decision of which strategy to pursue would depend primarily on the position of the Member States. The persistence of the rule of unanimity in the Council was the main institutional determinant impacting the future development of  policy  proposals  affecting  third‐country  nationals  at  this  stage.  And,  as  several participants  pointed  out,  it  was  quite  clear  from  the  beginning  that  there  was  not enough  political  support  among  the  Member  States  for  the  horizontal  approach.73  In particular with respect to the issue of rights, the position of the Member States differed significantly, with  some Member  States  taking more  utilitarian  views  of  rights,  others taking strongly pro‐migrant views. Taking the position papers by Austria and Portugal as  examples,  one  can  see how divergent  the position of  the Member  States were. The official  contribution  by  Austria  to  the  consultation  procedure  argued  that  certain categories of migrants—in particular  seasonal workers—should be excluded  from any                                                         73 This statement by a representative of the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, an important Brussels‐based NGO, provides evidence and gives insight into the process of consultation: „...die Kommission hat relativ  früh noch konsultiert, wobei es eine Zeit lang nicht klar war welche Instrumentarien…, es war klar nach den Green Book Arbeitsmigration, dass in den Bereich irgendwas geben würde, aber es war nicht ganz klar wie sektoral es sein würde, unseren Ansatz war immer zu sagen, es gibt die Richtlinienvorschlag 2001 Aufnahme von Abhängige Arbeit und Selbständige Tätigkeit, das war ein guter Vorschlag, der zurückgezogen worden ist, unseren Position war immer zu sagen, diesen Vorschlag sollte man eigentlich noch mal aufgreifen. War uns vollkommen klar, dass es dafür keine politische Mehrheit gab, und auch vielleicht in absehbare Zeit keine politische Mehrheit geben wird, hum, deswegen war es anders von Frattini auch nicht dumm zu sagen wir gucken uns einzelne Bereichen wo es vielleicht einfacher sein kann, gucken wir mal wie weit wir die Tür offnen können, um dann damit weiter zu kommen. Hum, wir waren dann relativ früh schon in Konsultation mit der Kommission und haben das dafür verwendet zu sagen, mach doch was horizontales, war klar, das war nicht zu haben...“ (Interview 12 00:25:44ff) 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rights  that  could  “lead  to  integration”,  and  welcomed  the  idea  of  granting  additional rights as an incentive to highly skilled migrants (Austrian Contribution to Green Paper 2005,  16‐17).74  By  contrast,  the  official  Portuguese  contribution  stated  that:  “social 
rights  of  citizenship  should  be  dissociated  from  the  employment  relationship  and  be universally granted to all  legal migrants resident in a host Member State, because they derive from the respect for the Person, from the incentive to Citizenship, and from the social model chosen. Fundamental rights, such as family reunification, should therefore not be used as remuneration for successful economic integration or as a mechanism to attract  certain  kinds  of migrants”  (Portuguese  Contribution  to  Green  Paper  2005,  9  ‐ own translation, emphasis and capitalizations in the original).75  Given  the  disparity  of  view  among  the  Member  States,  and  considering  the unanimity rule, it was clear that the Commission would have to opt for a less ambitious approach than was the case with the proposal from 2001. Importantly, the two biggest and  arguably  most  powerful  Member  States—Germany  and  France—both  argued  in their position papers in favor of prioritizing certain kinds of migration, especially highly skilled workers, and supported the idea that additional rights could be granted to highly qualified workers  in order  to make Europe an attractive destination  for  them (French Contribution  to Green Paper 2005; German Contribution  to Green Paper 2005). At  the same  time,  these  countries  and  several  others  argued  that  a  minimum  set  of  work‐related rights should be guaranteed for all third‐country workers (ibid).                                                         74 “Unabhängig davon, dass grundlegende wirtschaftliche und soziale Rechte selbstverständlich für alle gewährleistet sein sollen, ist eine Differenzierung zwischen unterschiedlichen Sachverhalten notwendig. Es wäre nicht sachgerecht, undifferenziert alle Rechte (bzw. Voraussetzungen/Pflichten) von Personen die ihren Aufenthalt auf längere Zeit oder auf Dauer ausrichten auch auf Personen mit einen klar begrenzten, vorübergehenden Perspektive anzuwenden. (…) Hier wird offensichtlich die besondere Problematik der Rechtsstellung von Saisonarbeitskräften angesprochen. (…), so muss sich daran auch die Konsequenz knüpfen, dass diese [saisonale] Arbeitskräfte während der Beschäftigung arbeitsrechtlich wohl gleichgestellt sind, jedoch damit rechnen müssen, nach deren Ablauf das Land zu verlassen. Die Gewährung besonderer Rechte, insbesondere im Hinblick auf Integration, sollte hier nicht in Betracht kommen.” (Austrian Contribution to Green Paper 2005, 16).  “Solche Anreize [Rechte] sind insbesondere qualifizierten Drittstaatsangehörigen zu bieten, wenn ihre Beschäftigung zur Schaffung und Sicherung con Arbeitsplätzen beiträgt.” (Austrian Contribution to Green Paper 2005, 17).  75 “Os direitos sociais associados a cidadania devem ser dissociados da contratualização laboral e serem universais para todos os imigrantes legais, residents num EM de acolhimento, pois decorrem do respeito pela Pessoa, do incentivo à Cidadania e da degesa do modelo social escolhido. Direitos essenciais, como o reagrupamento familiar, não devem, por conseguinte, ser usados como remuneração do sucesso de integração económica ou como mecanismo de atraccção de determinado tipo de imigrantes.” (Portuguese Contribution to Green Paper 2005, 9) 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On the basis of this consultation, the Commission decided to adopt a new strategy in  the  area  of  legal  migration,  which  was  published  in  its  “Policy  Plan  on  Legal Migration”  (COM(2005)669  final).  In  the  Policy  Plan,  the  Commission  notes  that  the contributions “drew attention to possible advantages of horizontal framework covering conditions  of  admission  for  all  third‐country  nationals  seeking  entry  into  the  labor markets  of  the Member  States”  (COM(2005)669  final,  5).  However,  it  points  out  that there was  not  enough  support  by  the Member  States  for  such  a  horizontal  approach. Therefore,  the  Commission  decided  for  a  mixed  strategy:  one  framework  Directive covering  the  rights  of  all  third‐country  nationals  but  not  dealing  with  conditions  for admission coupled with four sectoral Directives on specific categories. The four sectoral Directives would cover the following categories: highly skilled, seasonal workers, intra‐corporate  transferees and paid  trainees. The  first  two addressed  important  categories that were of concern for many Member States, whereas the other two addressed small numbers  of  people  and  should  be  relatively  uncomplicated.  The  package  of  sectoral Directives would be  limited  to  regulating  the conditions and procedures of admission, and would not address the issue of volumes. The  mixed  approach  of  combining  these  four  sectoral  Directives  with  one horizontal  Directive was  considered  the  best  option  because  it would  provide  a  level playing field and a minimum set of rights to all third‐country nationals. The horizontal Directive would protect  third‐country nationals  from exploitation and protect national workers from cheap labor, while still leaving the decisions on admission for the majority of  economic  migrants  in  the  hands  of  the  Member  States  (COM(2005)669  final).  As stated by  the Commission  in  the Policy Plan,  this new approach aimed  “to offer a  fair, rights‐based approach to all labour migrants on the one hand, and attracting conditions for specific categories of migrants needed in the EU on the other” (COM(2005)669 final, 5).  Thus  we  see  how  the  publication  of  the  Green  Paper  and  the  adoption  of  the Policy Plan represented a major change in strategy on the part of the Commission in the area of legal migration in general, and in the approach to governing the rights of legally resident  third‐country nationals  in particular. This change  in strategy was chosen as a response to the political stalemate that followed the presentation of the 2001 Proposal for a Directive on Economic Migration in Council, but it also reflected the new political and ideological orientation of the Commission in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. As an interviewee from the Commission put it, the preparations for the Green Book and the 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idealization of  the new strategy were “strongly  influenced by Frattini and his cabinet”, who  decided  that  “the  horizontal  approach  is  not  leading  anywhere,  so  let’s  chose  an easier path and propose specific categories”.76 The main assumption behind the Green Paper and the Policy Plan was that the horizontal approach was politically unfeasible, as had  become  clear  during  the  negotiations  of  the  2001  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on Economic Migration, and that a new alternative had to be sought. Nevertheless, whereas the difficulties of achieving comprehensive harmonization were institutionally given, the choice of alternative lay in the hands of the Commission. Thus, the decision to propose a sectoral  approach  as  the  main  alternative  to  the  2001  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on Economic  Migration  can  be  interpreted  as  an  essentially  political  decision  by  the Commission under Frattini  to prioritize  the development of supranational competence on legal migration over the establishment of a comprehensive policy with a high degree of  harmonization.  This  political  choice  reflected  a  more  pragmatic  and  economically‐oriented  view  of  immigration  that  was  summarized  by  a  high‐ranking  Commission representative as follows: Migration is not a goal in itself, much less economic migration. We  have  always  made  clear  what  the  goal  is  that  we  are pursuing  (and  that  comes  out  of  an  analysis  of  the  Lisbon strategy): we want growth, and to increase the competitiveness in Europe, and therefore the very first proposal we put forward was the one on highly qualified workers, and if you look at the European  Pact  that was  adopted  in  October  you will  see  that the overall direction of the EU immigration policy in the future will go much more in the direction of “immigration choisie”—a more  selective  immigration  policy.  Those  who  have  certain skills  may  come,  but  with  all  those  who  want  to  come  just because  they  are  family  members,  one  will  be  much  more restrictive  in  the  future.  Which  doesn’t  mean  that  family 
                                                        76 The passage of the interview from which this statement was taken is quoted in as follows: Interviewer: “Und wie waren dann die Vorbereitungen für die neue Strategie? War das jetzt unter Vitorino?” Respondent: “Nein, das war dann bereits Frattini. Da kam dann Frattini, und Frattini hum.. also gemeinsam mit einen neuen Generaldirektor, hat dann die Agenda fixiert, wir machen das Grünbuch, im Grünbuch würde sozusagen analysiert, was waren die bisherigen Ergebnisse und Verhandlungen, wie könnte eine neue Strategie aussehen, Konsultationen, Feedback und dann Policy Plan, aber auch stark von Frattini und Kabinett Frattini damals beeinflusst.” Interviewer: “Auch diese Idee der sektoriale…?” Respondent: “Ja, das war massiv, wir kommen mit den horizontalen nicht durch, also gehen wir für den leichteren Weg und schlagen spezifische Kategorien vor, zu erst natürlich die, wo es am meisten Akzeptanz bei den Mitgliedstaaten gibt, nämlich die ‚highly skilled’.” (Interview 17 00:11ff.) 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The “Blue Card” Directive The “proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third‐country nationals  for  the  purposes  of  highly  qualified  employment”,  also  known  as  the  “Blue Card Directive”, was put forward by the Commission on 23 October 2007 (COM (2007) 637  final).  In  line  with  the  new  approach  to  migration  adopted  by  the  Frattini Commission,  the  justification  for  the  Blue  Card Directive  put  forward  in  the  proposal was economic. As stated in the impact assessment, the objective of the proposal was “to improve the ability of the EU to attract and retain third country highly skilled workers” with the aim of “enhancing the competitiveness of the EU economy and addressing the consequences of demographic aging,” as well as “to effectively and promptly respond to existing and arising demands  for highly qualified  labour”  (SEC (2007) 1382 and 1403, 4). In the explanatory memorandum, the Commission notes that the EU is not attractive enough  to  highly  skilled  workers,  who  tend  to  choose  the  USA  or  Canada  as  their preferred destination (COM (2007) 637, 3). In order to make the EU more attractive, it is necessary  to harmonize  and  facilitate  admissions procedures  for  these workers,  grant them  mobility  within  the  EU,  and  grant  them  the  highest  level  of  rights  possible, including immediate family reunification with immediate access to the labor market for the spouses. More favorable derogations from the existing rules on family reunification and  the  acquisition  of  long‐term  residence  were  proposed,  and  justified  with  the instrumental goal of making the EU more attractive for those kind of migrants for which there  is  international  competition.  In  justifying  the  derogations,  the  explanatory memorandum  also  notes  that  the  Family  Reunification Directive  “followed  a  different logic”, since it was conceived of as “a tool to foster integration of third‐country nationals who  could  reasonable  become  permanent  residents”  (ibid,  11),  thus  implying  that integration  is  not  a  concern  of  this  Directive,  which  clearly  followed  a market‐driven logic, rather than a humanitarian one. The  negotiations  in  the  Council  for  the  Blue  Card  Directive  were  much  less polemic and difficult than for the Directives proposed between 1999 and 2004. The Blue Card Directive was adopted within a relatively short period of time: political agreement was  reached  already  in  October  2008  (CD  9057/09),  only  one  year  after  the presentation of the proposal by the Commission.80 A key factor in explaining this speedy adoption was the role played by the French Presidency, which took over from Slovenia                                                         80 As opposed to almost five years for the Family Reunification Directive, for instance. 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on 1 July 2008. Migration was one of the key priorities set by President Sarkozy during the  French  Presidency  of  the  European  Union,  as  clearly  evidenced  by  the  French initiative  to  push  for  an  European  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum,  which  was  finally adopted by  the Council  in October 2008  (CD 13440/08),  after having been  somewhat watered  down  during  the  negotiations,  especially  due  to  the  opposition  of  Spain  to passages  that  endorsed  integration  requirements  for  migrants  and  condemned regularizations (Monar 2009, 154). In terms of legislation, the French Presidency had set itself  the ambitious goal of adopting within six months  the Blue Card Directive and,  in the area of  illegal migration,  the “Employer Sanctions Directive”81, both of which were consistent  with  the  approach  of  the  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum  of  promoting  a selective  immigration  policy  focused  on  facilitating  entry  and  stay  for  only  certain categories  of  economically  desirable  immigration  while  strongly  sanctioning  illegal migration  and  imposing  strict  requirements  on  less  desirable  categories  of  migrants (Interviews 6, 13 and 14)(Monar 2009).82 During  the  negotiations  of  the  Blue  Card  Directive,  the  most  controversial discussions  revolved  around  three  issues.  First,  the  new Member  States  (in  particular Romania  and  Bulgaria)  felt  that  the  Directive  granted  a  more  favorable  situation  to third‐country  nationals  than  to  their  own  nationals,  given  the  fact  that  their  own nationals were subject to transitional agreements and therefore did not have access free access to the labor market of all Member States  in the Union (Interviews 4, 13, 14, 20, 23, 24). This was a very serious opposition, and it pointed to the difficulties created by the existence of rights hierarchies even among EU nationals. In the end it was possible to get  the  agreement  of  these  countries  by  emphasizing  that  when  hiring  highly  skilled third‐country  nationals  the  Member  States  had  to  comply  with  the  principle  of Community  preference.  Nevertheless,  the  Czech  Presidency  of  the  European  Union, which  took  over  from  the  French  on  1  January  2009,  delayed  the  adoption  of  the Directive as long as possible in a protest against what it saw as a preferential treatment of third‐country nationals over EU citizens from the new Member States (Interviews 13 and 14). 
                                                        81 For an analysis of this Directive see (Peers 2009, 411 ff.). 82 Also, in the area of illegal migration, the highly controversial “Returns Directive” (Directive 2008/115/EC) was adopted in December of 2008 at the very end of the French Presidency, after three years of negotiations (Monar 2009, 156).  
  147 
Second,  the  Member  States  disagreed  on  the  adequate  level  of  the  salary threshold  for qualifying  to highly skilled status. This was a major political  issue, given that  the salary  level was  the main condition  for a  third‐country national  to qualify  for the  preferential  treatment  given  to  highly  skilled  persons.  Although  there  were divergent  views  among  the Member  States,  the  analysis  of  the minutes  of  the Council negotiations is illuminating in terms of showing the logic behind the dominant position. Thus,  the French  representative pointed out  that  the main purpose of  the  salary  limit was to assure that the highly skilled status would remain “selective and practicable” (ref 6051/08). The Commission took the position that “a salary‐based approach needs to be used,  the  level of which should be sufficiently high”  (CD 6051/08, emphasis added).  In other words,  the  intention was  not  to  expand  rights  to  the  greatest  number  of  third‐country nationals possible, but rather to make sure that this status would be exceptional and  selective.  In  the  end  a  compromise  solution  was  found  which  used  the  average wages in the Member State as the parameter, and stipulated that the Blue Card holders must have a salary which is above‐average, which was also the approach supported by the European Parliament (European Parliament (T6‐0557/2008)).83 Third, a very controversial issue was the question of whether it would be possible for  the  Member  States  to  maintain  national  schemes  of  admission  of  highly  skilled workers in parallel to the Blue Card scheme. In particular, Germany wanted to maintain its  existing  rules  on  the  admission  of  IT  workers,  while  the  Commission  wanted  to achieve a higher level of harmonization by making sure that national permits would not compete  with  the  Blue  Card.  Finally,  given  the  time  pressure  created  by  the  French Presidency, which wanted to see the Directive adopted before the end of  its  term, and the requirement of unanimity, which favors veto players that oppose policy change, the German managed to push their demand through, and national schemes continued to be permitted. In sum, the analysis of  the negotiations  in the Council conducted above yields a number  of  interesting  findings.  In  particular,  it  makes  clear  that  the  main  concerns during  the  negotiations were  economic,  and  that  the whole  approach  to  the Directive was  one  of  facilitating  the  immigration  of  selected  types  of workers.  By  contrast,  the issue of integration conditions or of cultural and civic integration in general did not play a major role  in  the negotiations.  In  fact, Blue Card holders are not required  to comply                                                         83 As opposed to three times the minimum wage as in the original proposal (COM (2007) 637 final). 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with  such  conditions  (see  Annex  I).  The  justification  for  the  preferential  treatment  of Blue Card workers was grounded on  the  idea  that  this  is  a  select group of people—in terms of numbers, and in economic and social terms. The fact that the main criteria to qualify for a Blue Card are income and education speaks for the social selectivity of this approach. Moreover, the basic assumption was that this category of migrants is needed for  the  development  of  the  European  economy,  and  therefore  should  be  granted attractive  conditions.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  contribution  that  the  migrants make  to  the economy seems have been  less  important  than  the social  standing of  this category.  Whereas  there  are  other  categories  of  migrants  needed  in  many  European economies  but  without  high  incomes—such  as  seasonal  unskilled  workers,  domestic workers,  or  skilled workers with  average  salaries  such  as  nurses  and  care workers—these  categories were not  considered  for privileged  treatment. Rather, Member States were most willing to grant socio‐economic rights and labor rights precisely to the only category  which  is  least  likely  to  need  it,  namely  those  who  earn  above  average. Humanitarian  concerns were  only  present  in  the  provisions  that  aimed  at  preventing brain drain in the countries of origin, not in the concession of rights.  
 
The “Proposal for a Proposal for a Single Permit Directive” On  the  same  day  as  the  Blue  Card  proposal  was  put  forward,  the  Commission  also presented  a  “Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  on  a  single  application  procedure  for  a single permit for third‐country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State  and  on  a  common  set  of  rights  for  third‐country  workers  legally  residing  in  a Member State”, hereafter referred to as the proposal for a „Proposal for a Proposal for a Single  Permit  Directive”  (COM  (2007)  638  final).  This  Proposal  had  the  objective  of fulfilling the commitment made in the Policy Plan on Legal Migration of complementing the  sectoral  approach with  a  horizontal  Directive  on  rights  of  third‐country workers. Moreover,  the  Commission  intended  to  regulate  with  the  same  instrument  also procedural aspects of admitting third‐country workers for the purpose of employment by harmonizing  the  issuing of work and residence permits  in a  single procedure  for a single permit (hence the name). The joint publication of the Proposal for a Proposal for a Single Permit Directive and  the Proposal  for a Blue Card Directive aimed at creating a strong policy  linkage between  the  two  legislative  instruments  (Interviews 13 and 14), but the negotiations in the Council took very different directions, as we shall see. 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As  opposed  to  the  Blue  Card  Directive,  in  the  explanatory  memorandum  that accompanied the Proposal for a Proposal for a Single Permit Directive (COM (2007) 638 final),  the  justification  for  such  a measure was based on  the Tampere  commitment  of “fair  treatment”  of  third‐country  nationals.  The  Commission  argued  that  there  was currently  a  “rights  gap”  between EU  citizens  and  third‐country  nationals who  are  not long‐term residents, due to the fact that in many Member States third‐country workers are  not  protected  by  employment  legislation  and have  limited  or  no  access  to  certain kinds of  social  benefits  and public  services  (see  also:  SEC  (2007) 1393). The  aim was therefore to correct this situation by granting equal treatment on basic socio‐economic rights,  especially  employment‐related  rights.  The  framing  was  thus  rights‐based  and humanitarian, relying strongly on the norm of equal treatment. According to the Commission, the benefits of granting equal treatment would be threefold:  first,  equal  treatment  in  social  benefits  and  working  conditions  (including pay)  would  protect  EU  citizens  from  unfair  competition;  secondly,  it  would  protect migrants  from exploitation and be consistent with  the Tampere goal of  fair  treatment; third,  it would  create  a  level  playing  field  among  EU Member  States,  thus  preventing distortions of  competition.  In  addition,  the Proposal  for  a  Single Permit Directive  also aimed at simplifying procedures for the acquisition of a work and residence permit by combining  the  two  in a single  instrument and providing  for procedural guarantees  for the third‐country nationals. At the same time, the decision of whether to admit and grant access to the  labor market  to a  third‐country national would remain exclusively at  the discretion of the Member States. Accordingly, the proposed Directive did not grant any rights to labor market access or to mobility within the EU. Contrary to the Blue Card Directive, where there was a clear economic interest on the part of the Member States, in the case of the Proposal for a Single Permit Directive the Commission was at pains to try to justify the proposal as beneficial to the European economy  (SEC  (2007)  1393).  It  had  to  acknowledge,  however,  that  the  expansion  of rights  foreseen  in  the Directive was  likely  to produce significant costs—in  the  form of social benefits—for the Member States that did not yet grant equal treatment. The main justification for the Directive was clearly humanitarian and not economic, even though the argument of  creating a  level playing  field  and preventing unfair  competition were used  in  the  explanatory memorandum. However,  this  argument was  unlikely  to  carry much weight given the fact that third‐country workers lack free movement rights within the  Union.  Whereas  the  argument  of  creating  a  level  playing  field  had  been  very 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successful  in  the  development  of  anti‐discrimination  legislation  for  EU  citizens  in  the past, this was premised on the existence of a right to free movement. Although  the  Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive  started  to  be  negotiated together with  the  Blue  Card  Directive,  a  final  decision  on  the  former  is  still  pending. During the first phase of negotiations, the issue came up of whether the legal basis used by the Commission (Article 63(3) EC) was appropriate for such an instrument, which in reality did not cover the “conditions of entry and residence” of third‐country nationals, but primarily focused on employment‐related rights. In particular, Germany argued that labor  market  policy  was  exclusive  competence  of  the  Member  States  and  refused  to accept  the  legal  basis  proposed  by  the  Commission.  The  Commission  defended  its stance,  and  the  issue  was  transferred  to  the  legal  services  of  the  Council  and  the Commission,  each  of which  gave  a  diametrically  opposite  opinion  (Interviews  23  and 24).  As  a  result  of  this  controversy  and  the  strong  opposition  by  Germany,  no agreement  could be  found under  the French Presidency  (for whom  this Directive was also not a major priority – Interviews 13 and 14). The negotiations thus continued under the  Czech  presidency,  which  was  openly  resistant  to  the  adoption  of  supranational measures granting rights to third‐country workers. The Czech Presidency thus tabled a compromise solution  that proposed  to  limit  the provisions on equal  treatment only  to those holding a single permit according to the procedure established in the Directive. By contrast,  the  Commission  proposal  foresaw  that  all  third‐country  nationals who were allowed to work would benefit from the common set of rights, so as to close the “rights gap”  by  creating  a  common  socket  of  minimum  socio‐economic  rights  to  which  all categories  would  be  entitled.  The  solution  proposed  by  the  Czech  presidency  would have  instead  created yet  another  category within  the  rights hierarchy—“single permit holders”—with more favorable rights than those admitted by other procedures. According  to  the  interviews  conducted  for  this  dissertation,  almost  all Member States  would  have  been  prepared  to  accept  this  compromise  solution,  knowing  that under  unanimity  the  countries  that were  strongly  opposed  to  a  broader  scope would have  vetoed  the  Directive  otherwise—in  this  case  Germany,  Austria  and  Finland (Interview  23).  However,  a  political  dispute  emerged  between  these  countries  and Spain, which argued that there was no added value of accepting such a minimal proposal 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(ibid).84  The  position  of  Spain  was  determined  by  several  political  and  contextual factors.  The  Spanish  government  under  the  leadership  of  Prime  Minister  Zapatero defended  a  much  more  pro‐migrant  stance  than  the  majority  in  the  Council,  and especially  also  of  the  governments  of  the  two most  powerful Member  States,  namely France and Germany. Migration was an  important  issue  for Spain, which  is one of  the five  EU  countries  with  the  biggest  number  of  resident  third‐country  nationals  (SEC (2007)  1393).  In  addition,  Spain  was  expecting  to  take  over  the  Presidency  of  the European  Union  within  the  following  year,  and  migration  would  be  one  of  its  key priorities. Moreover, by the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 when these negotiations were taking place, the expectations were again high that the Treaty of Lisbon would be ratified soon, which would have clarified  the  legal basis and  transferred  the matter  to co‐decision  and  qualified  majority  voting.  Getting  the  Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit Directive through with a strong set of rights during its Presidency would have enabled the  socialist  Spanish  government  to  strengthen  its  profile  as  a  progressive  European leadership.  Thus,  when  the  issue  was  forwarded  to  the  highest  political  level,  the compromise solution was vetoed by Spain in the Council of Ministers (Interview 23).                                                         84 This illuminating passage of an interview conducted with an official of the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels shows how the political negotiations in the Council proceeded and reveals the background to the Spanish position: „Entonces Alemania y Austria han dicho, bueno la única forma que tienes de aprobar esta directiva es haciendo una directiva solamente para los titulares del permiso único. Cada uno con unos argumento distintos, eh? Alemania yo creo que va más por una argumentación jurídica, considera que no hay base jurídica suficiente para una directiva que en ese momento, tal cual está el tratado, pueda regular un catálogo de derechos en general, hay un informe del servicio jurídico al respecto de ese tema, que a lo mejor se lo puedes hacer coger, pues te puedo orientar un poco por donde va, pero hay otros países como Austria, como Finlandia, donde verdaderamente es un tema más político que jurídico, he, no quieren que se  apruebe una directiva de derechos a los trabajadores extranjeros. No lo quieren, y se agota sencillo como eso. Ni más ni menos. Bueno entonces eso se presenta en el COREPER, que es donde se analiza, y entonces en el COREPER se ve que hay un número considerable de países que pueden decir, que dicen bueno si no hay otro remedio, pues vayamos hace a esa vía, y solamente España y países bajos, y Luxemburgo dijeran que ellos no aceptaban la directiva tal cual, con ese recorte, ese cambio, entonces en ese momento la directiva esta paralizada. Esta paralizada porque fue al consejo de ministros del mes pasado y España la bloqueó, dice que no la aprobaba, entonces hay que seguir trabajando, estamos ahora trabajando con la presidencia, con el consejo y con la comisión para ver como se puede buscar una formula un poco más equilibrada para aprobar la directiva, pero no sabemos lo que va a pasar. Nosotros eh....pensamos que es una directiva que a nosotros no nos aporta nada. Nosotros tenemos un procedimiento único y tenemos un catálogo de derechos para los trabajadores inmigrantes muchísimo más amplio de lo que aparece en la directiva, con lo cual prisa no tenemos ninguna por que se apruebe. Y se encima tienes en cuenta que se te demoras unos cinco meses al final es un texto que pasará a codecisión y por tanto será un texto que vuelva otra vez a adquirir un nivel mucho más alto, porque el parlamento a pesar de que tenga una configuración de derechas es una institución muchísimo más proclive y muchísimo más favorable a unas políticas más progresistas en estos temas, pues bueno!“ 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After the veto by Spain, the negotiations were stalled. The Czech Presidency did not give priority  to  the  field of  immigration,  and was moreover  ridden with problems given  that  the  governing  coalition  in  the  Czech  Republic  had  just  disintegrated prompting a major political  crisis  in  the country. Only after  the entry  into  force of  the Treaty of Lisbon did the negotiations start again, this time with full participation by the European  Parliament,  who  is  still  examining  the  proposal  (expected  date  for  the  EP plenary vote is June 2010). Thus, the rule of unanimity in the Council prevented agreement on the Proposal for a Single Permit Directive, especially due to the position of Spain, which  , under the expectation of  imminent  changes  to  the  institutional  framework due  to  the  entry  into force  of  a  new  Treaty,  prevented  a minimum  compromise. Were  this  expectation  not there,  it  is quite possible that the result of the negotiations on the Single Permit  in the Council  would  have  yielded  a  compromise  solution  that  created  yet  another  totally artificial category of migrants, namely “single permit holder”. The rights of this category would have differed from other categories, including those who have a work permit on the same grounds, but who were not given a single permit for administrative or political reasons  at  the  discretion  of  the  Member  States.  Here  we  see  very  clearly  how  the creation  of  new  categories  works  at  least  in  part  as  a  strategy  to  minimize disagreements within the framework of unanimity voting and in the presence of a “joint decision  trap”.  By  creating  new  categories  or  excluding  existing  categories  from  the scope of the Directives, issues where there is agreement among the Member States are isolated from those which are too controversial, enabling a minimum compromise. It is a pragmatic  strategy  to  move  the  agenda  forward  despite  difficult  political  and institutional  conditions.  Nevertheless,  it  has  the  consequence  of  reinforcing  the fragmentation of EU law on the rights of third‐country nationals and creating new rights hierarchies between different categories of migrants. 
 
Common Framework for Integration One remarkable thing about the negotiation of the second round of Directives in the area of  legal  migration  was  the  almost  complete  absence  of  the  frame  of  “integration”. Whereas  migrant  integration  had  been  an  ubiquitous  topic  during  the  first  phase  of policies on the rights of third‐country nationals—first as a frame to justify the expansion of rights to third‐country nationals, and later as a frame that enabled Member States to impose new conditions on the acquisition of these same rights—it simply did not play a 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role  in  the discussion of  the Proposal  for a Blue Card Directive and  the Proposal  for a Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive.  This  does  not  mean  that  integration  was  no longer  relevant  as  a  frame  influencing  supranational  policy‐making,  however.  Rather, integration  had  been  largely  detached  from  the  rights  framework  granted  to  third‐country  nationals  and  was  now  understood  primarily  in  its  civic  and  cultural dimensions. Community action on integration was in fact given great priority during the time following the Hague Program, and several new initiatives were put forward as part of the new goal to create “a common integration framework”. The  Commission  responded  to  the  Council  initiative  of  defining  Common Basic Principles  of  integration  by  publishing  a  communication  on  a  “Common  Agenda  for Integration”  (COM  (2005)  389  final),  which,  together  with  the  Policy  Plan  on  Legal Migration  (COM  (2005)  669  final),  presented  the  Commission’s  interpretation  of  the Common Basic Principles and made a number of suggestions of how they could be put into action by the Member States and in terms of “soft measures” to be pursued at the Community  level.  Given  the  lack  of  clear  Community  competence  in  the  area  of integration,  most  of  the  initiatives  and  suggestions  for  “soft  measures”  concerning integration were actually coming from the Council, as the Member States displayed great interest  in  coordinating  their  policies  in  this  field  (Interview 19).  Thus,  in  accordance with its Communication (COM (2005) 389 final), and following recommendations by the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, the following initiatives were taken  at  the  European  level  during  this  phase  of  policy‐making:  intergovernmental cooperation within the framework of the Network of Contact Points on Integration was strengthened; a  second version of  the Handbook on  Integration with examples of best practices  from  the  Member  States  was  published  (Niessen  and  Schibel  2007);  an Integration  Forum  was  setup  with  representatives  from  NGOs,  social  partners,  and academia in order to strengthen the dialogue between EU institutions and civil society; and a website on integration was launched (http://www.integration.eu). In  addition  to  these  “soft”  tools,  the  European  Commission  proposed  one legislative measure  in  the area of  integration, namely  the creation of a  fund to  finance concrete  integration projects at  local, national and European level. The “Proposal  for a Decision establishing an European  fund  for  the  integration of  third  country‐nationals” (also known as “European Integration Fund”) was put forward already in 2005 together with  three  other  funds  as  part  of  the  establishment  of  a  “Framework  Programme  on 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Solidarity  and  the Management of Migration Flows”  for  the period between 2007 and 2013 (COM (2005) 123 final). The Proposal clearly shows that the Commission, having acknowledged the new trend in the Member States towards compulsory integration programs, was now trying to  influence  the  implementation  of  these  programs  by  providing  funding  for  such integration measures while at the same time setting very specific criteria for what kind of actions it is going to fund in this respect, and thereby influencing the contents of such programs as well as the way in which they are developed and implemented (Interview 9).  Although  the  biggest  part  of  the  of  the  funds  would  be  distributed  by  national governments  according  to  a  selection  made  at  the  national  level,  the  priorities  and guidelines for funding were established at the supranational level. Specifically, the Fund aims to contribute to 6 areas which are in line with the CBP: (i) admission procedures; (ii)  introduction programs for newcomers; (iii) participation of third‐country nationals; (iv) provision of services; (v) improving the attitudes of the host  society  towards migration  and migrants;  (vi)  improving  the  capacity  of Member States  to  develop,  monitor  and  evaluate  integration  policies.  Within  the  priorities  of “admission procedures”  and  “introduction programs  for  newcomers”,  the  Commission further  set  specific  priorities,  namely  to  improve  the  quality  of  integration  tests  and requirements  and  enable  migrants  to  successfully  prepare  to  these  requirements.  In particular, the European Integration Fund aimed to finance projects that contributed to the  following  objectives:  facilitating  the  ability  of  third‐country  nationals  who  are children,  women,  disabled  or  illiterate  to  succeed  in  fulfilling  integration  measures; making  it  possible  for  third‐country  nationals  to  participate  in  the  development  of policies that affect immigration; improving the quality of integration tests; provide more flexible  courses  and  training‐methods—such  as  part‐time  courses  or  e‐learning—for people who are required to take an integration exam, so as to enable specific groups of third‐country  nationals  such  as  mothers  or  workers  to  prepare  successfully  (COM (2005) 123 final). In each case, the Commission tied the priorities set in the fund to the normative guidelines of the Common Basic Principles, to which the Member States had made an explicit political commitment (ibid). The  original  Proposal  by  the  Commission  was  of  1.7  billion  Euros  for  the European  Integration  Fund.  After  the  negotiations  in  the  Council,  this  amount  was significantly cut, but the final agreement allocated 825 million Euros to the Fund, which is  by  no means  little. During  the  negotiations  in  the  Council,  the  question  of  the  legal 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basis was again very controversial, since the Fund was proposed on the basis of Article 63(3)  on  “conditions  of  entry  and  residence of  third‐country nationals”  (Interview 9). Nevertheless, given the strong  interest of  the Member States  in  this area of policy,  the Decision could finally be adopted on this legal basis. The analysis of the minutes of the Council working groups shows that a second controversial issue during the negotiations was whether the European Integration Funds should benefit only integration programs and courses aimed at newly arrived migrants, or also migrants applying  for  long‐term residence, besides financial and procedural issues related to the actual distribution and allocation  of  the  money,  and  the  form  of  reporting  required  by  the  Member  States. Despite the presence of contentious issues, after some modifications had been made to the  proposal  and  the  total  amount  had  been  reduced,  the  European  Integration  Fund was  successfully  adopted  in  June  2007  and  the  main  strategic  priorities  set  by  the Commission—in particular the focus on integration conditions—remained largely intact (Council Decision 2007/435/EC). The adoption of the Fund, and the linkage it created between the Common Basic Principles and the actual  integration policies of  the Member States showed once more that  rhetorical  commitments  adopted  at  the  supranational  level  have  the  potential  of creating  “rhetorical  entrapment”.  Whereas  during  the  negotiations  of  the  Long‐Term Residents Directive  and Family Reunification Directive  and  in  the  coordination within the  Network  of  National  Contact  Points  on  Integration,  the  governments  of  Austria, Germany and the Netherlands had successfully “uploaded” their preferences for the use of  “integration  conditions”  to  the  supranational  level,  these  policies  were  now increasingly  becoming  objects  of  supranational  scrutiny,  in  the  sense  that  in  order  to benefit from the new financial instrument these policies would have to comply with the Common Basic Principles. 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4.4. Conclusion:  In conclusion,  this chapter has shown how a combination of political,  institutional and ideational  factors  influencing  the  supranational  policy‐making  process  led  to  the adoption of ambiguous policies on the rights of third‐country nationals. During the first 
phase of policy‐making,  the Tampere Presidency Conclusions were  the expression of a very liberal moment for EU policy towards third‐country nationals, at a time when the EU agenda was mainly  focused on human rights,  the rights of migrants, and  the  fights against  racism.  These  ideas  strongly  influenced  the  initial  legislative  proposals  put forward  by  the  Commission  to  implement  the  Tampere  programme. However,  during the  negotiations  of  these  proposals  in  the  Council,  the  political  factors  that  impact policy‐making  at  the  EU  level  changed  significantly, with  important  consequences  for the  substance  of  the  policies  adopted.  Moreover,  given  the  rule  of  unanimity  in  the Council,  Member  States  were  caught  in  a  “joint  decision  trap”  (Scharpf  1988),  which favoured the countries with the most restrictive policies.  As a result,  this period of policy making saw a shift  from a very liberal moment marked  by  the  philosophy  of  Tampere  to  a  conservative  moment  characterized  by  a much  more  restrictive  approach—a  shift  between  what  one  might  call  two  different "philosophies  of  integration"  (Favell  2001  [1998]).  If  equal  treatment  was  the  idea guiding  the philosophy of Tampere,  the maintenance of  sovereignty  and  the  ability  to ”select”  migrants  on  the  basis  of  restrictive  conditions  were  the  guiding  principles behind  the  new  restrictive  approach.  Nevertheless,  despite  this  trend  towards restrictiveness,  one  philosophy  did  not  completely  replace  the  other.  Instead  of following a linear progression towards more and more restrictive policies, the evolution of  this  policy  area  during  the  first  period  followed  much  more  a  kind  of  dialectical pattern in which both trends come together to produce a new situation. One could call this  the  "dialectic  of  rights  and  control":  a  liberal  trend  focused  on  granting  rights (thesis),  combined  with  a  conservative  moment  focused  on  controlling  borders  and restricting entitlements  (antithesis),  ends up  leading  to a  situation  in which rights are granted in a very restrictive manner (synthesis). Both approaches were in fact combined with  each  other  in  the  same  policy  instruments,  namely  the  Directives  on  Family Reunification  and Long‐Term Residents.  In  these  instruments,  both  the  trend  to  grant rights, and the trend to restrict them co‐exist in the form of “restrictive rights”—that is, a high level of entitlements subject to very restrictive conditions. 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These conditions are moreover often formulated in an unspecific way that gives Member States a high degree of discretion. In an effort to maintain sovereignty over the selection  of  migrants  and  to  upload  their  national  policies  to  the  EU  level,  certain Member States pushed  for  less  specific  formulation of  the  requirements  that migrants must fulfil in order to qualify for the Directives, in particular the income and integration requirements. Thus, there is also a vertical dimension to ”restrictive rights”, in that even where  the  EU  policy  is  predominantly  liberal  in  its  overall  philosophy,  the implementation in the Member States can be restrictive. This is particularly the case of family reunification, where several Member States are applying the conditions foreseen in the EU Directives in the strictest way possible. On example of this is the use of DNA in order to prove biological descent as a requirement for family reunification (Interviews 6 and 8). This is a policy has been at least partially applied in several countries in different forms (may be compulsory or voluntary, free of charge or not, etc.) and is been currently debated in a number of others.85 This is a tool that might facilitate family reunification in some  cases,  in  particular  for  refugees  who  do  not  have  access  to  civil  registries  and would not be able to prove parentage otherwise. At the same time, however, it is also a tool that exemplifies the restrictive trend in migration and integration policies, whereby ever more requirements are being asked as conditions  for the exercises of  the right of family reunification. So two "conflicting trends" come together in the figure of this one tool  in  a  kind  of  double‐edged  sword:  Although  the  principled  right  is  not  put  into question per se, it is made very restrictive.  Multiple  factors  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  these  conflicting  trends.  First and  foremost,  the political  constellation changed during  the early 2000s when centre‐right  governments  came  to  power  in  a  majority  of  Member  States,  and  centre‐right governments defended more restrictive policies on migrants’ rights. In Germany, Austria and  the  Netherlands  new  national  policies  on  integration  were  passed  during  the negotiations  of  the  Family  Reunification  and  the  Long‐Term Residents Directives  that foresaw compliance with “integration conditions” as a requirement for the acquisition of rights  by  third‐country  nationals.  These  national  reforms  were  the  result  of  difficult political  negotiations  at  the  national  level,  and  were  very  salient  within  the  party‐political competition, so the outcome of  these negotiations at  the national  level  largely                                                         85 Among the countries where this policy is already in use or that are considering it are The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom and France. See: http://english.justitie.nl/currenttopics/pressreleases/archives2000/‐Dna‐testing‐in‐cases‐of‐family‐reunification.aspx?cp=35&cs=1578 (visited 11.04.2010). 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determined the preferences of these Member States at the European level. Moreover, the whole  migration  debate  suffered  a  dramatic  change  after  9/11,  so  that  the  debate became dominated by a strong focus on security, sovereignty and control. In particular, the  shift  in political  context provided an opportunity  for a  re‐framing of  the notion of “integration”. As a result of this re‐framing “integration” shifted from being understood as an objective to be achieved by granting rights to a being understood as a duty on the part of the migrant and a precondition for the acquisition of rights.  However,  these  restrictive  trends  were  mitigated  by  “rhetorical  entrapment” (Schimmelfennig  2001).  The  Member  States,  who  had  agreed  to  a  number  of  policy priorities in Tampere, and were now symbolically bound by this commitment. Rejecting all the proposals put forward by the Commission would have damaged the reputation of the  Member  States  and  the  legitimacy  of  their  preferences  and  behaviour  in  the institutional  environment  of  the  EU.  Further,  the  agency  of  the  Commission  (and  to  a lesser  extent  also  the  European  Parliament)  was  key  in  bringing  about  a  positive outcome  by  engaging  in what  Schimmelfennig  (2001)  calls  “rhetorical  action”,  that  is, the strategic use of norm‐based arguments,  in this case by stressing the norm of equal treatment. There  are  some  additional  “intervening  variables”  that  contribute  to  the emergence of conflicting trends and ultimately to the creation of ambiguous outcomes. One  of  these  factors  is  the  double  character  of  some  issues  as  both  integration  and migration issues. Here, again, family reunification is a case in point. Family reunification is  the main  source  of  new  immigration  to  the  European Union,  so  the Member  States have  tried  to  put  more  limits  to  that  right  in  order  to  maintain  sovereignty  over admission  into  their  territory.  In  other  words,  the  double  character  of  family reunification  as  both  an  integration  issue  (right  to  family  life)  and  a  migration  issue (granting right to entry  into the territory)  is a key factor  in explaining the ambiguities found  in  the  treatment  of  this  right.  Also  in  the  case  of  the  Long‐Term  Residents’ Directive, where the right of long‐term residents overlapped with admissions policy (i.e. the  provisions  on mobility),  the  Member  States  were  all  the  more  keen  on  imposing restrictive conditions.  In general,  therefore,  the  tense  "relationship between migration and  integration"  is  a  factor  that  contributes  to  ambiguity  in  the  approach  towards migrants’ rights. Finally, the institutional setup of the Union and its division of competences were of  great  importance  in  explaining  ambiguity.  The  current  Treaty  architecture with  its 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differentiated levels of competences within the Justice and Home Affairs area contribute to  inconsistent  and  ambiguous  policy  outcomes.  In  particular,  the maintenance  of  the unanimity rule in the area of legal migration has a pervasive effect. Whereas restrictive policies  focused  on  border  control  are  adopted  by  co‐decision  and  QMV,  policies  on migrant  integration  and  the  rights  of  migrants  that  pursue  more  liberal  goals  are adopted under consultation and unanimity, thus creating a “joint‐decision trap” (Scharpf 1988) and favouring the adoption of minimum‐common‐denominator Directives.   This major institutional determinant of EU policy‐making is also key in explaining developments  during  the  second  phase  of  EU  policy,  together  with  the  change  in  the party‐political  orientation  and  ideological  preferences  of  the  leadership  of  the Commission. Under Commissioner Vitorino, EU action in the area of legal migration had until  then been guided by a strong rights‐oriented  ideology, and  followed a horizontal approach that aimed at achieving the greatest level of harmonization between the rights of third‐country nationals and EU nationals as possible. By contrast, during the period of policy‐making  that  followed  the  adoption  of  the  Hague  Programme,  under  the leadership of the centre‐right Commissioner Frattini, the Commission decided to pursue a  sectoral  approach  to  the  regulation  of  legal  migration,  proposing  individual instruments to deal with specific categories of migrants. Instead of aiming to harmonize as  far  as  possible  the  rights  of  all  legally  resident  third‐country  nationals,  the  new strategy saw rights as a tool to attract particularly desirable categories of migrants, such as highly  skilled  labour migrants. The main  factor determining  this  change  in  strategy was  the  political  preferences  of  the  Commission  who  took  on  a  more  pragmatic  and instrumental  view  of  immigration  and  of  migrants’  rights,  and  was  supported  by  the majority of Member States in the Council.  Nevertheless,  the  agency of  civil  society  and of more pro‐migrant  governments during the policy formulation stage was very important in pushing for a comprehensive harmonization  of  membership  rights  of  third‐country  workers.  As  a  result,  the Commission  proposed  one  horizontal  Directive  that  would  have  counterbalanced  the sectoral approach by granting all third‐country workers a minimum common socket of rights.  However,  The  strong  polarization  between  the Member  States  on  the  issue  of migrants’  rights  and  the  agency  of  the  left‐wing  Spanish  government  in  preventing  a minimum compromise that would have further contributed to categorization ultimately resulted  in  the  failure  of  the  horizontal  “Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive”  from being adopted at all. The overall development of supranational policy‐making remained 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In the previous chapter  it was argued that political,  institutional and ideational  factors impacting  the  policy‐making  process  at  the  supranational  level  have  produced ambiguous outcomes characterized by two phenomena that I have called categorization and  restrictive  rights.  Thus,  although  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  are  indeed being  progressively  enlarged  by  the  enactment  of  European  legislation,  this  same legislation  categorizes migrants  into different  statuses  and  either  excludes  some  from entitlement  altogether  or  allows  Member  States  to  impose  different  restrictive conditions  on  the  acquisition  of  rights.  These  two  phenomena  have  the  potential  to create  or  reinforce  differences  in  the  level  of membership  rights  granted  to  different categories  of  migrants.  In  that  respect,  the  policies  of  the  European  Union  adopted during the last 10 years have blurred the boundaries between citizens and non‐citizens, but it has also drawn new lines of inclusion/exclusion and differentiation. The previous chapter sought to explain the conditions and processes that  led to this  redrawing of boundaries. This  chapter,  in  turn,  intends  to  analyze where  the new boundaries  are  drawn,  and  seek  to  unveil  the  implicit  grounds  upon  which categorization is built. In order to tackle this question, the chapter undertakes a careful analysis  of  the  policy  outputs  in  order  to  assess  precisely  to  which  extent  are  rights hierarchies between different categories of third‐country nationals created by European legislation. In doing so, the chapter attempts to deconstruct the intricate web of complex legal  regulations  that  affect migrants’  rights  in  order  to  reconstruct  the  logic  that  lies behind the emergence of rights hierarchies. The chapter analyzes the provisions of the most important Directives adopted at the supranational  level governing the access of third‐country nationals to membership rights,  namely:  the  Long‐term Residents  Directive,  the  Family  Reunification  Directive, and the Blue Card Directive.  In addition, as we have seen,  the Commission proposed a horizontal Directive  that,  if  adopted, would grant a  common set of  rights  to all  legally 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resident  third‐country  workers,  the  “Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive”.  This Proposal has not been adopted yet is still being negotiated in the Council, but given its importance  for  the  thematic  of  the  Dissertation,  it  will  also  be  included  in  the comparison. Obviously, the analysis of its provisions must be taken with a grain of salt. Even if this Proposal gets adopted soon, any modifications made by the Council will not have been included here. In order to compare the access of membership rights of third‐country  nationals  to  those  of  EU  citizens,  the  provisions  of  the  “European  Citizenship Directive” will also be analyzed.  The  substance  of  each  of  these  legislations  is  highly  complex,  and  each  often follows  different  logics  and  organizational  structures  (see  Annex  I).86  Therefore,  the chapter starts by defining two analytical dimensions along which the Directives can be compared,  namely:  entitlements  in  principle  and  conditions  placed  on  actual entitlement.  The  provisions  of  the Directives  that  impact membership  rights  are  then systematically compared along the said dimensions, and this comparison is summarized visually in 8 Tables (reproduced in Annex II). The aim of the comparison is to establish which rights are granted to which categories, identify the areas in which limitations on equal  treatment  with  EU  citizens  remain,  and  point  out  the  fields  in  which  the entitlements  of  different  groups  of  third‐country  nationals  diverge.  Finally,  the  last section  assesses  the  extent  to which  entitlements differ  and analyzes  the  logic behind the  persistence  of  rights  hierarchies,  concluding  with  some  thoughts  on  how we  can expect them to develop in the future. It will be argued that there are very few differences on entitlements in principles, but that rights hierarchies do exist in terms of conditions placed on actual entitlement. Confirming the findings of Chapter 4, the analysis shows that the main mechanisms by which  rights  hierarchies  emerge  are  the  combination  of  “restrictive  rights”  and “categorization”.  In  other  words,  rights  hierarchies  emerge  from  the  fact  that  the Directives  produce  a  multiplicity  of  categories  of  migrants  and  impose  different conditions on entitlement for each category. Furthermore, it will be argued that the most relevant  grounds  for  distinguishing  between  categories  of migrants  are  economic  and humanitarian, and that economic consideration and the drive to maintain some degree 
                                                        86 For those who are not familiar with the pieces of legislation being compared here, a detailed description of the Directives is provided in Annex I. 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of  sovereignty  despite  abiding  by  humanitarian  obligations  are  the  main  factors  that impact on the conditions placed on entitlement to membership rights.  
5.2. Analytical dimensions for comparison 









The fields marked in grey represent those areas where differences in entitlement exist.  As  we  can  see,  there  are  only  three  areas  in  which  the  entitlements  differ: protection against expulsion, family reunification, and transport of pensions. All in all, it can be said that all denizens are in principle entitled to a very wide range of rights and that  the  differences  in  entitlement  between  them  are  remarkably  small, with  the  sole important exception of family reunification. In  the  first area—protection against expulsion—a difference exists between the rights  of  EU  citizens  and  third‐country nationals with  reference  to  the possibility  of  a Member  State  to  expel  the migrant  on  the  ground  that  he/she  constitutes  a  threat  to public  policy  or  security.  Here,  a  slightly  bigger  degree  of  security  is  granted  to  EU citizens than to third‐country nationals. EU citizens can only be expelled on this ground in  the  case where  they  constitute a  ”serious”  threat,  and after 10 years of  residence a ‘imperative’  threat  to  public  policy  or  security  (Article  28(2)  and  (3)  respectively). Moreover,  following  the  jurisprudence  of  the  ECJ  in  this  matter,  the  EU  Citizenship Directive also explicitly states that previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for measures based on public security or public policy. By contrast, the LTRD allows  for Member States  to withdraw the  long‐term resident permit on  the grounds  that  the  third‐country  nationals  represents  a mere  threat  to  public  policy  or security  (without  qualification),  and  the  preamble  explicitly  makes  clear  that  this concept includes a previous conviction for a serious crime (LTRD Article 9 and Preamble §8).  In  this  case, Member  States must  allow  the  third‐country  national  to  stay  on  the territory on the basis of a temporary permit, but clearly this can only represent a delay in the decision to expel, since the Member State could then simply refuse to renew the temporary permit. This slight difference in protection between permanent resident EU citizens and  third‐country nationals  is  clearly  a  consequence of  the  increased  security concerns  in  the aftermath of  the  terrorist attacks of 9/11.  It must be  recalled  that  the Long‐Term  Residents  Directive  was  negotiated  precisely  in  the  period  between  2001 and  2003,  when  these  concerns  were  omnipresent.  Against  this  background,  it  is actually  remarkable  that  the  difference  in  protection  is  so  minimal,  which  speaks  in favor  of  the  pro‐migrant  forces  and  institutional  determinants  such  as  “rhetorical entrapment” in the policy‐making process. The second field of difference—family reunification—refers to the fact that third‐country  nationals,  as  a  default  situation,  are  only  entitled  to  bring  in  the  spouse  and minor children by means of family reunification, whereas the definition of the family in 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the  European Citizenship Directive  (EUCD)  is much  broader.  This  is  clearly  the  single most  significant  difference  between  the  entitlements  of  denizens,  and  it  obviously represents a big divergence from equal treatment. Nevertheless, the field is marked with stripes  because  the  Family  Reunification  Directive  explicitly  allows Member  States  to extend  the Directive  to members of  the extended  family of  the  third‐country national. Recital 10 of the Preamble states that „it is for the Member State to decide whether they wish  to  authorize  family  reunification  for  relatives  in  the  direct  ascending  line, unmarried adult children, unmarried or registered partners, as well as, in the event of a polygamous  marriage,  minor  children  of  a  further  spouse  and  the  sponsor.“  In  case Member  States make  use  of  this  possibility,  the  entitlement  to  family  reunification  in 
principle  would  no  longer  differ  between  permanent  resident  EU  citizens  and  third‐country  nationals  denizens.  It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  the  EU  citizenship Directive  does  not  regulate  the  family  reunification  rights  of  EU  citizens  who  stay  in their country of nationality. This means that a hierarchy could exist whereby mobile EU citizens  are  granted more  rights  than  nationals  of  the Member  State—a  phenomenon well known to EU lawyers under the term “reverse discrimination”. The  third  field—export  of  pensions—is marked  green  because  of  a  derogation from  the Long‐Term Residents Directive  foreseen  in  the Blue Card Directive. Whereas the LTRD is silent on the issue of the right to transport benefits from statutory pensions schemes to a third country (for instance in case the third‐country national moves back to  the  homeland  after  retirement),  the Blue  Card Directive  explicitly  provides  for  this possibility and clarifies  that  this more  favorable provision  shall  remain valid after  the Blue Card holder acquires permanent residence (BCD Article 14(1)(f) and 16(6)).89   
5.4. The rights of short­term residents 
 As  for  residents  who  have  not  yet  acquired  permanent  residence,  the  situation  is somewhat  different.  Current  EU  legislation  constructs  many  more  categories  of residence  permits  than  categories  of  permanent  residents.  Even  between  EU  citizens,                                                         89 It is interesting that Austria annexed the following declaration concerning this provision: „Under the 
principles applied by Austria in the field of international social security, pensions are compulsorily exported to 
other States only if is guaranteed that pensions are also exported from those States to Austria. That cannot be 
guaranteed under the present rules. Having regard to the specific nature of this category of persons, Austria is 
prepared to accept the arrangement in Article 14(1)(f) if it is made clear that no prejudice may thereby arise in 
respect of other categories of persons.“ See: CD 11670/09, p. 21. 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Table  5.3  shows  how  these  entitlements  would  look  like  if  the  Proposal  for  a  Single Permit  Directive  tabled  by  the  Commission  were  adopted  without  amendments.  As Table  5.3  makes  clear,  if  the  Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive  is  adopted,  the situation will change significantly. The entitlement of all categories of migrants who are allowed  to work would  be  almost  fully  equalized.  This  includes  all  categories  studied here, except family members of third‐country nationals who are not Blue Card holders during their first year of residence, where the Member States make use of the optional derogation  to  block  access  to  the  labor  market  for  one  year.  As  we  have  seen,  this derogation  does  not  apply  to  the  family members  of  Blue  Card  holders, who must  be given immediate access to the labor market. If  the  Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive  is  adopted  as  proposed,  rights hierarchies between migrants with a work permit would only persist in four areas: right to  work  and  reside  in  a  second  Member  State,  protection  against  expulsion,  equal treatment  in  tax  benefits,  and  free  access  to  the  labor market.  The  last  category,  free access  to  the  labor market  refers  to  the  fact  that Blue Card holders  and  third‐country workers  may  have  their  residence  permit  tied  to  a  particular  activity,  at  least  for  a certain time, while family members brought in by family reunification are not subject to such  restrictions.  A  fifth  area  where  some  divergence  might  exist  (depending  on whether  Member  States  make  use  of  the  optional  derogations  provided)  would  be access to the provision of public housing. However, the provisions of the Proposal for a Single  Permit  Directive  on  access  to  housing  and  to  tax  benefits  are  very  likely  to  be watered down in the Council in order to bring them in line with the Blue Card Directive. In  that  case,  the  only major  differences would  be  that  Blue  Card  holders would  have easier access to residence and work in a second Member State, and that both Blue Card holders and family members brought in by family reunification enjoy a certain degree of protection  against  expulsion.  The  difference  in  terms  of  protection  against  expulsion emerges because the Blue Card Directive and the Family Reunification Directive regulate the  conditions  for  acquisition,  and  consequently  also  for withdrawal  of  the  residence permit. The Proposal for a Single Permit Directive, by contrast, only regulates the rights of the permit holders, leaving the conditions for entry and withdrawal to the discretion of the Member States. Moreover,  the degree of protection against expulsion granted to family  members  brought  in  by  family  reunification  is  higher  than  that  of  Blue  Card holders  because  the  former  are  granted  a  residence  permit  on  the  basis  of  a  human right—the right to family life—whereas the latter are “mere” labor migrants. 
  172 
Despite these differences, it is quite extraordinary that migrants who cannot even be considered “denizens” should have access  to so many equal  treatment rights.  If  the Proposal  for  a  Single  Permit  Directive  is  adopted,  the  main  differences  in  equal treatment with nationals/EU citizens will be in the field of settlement rights and family reunification  rights.  In  terms of  equal  treatment  rights,  the only differences will  be  in two areas: unrestricted access to the labor market and access to social benefits that go beyond  social  security—such  as  study  grants,  tax  benefits,  subsidized  housing,  and social  assistance.  In  all  other  areas, migrants  from  third‐countries will  be  in  principle entitled  to  the  same  rights  as  nationals  even  before  the  acquisition  of  permanent residence.  So  the  rights  of  different  categories  of migrants  does  not  differ  so much  in 
principle. But what about the conditions placed on actual entitlement?  





Neither the Long‐Term Residents Directive nor the Proposal  for a Single Permit Directive regulates the conditions for entry and residence in a Member State. As seen in previous  chapters,  the  Commission  tries  to  regulate  the  conditions  for  residence  for labor migrants with a single  instrument (COM (2001) 386 final), but  the proposal was dismissed by the Council. The conditions for the acquisition of the rights enumerated in the Proposal  for a Single Permit Directive are  therefore  totally at  the discretion of  the Member States. For this reason, the part of the table referring to the conditions for the acquisition of resident status in the first Member State are left blank for the category of “regular” third‐country workers. In other words, the situation in the first Member State is  only  comparable  for  the  acquisition  of  permanent  residence.  As  Tables  5.4  and  5.5 show, with one single exception, the conditions for acquisition of permanent residence are exactly the same for both Blue Card holders and all other categories of third‐country nationals  covered  by  the  Long‐Term  Directive.  The  only  exception  is  the  time  of residence required for the acquisition of permanent residence. Whereas “regular” third‐country nationals must provide evidence of continuous residence  for  five years within the  territory  of  the  Member  State  concerned,  Blue  Card  holders  can  cumulate  the periods of residence spent within the territory of the European Community. Moreover, Blue  Card  holders  are  allowed  longer  periods  of  absence  than  “regular”  third‐country nationals without  interrupting  the computation of  the  five years  continuous  residence (see Annex  I). Both of  these are major advantages  for circular migrants,  for whom the requirement  of  continuous  residence  for  long  periods  of  time  has  the  pervasive consequence of blocking access to rights associated with permanent residence. As  for  the  right  to  settle  in  a  second Member  State,  there  are  three differences between  long‐term  residents  and  Blue  Card  holders.  The  first  difference  is  that  Blue Card holders are allowed to move to a second Member State after 18 months, so even before the acquisition of permanent residence in the first Member State. ”Regular” third‐country nationals are only granted the right to move to a second Member State after the acquisition  of  long‐term  residence  in  the  first  Member  State,  that  is,  after  five  years. Nevertheless, a second difference concerning the purpose of residence favors long‐term residents. There are no restrictions as to the purpose for which long‐term residents are allowed  to  move  to  a  second  Member  State:  they  can  move  as  workers,  in  order  to exercise a self‐employed activity, as students, or even as economically inactive persons. The  condition  of  having  to  show  sufficient  income  is  only  optional.  By  contrast,  Blue Card  holders  who  are  not  yet  long‐term  residents  can  only  move  for  the  purpose  of 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highly qualified employment, and must have a contract under the same conditions (high salary) as in the first Member State. A third difference concerns the optional integration conditions.  Integration conditions  can be  imposed on  long‐term residents  (but only  in case they have not yet been subject to such conditions in the first Member States), and on  family  members  of  Blue  Card  holders  (but  only  after  they  have  been  granted  the permit to reside), but cannot be imposed on Blue Card holders. There are no differences between Blue Card holders and long‐term residents as for the conditions for acquiring permanent residence, except that, as in the first Member State, the period of residence within the territory of the Community can be cumulated for Blue Card holders but not for long‐term residents. The  differences  are  more  substantial  between  EU  citizens  and  their  family members  (independent  of  nationality)  on  the  one  hand,  and  long‐term  residents  and Blue Card holders on  the other hand. The  first difference  is  that EU  citizens and  their family  members  may  not  be  subject  to  any  quota,  whereas  the  other  categories  can. Secondly,  there are substantial differences  in  the  income requirement. EU citizens and their families only need to prove that they have sufficient income if they are moving as economically inactive persons. If they are moving as students, a declaration of sufficient resources suffices. If they are moving as workers, job‐seekers, or self‐employed, there is no income requirement at all. By contrast, as already seen, Blue Card holders must have a contract with an above‐average salary. Long‐term residents may be required to prove that  they  have  sufficient  income,  independent  of  the  purpose  of  their  stay. Moreover, “sufficient income” in the case of EU citizens means that they have enough resources not to become a burden on the social assistance of the Member State, whereas in the case of long‐term residents Member States have more discretion to define the level of “sufficient income”.90  Thirdly,  Member  States may  not  impose  any  integration  conditions  on  EU citizens and their family members, whereas they can for long‐term residents and for the family of Blue Card holders. Fourthly, Member States may not require  that EU citizens prove  that  they  have  appropriate  housing, whereas  they  can  for  the  other  categories. Finally, the definition of constituting a danger to public policy or security is narrower for EU  citizens  than  for  the  others.  The  same  differences  exist  in  the  requirements  for acquisition  of  permanent  residence.  Again  the  optional  integration  and  housing conditions  do  not  apply  to  EU  citizens  and  their  families,  there  is  not  requirement  to                                                         90 Even though, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Annex I, this income requirement has been interpreted narrowly be the European Court of Justice in a recent judgment (Case C‐578/08). 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prove  income  and  possess  sickness  insurance,  and  the  public  policy  or  security condition is defined somewhat more narrowly. The next  set  of  conditions  that must be  examined are  the  conditions placed on family  reunification.  Table  5.6  below  shows  the  conditions  placed  on  the  sponsor  in order to be able to exercise the right of family reunification. As we can see, there are no additional  conditions  placed  on  EU  citizens  in  order  to  exercise  the  right  of  family reunification. All EU citizens who are allowed  to  reside  in a  second Member State  can bring  their  families  without  any  additional  requirements  on  their  part.  As  for  third‐country nationals, the main criterion is of course to have a residence permit that entitles one  to make  use  of  the  Family  Reunification  Directive.  In  addition,  one  also  needs  to have  adequate  accommodation  for  the  whole  family,  health  insurance,  and  sufficient resources to sustain the whole family without recourse to the social assistance system of the Member State. Additional conditions that may be imposed on ”regular” third‐country nationals include integration measures from abroad or after entry, the requirements of having  lived  in  the Member State  for at  least  two years, and a waiting period of up  to three  years  after  the  date  of  application  for  family  reunification.  These  optional conditions are all waived for Blue Card holders.  
  Tables  5.7  and  5.8  show  the  conditions  that  can  be  imposed  on  the  family members  in order  to be able  to  join  their sponsors. Table 5.7 shows the requirements imposed  on  the  core  family.  Table  5.8  shows  under  which  conditions  the  extended family may be brought  in  through  family  reunification,  if  at  all. As already mentioned, the  main  difference  between  EU  citizens  and  third‐country  nationals  in  family reunification is the definition of the family, which in the case of EU citizens includes the extended family. However, besides that there are also other substantial differences. The most  important  differences  are  the  age  limits  imposed  on  family  members  of  third‐country  nationals,  the  requirement  that  children  be  financially  dependent,  and  the 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This  chapter  has  reviewed  and  compared  the  provisions  of  four  Directives  and  one Proposal  for  a  Directive  that  regulate  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  in  the European Union. What does this comparison allow us to say about the existence of rights hierarchies between different groups of migrants? Do such hierarchies exist, and if yes, to  which  extent?  The  comparison  has  shown  that  there  are  actually  very  little differences  with  respect  to  the  rights  to  which  the  different  categories  of  migrants regulated  by  the  Directive  are  entitled  to  in  principle.  This  is  true  in  particular  of migrants who have acquired permanent residence, that is, denizens in the classic sense of  the  term. The only privileges of EU citizens compared  to permanent  resident  third‐country  nationals  in  terms  of  entitlements  amount  to  heightened  protection  against expulsion and rights of family reunification with the extended family. Nevertheless, this chapter has confirmed the findings of Chapter 4 that there are two  mechanisms  by  which  EU  legislation  does  produce  rights  hierarchies.  The  first mechanism  is  by  producing migrant  categories.  EU  legislation  differentiates migrants according  to  the  type  of  residence  permit  they  hold,  each  one  constituting  a  different “category” of migrant who whose access to rights are subject to different conditions or regulated by different instruments. Some of the categories predated the adoption of EU legislation  (e.g.  refugees),  others  are  actually  artificially  constructed  by  EU  legislation and can be traced back to what I have called “the politics of categorization” (e.g.  ”Blue Card holder” or  ”Long  term resident  former Blue Card holder”).  In  total  the Directives studied here produce—either explicitly or  implicitly by exclusion—a total of  fifteen (!) different categories or legal statuses (see Annex I):  1. EU citizens in homeland/”nationals” 2. Mobile EU citizens workers 3. Mobile EU citizens – students or economically inactive 4. Family members of mobile EU citizens 5. Single Permit holders/third‐country nationals with work permit 6. Family members of ‘regular’ third‐country nationals 7. Blue Card holders 8. Family members of Blue Card holders 9. Long‐term residents 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10. Refugees (meaning all beneficiaries of international protection) 11. Asylum seekers (meaning all applicants for international protection) 12. Temporary migrants (seasonal workers, au pairs, etc.) 13. Posted workers 14. Third‐country national students 15. Third‐country national researchers  
Categorization  is  therefore  one  of  the mechanisms  by which  rights  hierarchies emerge  because  it  allows  for  different  sets  of  rights  or  different  conditions  for entitlement  to  be  allocated  to  each  one  of  these  categories.  Nevertheless,  it  is remarkable  that  the  impact  of  categorization  is  so  small  once migrants  have  acquired permanent  residence,  since,  as  mentioned  before,  after  the  acquisition  of  permanent residence all categories are entitled to a very wide range of rights. The main source of rights hierarchies  in this context  is the categorical exclusion of certain categories from the scope of  the Directives and  from the possibility of acquiring permanent  residence. Particularly  problematic  is  the  current  exclusion  of  refugees,  asylum  seekers,  and temporary  workers  from  all  Directives.91  Similarly,  the  provisions  that  block  change from  one  status  to  another,  and  the  conditions  that  make  it  difficult  to  accumulate residence time spent under different statuses for the purposes of acquiring permanent residence,  also  contribute  to  the  creation  of  differences  in  entitlement  between categories.    The second mechanism by which hierarchies emerge is through the imposition of different conditions on actual entitlement. Thus, although the Directives do grant a great number of  rights  to  third‐country nationals,  the  conditions  that  have  to be  fulfilled  in order  to  be  able  to  enjoy  these  rights  are  often  very  restrictive,  creating what  I  have called  restrictive  rights.  Particularly  affected  is  the  right  to  family  reunification.  The conditions  for  actual  entitlement  diverge  between  EU  citizens  and  third‐country nationals  in  terms of  income requirements, age  limits, waiting periods, public  security clauses  and  the  possibility  of  Member  States  imposing  integration  conditions.  Of  all these,  the  possibility  of  imposing  integration  conditions  from  abroad  for  family members of ”low‐skilled” third‐country nationals is the most problematic aspect of the restrictions on the right to family reunification, because it allows a very high degree of                                                         91 Nevertheless, it is known that Directives regulating the rights of these categories are currently under negotiation or being prepared by the Commission. 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discretion  to  Member  States  without  almost  any  safeguards  to  the  migrant.  This condition truly has the potential of undermining the goal of the Directive. So  categorization  and  restrictive  rights  are  the  mechanisms  that  create hierarchies. But what is the logic behind these mechanisms? On which grounds are the different categories created that then lead to different treatment? What is the basis for the hierarchical ordering of the categories? From  the  comparison  of  the  five  Directives  discussed  here,  it  appears  that  the most  relevant  grounds  for  categorization  are  economic  and humanitarian. On  the  one hand  there  are  the  migrants  who  are  categorized  in  terms  of  the  type  of  economic activity  that  they are undertaking,  and  their  rights are  linked  to  the  fact  that  they are exercising  a  specific  type  of  economic  activity  (e.g.  highly  skilled  workers,  seasonal workers, posted workers, Single Permit holders). On the other hand, there are migrants whose  rights  are  derived  from  human  rights  commitments,  such  as  refugees,  asylum seekers and family members.  Both of these considerations are important not only for categorization, but also in defining  how  restrictive  the  conditions  for  acquiring  the  rights  are.  Economic 
considerations most obviously play a role in the fact that the conditions imposed on Blue Card holders for certain types of rights such as mobility rights and family reunification rights  are  less  restrictive  than  for  other  third‐country  nationals.  Economic considerations are also evident in the distinction made between the entitlements of EU citizens who are workers and economically inactive EU citizens. The impact of humanitarian justifications for rights is a paradoxical one. Whereas Member States feel compelled to grant rights to migrants on the basis of humanitarian considerations—such  as  family  reunification  rights—these  rights  are  defined  all  the more restrictively. The fact that a right derives from a human right obligation—such as family  reunification  rights—means  that  states  are  less  free  to define who  can  enjoy  it and to impose selective economic criteria (for example an above‐average salary level, as in the case of the Blue Card). Therefore, these rights are defined very restrictively, with age  limits,  waiting  periods,  and  integration  conditions  as  prerequisites.  Thus, paradoxically,  rights  are  defined  all  the more  restrictively  when  they  are  based  on  a human  right.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  family  reunification  rights  intertwine  with immigration policy, and therefore diminish the sovereignty of states to control the influx of migrants  into  their  territory,  also  contributes  for  it  to  be defined  restrictively. This relates directly to the point made in Chapter 4 that the reluctance of Member States to 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transfer competence over the regulation of migrants’ rights to the supranational level is stronger  where  the  regulation  of  rights  is  entangled  with  immigration  policy  strictu 
sensu (i.e. control of entry and residence in the territory). If  the  analysis  above  is  correct,  then  economic  considerations  and  the  drive  to maintain some degree of sovereignty in the face of humanitarian commitments are the logic  behind  the  mechanisms  (categorization  and  restrictive  rights)  that  create  rights hierarchies. This conclusion weakens some widespread assumptions in the literature, in particular  the  assumptions  that  “securitization”  and  “cultural  anxiety”  are  the  main drives behind restrictive migrant policies in the EU. Firstly,  the  “securitization”  hypothesis  would  imply  the  existence  of  a  security rationale  behind  the  most  relevant  limitations  on  the  acquisition  of  rights  by  third‐country  nationals. However,  the most  relevant  conditions  or  limits  imposed  on  actual entitlement  are of  a different nature. Moreover, whereas  the possibility  of  refusing or withdrawing a residence permit and its attendant rights from a migrant on the grounds of concerns for public policy and security does exist in all the Directives analyzed, this is by no means the most important factor in explaining the distribution of entitlements to different categories. Secondly,  the  “cultural  anxiety”  hypothesis  cannot  account  for  some  important features  of  the  Directives  analyzed  in  this  chapter.  The  assumption  that  “cultural anxiety”  is  the main drive behind the restrictive  turn  in EU  legislation on the rights of third‐country nationals is most convincingly outlined in Joppke’s claim that integration conditions amount to a form of “illiberal liberalism”, whereby states seek to impose their liberal values on migrants who are assumed to belong to illiberal cultures. In fact, there seems to be an element of  liberal paternalism and cultural anxiety  in  the  insistence of some  Member  States  to  include  the  possibility  of  applying  integration  conditions  to migrants  coming  into  their  country.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  Blue  Card  holders  are exempt from any integration conditions weakens the cultural anxiety assumption. As the Commission’s  explanatory memorandum  to  the  Blue  Card  proposal  shows, most  Blue Card holders are likely to come from Africa and other less developed parts of the world (quoted in: Peers 2009, 403). That they should be excluded from integration conditions belies  the  claim  that  culture  and  values  are  the most  important  things  at  play.  Much more,  it  would  seem  like  the  ability  to  fulfill  ”integration  conditions”  is  used  as  a surrogate  for  socio‐economic  origin.  Especially  in  the  case  of  family  reunification—which is based on a human right, and therefore allows states little degree of discretion—
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the ability to impose a test on applicants might work as a surrogate for socio‐economic criteria such as level of education, income level, etc. However,  despite  the  main  criteria  being  economic,  the  states  are  of  course constrained by  their  liberal aspirations and commitments. The struggle between these two drives is clearly visible in the Directives and the way that rights are formulated—in the need for categorization based on “objective” criteria (such as legal status and type of permit) in order to justify rights differentials; and in the fact that rights are formulated as  universal  entitlements  and  then  derogations  are  made  from  these  entitlements, rather than formulating rights as rewards. It is precisely this tension that seems to push the continuous extension of migrants’ rights. Categorization leads to rights hierarchies, but  rights  hierarchies  do  not  conform  with  the  liberal  democratic  ideals  of  equal treatment and inclusion. Therefore, in a second moment, new legislation is created to try to fill in the gap and equalize entitlements.   Thus, despite all these “mechanisms” to be able to retain discretion in the face of pressure  for  universal  entitlements,  it  is  likely  that  several  of  these  hierarchical elements  and  differentiations  will  not  stand  the  passage  of  time.  The  fact  that  the economic  criteria  are  key  to  equal  treatment  rights  mirrors  the  origins  of  EU  anti‐discrimination  legislation  on  the  basis  of  nationality  for  EU  citizens.  As  has  been well documented  in  the  literature,  the  original  rationale  for  equal  treatment  and  free movement  rights  for  EU  national  was  to  facilitate  the  movement  of  “factors  of production”  (among which: workers,  the  self‐employed,  and  service providers) within the Union in order to build the common market. It was only through the activist attitude of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  that  equal  treatment  rights  were  progressively expanded to job seekers, students, and economically inactive persons, and the rationale for  equal  treatment  right  has  gradually  shifted  from  an  economic  to  a  citizenship rationale  (see,  among others: Bell  2002; Fredman 2002; Barnard 2007).  Similarly,  the anti‐discrimination legislation of the EU on the grounds of gender was also transformed with  the  help  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  and  moved  from  being  based  on  an economic rationale to a fundamental rights rationale (Ostner and Lewis 1995; Bell 2002; Stone Sweet and Cichowski 2004; Ellis 2005). Against this background, one could speculate that a similar process of expansion of equal treatment and progressive detachment from economic considerations will also set  in  for  third‐country  nationals.  Although  a  full  harmonization  of  all  categories  is unlikely (it is not even the case for EU citizens, who still have different rights depending 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6.1. Introduction  We  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapters  that  the  possibility  to  impose  “integration conditions’” on certain categories of  third‐country nationals—as a prerequisite  for  the actual entitlement to membership rights—is one of the most problematic aspects of EU legislation that regulates the rights of third‐country nationals. Since the exact meaning of “integration conditions” remains undefined in the Directives, these provisions end up offering  a  backdoor  possibility  for Member  States  to  impose  discretionary  criteria  for the  acquisition  of  rights.  Through  these  provisions,  national  and  local  governments regain power to influence the regulation of migrants’ rights, which had been transferred to  the  supranational  level.  As  such,  integration  conditions  have  the  potential  to undermine  the  effect  of  EU  legislation  that  aims  at  safeguarding  the  rights  of  legally resident  third‐country  nationals;  all  depends  on  how  these  requirements  are implemented and applied in practice. The aim of this chapter is to conduct a case study of  how  integration  conditions  are  applied  in  practice  in  order  to  assess  the  extent  to which  requirements  actually  jeopardize  migrants’  access  to  rights.  Taking  into consideration the multi‐level character of integration policies, the analysis will focus on two levels: the federal level (Austria) and the local level (Vienna). Austria and Vienna are interesting cases on several accounts. As seen in previous chapters, Austria was instrumental in inserting this condition in EU legislation together with Germany and the Netherlands (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, until now the analyses have mostly been focused on the Netherlands (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2008; Besselink 2009), and to a lesser extent Germany (e.g. Wiesbrock 2009), whereas no attention has been paid to the Austrian case. Austria is furthermore one of the Member States with the most restrictive immigration and integration policies of the EU (Niessen et al. 2007), and was  governed  by  a  right‐wing  coalition  extremely  unfavorable  to  liberal  migration policies during the time of the implementation of integration conditions. In that sense, it can be considered as a most‐likely case for exclusionary policies (and conversely a least‐likely case for pro‐migrant policies). 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The choice of Vienna as a case pays due respect to the importance of local settings in  the  implementation  of  integration  policy.  Students  of  migrant  integration  are becoming  increasingly aware of  the  relevance of  studying  the  local  level,  first because most integration policy measures must be implemented at the local level, and secondly because,  as Poppelaars  and Scholten  (2008) point  out,  local  and national  contexts  are often  characterized  by  “divergent  institutional  logics”  that  result  in  conflicting  frames and  impact  policy  outcomes  (see  also:  Ireland  2004).  In  Austria,  although  the  legal framework for integration conditions is clearly decided at the national level, the actual implementation,  administration  and  enforcement  of  the  policy—including  such important  factors  as  financing,  selection  of  course  institutes,  dissemination  of information, etc.—are carried out in a local setting and by local political actors. Vienna  is  the  capital  and  the biggest  city  in Austria,  and  it  also has  the biggest concentration  of  migrants.  Moreover,  Vienna  is  an  interesting  case  because  it  is characterized  by  a  diametrically  opposed  political  context  and  opportunity  structure with respect to migration than the national level, despite being subject to the same legal regime. Vienna has been a pioneer in the development of pro‐active integration policy. At the  local  level,  the Social‐Democratic party, which has governed the city for the  last 50 years, pursues an inclusionary and pro‐migrant policy that contrasts strongly to that of  the  national  government.  The  combination  of  equal  legal  framework with  different political context will allow us to measure the impact of political factors such as the actor constellation, political ideology, and political will. Of course, this case selection is not without its limitations. The analysis of a single national and one local case must remain illustrative, and cannot give rise to overarching generalizations. Nevertheless,  it  is hoped that this exemplary case will shed some light onto  previously  neglected  aspects  of  integration  policy  in  connection  with  the implementation  of  integration  conditions.  In  particular,  by  focusing  on  practice  in addition to the  law, and by emphasizing the political aspects of  integration policy,  it  is hoped that this study will be able to capture some of the complexity of the field that gets lost in the predominant legal analyses, and therefore offer a more nuanced view than the leading voices in the academic literature (see section 6.2 below). An  empirical  investigation  of  how  integration  conditions  is  applied  in  practice can make a contribution to answering some interesting theoretical questions in terms of how  citizenship  is  undergoing  a  transformation  in  the  context  of  globalization  and increased  international  migration.  As  seen  in  Chapter  2,  the  theoretical  literature  on 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migrants’ rights is divided between those who argue that migrants’ rights are bound to expand  due  to  the  liberal  norms  embedded  in  liberal  democratic  regimes  on  the  one hand, and  those who emphasized  the emergence of  illiberal  trends  in  the  immigration and integration policies that restrict the rights and create civic stratification on the other hand. The imposition of integration conditions on the acquisition of rights is one of the mechanisms through which civic stratification may emerge. Understanding the extent to which  integration  conditions  really  limit  the  access  of  third‐country  nationals  to membership  rights  can  therefore  bring  some  insight  to  controversy  between  two strands of the literature on the transformation of citizenship. Against  this  background,  the  chapter  will  investigate  the  implementation  of integration  conditions  in  Austria  and  in  Vienna  in  order  to  assess  the  validity  of  the critique  often  raised  against  integration  conditions  by  answering  the  following questions: 
• To which extent do integration conditions as implemented in Austria and Vienna prevent migrants from having access to rights and why? 
• Were these conditions intended as a tool for exclusion and selection of migrants (hierarchies), or for their acculturation (illiberal liberalism)? Do they also function as such? What explains the policy outcome?  The  chapter  will  start  by  providing  some  basic  information  about  integration conditions  and  reviewing  the  critical  literature  on  the  topic.  The  second  section  then introduces  the  case  study  be  providing  background  information  on  immigration  and integration policy  in Austria. Next,  the  implementation of  integration conditions at  the national  level will  be  investigated,  followed by  the  implementation of  the  same at  the local level in Vienna. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the findings in  light  of  the  existing  literature  on  integration  conditions,  as  well  as  against  the background of the theoretical puzzle concerning the transformation of citizenship in the context of migration.  The main  thesis  is  that  integration measures  and  condition  are  not  always  an instrument of immigration control and a tool in the cultural assimilation of migrants, as often criticized in the literature. Although these conditions are adopted with the aim of sending a restrictive message, the actual practice of how these policies are implemented does not correspond to this restrictive message. Rather, they are to be understood as an instance  of  “symbolic  politics”.  In  a  favourable  political  context,  such  as Vienna,  these 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measures have even helped to strengthen pro‐migrant actors at the local level, providing opportunities  (funding  and  legitimation)  for  these  actors  to  carry  out  empowering programmes  for migrants  (such  as  counselling  by migrant  and  feminist  organizations within the framework of German/integration courses). In a book entitled “The Symbolic Uses of Politics”, Murray Edelman (1964) argues that a wide range of policies actually do not pursue the goal that they purport to pursue, but  rather  a  symbolic  goal.  For  Edelman,  symbolic  politics  explains  why  organized groups  sometimes  support policies,  the material  effects of which go against  their own interests—namely because of the non‐material or “symbolic” functions of these policies. This chapter will argue that the “integration conditions” as implemented in Austria are an example of such policies, which have material effects that do not correspond to the symbolic  effects,  and which  find  their basis  for political  support  in  the  latter.  In other words,  the  “restrictive”  politics  that  the  national  government  carried  out  by  adopting “integration  conditions”  and  pushing  for  their  inclusion  into  supranational  legislation had a mostly symbolic effect of reassuring a predominantly anti‐migrant public opinion, while giving in to European pro‐migrant norms.   
6.2. Integration conditions: an exclusionary tool?  Ever since the possibility of imposing integration conditions was explicitly incorporated into  supranational  legislation,  the  adoption  of  this  policy  has  been  spreading  rapidly among the Member States of the European Union. Before 2003—the date of adoption of the  Long‐Term  Residents  and  Family  Reunification  Directives—only  the  Netherlands and  the  Scandinavian  countries  had  some  form  of  requirement  that migrants  comply with  integration  measures  already  in  place  (Feik  2003).92  In  the  Netherlands,  the fulfillment of integration measures was a condition for acquiring a permanent residence permit, and was rewarded with additional rights such as free access to the labor market, and local voting rights. As Feik (2003) points out, these measures were however part of a comprehensive package of qualifying measures individually tailored to the necessities of  the  migrant  and  fully  financed  by  the  government.  In  Denmark,  Sweden,  and Finland—in  line  with  the  ‘activation’  policies  typical  of  Nordic  welfare  states—
                                                        92 Although some countries were in the process of amending their natinal legislations in order to adopt similar measures, in particulary Germany and Austria. 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integration  measures  of  a  similar  nature  were  either  required  in  return  for  social assistance and unemployment benefits, or offered as an optional service to the migrant (Feik 2003). If  before  2003  compulsory  integration measures  were  a minority  program,  by 2007 they had become the rule. According to a study by IOM, as of 2007 no less than 13 Member States applied some sort of compulsory integration requirement (International Organization for Migration 2008). Of these, 11 Member States require compliance with integration measures as a condition for the acquisition of EC long‐term resident status under the Long‐Term Residence Directive and four Member States require compliance with  integration  measures  as  a  condition  for  family  reunification  under  the  Family Reunification Directive. The 11 Member States  are: Austria, Estonia,  France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. Moreover, of the three Member States that opted out of the Long‐Term Residents Directive—United Kingdom, Denmark and  Ireland—two (UK and DK) also  impose  integration conditions for the acquisition of national permanent residence status, and Ireland was negotiating a new immigration bill in 2007 that would introduce such requirements. Austria, France, Germany  and  the  Netherlands  also  require  compliance with  integration measures  for family reunification. Germany and the Netherlands require that the integration measure (a  language test  for DE; a  language + civics  test  for NL) be  fulfilled while  the potential migrant is still abroad. It is notable that many of the countries that require integration conditions for the acquisition  of  long‐term  residence  are  “new”  Member  States  which  do  not  have  a tradition  of  being  receiving  states.  This  suggests  that  the  imposition  of  integration conditions  has  been  adopted  as  a  “best  practice”  and  is  being  exchanged  between Member States within the framework of the national contact points on integration in a process of “policy learning” and “policy diffusion” (Interviews 9 and 19). According to an interviewee  in  the  European  Commission,  public  officials  of  the  Member  States  that interact within the network of national contact points are extremely curious about the practices  of  other  countries  in  this  area,  and  are  very  eager  to  exchange  information, compare their policies and practices, and ‘learn’ from their peers (Interview 19).  While integration conditions are spreading rapidly across Europe, they are at the same time politically highly controversial, and have been very strongly criticized in the literature.  According  to  Guild  et  al.  (2009)  integration  conditions  potentially  infringe four  liberal  principles:  fairness,  effectiveness,  lawfulness,  and  respect  for  cultural 
  189 
diversity.  The  issue  of  fairness  arises,  they  argue,  if  low‐income  migrants  with  little education are required to take the same test as wealthy and highly educated migrants. Unless  the  state  provides  for  facilitated  access  to  learning  facilities,  poorly‐educated migrants  will  be  at  a  clear  disadvantage.  Moreover,  the  authors  suggest  that governments are not  interested  in  resolving  this  social unfairness because  integration and learning are not the actual goals of  integration conditions. Rather,  they claim that: “the main purpose  of  the  new  tests  is  a  reduction  in  the number  of migrants  and  the restriction of migrants’ access to security of residence and nationality” (Guild et al. 2009, 8).  A  similar  critique  has  been  raised  by  other  authors with  reference  to  the  costs  of fulfilling integration requirements, such as language courses and tests. It is argued that the high costs of complying with integration conditions betray the fact that such policies have a hidden aim, namely the social selectivity of migrants (Besselink 2009). Integration conditions are also accused of being ineffective on two counts. First, integration conditions are counterproductive if failure to pass a test implies diminished rights and opportunities. Whenever a migrant is deprived of socio‐economic rights and family reunification rights because he or she failed to pass an integration test, he or she is  less  likely  to  integrate  rapidly  into  the host  country.  Secondly,  integration  tests  are also  counterproductive  because  they  create  the  impression  that  migrants  are unwelcome  and  unable  to  integrate.  Several  authors  have  also  criticized  the  fact  that language  learning  cannot  be  imposed,  and  that  putting  a  person  under  pressure  is counterproductive for the acquisition of language skills (Vavken 2009). As  for  the  lawfulness of  integration  conditions, Guild  et  al.  (2009) question  the compliance  of  integration  tests with  the  principle  of  non‐discrimination  and with  the human right to family life. First of all, they argue that the exemption of certain categories of migrants from the obligation to take the test solely on the grounds of their nationality amounts  to discrimination because nationality has no direct  relationship  to a person’s ability  to  integrate. Moreover,  the  authors  argue  that  the  content  of  some  integration tests  specifically  target  migrants  of  certain  origins  (e.g.  Muslim  or  Turkish),  which amounts to indirect discrimination on the ground of religion or ethnic origin (see also: Joppke  2007a;  Besselink  2009).  Finally,  the  authors  argue  that  integration  conditions infringe the right to family life because failure to pass a test prevents families from living together. A related issue here is whether the sanctions for failing to pass a test comply with the principle of proportionality (see also: Groenendijk 2007).  In other words,  the question is whether it is justifiable to prevent a person from exercising his/her human 
  190 
right to family life on the grounds that the person concerned has difficulties in learning a foreign language. Finally,  integration  conditions  have  been  widely  accused  by  many  authors  of undermining  respect  for  cultural  diversity.  Integration  conditions  are  seen  as  a  tool through which the culture and values of  the majority society  is  imposed upon migrant minorities (Carrera 2009b; 2009a). Not only would such conditions disrespect the right of migrant minorities to maintain their own culture and values, it would also artificially construct the majority culture as a homogenous one, thereby perpetuating structures of dominance within the host society. As Guild et al. (2009, 11) put it: “The tests not only present  new  barriers  for  many  migrants,  they  also  project  the  image  that  migrants should become like ‘us’, i.e. white, highly educated, middle class persons.” This  chapter will  assess  the  validity  of  this  critique  by  investigating  the  actual implementation  and  enforcement  of  “integration  conditions”  in  Austria  and  Vienna. Whereas there is a significant amount of critical literature on integration conditions, this literature  often  lacks  substantial  empirical  underpinnings.  Most  of  the  empirical investigations on this subject have been focused on the Netherlands. However, the Dutch case  is  the most  extreme,  and  is  not  really  representative  of  other  national  and  local contexts.  Moreover,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  scholars  who  have  written  about integration conditions are legal scholars, whose analysis focuses primarily on the text of the law. As we shall see, there is much to be won by looking beyond the law and focusing also  on  the  processes  that  lead  to  the  adoption  of  such  policies  as  well  as  on  their application in actual practice.   
6.3. Background: immigration and integration in Austria  Throughout  its  history,  Austria  has  been  a  target  country  for  international migration. During  its  imperial  past, Austria was  the  centre of  a multi‐ethnic  empire,  and  as  such received  large  influxes  of  populations  from  what  is  nowadays  considered  Eastern Europe and the Balkans. After World War II, there were two main waves of international migration,  first  in  the  1960’s/70’s,  and  then  in  the  1990’s,  followed  by  more  or  less continuous flows of family migration, asylum seekers and seasonal workers. 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The  first  wave  occurred  within  the  regulated  framework  of  the  so‐called 
Gastarbeiter93  programs  of  the  1960s  and  early  1970s,  whereby  the  Austrian government  actively  recruited  temporary  labor  migrants  for  low‐skilled  jobs  (see: Bauböck  1996;  Payer  2004).  These  migrants  came  from  low‐educated  rural  areas  in less‐developed  southern  countries,  especially  Turkey  and  former  Yugoslavia.  The 
Gastarbeiter Programme was based on the premise that migrant workers would go back to  their  country  of  origin  after  having  worked  abroad  for  a  certain  time.  As  a consequence,  there  were  no  policies  aimed  at  improving  the  educational  and qualification level of these migrants and their children or their integration into Austrian society  (Perchinig 2009,  233). Much  to  the  contrary,  there were  legal  impediments  to the  integration  of migrants  into  society,  such  as  curtailed  rights  and  obstacles  for  the acquisition  of  permanent  resident  status  and  citizenship.  Tellingly,  migrant  children were often offered  language courses  in  their mother tongues – predominantly Turkish and Serbo‐Croatian – rather than in the language of the host country, so that they would be able to integrate into the country of origin of their parents upon their return (Austria Wochenschau 1979). The Gastarbeiter program ended in the 1970s, and since then the government has officially adopted a policy of ”zero‐immigration”. A second wave of  immigration took place  in  the 1990’s, when  large numbers of refugees  fleeing  the Yugoslav war  sought  refuge  in  this  country.  In  total  about 90.000 refugees  from  former  Yugoslavia,  primarily  Bosnians  and  Croats,  fled  to  Austria  and were  allowed  to  stay  in  the  country.  They  were  initially  given  temporary  protection status, but it eventually became clear that a speedy return would not be possible. Thus, the government recognized that these refugees had become residents and gave them a permanent status (Bauböck 1996 p. 21‐22). In addition to these two exceptionally big waves of immigration, there are more or  less  continuous  flows  of  immigration  that  remained  rather  stable  throughout  the years.  One  of  them  is  the  immigration  of  EU  citizens,  who  have  enjoyed  freedom  of movement in Austria since 1995.94 The second main source of immigration to Austria is family reunification. As is well known, the envisaged return of the temporarily recruited                                                         93 German for „guest‐worker“ or „foreign‐worker“. 94 One exception are the nationals of the new Member States that joined the Union in its last two enlargements. The citizens of these Member States are subject to transitional agreements that block them from taking up work in other Member States for a number of years. Nevertheless, once these agreements have expired, also these citizens will be able to enjoy a right to free movement and will be able to reside and work in any Member State of the European Union under conditions of equal treatment with nationals. 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Gastarbeiter did not take place exactly as planned. Many migrants ended up staying and started  to  bring  their  families.  Obviously,  also  EU  citizens  and  Austrian  citizens contribute  to  immigration  flows  by  bringing  in  their  family  members  who  are  third‐country nationals through family reunification. The third main source of immigration to Austria is the influx of asylum seekers. Although only about one‐third of applicants for asylum  are  granted  refugee  status,  the  decision  process may  take  several  years.  This means that many asylum seekers live in Austria for a long time and are de facto migrants during the waiting period of their asylum claim, although their rights and freedoms are often strongly curtailed during this time. Finally,  a  fourth  important  source  of  immigration  is  the  influx  of  seasonal workers.  Despite  the  official  adoption  of  a  “zero‐immigration  policy”,  the  influx  of temporary  labor migrants  into Austria  has  continued  at  a  smaller  scale, mostly  under the  label  of  “seasonal  workers”.  Seasonal  workers  may  be  employed  in  any  industry under a six‐month permit (renewable once) and with  little rights and no possibility of acquiring permanent residence. Austrian politicians refrain from politicizing this kind of migration  and  the  legislation  is  negligent  towards  these  possibilities  of  abuse  of  this kind  of  permit.  In  a  sense,  the  political  intention  behind  the  recruitment  of  labor migrants under the legal category of ”seasonal worker” represents an attempt to revive the Gastarbeiter regime under a different guise (Perchinig 2006a, 296). Thus, in the year 2007, of  all  the persons who were granted an entry permit  for  the  first  time,  ca. 27% were asylum seekers, ca. 22% were entitled to a permit due to family reunification, ca. 20% were  seasonal  workers  with  a  non‐renewable  visa,  16% were  students,  and  ca. 11% were qualified labor migrants (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2009, 28).  The successive waves of labor migration and continuous influx of family migrants and refugees have led to a relatively high number of persons of migrant origin within the population. According to the Austrian statistical agency, Austria had a population of 8.2 million in 2008, of which 17% had “migrant origin” (Statistik Austria 2008b). “Migrant origin” (Migrationshintergrund) is defined by the Austrian statistical agency as persons that migrated to Austria themselves (first generation), or who were born in Austria from parents  who  were  both  first  generation  migrants  to  Austria  (second  generation).95 Moreover, about 10% of the population, and 54% of the persons with “migrant origin”,                                                         95 Data collected on the basis of this definition is only available since 2008 because another definition was used before. see: http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_migrationshintergrund/index.html (accessed: 03.12.2009). 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do not have Austrian citizenship. The main ethnic groups of migrants have remained the same  throughout  the  last  decades.  About  half  of  the  incoming migration  to  Austria  is from  EU  countries,  whereas  the  main  groups  of  third‐country  nationals  are  persons from former Yugoslavia and Turkey.  In 2007,  for  instance, 107,000 people  immigrated to Austria in total, of whom about half were citizens from a second EU country, mostly Germans,  and  10%  were  returning  Austrians.  Incoming  migration  by  third‐country nationals makes up only 37% of the total (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2009, 25).  
   In  terms  of  integration,  the  situation  of migrants  from  third  countries  shows  a very poor picture. Third‐country nationals occupy a rather marginal position within the socio‐economic  structure,  having  lower  education,  higher  unemployment  rates,  lower income,  and  higher  poverty  rates  than  the  native  population  (see:  Fassmann  2007,  ; Statistik Austria 2008a; Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2009). This situation attests to  the precarious  structural  integration of migrant  communities  and points  out  to  the necessity  of  adopting  effective  integration  policies.  Nevertheless,  there  are  major differences  between  various  groups  of  migrants.  In  particular,  there  is  a  huge  chasm between migrants from EU and EEA countries on the one hand, and migrants from third‐countries on the other hand, especially from Turkey and former Yugoslavia.  
  194 
  
This situation is the product of a combination of factors.  Firstly,  Austrian  policy  towards  migrant  integration  is  marked  by  years  of negligence.  Despite  the  long  history  of  migration  and  the  evident  structural disadvantage suffered by persons of “migrant origin” in access to education and upward mobility  (see  Table  6.1  above),  integration  has  only  very  recently  become  a  political priority for the Austrian government. The relatively late appearance of integration as a political field in Austrian politics can be partially explained by the predominance of an exclusionary  discourse  towards  migrants  that  translates  into  a  national  self‐understanding of “not being a country of immigration”. This ”denial” is a defining feature of Austrian migration discourse that has strongly influenced the way integration policy emerged as a political  topic and the way it  is approached in policy‐making. Thus, until 2003, the integration policy of the Austrian federal government was focused exclusively on recognized refugees and aimed at assisting refugees organizationally, financially, and psychologically  in  the  first  years  following  their  entitlement  to  refugee  status.  It  was only very recently that migrant integration really entered the political agenda. However, this recent rise in political salience had much more to do with the negative approach to immigration  by  far‐right  parties  than  with  a  concerted  political  effort  to  tackle  the institutional  and  structural  obstacles  that  hamper  the  full  incorporation  of  certain migrant  groups. The  anti‐immigration  climate has  created  strong biases  in  the way  in which  integration  is  approached  by  political  elites.  Thus,  the  need  for  integration policies  is  mainly  viewed  within  the  context  either  of  cultural  adaption  to  the proclaimed  Austrian  value  system  or  to  the  control  and  restriction  of  immigration  to Austria. Secondly,  the  structural  situation  of  migrants  is  also  conditioned  by  the  legal framework that defines the rights of third‐country nationals in the social, economic and political spheres of life. The legal framework in Austria distinguishes between two broad categories  of  migrants:  those  with  a  residence  permit  and  those  without  (seasonal 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workers, asylum seekers, etc.). Here it is important to note that from the point of view of the Ministry of Interior only those categories of migrants with a residence permit should be  offered  the  possibility  to  “become  integrated”  (see:  Nationaler  Kontakpunkt Österreich  2005,  39‐46).96  The  other  categories  are  systematically  excluded  from integration  activities  and  in many  cases  also  legally  blocked  from participation  in  the labor market. According to the Ministry of Interior,  this  is a  logical consequence of the fact that these migrants are not legally entitled to settle in Austria. In fact, in the view of the Ministry, in the case of these migrants “any exaggerated attempts to integrate should be  regarded  with  suspicion,  since  that  could  betray  a  hidden  intention  to  settle permanently  in  the  country”  (ibid  2005,  41).97  As  for  the migrants  with  a  residence permit,  the  legal  framework is structured in a way that access to rights  increases with time of residence. In this context the European Union has also been an important actor, especially  through  the  establishment  of  the  EU‐wide  status  of  ‘long‐term  resident’, which reinforces  the principle  that  the  length of stay should go hand‐in‐hand with the progressive acquisition of rights (Directive 2003/109/EC). Another  essential  factor  impacting  the  range  of  opportunities  of migrants  is  of course  the  citizenship  regime.  As  recent  efforts  to  create  European‐wide  indexes  of citizenship  and  integration  policies  have  shown,  Austria’s  citizenship  regime  ranks clearly among the most restrictive in Europe (Niessen et al. 2007; Çinar 2009; Howard 2009). Traditionally, Austria’s citizenship regime has been based on the concept of  jus 
sanguinis, meaning that citizenship is acquired by descent from a citizen rather than by birth  in  the  territory. Access  to citizenship by migrants  in Austria  is extremely  limited and  has  been made  increasingly  difficult  with  every  legislative  amendment  since  the 1990s  (Çinar  2009).  The  period  of  legal  residence  required  for  entitlement  to naturalization  is  10  years,  whereas  spouses  of  Austrian  citizens  have  to  wait  for  six years  of  residence  and  at  least  five  of  marriage.  Children  and  grandchildren  of  non‐Austrians who are born in the country do not immediately acquire Austrian nationality, but may  go  through  a  facilitated naturalization process.  Further  requirements  include                                                         96 The phrase „become integrated“ refers here to the discourse used by the Austrian Ministry of Interior. Without defining what exactly is meant by „integration“, the Ministry has the official policy that certain categories of migrants should not „integrate“ or „become integrated“. „Diesem System folgend wäre es z.B. nicht zweckmäßig, Fremde ohne rechtlich gedeckte Zuwanderungsperspektive (z.B. Saisoniers, Au‐Pairs) in bestimmten Aspekten ihrer „Integration“ (...) zu fördern.“ (See: Nationaler Kontakpunkt Österreich 2005, 40‐41). 97 „Intensive Integrationsanstrengungen („Verwurzelung“) müssten hingegen zur Prüfung führen, ob nicht schon die Schwelle zur Niederlassung erreicht wird (und die Zuwanderungsabsicht nur nicht offen gelegt wurde).“ (See: Nationaler Kontakpunkt Österreich 2005, 40‐41). 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the  abdication  of  the  previous  citizenship  and  a  relatively  high  income  requirement. Recently,  additional  requirements  have  been  put  in  place,  including  integration conditions  (König  and  Stadler  2003).  As  a  result,  many  persons  who  were  born  in Austria, or migrants who have resided for several years or even decades in the country, are still subject to the laws that regulate the rights of third‐country nationals. In  sum,  Austrian  immigration  and  citizenship  regimes  have  historically contributed to hindering the capacity of migrants to take part in social institutions. Yet, Austria has a very developed welfare state and a number of redistributive policies that would contribute to improve structural integration if migrants were allowed to take part in  them.  Particularly  important  in  this  regard  are  labor‐market  policies  and unemployment  benefits,  subsidized  housing,  and  welfare  aid —  all  of  which  play  an important  role  in  mitigating  the  effects  of  income  inequality  (Guger  et  al.  2009). Considering that migrants from third‐countries are strongly overrepresented among the lower income share of the population, these policies could have a very positive effect for integration. Ever since the implementation of the Long‐Term Residents Directive, these benefits are available to migrants after a five‐year residence period, provided they can fulfill  the  necessary  requirements.  The  question  of  integration  conditions  is  therefore extremely  relevant  in  the Austrian  context,  since  it determines precisely  the access  to these rights and benefits.   
6.4. Integration conditions in Austria: origins and political context  Despite the reluctance of dominant political actors to recognize that Austria had become  a  country  of  immigration,  the  issue  of migrant  integration  finally  entered  the political  agenda during  the 1990s,  in  a  context of  strong anti‐migrant  sentiments. The 1990s were a period of high negative politicization of migration on several grounds. For one,  this  decade  saw  the  rapid  rise  of  far‐right  parties  in Europe,  and  in  particular  in Austria.  The  FPÖ  (Freiheitliche  Partei  Österreichs),  led  by  Jörg  Haider,  was  highly successful  in  mobilizing  latent  xenophobic  sentiments  in  the  population  by  adopting strongly  anti‐foreigner  slogans  and  campaigns  (see:  Wodak  and  Reisigl  2000).  In addition, the rise of the FPÖ coincided with the realization that the former Gastarbeiter were not going to return to their home countries, and that, on the contrary,  they were increasingly  acquiring Austrian  citizenship  and  bringing  their  families  to  join  them  in their  new  homeland.  At  the  same  time,  this  population  remained  structurally 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disadvantaged  in comparison with  the majority population. The combination of ethnic difference,  cultural estrangement,  and socio‐economic marginalization  reinforced anti‐foreigner sentiments among the population and contributed to the perception that there was  an  ‘integration  problem’.  Finally,  the  1990s  were  marked  by  an  extremely  high influx of asylum‐seekers from Eastern Europe, in particular former Yugoslavia. This led to  a  negative  shift  in  the  political  perception  of  asylum  and  gave  rise  to  claims  that Austria had exhausted its reception capacity. The figure of the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ or ‘economic refugee’ came into being, so that asylum‐seekers were increasingly treated as illegal migrants in disguise, and associated with welfare‐state abuse and criminality. Integration and immigration thus became highly politicized topics with primarily negative  connotations,  which  was  reflected  in  a  series  of  political  measures  and legislative amendments  in the 1990s and 2000s. Whereas until  the 1980s immigration and  the  rights of migrants were primarily  regulated  through  compromise deals of  the social  partners  negotiated  behind  closed  doors,  in  the  1990s  the  picture  changes. Immigration  and  integration  become  subjects  of  political  controversy,  and  the competence shifts progressively towards the Ministry of Interior (Bauböck 1996). Four major  legislative  reforms—1992,  1997,  2002  and  2005—of  primarily  restrictive character sought to establish a firm legal basis in this area and clarify the conditions of residence of  long‐term migrants, but also to  limit the possibilities  for the entry of new migrants  into  the  territory  and  block  access  to  the  labor  market  and  to  long‐term residence  for  temporary  migrants.  Whereas  in  1992  integration  was  not  yet  an important  topic—the  focus  being  on  controlling  migration  flows  through  the introduction of a quota system—from 1997 onwards ”integration” emerged as a major theme of all legislative reforms. The  concept  of  integration was  important  in  two ways.  First,  the  idea  that  the integration of existing migrants had failed served as a  justification to restrict  incoming migration. As Ruth Wodak and Michael Krzyzanowski (2009) show through a discourse analysis of parliamentary debates, in two major reforms of the immigration and asylum laws in 1997 and 2002, integration was the ”buzzword” used to justify more restrictive legislation. The same can be said of the last major legislative reform of the immigration and integration laws which took place in 2005 (Österreichisches Parlament 07.07.2005). That ”integration” was used discursively as a justification to restrict incoming migration is  also  evident  in  the  slogan  “Integration  vor  Neuzuzug”  (Integration  before  new immigration)  first  adopted  during  the  preparation  of  the  1997  legislative  reform  and 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later adopted as the motto of the right‐wing government coalition between the centre‐right party ÖVP and the far‐right party FPÖ (later BZÖ)98, which was in power between 2000 and 2006 (Regierungsprogramm der ÖVP‐FPÖ Koalition 2000). Second, the idea that the integration of former Gastarbeiter and their families had failed gave rise  to concerns about  the  integration of settled migrants. The problem was seen mainly  as  an  issue  of  cultural  estrangement  and  lack  of  social  cohesion.  There  were some isolated national initiatives to increase the opportunities of migrants in structural terms—such  as  the  Integrationserlass  that  opened  up  the  labor  market  to  family migrants  who  had  become  long‐term  residents  (BMWA  2000)—but  in  general  these initiatives  remained  very  limited.  Rather,  the  problem  of  “failed  integration”  was understood in Austria primarily in its cultural dimension, so the source for the ”failure” was  accordingly  seen  as  lying  in  the  culture  of  certain  migrants  and  their  alleged “unwillingness  to  integrate”. This  accusation was often brought up  in  connection with Islam  and  culminated  in  a  study  (Rohe  2006)  Commissioned  by  the  Interior Ministry which claimed that a significantly large group of Muslims were ”unwilling to integrate” because of  their strong religiosity and conservative value system. At  the same time,  in the European Union, the concept of integration was undergoing a reframing as a result of a framing contest in which Austria played an important role, as shown in Chapter 4.  It  was  in  this  political  and  discursive  context  that  the  notion  of  ‘integration conditions’ entered the Austrian debate.  The idea of obliging migrants to learn German was first put forward in 2001 by Mr. Peter Westenthaler, the FPÖ floor leader at the time (see:  Rohsmann  2003,  68‐72).  During  the  preparations  of  the  2002  legislative amendment  of  the  immigration  legislation,  Mr. Westenthaler  proposed  that  all  third‐country  nationals  living  in  Austria  should  be  subject  to  an  ‘integration  contract’.  The proposal was that migrants would have to comply with certain integration measures as a prerequisite  for  the acquisition of  residence permits and  the attendant rights. These measures would focus particularly on language acquisition, but might also include civic education or vocational training. The  proposal  was  welcomed  by  the  coalition  party,  but  proved  to  be  highly controversial,  attracting  much  media  attention  and  severe  criticism  from  experts, sectors of  the public opinion, and the political opposition. After months of preparation                                                         98 In 2005 (during the ÖVP‐FPÖ coalition government), a group of politicians around Jörg Haider split from the FPÖ and created a new far‐right party under the name BZÖ (Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs). The newly‐founded splitter‐party BZÖ continued the coalition with the ÖVP, whereas those who decided to stay in the FPÖ went into opposition. 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and  internal  negotiations,  a modified  version  of Mr. Westenthaler’s  original  idea was agreed upon by the government and adopted as part of the legislative package of 2002 under the name of “Integration Agreement” (Rohsmann 2003, 72‐76).99 The new version stipulated  that  certain  categories  of  migrants  would  be  required  to  attend  a  German course in order to achieve a basic  level of knowledge of the German language within a specific  period  of  time  as  a  condition  for  the  acquisition  of  a  long‐term  residence permit.100 The federal government would cover 50% of the costs for migrants entering through  family  reunification.  In  the  case  of  non‐compliance,  gradually  increasing sanctions would  follow,  ranging  from financial penalties all  the way  to expulsion  from the territory (see the next section for details). The  FPÖ  heralded  the  introduction  of  this  requirement  in  the  law  as  a  major achievement  of  the  party  and  as  paving  the way  for  a  restrictive  shift  in  immigration policy. When  presenting  the  legislative  package  to  the  Austrian  Parliament, Mr.  Peter Westenthaler, described the aim of the Integration Agreement as follows: We  are  making  clear  that  abuse  of  the  social  system  will  no longer  be  possible  in  the  future.  I  fully  support  the  negotiated solution  of  the  so‐called  “sanction  ladder”  with  which  we  are saying:  Yes,  sir! We want  to  know within  3  years  if  somebody who has come to Austria after 1998 is at all willing and able to integrate!  (…)  After  three  years  we  must  be  able  to  ask  these people who do not want to integrate why they are in this country in the first place. If they cannot answer, then it is clear what shall happen: Then they will no longer be allowed to stay here! After all, this is not what the Austrian social system is meant for, ladies and gentleman! (Österreichisches Parlament 09.07.2002, 52)101                                                         99 In German: Integrationsvereinbarung. The name was changed from integration contract (Integrationsvertrag) to Integration Agreement by the ÖVP, probably as a consequence of criticisms raised by lawyer organizations. These argued that the government was misusing the legal term ‘contract’ by applying it to a situation in which one party was forced to comply with whatever measures. Technically, neither ‘contract’ nor ‘agreement’ is correct, because both terms imply a voluntary act between partners who are legally in equivalent positions. In reality, what the law actually does is to unilaterally impose a requirement on the migrant (see the discussion in Rohsmann 2003, 76‐80). 100 This first version of the Integration Agreement did not include a final examination, only 100 hours of German course or evidence of German knowledge at the level A1. In 2005 the law was amended and the requirement was raised to 300 hours of German course plus passing a test at the level A2, or evidence of already having that level. 101 Own translation. The words of the congressman in the original are: „Wir stellen auch klar, dass sozialer Missbrauch künftig kaum oder nur mehr schwer möglich sein wird, denn ich stehe voll und ganz zu der ausverhandelten Lösung der so genannten Sanktionsleiter, mit der wir sagen: Jawohl, wir wollen innerhalb von drei Jahren wissen, ob jemanden, der in Österreich ist, der nach dem 1. Jänner 1998 gekommen ist, überhaupt willig und bereit ist, sich zu integrieren. (...) Disesen Menschen, die das nicht wollen, die sich nicht integrieren wollen, muss man nach drei Jahren die Frage stellen dürfen, warum sie überhaupt hier im Land sind. Wenn sie diese 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The  above  statement,  with  its  emphasis  on  protecting  Austrian  institutions against abuse by migrants, reflects quite well the context in which integration conditions originated.  The  primary  aim  of  this  policy  as  portrayed  by  its  initiator  was  not  to empower migrants and improve their opportunities. Rather, the new policy was meant to  reinforce  the  image  that  the  Austrian  government  was  tough  on  migration  and restrictive with  regards  to migrants’  access  to  rights.  The  speech  of Mr. Westenthaler before  the  Parliament  when  presenting  the  new  measure  makes  clear  that  the  new policy was meant to send a message. A message that is formulated quite explicitly in his concluding words: “With this law we make one thing clear: Austria is not an immigration country and it will never be one. We will make sure of that!”102 (ibid, 55). The  importance  of  sending  a  restrictive  message  should  not  be  understated, especially in a context in which national governments were actually losing control over the  structural  aspect  on  integration  policy  to  the  supranational  level.  It  should  be recalled that, at the same time that the Integration Agreement was being adopted at the national  level,  the Austrian government was negotiating at the supranational  level two Directives  that  aimed  at  improving  the  rights  of  migrants—the  Long‐Term  Residents and the Family Reunification Directives. These two Directives, which were implemented in  the  following  legislative  reform, would have quite  liberal  consequences  for Austria, expanding social, economic and settlement rights of third‐country nationals (see Annex I for a detailed analysis of these Directives). In  the  Austrian  media  and  political  discourse,  the  adoption  of  the  Long‐Term Residents  and  the  Family  Reunification  Directives were  completely  overshadowed  by the restrictive character of the Integration Agreement. However, as we shall see  in the following  sections,  the  actual  outcome  of  the  Integration  Agreement  is  not  nearly  as restrictive as the message that it sends out. The way in which the Integration Agreement has  been  implemented  in  national  law  and  in  national  and  local  practice  does  not support the idea that this policy had the hidden aim of reducing the number of migrants,                                                         nicht beantworten können, dann ist klar, was passiert: Dann können sie nicht länger hier bleiben! Das ist ganz klar, denn dafür ist das östereichchische Sozialsystem nicht gedacht, meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren!“ 102 Own translation. The words of the congressman in the original are: “Mit den heutigen Gesetz schaffen wir jedenfalls Klarheit: Österreich ist kein Einwanderungsland und wird auch keines werden. Dafür werden wir sorgen!“ This statement concluded the speech of the congressman in Parliament and refered to the whole legislative package of which the Integration Agreement was a part. 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as the speech of Mr. Westenthaler above seemed to imply. What all this points to is that in  the  Austrian  context  the  main  aim  of  adopting  integration  conditions  was  not  to prevent  third‐country  nationals  from  having  access  to  socio‐economic  and  settlement rights.  Rather,  it  was  the  exclusionary  symbolism  of  the  Integration  Agreement  that mattered. In the following sections we shall see how this exclusionary symbolism relates to the implementation of the Integration Agreement in actual law and political practice.   
6.5. The Integration Agreement – implementation into national legislation 
 The  “Integration  Agreement”  is  defined  by  paragraphs  14‐16  of  the 
Niederlassungsgesetzt  (NAG  2005)  and  in  a  decree  of  the  Interior  Ministry,  the 
Integrationsvereinbarungs­Verordnung  (IV‐V  2005).  In  the  following,  these  provisions will  be  examined  in  detail.  The  Integration  agreement  was  first  codified  in  the  NAG 2002, but was later subject to a legislative revision in 2005 in which the provisions on the  Integration  Agreement  were  amended  and  the  requirements  expanded.  The description below refers to the law from 2005, which entered into force in 2006 and is still  in  force  at  the  time  of  writing.  The  main  differences  to  the  first  version  of  the Integration Agreement will be mentioned in footnotes. The justification for the imposition of integration conditions that can be found in Austrian  law  differs  significantly  from  the  version  we  have  just  read  by  Mr. Westenthaler. According to NAG §14(1), “the purpose of the Integration Agreement is to promote the integration of third‐country nationals who are legal residents with a long‐term perspective or permanent residents. Its aim is that third‐country nationals acquire sufficient  knowledge  of  the  German  language,  in  particular  the  capacity  to  read  and write, in order to be able to participate in social, economic and cultural life in Austria.”103 Thus,  rather  than  focusing  on  the  prevention  of  “abuse”,  as  in  the  speech  by  Mr. Westenthaler, the legal definition of the Integration Agreement stresses an inclusionary goal,  namely  the  goal  of  promoting  the  autonomy  of  migrants  and  increasing  their capacity to participate in society. The  definition  above makes  clear  that  the  integration  conditions  only  apply  to third‐country nationals, so EU, EEA and Swiss citizens, as well as their family members                                                         103 Own translation. 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who have a right to free movement, are exempt from the obligation to learn German. The Integration Agreement also does not apply  to migrants with a  temporary permit, who make  up  the  bulk  of  labor  migration  to  Austria.104  Moreover,  asylum  seekers  and refugees are also exempt (interview 25). Asylum seekers are exempted because of  the above‐mentioned  policy  by  the  government  that  they  should  not  be  given  the opportunity to ”integrate” before their case has been decided. Recognized refugees, by contrast, are offered  fully subsidized  language courses on a voluntary basis (Interview 25). Also exempt are children below the age of 9, and persons in a precarious physical or mental condition due to old age or illness (NAG 2005 §14(4)). In addition, the law states that  the  Integration  Agreement  is  deemed  to  be  fulfilled,  without  need  for  further evidence,  for  third‐country nationals – and  their  families – who are  in possession of a residence  permit  as  “highly  qualified workers”  (Schlüsselkraft)105,  as well  as  for  those who qualify as “special executive personnel” (besondere Führungskraft) according to the Alien’s Employment Act  (§14(5)  (8)).106 Finally,  the  requirement  is  also deemed  to be fulfilled by persons who have gone to school or completed an apprenticeship in Austria, which  mainly  serves  the  purpose  of  exempting  the  second  generation  from  the obligation (§14(5) (1‐7)).  In sum,  it can be deduced  from the  list of exemptions above that only two categories of migrants are required to fulfill integration conditions: family migrants and “regular” labor migrants (i.e. not temporary, but also not highly qualified). Since Austrian legislation does not foresee the possibility of regular labor migration, this requirement  primarily  affects  family  migrants  of  other  third‐country  nationals  or  of Austrian citizens.107 
                                                        104 These are officially called ‚seasonal workers’, although they can be employed in any sector of the economy and do not need to be hired on a seasonal basis. 105 This national legislation predates the adoption of the Blue Card Directive, nevertheless, this category can be considered equivalent to the newly created category of “Blue Card holder”. 106 The concept of besondere Führungskraft is defined in the AuslBG §2 (5a). Mainly executives of the board or the management level in international corporations or companies fall into this category, but also internationally renowned scientists. The main requirement is a very high salary (4,824 EUR in 2009). This category is not only exempt from the Integration Agreement, it is also exempt from compliance with the alien’s employment act and is even allowed to employ ‚supporting staff’ such as nannies, cleaners, and other household personnel without the need for a work permit (see the website of the Austrian Public Employment Services: http://www.ams.at/english/14616_9683.html). 107 In the original version of the Integration Agreement in force between 2003 and 2006 there were even more exceptions. The number of persons who must fulfill the Integration Agreement increased dramatically after the entry into force of the amended legislation in 2006. The  rights of family members of EU citizens exercizing their right of mobility may not be subjected to integration conditions because this would contradict the relevant EU legislation (see Chapter 5). 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Those  third‐country  nationals  who  do  not  fall  in  the  exempted  categories mentioned above must fulfill the Integration Agreement within five years as a necessary condition  for being able  to keep or  renew a  residence permit.108 The  law makes  clear that, despite the euphemism of the name ‘agreement’, the fulfillment of this integration condition  is  not  subject  to  an  actual  agreement  by  the  migrant,  but  rather  a  legal requirement  (§14(3)).109  The  obligation  itself  consists  of  two  elements.  First,  the migrant must prove  the  ability  to  read  and write,  or  attend a  certified  literacy  course (Module 1). Second, the migrant must either prove a basic level of German equivalent to A2 of  the Common European Framework of Reference  for Languages—for  instance by presenting  an  internationally  recognized  language  diploma—or  attend  a  certified German/Integration course and pass a standardized exam in the end (Module 2).110 The federal  government  refunds  100%  of  the  costs  of  the  Module  1  course  for  all  third‐country nationals,  provided  that  the  course  is  completed within one year.  In  addition, the  federal  government  refunds  50%  of  the  costs  of  the  Module  2  course  for  family migrants, provided that the course is successfully completed within 2 years (or within 3 years for those who also need to take a Module 1 course). 111 The subsidies are subject to a maximum cap regulated by ministerial decree (see below). Penalties  for  non‐compliance  increase  gradually  with  time.  If  the  Integration Agreement  is not  fulfilled within  two years  (or 3 years  for both modules),  the  federal subsidies for the individual courses are cut. If the Integration Agreement is not fulfilled within five years, the government may impose a financial penalty on the migrant, refuse to  renew  the  residence permit or  to grant  long‐term residence,  or deport  the migrant from  the  territory.  Nevertheless,  it  is  possible  to  apply  for  an  extension  of  up  to  two years in consideration of special personal circumstances. Such an extension can also be granted more  than once. Moreover,  in  case a person  fails  the  test, he or  she can  try  it again as many times as necessary within the relevant timeframe (IV‐V 2005, §8(5)).                                                         108 In the first version (NAG 2002) the limit was 4 years. 109 Nevertheless, the migrant may chose to sign a declaration stating that he or she will not stay any longer than 12 months in Austria within a period of 24 months. In that case, the person will be exempt from fulfilling the integration condition, but will also not be entitled to renew his/her residence permit. 110 The formulation used in the law is actually misleading, since it implies that there is a requirement to attend a course or module, but the subsequent paragraphs make clear that there are different ways to prove literacy and language proficiency which serve to fulfill the integration condition (NAG (2005), §14(2) ‐ § 14 (5)). 111 Module 1 was introduced with the NAG 2005. In the first version there was only the requirement of attending a German/Integration course of 100 units of 45 minutes. There was not requirement to pass a test in the end. 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The  law  establishes  that  the  courses  shall  be  controlled  and  certified  by  the Austrian Integration Fund, which is an agency of the Ministry of Interior, in accordance with  rules  established  by  the  ministerial  decree.  It  further  establishes  that  the German/Integration courses must convey “knowledge of the German language in order to  communicate  and  to  read  everyday  texts,  as well  as  topics  from everyday  life with civic  elements  (staatsbürgerschaftlichen  Elementen),  and  topics  that  serve  to  convey European  values  and  core  democratic  values,  and  which  enable  participation  in  the social,  economic  and  cultural  life  in  Austria”  (NAG  2005,  §16(2),  own  translation). However,  as  we  shall  see,  this  requirement  is  not  exactly  followed  to  the  letter  in practice.  The  duration  of  the  courses  and  the  maximum  amount  of  the  government’s refund  are  regulated  by  ministerial  decree  (IV‐V  2005,  §6  and  19).  According  to  the decree, for Module 1 the federal government refunds a maximum of 75 course units of 45 minutes  in  the  value  of  375  Euros. Many NGOs  and  experts  have  criticized  this  as insufficient for previously illiterate adults (Vavken 2009). It seems that the government had primarily  in mind that Module 1 would  target migrants who have  learned to read and write in a non‐Latin alphabet, rather than persons who do not know how to read or write  at  all  (interview  25).  In  any  case,  in  2008  the  amount  of  people  following  a government‐subsidized  literacy  course  amounted  to  less  than one percent of  the  total amount of people following a regular German‐Integration course.112 People for whom 75 units  are  not  enough  to  fulfill  Module  1  must  cover  the  costs  of  additional  literacy courses out of their own pocket. The courses for Module 2 should comprise 300 units of 45  minutes  each,  and  the  federal  government  refunds  50%  of  the  value  for  family members up to a maximum of 750 Euros. The rest of the costs shall in principle be paid by  the  migrant  him/herself,  but  local  or  state  governments  may  decide  to  offer additional subsidies (NAG 2005, §15‐16). To summarize, the cornerstones of the implementation of integration conditions in Austrian legislation are: 
                                                        112 In 2008, 224 people were taking part in subsidized literacy courses, as compared to 36.765 taking a German/Integration course. (See: Parliamentary Document 08.09.2009. This document is the reply by the Minister of Interior to a parlamentary question by Congresswoman Korun. The parliamentary question was posed on 08.01.2009 under the number 2638/J and the reply by the Minister was presented on 08.09.2009. Both are available from the website of the Austrian Parliament (http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/).) 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• What’s  required:  ability  to  read  and  write  +  knowledge  of  the  German language at level A2 
• How: school/language certificate OR partially subsidized language course with civic education elements + standardized test 
• When: within five years, with the possibility of extension 
• Who:  third‐country nationals who are  family migrants or  “regular”  labor migrants.  Asylum  seekers,  refugees,  highly  qualified  and seasonal/temporary workers are exempted. 
• Sanctions: withdrawal of (eligibility for) subsidy; financial penalty; refusal or non‐renewal of residence permit; deportation.     
6.6. The Integration Agreement in policy and practice  Although  the  essence  of  the  Integration  Agreement  is  determined  by  the  legislative framework  discussed  above,  there  is  much  room  for  maneuver  in  terms  of  political decisions  about  how  this  requirement  should  be  actually  applied.  In  order  to  fully understand the impact of integration conditions, it is important to know who offers the courses, on which basis the institutions offering the courses are selected and by whom, which  materials  are  used,  what  kind  of  civic  knowledge  is  required,  how  much  the courses actually cost, and how many people are prevented from enjoying rights or from staying in the country due to non‐compliance. In order to answer these questions, I have collected  data  through  interviews  and  the  analysis  of  empirical  documents—the ministerial  decree,  statistics  produced  by  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  answers  to parliamentary  questions,  and  the  materials  and  guidelines  produced  by  the  Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF ‐ Österreichischer Integrationsfonds). We  have  seen  that  the  standard  way  to  fulfill  the  Integration  Agreement  is  to complete a  certified German/Integration course. This  course  is partially  subsidized by the state for family migrants. In addition, for those migrants who cannot read and write, or  who  have  been  schooled  in  a  different  alphabet,  the  state  fully  subsidizes  a preparatory literacy course to be completed before the German/Integration course. It is the responsibility of the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) to certify the institutes allowed to offer  the  courses  and  to  carry out  regular quality  control.  The Austrian  Integration Fund is an agency of the Ministry of Interior that was created in 1960 by the UNHCR and 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the Ministry of Interior under the name ‘United Nations Refugee Fund’ (Flüchtlingsfonds 
der  Vereinten Nationen)  as  a  federal  agency  focused  on  the  integration  of  refugees.  In fact, until 2003, the integration policy of the Ministry of Interior was focused exclusively on assisting recognized refugees in the first years following their entitlement to refugee status.  The United Nations Refugee  Fund was  the  agency  responsible  for  carrying  out this  task  by  offering  psychological  counselling,  helping  refugees  to  find  housing, organizing  German  language  training,  etc.  (see:  Nationaler  Kontaktpunkt  Österreich 2005, 49‐57). Since the entry  into  force of  the  Integration Agreement,  this agency was renamed  into  Austrian  Integration  Fund  (ÖIF),  and  was  given  the  additional  task  of organizing  the  supply  of  German/Integration  and  literacy  courses  and  managing  the subsidies of the federal government for timely completion of the Integration Agreement. Four  kinds  of  institutions  are  allowed  to  offer German/Integration  and  literacy courses within the framework of the Integration Agreement: (1) Language schools; (2) publically  funded  institutions  of  adult  education;113  (3)  private  or  humanitarian institutions  with  experience  in  advising  and  supporting  migrants  as  well  as  teaching German; (4) officially recognized religious  institutions with experience  in advising and supporting  migrants  (IV‐V  2005,  §1(1)).  Interested  institutions  must  apply  to  the Austrian Integration Fund, which then decides whether to certify the institution or not on  the basis of  this application. Within  the  framework of  the  learning goals  set by  the Austrian  Integration  Fund  (Rahmencurriculum),  the  certified  institutions  are  free  to structure  their  courses  as  the wish,  and may  choose  freely  the method,  contents,  and learning materials, as long as these are appropriate to achieve the level A2 and cover the learning goals defined by the ÖIF.114 According to the ÖIF, the course landscape is in fact characterized  by  great  diversity,  and  there  is  no  preferred  textbook  or  structure  to which most institutions resort (Interview 25).  The  contents  of  the  courses  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  learning  goals established  by  the  ÖIF  attached  to  the  ministerial  decree.  These  contents  have  been developed  by  linguists  and  are  publically  available.  Despite  the  emphasis  on  civic                                                         113 Two types of institutions for adult education may offer German/Integration courses: (1) institutions that are eligible for federal public funds according to the 1973 Federal Act on the financing of adult education and public libraries from public funds (BGBl.171/1973); (2) institutions of adult education that are publically financed by federal, provincial or local governments and that have at least 2 years experience in advising and supporting migrants (see: IV‐V (2005) §1(1)2‐3). 114 The Rahmencurriculum is attached to the Integrationsvereinbarungs‐Verordnung. It can also be downloaded from the website of the ÖIF (http://www.integrationsfonds.at/). 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• Treaties [Verträge]  The  list  above  suggests  a pro‐migrant  and praxis‐oriented  curriculum aimed at helping the migrant to know his/her way around in Austria, rather than an exclusionary instrument or a mechanism for cultural assimilation. This impression was confirmed by an  interview  with  the  Austrian  Integration  Fund.  When  asked  how  important  the conveyance of “core democratic values” were for the certification and quality control of the  courses,  the  representative  of  the  ÖIF  seemed  quite  surprised.  I  was  told  that “values” did not  really play  a  role  in  the  selection of  the  courses. Rather,  the ÖIF was more concerned with whether the courses included situations relevant for the migrants such as filling out a form, or going to a post office, etc. Especially because being able to                                                         115 Own translation 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get  around  in  such  everyday  situations,  the  interviewee  was  quick  to  pint  out,  is something that comes up in the test (Interview 25). In order to successfully complete the German/Integration course, and thus fulfill the  Integration Agreement,  the migrant must pass a  test at  the end of  the course. The course  institutes  have  a  choice  between  a  test  that  has  been  developed  by  the  ÖIF specifically  for  this  purpose,  or  internationally  recognized  language  certificates  (i.e. ‘Österreichische  Sprachdiplom  Detusch’,  ‘Goethe‐Institut’,  ‘WBT  Weiterbildungs‐Testsysteme GmbH’)  (IV‐V 2005, §9). According  to  the ÖIF, about 80% of  the certified course  institutes use  the ÖIF  test  (Interview 25). The ÖIF sends  the  test  to  the course institutes,  which  administer  it  themselves.  An  analysis  of  a  sample  test  confirms  the information  provided  by  the  ÖIF  representative  concerning  civic  elements.  Of  10 assignments,  not  a  single  one  addressed  topics  related  to  values  or  to  political institutions and civic knowledge. Almost all assignments, however, were related to the everyday  themes mentioned under  the  first  part  of  the  topics  list  above.  For  instance candidates are asked to read an advertisement for a job, or for an apartment, and then to reply to questions of comprehension. Other assignments include reading a small article about what  a  person  should  do  if  he/she  gets  sick  and  cannot  go  to work,  listen  to  a message of somebody making an appointment with the doctor, fill in a form for a bank account, etc.116 Interestingly, this is the same language test that applicants for Austrian citizenship must also pass (StbG 1991 [2009] §10a). However, applicants for citizenship must  pass  an  additional  test  of  civic  knowledge  with  detailed  questions  about  the history,  geography,  political  system,  and  culture  both  of  Austria  and  of  the  province where  they  live.117  The  absence  of  such  an  additional  test  for  the  fulfillment  of  the Integration  Agreement  provides  a  clear  indication  that  the  supposed  ”cultural assimilation” aspect of the Integration Agreement is more symbolic than real. One of the potentially most problematic aspects of the Integration Agreement is the  cost  of  taking  the German/Integration  courses. We have  seen  that  the  75 units  of literacy course are paid  in  full by  the government  (up  to a  certain  limit), but as many experts  have  pointed  out  this  is  not  enough  for  an  illiterate  person  to  be  fully alphabetized  and  able  to  follow  a  regular  language  course.118  As  for  the                                                         116 Modeltest. Available from the website of the ÖIF (ttp://www.integrationsfonds.at/) 117 Sample questions and learning materials available at: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi%5Fstaatsbuergerschaft/ 118 See, for instance, the expert opinion of Prof. Krumm presented on the occasion of an expert hearing in Parliament: „Expertenanhörung Parlament; Innenausschuss am 20.6.2005; Hans‐Jürgen Krumm“ available 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German/Integration course,  it  is only partially subsidized for family migrants, whereas other  migrants  must  cover  the  full  costs  out  of  their  own  pockets.  Moreover,  the government subsidy is paid in the form of a voucher which can only be cashed in after successful completion of the course in due time, until which time the migrant must cover all  the  costs.  In  addition,  the  subsidies  of  the  government  are  subject  to  a  certain maximum amount, so  it  is not clear whether the subsidies really amount to 100% and 50% of the costs for Module 1 and 2 respectively. Moreover, since the government only refunds 50% of the German/Integration course,  it might be difficult for some migrants to  cover  the  remaining  costs,  especially  in  the  case  of  large  families  where  several members of the family are required to fulfill the Integration Agreement at the same time. Most  of  these  potential  problems  are  mitigated  by  the  way  in  which  the organization of the courses is handled in practice. According to the ÖIF, it turns out that practically  all  the  course  institutes  peg  the  course  prices  to  the  subsidies  of  the government. In other words, since the government pays up to 350 Euros for 75 units of literacy course, all literacy courses cost 350 Euros and comprise 75 units of 45 minutes (Interview  25).  The  same  is  true  of  the  German/Integration  courses.  Here  it must  be noted  that  only  persons  entering  through  family  reunification  receive  government subsidies. However, as the statistics of the ministry show, the overwhelming majority of persons  who  have  fulfilled  the  Integration  Agreement  so  far  have  cashed  in  a government voucher . For instance, in the year 2008, of 4.655 persons who fulfilled the Integration Agreement,  4.008  received  subsidies  from  the  government  (Parliamentary Document  08.09.2009).  This  is  the  case  because,  as  mentioned  previously,  almost  all third‐country nationals entering Austria with a non‐temporary or humanitarian permit are  family migrants. Moreover,  the  question  of  having  to  pay  in  advance  is  not  a  real problem, because most course institutes give the migrants an implicit loan by allowing them to complete the payment only after they cash in the subsidy (Interview 25). A further potentially very problematic aspect of the Integration Agreement is of course  the  very  strong  sanctions  attached  to  non‐compliance.  Deporting  a  person  for failure to pass a language test is obviously an affront to the principle of proportionality. Even  though  the  time  limit  allotted  for  compliance with  the  Integration Agreement  is quite generous (five years without extension for a course that is meant to last 6 months), it must be taken into account that some family migrants might have no familiarity with                                                         at http://www.sprachenrechte.at/cgi‐bin/TCgi.cgi?target=home&P_Kat=12 (last visited: 05.02.2010). 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taking  a  standardized  test.  Unfortunately  the  Ministry  of  Interior  does  not  release statistics  on  the  number  of  people  who  have  had  to  face  sanctions  for  untimely completion  or  non‐completion  of  the  Integration  Agreement,  only  on  the  number  of people who successfully complete the Integration Agreement (see table 6.2 below). 119  
   Although  the  issue of proportionality  is  indeed a very pressing one  that  should not be minimized,  in practice almost no one must  face deportation for having failed to pass a German/Integration test. In a number of parliamentary questions, the Ministry of Interior  has  been  repeatedly  asked how many people  have  been  issued  a  deportation order  on  the  grounds  of  non‐fulfillment  of  the  Integration  Agreement.  Ever  since  the first  version  of  the  Integration  agreement  entered  into  force  (from  2003  until  2009), only three persons were  issued a deportation order. According to a newspaper article, these people had refused  to  take a German/Integration exam (Salzburger Nachrichten 2009). In an interview, the ÖIF confirmed that all three were still in Austria by the end of 2009  and  had  lodged  an  appeal  against  the  expulsion  decision  (Interview  25).120  The outcome of these procedures was not yet known at the time of writing. If these people have entered Austria on the grounds of  family reunification,  it would be  interesting  to see whether  such  a  case  reaches  the European Court  of  Justice,  in which  case  the ECJ                                                         119 According to the reply of the Interior Minister to a parliamentary question, the Ministry does not collect statistics on the number of people who fail to pass the test or on the number of people who are faced with sanctions (see: Parliamentary Document 08.09.2009). 120 The ÖIF could not give me any information on this. According to a newspaper, these 3 persons have refused to take a German/Integration course (Salzburger Nachrichten 06.10.2009). 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would have  to make a  judgment  for  the  first  time on  the compatibility of  the Austrian integration conditions with the principles of proportionality and with the right to family life.  In  any  case,  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  in  seven  years  that  the  Integration Agreement  has  been  in  force  in  Austria,  nobody  has  ever  been  deported  for  non‐fulfillment, and only three people are at risk of being deported, whereas 19.650 people had successfully fulfilled the Integration Agreement by 2008 (see Table 6.2).  In sum, the implementation of the Integration Agreement in Austria weakens the hypothesis often presented in the literature that integration conditions constitute either hidden instruments of migrant selection, exclusionary tools, or mechanisms of cultural assimilation.  In  order  to  fully  assess  the  impact  of  the  Integration  Agreement  it  is necessary to look further than the national level, however. Ultimately, the way in which the German/Integration courses are organized and conducted depends as much on the opportunity structures found at the  local  level  for pro‐migrant actors as  it does on the legal and institutional framework set at the national level.   
6.7.The importance of political setting: the case of Vienna 
 The local context is increasingly recognized as being of great importance for the study of integration policies  (see:  Ireland 2004; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). As Poppelaars and  Scholten  (2008)  point  out,  the  national  and  local  levels  are  characterized  by divergent institutional logics that often drive integration policy in different directions. In particular,  due  to  the  necessity  of  coping  with  actual  practices,  local  levels  are  more prone  to adopt accommodative rationales  for problem  framing. Thus,  local  integration policies  are  often  characterized  by  a  tendency  towards  pragmatism  and  by  the instrumental  use  of migrant  organizations.  In  addition  to  these  structural  differences, national  and  local  levels  are  often  characterized  by  different  party  constellations. Nevertheless,  the  impact  of  party  politics  and  of  different  opportunity  structures  on integration  policies  at  the  national  and  local  levels  remains  under‐researched  (see: Givens 2007, 80). The implementation of the Integration Agreement in Vienna is an excellent case to analyze the impact of local context and party politics on integration policy. Vienna is the biggest city in Austria and it has the highest concentration of migrants. Whereas in 2008 the 17.5% of the Austrian population was of “migrant origin”, this figure was twice 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as  high  for  Vienna,  namely  35.4%  (Statistik  Austria  2008b).121  The  party‐political context  in Vienna differs strongly from the national  level. As mentioned before, during the period of formulation and implementation of the Settlement Acts (NAG) of 2002 and 2005  that  form  the  basis  for  the  Integration  Agreement,  Austria  was  governed  by  a coalition  between  the  center‐right  party ÖVP  and  the  far‐right  party  FPÖ  (later  BZÖ). This coalition stayed in power between 2000 and 2007. By contrast, “red Vienna”, as it is known,  is  the  stronghold  of  the  Social‐Democratic  Party  in  Austria,  having  been governed by it ever since the end of the First World War (except for the period between 1934  and  1945).  Moreover,  the  Viennese  wing  of  the  Social‐Democratic  Party  has consistently  taken  a  positive  attitude  towards  migration  and  defended  liberal  pro‐migrant policies, often in contrast to the national party line. These  ideological  differences  are  also  reflected  in  the  governmental  structures and institutions in place in the area of migration. By contrast to the federal level, the City of  Vienna  exhibits  a  long‐standing  commitment  to  a  proactive  policy  in  the  area  of migrant  integration.  Thus,  already  in  1972  the  Viennese  government  created  an “Immigrant  Fund”  (Zuwanderer­Fonds)  with  the  objective  of  offering  counselling  and assistance to migrants  in  legal and social  issues (Austria Wochenschau 1972).  In 1992 the  “Viennese  Integration  Fund”122  was  created.  From  1992  to  2004  the  Viennese Integration  Fund  was  responsible  for  counselling  of  migrants,  conflict‐mediation, political  consultancy  and  lobby  for  migrants  interests.  In  1996  the  position  of  City Councillor  for  Integration  (Integrationstadträtin)  was  created  within  the  local government.  In  2004,  the  Viennese  Integration  Fund  was  replaced  by  a  full‐fledged department  inside  the  municipality  administration—the  MA‐17  or  ‘Department  for Integration and Diversity Issues’.123  The existence of a specialized department in charge of integration, which is only subordinate  to  the  mayor,  contrasts  with  the  federal  allocation  of  competence  for integration matters at the Ministry of Interior. In 2007 the MA‐17 employed 35 persons, 2/3 of which with migration background, and disposed of a budget of 7,7 million Euros (Stadt Wien  2007b;  2007a,  18).  In  comparison,  the  budget  of  the  federal  government allocated to the co‐financing of the Integration Agreement—the most important national                                                         121 The concept of ‚migration background’ includes foreign nationals and persons of whom both parents were born abroad (first and second generation). 122 Wiener Integrationsfonds 123 Magistratsabteilung für Integrations‐ und Diversitätsangelegenheiten (MA‐17): http://www.wien.gv.at/integration/ 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policy in the area of  integration—amounted to roughly 1 million Euros.124 Besides, the approach  followed by  the MA‐17  is clearly very different  from the one adopted by the Ministry of Interior. In addition to emphasizing that migration and cultural diversity are assets  for  the  city,  the  approach  to  integration  of  the  City  of  Vienna  is  much  more focused  on  creating  opportunities  for  the  inclusion  of  migrant  populations  into mainstream  institutions;  rather  than  formulating  integration  as  a  requirement  or condition (see: Stadt Wien 2007a; 2010). In a report from 2007 the MA‐17 presented its overall approach to integration as follows: Integration  is  an  asymmetrical  and  mutual  process  that aims  at  increasing  equal  access  and  participation  by eliminating barriers, fighting discrimination, and promoting strategies  of  empowerment.  (Stadt  Wien  2007a,  11,  own translation)  The implementation of the Integration Agreement lies among the competences of the MA‐17. In principle, since the ÖIF certifies and controls the course institutes in the whole country, the sole task of the local administration would be to inform migrants of the requirement and distribute the federal subsidy. In reality, however, the MA‐17 does much  more  than  that.  First  of  all,  the  City  of  Vienna  has  created  its  own  ‘Viennese language voucher’ in 2007. Every family migrant who is required to fulfil the Integration Agreement receives three vouchers worth a total of 300 Euros that they can use to pay the remaining costs of the German/Integration courses not covered by the government. The amount that has to be paid by the migrant for the whole course is thus reduced by 40% from 750 to 450 Euros. In order to receive the vouchers, the migrants must make an  appointment  with  a  bilingual  counsellor  of  the  City  of  Vienna  and  attend  one information  session  (Interview  26).  In  the  first  meeting  with  the  counsellor  each migrant  is  given  a  package with  information  on  educational  possibilities  and  services offered by  the City of Vienna and  information on  the  Integration Agreement  including the  list  of  certified  courses  and  the  vouchers.  In  order  to  “activate”  the  vouchers,  the migrant is required to attend three information ”modules”. The modules are offered by organizations supported by the MA‐17 in the languages of the most important migrant communities  and  address  topics  of  interest  to  migrants,  providing  also  information about services offered by the City of Vienna (Interview 26).125                                                         124 Statistics provided to the author by the ÖIF. By 2008 this amount had doubled and amounted to approximately 2 million Euros. 125 See also the guidelines of the City of Vienna (MA 17 2008). 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German courses offered by the City of Vienna than are required to fulfil the Integration Agreement (Gemeinderat der Stadt Wien 2009, 90). In  sum,  through  a  series  of measures,  the  City  of  Vienna  has managed  to  take control  of  most  aspects  of  this  federal  policy,  and  has  become  the  key  player  in organizing  the  supply  of  courses,  selecting  and  financing  the  learning  institutes, controlling  the  costs  of  the  courses,  and  informing  migrants  of  their  obligations  and opportunities. The strategy of the City of Vienna effectively minimizes two of the most controversial  and  restrictive  aspects  of  the  Integration  Agreement,  namely  the  high costs  and  the  danger  of  acculturation.  The  costs  are  significantly  lowered  by  the ”Viennese  language  voucher”  and  the  danger  of  acculturation  is  minimized  by  the certification  of  migrant  organizations  as  course  institutes.  In  addition,  the  welcome package,  the  initial  counselling  in  the  migrant’s  mother  tongue  and  the  information modules  offered  by  the  City  of  Vienna  serve  to  counterbalance  the  negative  symbolic message that a compulsory integration condition is likely to send. Thus we see how the introduction of German/Integration courses, when met with favourable political opportunity structures might even help shift  the balance of power between pro‐migrant and anti‐migrant actors at the local level, providing opportunities (funding and legitimation) for pro‐migrant actors to carry out empowering programmes for migrants.  The  creation  of  the  Viennese  language  voucher  as  a  direct  reply  to  the implementation  by  the  national  government  of  the  Integration  Agreement,  and  the increase  in  subsidies  for  migrant  background  institutions  that  resulted,  are  clear evidence  that  “integration  conditions”  need  not  constitute  an  exclusionary  tool  of migration control or cultural assimilation. As the case of Vienna has shown, faced with favorable  political  opportunity  structures,  pro‐migrant  actors  have  been  able  to  use their agency to turn this requirement into a policy that empowers migrants.  
 
 
6.8. Conclusion  This chapter has investigated the implementation of  “integration conditions”  in Austria and Vienna. From this investigation it has become clear that the factors influencing the implementation of integration conditions in concrete national and local context are very complex and multifaceted.    In terms of  its overall effect on the integration of migrants, the Integration Agreement must be criticized on a number of grounds. Firstly, putting a 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person under pressure is not conducive to language learning. In addition, standardized tests can be very challenging to some migrants with little education, and that the literacy courses offered by the government are likely to be insufficient. Even more importantly, the  overall  approach  of  the  Integration  Agreement  of  making  language  learning  a requirement  subject  to  such  high  material  sanctions  as  the  loss  of  rights  and  of  the permission to stay must be strongly criticized. Even if the sanctions are seldom applied, the possibility that failing a language test might lead to loss of rights clearly contradicts the principle of proportionality. But what does  this  case study  tell us about  the actual impact  of  integration  conditions  on  the  ability  of  third‐country  nationals  to  enjoy  the rights guaranteed by EU legislation? As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, critics of integration conditions have  challenged  the  effectiveness  and  lawfulness  of  integration  measures,  and  have accused  their  defenders  of  using  “integration”  as  a  pretext  to  reduce  the  number  of incoming  migrants  (Besselink  2009;  Guild  et  al.  2009;  Wiesbrock  2009).  For  these critics, integration conditions are not aimed at empowering migrants or improving their situation, but rather “the category of  integration acts as a security tool  in the hands of the  State  to  restrict  immigration”  (Carrera  2009a,  429).  Moreover,  integration requirements  have  also  been  criticized  as  illiberal  practices  that  seek  to  impose  a particular  culture  or  set  of  values  on migrants  (Carrera  2005;  Joppke  2007a;  Carrera 2009a; 2009b; Guild et al. 2009). The  implementation of  the Integration Agreement  in Austria  invalidates both of these  critiques. We have  seen  that only  three persons have been  issued a deportation order  for  failing  to  comply  with  the  Integration  Agreement,  whereas  thousands  have successfully completed it. When the language level required was raised in 2006, so was the amount of course‐hours refunded by the federal government. The time frame of five years  for  fulfilling  the  Integration Agreement  is very generous, and extensions may be granted in exceptional situations. It is therefore hard to argue that in the Austrian case integration conditions are used to restrict migration.  The  idea  that  integration  conditions  are  a  tool  for  the  social  selectivity  of migrants  because  it  is  meant  to  disproportionately  affect  migrants  of  low  economic background  and  educational  level  is  also weakened  by  the  data.  The  fact  that  certain categories  of  migrants  are  excluded  from  fulfilling  the  Integration  Agreement  on  the basis  of  their  privileged  socio‐economic  position  (key  executives  and  highly  qualified workers)  indicates  that  there  is an economic dimension  to  the adoption of  integration 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conditions.  Integration  conditions  seem  to  be  indirectly  justified  by  a  latent  anxiety about the emergence of an ethnically distinct underclass. Nevertheless,  the Integration Agreement is clearly not aimed at preventing the most economically disadvantaged from becoming entitled to rights. As we have seen, in its revision of the Integration Agreement in  2005  the  government  introduced  a  fully  subsidized  literacy  course  that  should prepare  low‐educated  migrants  to  follow  the  regular  language  course.  Although insufficient  to  balance  out  differences  in  economic  and  educational  background completely, the introduction of this extra course clearly shows that it  is not the goal of the policy is not to purposefully select out low‐educated migrants.  Also  the second main point of  critique, namely  that  integration conditions have the  objective  of  imposing  the  dominant  culture  and  values  on  migrants,  must  be reconsidered in light of the empirical data. Although the national law establishes that the German/Integration  course  should  have  an  element  of  civic  education,  this  is  not implemented  in  practice  in  an  assimilatory  way.  Rather,  the  contents  of  the German/Integration courses tackle issues that can help migrants cope with bureaucracy, resolve  issues  of  the  daily  life,  and  be  informed  about  the  institutions  of  the  host‐country,  such  as  the  welfare  and  educational  systems.  Thus,  given  the  way  it  is implemented  in  practice,  it  turns  out  that  the  requirement  of  attending  a German/Integration  course  is more  likely  to empower  low‐educated migrants  in  their relationship  to  the state  than  to constitute a  restrictive  tool of migration control or of forceful acculturation. In addition, the fact that highly qualified workers and EU citizens are  not  even  encouraged  to  voluntarily  comply  with  similar  integration  measures indicates  that  the  roots  of  this  policy  are  not  simply  nationalism  and  cultural intolerance,  but  rather  intrinsically  linked  to problems of  the  structural  integration of socially and economically disadvantaged migrants. However, it is important to note that even though the structural aspect is clearly the most relevant, it is seldom addressed with concrete policies, and is practically never the object of productive politicization at the national level. Instead, the national debate in  Austria  continues  to  be  focused  on  cultural  aspects  of  integration,  reflecting  and contributing to mutual estrangement, and to  the rise of xenophobic sentiments among the  majority  population.  This  is  not  by  chance.  As  we  have  seen,  the  political  actors behind  the  inclusion of  the provisions  in  the EU Directives on “integration conditions” and  their  incorporation  into  Austrian  legislation  in  the  form  of  the  “Integration 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Agreement” had a clear interest in portraying this policy as a restrictive policy aimed at cultural assimilation, national protectionism, and migration control.  This  conclusion  reinforces  and  complements  the  findings  of  Chapter  5.  The analysis and comparison of the relevant Directives undertaken in Chapter 5 has shown that  the most relevant conditions or  limits  imposed on the actual entitlement of  third‐country  nationals  to  membership  rights  are  not  consistent  with  the  hypotheses  of cultural  anxiety  and  securitization.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  the  conditions  and limitation  imposed  on  rights  are  not  underpinned  by  securitization  and  cultural framings  in  EU  legislation  does  not  mean  that  these  could  be  important  factors motivating  the Member  States  to  include  conditionalities  in  the Directives  in  the  first place. What  the  case  study  of  the  implementation  of  integration  conditions  in Austria and  Vienna  has  shown,  however,  is  that  although  national  governments  do  frame integration conditions in terms of cultural assimilation and migration control, this does not  correspond  to  the  aims  and  outcomes  of  the  policy  in  actual  political  practice.  In other words, integration conditions are supposed to send the message that they lead to less migration and more acculturation; it is much less important that they actually do so. This  has  become  clear  from  the  investigation  of  the  Austrian  case,  where  the Integration Agreement seems to be more restrictive in spiritu than it is in actual practice. As the case study has shown, the introduction of integration conditions in Austria took place in an anti‐migrant context, as part of a mostly restrictive legislative package, and by a government openly hostile to migrants. The Integration Agreement was announced as  a  restrictive  policy  and  was  widely  perceived  as  such.  Nevertheless,  the  actual outcome of the implementation of this policy is that Ministry of Interior and the Austrian Integration Fund are for the first time engaged in organizing and financing programmes for  language acquisition and “civic education”. As the case of Vienna shows, depending on the opportunity structures in place, the challenges of implementation of integration conditions might even strengthen pro‐migrant political forces, who are able to capitalize on their expertise and activism in order to modify the character of the policy. Nevertheless, even the most openly anti‐migrant governments are constrained in their  ability  to  implement  restrictive  and  illiberal  policies.  Governments  of  liberal democratic  governments  are  constrained  in  their  ability  put  restrictive  ideas  into practice in extremely illiberal ways. Thus, it was the manifested aim of the conservative coalition  government  of  the  ÖVP‐FPÖ  to  restrict  access  to  rights  or  to  security  of residence  by  imposing  the  language  condition.  This  restrictive  aim  notwithstanding, 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CONCLUSION   This  dissertation  investigated  how  the  supranational  regulatory  framework  that governs  the  rights  of  legally  resident  third‐country  nationals  in  the  European  Union developed  in  the period between 1999 and 2009.  It  traced  the political process at  the supranational  level  that  led  to  specific  policies  towards  third‐country  nationals, analyzing  the main  factors  that  explain  that  process  and  the  resulting  policy  outputs. This  investigation has  shown  that  the development of European Union policies on  the rights  of  legally  resident  third‐country  nationals  during  the  last  decade  was characterized  by  what  I  have  called:  “restrictive  rights”  and  the  “politics  of categorization”.  Whereas  EU  policy  does  in  fact  extend  membership  rights  to  third‐country  nationals,  these  rights  are  subject  to  very  strict  conditions.  These  conditions vary significantly between different categories of migrants “constructed” by EU law and policy,  which  contributes  to  the  emergence  of  rights  hierarchies.  The  analysis  of  the policies adopted during the last decade has shown that the construction of categories is based  primarily  on  economic  and  humanitarian  criteria.  Moreover,  the  analysis  has indicated  that  the  logic  behind  the  differences  in  entitlement  is  one  of  economic protectionism  and maintenance  of  national  sovereignty. Whereas  cultural  anxiety  and security  are  drives  for  the  imposition  of  restrictive  conditions  on  the  acquisition  of rights—in  particular  so‐called  “integration  conditions”—we  have  seen  that  the application  of  these  conditions  does  not  always  correspond  to  the  exclusionary symbolism that political actors endow them with. The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarize the main findings and contextualize these findings in terms of the broader theme of reconfiguration of membership.  
 
7.1. Main findings: dynamics of inclusion and mechanisms of exclusion 
 The main  question  posed  in  the  beginning  of  this  study was:  how,  why  and  to  which 
extent  do  supranational  policies  of  the  European  Union  grant  membership  rights  to legally  resident  third‐country  nationals?  In  order  to  show how  and why  EU  policy  on 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third‐country nationals has developed in the  last decade,  the dissertation analyzed the policy‐making process at the supranational  level with the help of the concept of policy cycle.  It  showed  that  there  were  two  distinct  periods  of  policy‐making  in  the  last decade—the first  lasting from 1999 to 2004 and the second from 2004 to 2009—each containing  its  own  agenda‐setting,  policy  formulation  and  decision‐making  stages.  In both  of  these periods,  so  the  argument  of  this  dissertation,  a  combination  of  political, institutional and ideational factors impacting supranational policy‐making on the rights of third‐country nationals have contributed to the adoption of ambiguous policies. The  first  phase  of  policy‐making  was  marked  by  a  strong  commitment  to  the expansion of migrants’  rights  in  the  form of  the Tampere Presidency Conclusions. The liberal commitments made by heads of state and government  in  the European Council meeting in Tampere in 1999—at a time when most Member States of the Union had left‐wing governments and the political context was favorable to the expansion of migrants’ rights—produced a lasting impact in the policy field. Throughout the decade, at different moments pro‐migrant actors were able to engage in “rhetorical action” and point to the commitments made in Tampere in order to compel the representatives of the Member States to adopt policies that expanded the rights of migrants, or to force compliance with fundamental rights in the implementation of policies. In other words, the agenda set in Tampere  and  the Union’s  commitments  to  fundamental  rights  provided  opportunities for “rhetorical entrapment” that were successfully exploited by pro‐migrant actors. During  the  first  phase  of  policy‐making,  the most  important  pro‐migrant  actor was the European Commission itself, the agency of which was instrumental in expanding membership  rights  to  third‐country nationals. Under  the  leadership of  the  left‐leaning and strongly pro‐migrant Commissioner Antonio Vitorino, the Commission’s Directorate General  for  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  tabled  a  number  of  far  reaching  legislative proposals  to  expand  and  harmonize  the  rights  of  third‐country  nationals  in  the European Union, with the stated aim of creating a status of “civic citizenship” that would be independent of nationality and citizenship status of a Member State. However,  the  early  2000s  saw  a  shift  in  the  political  preferences  of  several Member  States.  National  elections  in  many  European  countries  changed  the  political constellation of the Council of the European Union, which now had a majority of right‐wing  governments.  Furthermore,  the  rise  of  far‐right  parties  in  a  number  of Member States was one factor that contributed to the growing salience of migration and migrant integration  issues  throughout  Europe,  with  negative  consequences  for  pro‐migrant 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initiatives. Adding to this, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the ensuing politicization  of  immigration  and  integration  in  the  context  of  security  concerns  and fears  of  Islamic  fundamentalism  impacted  negatively  on  the  willingness  of  national governments to transfer competences in the area of migration to the supranational level. In  an  institutional  environment  marked  by  “partial  communitarization”  and  strong “competition for competence”, this political constellation contributed to the creation of “joint decision traps” and was conducive to minimal compromises. The  combination  of  these  “conflicting  trends”  produced  ambiguous  outcomes. Instead of following a linear progression towards more and more restrictive policies, the evolution  of  this  policy  area  during  the  first  period  followed  much  more  a  kind  of dialectical  pattern  that  can  be  conceived  of  as  “the  dialectic  of  rights  and  control":  a liberal trend focused on granting rights (thesis), combined with a conservative moment focused  on  controlling  borders  and  restricting  entitlements  (antithesis),  ended  up leading  to  a  situation  in  which  rights  were  granted  in  a  very  restrictive  manner (synthesis). Both approaches were in fact combined with each other in the same policy instruments,  namely  the  Family  Reunification  Directive  and  Long‐Term  Residents Directive. In these instruments, both the trend to grant rights, and the trend to restrict them  co‐exist  in  the  form  of  “restrictive  rights”—that  is,  a  high  level  of  entitlements subject to very restrictive conditions. The  second  phase  of  policy‐making  saw  a  major  change  in  the  political orientation  of  the  Commission,  which,  under  the  leadership  of  Commissioner  Franco Frattini  adopted  a  much  more  pragmatic  and  instrumental  view  of  migration  and  of migrants’ rights. As a result of a major public consultation, and in consideration of  the difficulties  in decision‐making between 25  (later 27) Member States under  the  rule of unanimity,  the  Commission  decided  to  abandon  the  goal  of  establishing  a comprehensive migration policy  for  the Union and opted  for a change of strategy. The new strategy consisted  in adopting  “sectoral”  instruments  regulating  the conditions of entry and residence of only some specific categories of migrants. Priority was given to highly qualified workers, which was a select category of migrants considered to be in the economic  interest  of  the  Member  States.  Moreover,  the  concession  of  additional membership  rights was  conceived  as  a  possible  instrument  to  “attract”  this  desirable category  of  migrants.  At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  also  proposed  a  horizontal legislative  instrument  aimed  at  granting  a minimum  set  of  rights  to  all  “third‐country workers”, understood as those categories of legally resident third‐country nationals that 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have full access to the labor market of a Member State. Nevertheless,  it refrained from regulating  the  conditions  of  entry  and  the  concession  of work  permits  for  low‐skilled third‐country  nationals,  which  remained  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Member States. As a result of this new strategy, the policies adopted during the second phase of policy‐making were characterized by what I have called “the politics of categorization”, which  refers  to  the  way  with  which  EU  law  and  policy  categorize  migrants  into  a multiplicity of  legal  statuses,  and  subjects  each  to  a different  rights  framework. These categories are “constructed” by the law, in the sense that they do not correspond to the self‐identification  of  social  groups,  but  are  rather  artificial  constructions  meant  to facilitate  decision‐making  and  consensus‐reaching  in  a  complex  political  and institutional  setting.  The main  example  of  this  is  the  Blue  Card  Directive,  which  was adopted during this period and regulates the conditions of entry and residence of highly qualified workers  from  third‐countries  into  the  European  Union,  granting  them more favorable  rights  than  those  available  to  other  categories  of migrants.  By  contrast,  the strong  polarization  of  the  Member  States  represented  in  the  Council  prevented  the successful adoption of  the horizontal proposal meant  to  regulate  the right of all  third‐country workers, which is still under negotiation. Thus the analysis of the second period of  policy‐making  has  shown  that  the  “politics  of  categorization”  had  the  paradoxical effect  of  enabling  compromises  and  thus  propelling  the  expansion  of migrants’  rights, while  at  the  same  time  contributing  to  the  creation  of  rights  hierarchies  between  the different categories. In order to complement these findings, this dissertation analyzed the provisions of  the main  Directives  and  compared  them  to  the  rights  granted  by  EU  legislation  to mobile EU citizens and their families. This analysis enabled an assessment of the extent 
to  which  EU  policy  really  creates  rights  hierarchies  by  granting  different  rights  to different categories of migrants or by imposing different conditions on the acquisition of these rights. Moreover, this analysis also revealed important aspects of the phenomenon of  categorization,  by unveiling  the  logic  through which  the  lines dividing  the different categories  are  drawn.  The  comparison  showed  that  EU  legislation  grants  a  very  high level of entitlements  to migrants after  the acquisition of  long‐term residence. There  is little divergence on the levels of entitlements granted to different categories of denizens, such as mobile EU citizens,  long‐term residents, and Blue Card holders with  long‐term residence. Nevertheless, rights hierarchies are produced by two different mechanisms: 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first, by the exclusion of a number of categories  from the possibility of acquiring  long‐term  residence;  second,  by  the  imposition  of  stricter  conditions  on  the  acquisition  of permanent residence for certain categories than for others. Moreover, given the lack of agreement on the horizontal proposal made by the Commission to regulate the rights of all “third‐country workers”, rights hierarchies between mobile EU citizens and different categories  of  third‐country  nationals  before  the  acquisition  of  permanent  residence abound. The  implicit  logic  for  differentiating  between  the  categories  seems  to  be determined by two main concerns. First, economic concerns for protection of the labor market and the welfare systems are clearly expressed in the hierarchical ordering of the categories. Thus, Blue Card holders, who are selected according to their salary level, are granted  the  most  rights  subject  to  the  least  conditions.  Second,  the  imposition  of conditions also seems to be motivated by concerns for maintaining sovereignty over the control of national borders  (meaning  the ability  to  select who  is  allowed  to enter and reside  in  the  territory).  Thus,  whenever  acquiring  a  certain  status  associated  with membership  rights  derives  from  humanitarian  commitments—which  means  that Member States’ discretion  is  reduced—the conditions  for acquisition of  this  status are defined all the more restrictively, as is the case for family reunification. As the analysis of the policy‐making process and of the policy outputs conducted in this dissertation showed, one of the most problematic conditions imposed on access to membership rights are so‐called “integration conditions”. Given the indeterminacy of these  conditions,  which  are  not  defined  in  supranational  legislation,  they  provide  an opportunity  for  national  and  local  administrations  to  limit  the  access  of  migrants  to membership  rights.  If  applied  restrictively  and with  a  strong  emphasis  on  values  and culture, as feared by many scholars, “integration conditions” would potentially function as a major mechanism of exclusion or as a tool of cultural assimilation. In  order  to  assess  the  actual  effect  of  these  limitations  on  equal  treatment,  the dissertation  therefore  carried  out  a  case  study  of  how  integration  conditions  are implemented and practiced in Austria and in Vienna. Although the conclusions derived from  such  a  case  study  cannot  be  generalized,  the  investigation  nevertheless  yielded very interesting findings. It showed that that the discourse surrounding the adoption of this  policy  was  indeed  a  very  restrictive  and  exclusionary  one.  The  advocates  of integration conditions portrayed them as an instrument to protect national institutions from  “abuse”  by migrants,  and  as  a way  to  select  out  certain migrants  deemed  to  be 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“unwilling  to  integrate”.  Nevertheless,  the  actual  implementation  and  enforcement  of this  policy  does  not  correspond  to  this  exclusionary  discourse,  suggesting  that  the imposition of  integration conditions is an instance of “symbolic politics”.  In the case of Austria and Vienna, the agency of pro‐migrant actors at different levels of government, and  the  liberal  constraints  ingrained  in  national  institutions  and  political  culture contributed  to minimize  the  exclusionary  aspects  of  “integration  conditions”  in  actual practice, even  though  the policy clearly sends out an exclusionary message. Moreover, the  implementation  of  the  “integration  conditions”  had  as  a  corollary  the institutionalization of integration as a policy field in Austria, contributing to the creation of  new  institutions  (such  as  the Austrian  Integration  Fund)  and  the  allocation  of  new resources to a policy issue which had long been obliviated by a discourse of “not being a country of immigration”. This suggests an interesting dynamic of institutionalization and consolidation of integration  as  a policy  field, which  is  incidentally  also happening  at  the  supranational level,  and which will  probably mark  the  future  development  of  EU  policy  in  towards third‐country  nationals.  As  the  year  2009  drew  to  a  close,  so  did  a  particular  era  of supranational policy‐making in the migration field. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon  has  ended  the  “partial  communitarization”  of  migration  policy  and  created  a strong legal basis for supranational action in the regulation of the rights of third‐country nationals. At the same time, the development of a new multiannual program for the area of  Justice  and Home  Affairs—the  “Stockholm  Programme”—announces  the  begin  of  a new policy cycle. One of the main goals for future EU migration policy stated in this new policy program is the “consolidation of all legislation in the area of immigration, starting with  legal migration, which would be based on an evaluation of  the existing acquis de 
l’Union  and  include  amendments  needed  to  simplify  and/or, where  necessary,  extend the  existing  provisions  and  improve  their  implementation  and  coherence”.  Moreover, explicit  mention  is  made  of  the  intention  to  review  the  family  reunification  directive “taking account of the  importance of  integration measures”. As we see,  the question of 




 This  dissertation  started  by  arguing  that  the  policies  of  the  European  Union  that regulate the rights of third‐country nationals are redefining membership and displacing citizenship  status and nationality  as  the main  criteria  for  the  concession of  rights. We can now return to the theme of transformation of citizenship and put the findings of this dissertation  into broader perspective. What do these findings tell us about the general phenomenon  of  reconfiguration  of  membership  in  the  face  of  globalization  and European  integration?  In  this  concluding  section,  I would  like  to  suggest  two ways  in which the findings of this dissertation might contribute to and stimulate the theoretical debate on the reconfiguration of membership. The first relates to the changing locus of decisions  on  rights,  the  second  to  the  role  of  ambiguity  in  the  redefinition  of membership.   The  insights of  this dissertation on  the politics of  categorization and  restrictive rights  indicate  that  the  process  of  expansion  of  substantial  citizenship  beyond  formal citizenship  has  two  sides.  On  the  one  hand,  the  guarantee  that  non‐citizens  are  in 
principle  entitled  to  membership  rights  without  having  to  naturalize  points  to  a detachment  of  substantial  citizenship  from  the  qualities  and  criteria  once  associated with  the  acquisition  of  citizenship  status—membership  in  the  cultural  or  ethnic community;  civic  or  national  patriotism;  evidence  of  de  facto membership  in  society; oaths of allegiance to the polity, etc. On the other hand, we have seen that migrants must qualify  for  the  acquisition  of  the  rights  to  which  they  are  entitled  in  principle  by complying  with  several  conditions  and  by  possessing  a  specific  type  of  permit  (i.e. belonging  to  a  particular  category  that  is  not  blocked  from  acquisition  of  permanent status). This  indicates  that rather  than  the modes of decision‐making,  it  is actually  the 
locus  of  decisions  on  entitlement  that  are  changing.  Whereas  the  decisions  on  who qualifies  for  the entitlement  to membership rights (and on the basis of which criteria) were once taken within the ambit of naturalization policies, they are now taken within the ambit of  immigration policies.  In  that context,  it  is perhaps not surprising  that  the criteria once associated with the acquisition of citizenship (i.e.  integration criteria) are being progressively transferred to the realm of immigration policy as well.   The  second  theoretical  insight  this  dissertation  offers  relates  to  the  role  of ambiguity.  Ambiguity  is  a  pervasive  feature  of  the  processes  of  rights  expansion  and 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This annex reviews the provisions of the following Directives: the ‘Long‐Term Residents’ Directive,  the  ‘Family  Reunification’  Directive,  the  ‘Blue  Card’  Directive,  the  ‘EU Citizenship’ Directive and the proposed (but not yet adopted)  ‘Single Permit’ Directive. The analysis carried out in this annex is the basis for the comparison of these Directives undertaken in Chapter 5. 
 
The Long­Term Residents Directive (LTRD) “Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning  the status of  third‐country  nationals who  are  long‐term  residents”  regulates  the  conditions  under which third‐country nationals legally residing in the territory of a Member State are entitled to the  status  of  ‘long‐term  resident’,  and  the  conditions  under which  this  status may  be withdrawn,  as well  as  the  rights  attached  to  the  status  (Directive  2003/109/EC).  The Directive also establishes the conditions under which long‐term residents are entitled to move to a second Member State and the rights that can be enjoyed there, including the conditions for family reunification in the second Member State. The  Directive  does  not  apply  to  refugees,  asylum‐seekers,  and  persons  with  a formally  limited  residence  permit  granted  for  the  purposes  of  exercising  a  temporary activity  such  as  students,  seasonal  workers,  au  pairs,  posted  workers,  and  diplomats (Article  3(2)  LTRD).  Thus,  with  the  exception  of  refugees,  the  personal  scope  of  the Directive  includes  all  immigrants  whose  residence  permit  is  not  intrinsically  limited, which in practice amounts to two broad categories of immigrants: non‐temporary labor migrants and family migrants. Nevertheless, the Directive is very likely to be expanded to  refugees  in  the  near  future.  The  original  version  of  the  Directive  proposed  by  the Commission did cover refugees as well (COM (2001) 127 final), but this proved to be too controversial during negotiations in the Council. Therefore refugees were provisionally excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  facilitate  the  negotiations,  under  the condition  that  the  Commission  would  present  a  proposal  to  expand  the  LTRD  to refugees at a  later time. This proposal was presented  in 2007 (COM (2007) 298 final), but agreement on it was vetoed by one single Member State (CD 16476/08). Now that 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the  Lisbon Treaty  has  entered  into  force,  and  unanimity  is  no  longer  required  in  this area of policy, one can consider an agreement on the extension of the LTRD to refugees as  practically  certain.  In  addition,  as  a  general  derogation,  the  Directive  is  without prejudice  to more  favorable provisions of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements and international conventions, which therefore continue to apply (Article 3(3) LTRD).   There  are  four  general  conditions  for  the  acquisition  of  Long‐Term  Resident status: (i) five years continuous residence in the territory of the Member State (Article 4(1)),  (ii)  stable  and  regular  resources  sufficient  to  sustain  oneself  and  one’s  family without  recourse  to  social  assistance  (Article  5(1)(a)),  (iii)  comprehensive  sickness insurance (Article 5(1)(b)), and (iv) the person should not constitute a threat to public policy and public security (Article 6). The Directive specifies in more detail how some of these conditions should be 
applied. First, in terms of calculating the five years of residence, time spent as a student may  count  as half,  but  time  spent  as  a  seasonal worker,  au pair  or diplomat  shall  not count  (Article  4(2)).  Although  the  residence  should  be  continuous,  small  periods  of absence from the territory, not exceeding 6 consecutive months or 10 months  in total, shall  not  count  as  interrupting  residence.    Member  States  are  free  to  tolerate  longer periods of absence for exceptional reasons (Article 4(3)). Secondly,  in  terms of  setting  the  level of  resources  required,  the Directive does not  give  precise  guidelines,  but  states  that Member  States may  take  into  account  the level of minimum wages and pensions (Article 5(1)(a)). This formulation leaves a wide range of discretion to the Member States. Nevertheless, §9 of the preamble states clearly that  “economic  considerations  should not be  a  ground  for  refusing  to  grant  long‐term resident status and shall not be considered as interfering with the relevant conditions”, which  means  that  Member  States  are  supposed  to  set  low  income  requirements intended to prevent long‐term dependence on the social assistance system. Should they decide  to  set  an  exorbitantly  high  level  of  income  as  a  requirement  for  long‐term resident status, Member States would probably be liable to infringement procedures or individual Court cases. Finally,  as  a  safeguard  to  the  applicant,  when  considering  whether  the  third‐country national  constitutes  a  threat  to  public  policy  or  security, Member  States  shall consider  the  severity  of  the  danger  emanating  from  the  person—meaning  that  small offences  should  not  constitute  a  ground  for  refusal—and  shall  have  regard  to  the duration  of  residence  and  to  the  existence  of  links  with  the  country  of  residence—
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meaning  that  people  should  not  be  deported  to  a  country  in  which  they  have  never resided  (2nd  generation)  or  to  which  they  have  no  contacts  anymore  (Article  6). Economic considerations shall not play a role in this consideration (ibid). Nevertheless, §8 of the preamble makes clear that “the notion of public policy may cover a conviction for committing a serious crime”, so a person who has been convicted of a serious crime in the past but has since then no  longer engaged in any criminal or dangerous activity may be refused long‐term residence on that ground.   In addition to the four general conditions mentioned above, the Directive allows Member States to apply two optional conditions: (i) Member States may require third‐country nationals to comply with integration conditions (Article 5(2)), and (ii) Member States  may  require  evidence  of  appropriate  accommodation  (Article  7(1),  second subparagraph).128 No further specifications are made on how these conditions should be applied. Also the term “integration conditions” is not further specified, opening the door for Member States to impose any kind of restrictive measure that can be fitted under the label  of  ‘integration’.  In  practice,  these  ‘integration  conditions’  refer  primarily  to language  courses,  and,  in  some  cases,  also  civic  education  courses  (Carrera  and Wiesbrock  2009).  The  fact  that  Member  States  may  deny  the  status  of  long‐term resident to third‐country nationals for failing to comply with such integration measures, for  instance  for  failing  to  pass  a  language  test,  is  in  fact  a  huge  weakness  of  this Directive.  For  one,  it  gives  a  great  degree  of  discretion  to  national  governments  and therefore  puts  into  question  the  effective  and  homogeneous  implementation  of  EU legislation. In addition, denying access to permanent residence and its attendant rights on the basis of criteria such as  inability to pass a  language or civics exam goes against the  principle  of  proportionality,  and  is  very  likely  to  disproportionately  affect  low‐income  and  low‐educated  migrants  (see:  Guild  et  al.  2009).  Where  integration conditions  disproportionately  affect  immigrants  of  certain  ethnicities,  this  rule  could even constitute indirect discrimination (Human Rights Watch 2008). Nevertheless, in a judgment about a  similar provision  in  the  family  reunification Directive,  the European Court of Justice ruled that integration conditions must be applied in conformity with the                                                         128This is not formulated as a condition, but rather as an item among the documentary evidence that the applicant must submit (together with a valid travel document and evidence that he/she fulfils the other conditions). Nevertheless, since migrants are often discriminated in the housing market, and being able to afford a decent accommodation can be difficult for low‐income migrants or migrants from visible minorities, being able to give evidence of „appropriate housing“ ends up becoming a condition. 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principles of European law and in full respect of human rights. In sum, all depends really on  how  these  ‘integration  conditions’  are  implemented  in  national  legislation  and applied  in  practice  by  national  and  local  administrations.  Here  therefore  is  a  case  in which  it  is  necessary  to  think  in  terms  of  a  ‘best‐case’  and  a  ‘worse‐case’  scenario, because  a  precise  evaluation  of  the  scope  of  such  a  provision  requires  empirical investigation  of  its  implementation  and  would  vary  for  each  national  or  even  local context.   Once  granted  the  status  of  Long‐Term  Resident,  the  third‐country  national  is entitled  to  the  following  rights:  (i)  permanent  residence  and  protection  against expulsion,  (ii)  a number of procedural  rules and guarantees  (iii)  equal  treatment with nationals in access to employment and self‐employment, as well as working conditions, (iv) equal treatment with nationals in education and vocational training, including study grants, (v) equal treatment with nationals in recognition of diplomas and qualifications, (vi)  equal  treatment  with  nationals  in  social  security,  social  assistance  and  social protection, (vii) equal treatment with nationals with regard to tax benefits, (viii) equal treatment with nationals in access to, and the supply of, goods and services available to the  public,  including  procedures  for  obtaining  housing,  (ix)  equal  treatment  with nationals in freedom of association, and affiliation, and membership of an organization representing workers, or employers, or any professional organization, and the benefits that emerge from such membership, (x) free access to the entire territory of the Member State, (xi) free movement rights within the European Union—i.e. facilitated residence in a second Member State under conditions of equal treatment similar to the first Member State, and (xii) immediate family reunification in the second Member State.   As  the  list  above makes evident,  the  rights granted by  the Long‐Term Directive are very comprehensive. Considering that, in the best‐case scenario, the sole conditions for  achieving  this  status  are  a  non‐temporary  residence  permit,  a  minimum  level  of income, and the possession of sickness  insurance,  this  is really an extraordinary move towards decoupling membership rights from citizenship status. Nevertheless, in order to check  whether  rights  hierarchies  exist,  it  is  important  to  look  in  detail  into  the specifications made  in  the Directive about how each of  these rights  is  to be applied 
and  possible  derogations.  In  the  following,  the  conditions  and  derogations  will  be discussed in detail for each type of right regulated by the Directive. 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Settlement Rights: The  long‐term  resident  status  entitles  third‐country nationals  to  a  right  to permanent residence  that  can  only  be  withdrawn  under  the  following  conditions:  (i)  if  it  is detected that there was fraud in the acquisition of the status, (ii) in the case of absence from  the  territory  of  the  Community  for more  than  12  consecutive months,  although Member  States  are  free  to  tolerate  longer  periods  of  absence,  (iii)  in  case  where  the third‐country  national  becomes  a  threat  to  public  policy  or  security,  (iv)  in  case  the third‐country  national  acquires  the  status  of  long‐term  resident  in  another  Member State, or (v) in case of absence for more than 6 years from the territory of the Member State  (while  remaining  in  the EU),  although Member States  are  free  to  tolerate  longer absences (Article 9(1‐4). Withdrawal of the long‐term resident status is not a sufficient reason  for  expulsion  from  the  territory.  As  long  as  the  third‐country  national  fulfills conditions in national  legislation to remain in the territory, he/she must be allowed to do so (Article 9(7)). Moreover, where the long‐term resident status is withdrawn due to a  long  absence  from  the  territory,  the  Member  State  must  provide  for  facilitated  re‐acquisition of the permit (Article 9(5). As a safeguard to the immigrant, the Directive explicitly provides that the right to  long‐term  residence  cannot be  lost  due  to  expiration of  the  residence permit  itself. Although the permit is issued for a period of 5 years, after which it must be renewed, the right to residence itself is permanent (Article 9(6)). This, which at first sight seems like a rather  inoculate  procedural  right,  can  prove  to  be  a  very  important  safeguard  for immigrants  against  the  vicissitudes  of  anti‐immigrant  legislation  adopted  by  national governments. For  instance,  in Austria, a  recent  law has been passed which establishes that,  starting  in  1.  April  2009  applications  for  extension  of  certain  types  of  residence permits have to be submitted before the residence permit expires. If the application for extension  is  submitted  after  the  expiration  date  the  application  will  be  considered  a first‐time  application, which moreover  has  to  be  submitted  at  an  Austrian  diplomatic representation  in  the  person’s  country  of  origin.129  The  safeguard  inserted  into  the Long‐Term  Residents  Directive  protects  holders  of  the  status  from  this  kind  of subterfuges aimed at reducing legal migration.  
                                                        129 See the information sheet of the municipal department 35 of the City of Vienna in charge of immigration available at: www.migrant.at/aktuell‐rechtliche‐infos‐2006/nag/Factsheet_MA%2035_EIN_NAG_Aenderung%20Verlaengerung.pdf) 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The  long‐term resident  status also entitles  third‐country nationals  to extended 
protection against expulsion. Member States may only take a decision to expel a long‐term  residence where  he/she  constitutes  “an  actual  and  sufficiently  serious  threat  to public  policy  or  public  security”  (Article  12(1)).  This  provision  adopts  a  similar formulation  used  with  regards  to  EU  citizens.  This  is  a  strong  protection  against expulsion,  because  the  European  Court  of  Justice  has  ruled  in  several  occasions  that public policy provisions must be interpreted narrowly, and that any expulsion decision on the basis of the public policy exception must be based on a ‘present’ threat, meaning that  national  authorities  are  required  to  assess  each  situation  on  a  case‐by‐case  basis and must take into account whether the measure or the circumstances which gave rise to that expulsion order prove the existence of personal conduct constituting a ‘present’ threat to the requirements of public policy. This interpretation has been extended by the Court also to  third‐country nationals who are protected by Association Agreements.130 Moreover,  as  an  additional  safeguard,  the  Directive  provides  that  before  taking  a decision  to  expel,  Member  States  shall  have  regard  to  the  situation  of  the  person concerned,  specifically:  the  duration  of  residence,  the  age  of  the  person,  the consequences  of  expulsion  for  the  person  and  his/her  family members,  and  whether there  are  any  links  to  the  country  of  origin  (Article  12(3)).  Additionally,  in  case  of  a decision  to  expel,  a  judicial  redress procedure must  be made  available,  and,  if  lacking adequate  resources,  the  third‐country  national must  be  offered  legal  aid  on  the  same terms as nationals (Article 12(5)).  Equal Treatment Rights: With regard to the equal treatment rights enumerated above, a number of derogations apply.  Only  one  of  these  derogations  is  of  general  character,  that  is,  applies  in  all Member States, namely that access to employment and self‐employed activity is limited to  cases  where  there  is  not  even  occasional  involvement  in  the  exercise  of  public authority (Article 11(1)(a)). This is a quite moderate limitation, since it does not cover all public service  jobs, but only those that  involve the exercise of public authority. The same limitation also applies to EU citizens exercising their right of free movement (see below). 
                                                        130 See Case C‐467/02 Inan Cetinkaya v. Land Baden Württenberg, especially §44, and the cases cited therein. 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By  contrast,  the  Directive  gives  the  possibility  of  Member  States  adopting additional optional derogations, which differ from the treatment given to EU citizens. In  particular,  there  are  two  important  derogations  that  allow  for  less  preferential treatment.  The  first  is  that  Member  States may  retain  restrictions  already  present  in national  or  Community  legislation  at  the  time  of  adoption  of  the  Directive  that  limit access  to  certain  jobs  and  self‐employed  activities  to  nationals  EU  or  EEA  citizens (Article  11(3)(a)).  The  second  is  that  Member  States  may  limit  equal  treatment  in respect  of  social  assistance  and  social  protection  to  core benefits  (Article 11(4)).  This derogation is limited, however, by a safeguard inserted into the preamble, which states that “core benefits” must include “at least minimum income support, assistance in case of  illness,  pregnancy,  parental  assistance  and  long‐term  care”  (Preamble  §13).  Two minor  derogations  are  that  the  enjoyment  of  some  rights  such  as  tax  benefits,  social assistance,  etc. may  be  conditional  on  residence  in  the  territory  of  the Member  State (Article 11(2)),131 and that access to university may be conditional on fulfilling specific educational  prerequisites  and  providing  evidence  of  language  proficiency  (Article 11(3)(b)). A more favorable optional derogation  is provided for by article 11(5), stating that Member States may decide to grant access to additional benefits and to grant equal treatment in any other area not covered by the Directive. The open formulation of this provision means that there is not upper limit in terms of equal treatment for long‐term resident  third‐country nationals. The Directive only sets a bottom  line, but  it does not prevent Member States to adopt more favorable provisions.  Rights in 2nd Member State & Family Reunification: Settlement rights also include free movement rights within the Union, that is, the right to settle  in a  second Member State  for  the purposes of pursuing an economic activity,  to study,  or  for  any  other  reason  (i.e.  also  as  an  inactive  person).  There  are no  general 
conditions specified in the Directive for the ability to exercise this right, but there are optional  conditions  that  Member  States  may  apply  if  they  so  wish.  The  optional 
conditions  are:  proof  of  income  (Article  15(2)(a)),  possession  of  sickness  insurance (Article  15(2)(b)),  evidence  of  appropriate  accommodation  (Article  15(4))  integration conditions (but only  in case where these were not required  in the  first Member State)                                                         131 One should keep in mind that a person may keep his/her LTR status in a first Member State for up to 6 years or longer after moving to a second Member State. 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(Article  15(3)).  Independently  from  the  integration  conditions,  Member  States  may require that the person concerned attend language courses (ibid). In addition, when the person  applies  for  residence  specifically  in  order  to  pursue  an  economic  activity  or study,  the  Member  State  may  require  evidence  of  a  work  contract,  or  the  necessary qualifications  for  the  self‐employed  activity,  or  of  enrollment  in  an  educational institution (Article 15(4)(a‐b). This is also required of EU citizens (see below). The  long‐term  resident  has  a  right  to  immediate  family  reunification  with his/her  core  family,  provided  that  the  family  was  already  constituted  in  the  first Member  State  (Article  16(1)).  Member  States  may  also  opt  to  allow  other  family members  to  join  the  long‐term  resident  (Article  16(2)).  As  optional  conditions,  the second Member State may require evidence of enough resources and sickness insurance for  the  family (Article 16(4)).  If  the third‐country national  fulfills  these conditions,  the second  Member  State  can  only  refuse  the  permit  on  grounds  of  public  policy  and security (defined as in the first MS) or on grounds of public health, which is defined very narrowly  and  only  applicable where  protective  provisions  have  already  been  enacted with respect to the country’s own nationals (Article 18). In addition, there is a derogation in the Directive that states that Member States may  limit  the  total  amount of  third‐country nationals  entitled  to a  residence permit  if this  is  already  part  of  the  national  legislation.  This  is  the  (in)famous  ‘quota’  or 
‘volumes’ derogation that exists in all EU Directives in the area of migration in order to protect legislation which establishes maximum quotas of immigrants that can enter the territory per year on each type of visa or residence permit. It means that the application may not be denied to the third‐country national who fulfills all conditions, but it may be delayed in case the quota is already full for that particular year. Once residence in the second Member State has been granted, the third‐country national  is  immediately entitled  to equal  treatment  in all  areas as  in  the  first Member State, with  only  two  possible  optional  derogations.  The  first  optional  derogation  is that a third‐country national who was granted a residence permit in the second Member State in order to pursue a specific economic activity may have restricted access to other employed  activities  during  one  year,  after  which  he/she  must  be  granted  equal treatment on access to the  labor market (Article 21(2)). The second is  that the second Member State may  limit  the access to employment and self‐employed activity  to those third‐country nationals who receive a residence permit for the purposes of study or as inacti
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Family Reunification Directive (Article 21(3)), which will be discussed below. Until the third‐country national has acquired long‐term residence in the second Member State, he or  she  may  have  the  residence  permit  withdrawn  or  be  expelled  on  the  grounds  of public policy and security, or if the person is staying illegally in the territory, or in case he  or  she  no  longer  fulfills  the  necessary  conditions  (income/sickness  insurance).  In those  cases,  however,  the  first  Member  State  has  a  duty  to  readmit  the  long‐term resident (Article 22(2)).  Summary and Analysis On the basis of this detailed discussion of its provisions, it becomes clear that the Long‐Term Residents Directive  does  in  fact  grant  a  very wide  range  of  rights  to  those who qualify  for  the  status,  including  settlement  rights,  equal  treatment  rights and  rights of free movement  and  family  reunification  in  a  second Member  State.  The  conditions  to qualify  for  the  status  and  to  actually  exercise  the  rights  attached  to  it,  as well  as  the derogations provided for in the Directive, must be divided into two categories: general and  optional.  While  the  general  conditions  and  derogations  are  few  and  narrowly defined,  the  optional  derogations  and  conditions  are widely  formulated  and  therefore give  rise  to  a  lot  of  ambiguity.  In  particular,  the  most  problematic  aspects  of  the Directive  are  its  limited  personal  scope  which  excludes  several  categories  of  third‐country nationals  (i.e.  refugees,  asylum seekers  and  temporary migrants),  the  vaguely defined  income  requirement,  and  the  total  discretion  allowed  to  Member  States  in applying  integration  conditions.  Nevertheless,  as  will  be  discussed  below,  a  similar income requirement in the case of the Family Reunification Directive has been narrowed down by a recent ECJ judgment, and the scope of the Directive is likely to be expanded to refugees in the near future. The single most problematic provision therefore remains the so‐called “integration conditions”.   
The Family Reunification Directive (FRD) “Council  Directive  2003/86/EC  of  22  September  2003  on  the  right  to  family reunification”  regulates  the  conditions  under  which  third‐country  nationals  residing legally  within  the  territory  of  a  Member  State  are  entitled  to  family  reunification (Council  Directive  2003/86/EC).  It  defines which  family members may  be  brought  in and determines the rights that they are entitled to, once in the territory of the Member State.  Thus,  the  Directive  regulates  the  rights  of  two  categories  of  third‐country 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nationals  –  the  ‘sponsor’  and  the  members  of  his/her  family  who  are  brought  in  by family  reunification.  Importantly,  the  Directive  covers  family  reunification independently  of  whether  the  family  relationship  was  already  constituted  before  the sponsor  acquired  a  residence permit  in  the Member  State,  or whether  the  family was constituted afterwards (i.e. “family formation” in legal jargon) (Article 2(d) FRD). The  Directive  does  not  apply  to  asylum  seekers  and  to  persons  enjoying subsidiary  or  temporary  protection,  although  it  does  apply  to  recognized  refugees.132 Persons with a short‐term residence permit for less than one year, or who do not have “reasonable prospects of obtaining the rights of permanent residence” –i.e. persons with a formally limited residence permit granted for the purposes of exercising a temporary activity such as students, seasonal workers, au pairs, posted workers, and diplomats – are also not entitled to become sponsors in the terms of the Directive (Article 3(2)). The Directive also does not apply to family members of EU citizens, who are subject to more favorable regulations (see below), and is without prejudice to more favorable provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements and international conventions (Article 3(3‐4). As  with  the  LTRD,  the  Family  Reunification  Directive  regulates  not  only  the entitlement to family reunification and the rights of the family members once admitted, but also specifies a number of conditions that must or can be required of third‐country nationals wishing to acquire these entitlements. One can therefore divide the provisions of  the Directive  along  the  following  lines:  (i)  conditions  placed  upon  the  sponsor,  (ii) conditions  placed upon  the  family member,  (iii)  rights  granted  to  the  family member. These will be discussed in detail separately below.  Sponsor’s conditions: The  first  set of  conditions  placed upon  the  sponsor  refer  to his/her  legal  status  and duration  of  residence  as mentioned  before,  namely  the  prerequisite  of  having  a  non‐temporary kind of residence permit valid for at least one year with reasonable prospects of acquiring permanent residence. The second set of general conditions that apply to the  sponsor  include  the  following:  evidence  of  appropriate  accommodation  for  the 
                                                        132 Special (more favourable) provisions are made for refugees in the Directive. These will not be considered in more detail here, however, since the chapter does not deal with the rights of refugees. 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whole  family  (Article  7(1)(a)),133  comprehensive  sickness  insurance  (Article  7(1)(b)), stable and regular resources sufficient to maintain the whole family without recourse to social assistance (Article 7(1)(c)). In addition, there are three optional conditions that can  be  required  of  the  sponsor.  Firstly,  Member  States may  require  that  the  sponsor comply with integration measures (Article 7(2)).134 Secondly, Member State may require that the sponsor have lived in the territory for up to two years before the family can join him/her  (Article  8,  first  subparagraph).  Thirdly,  the  Directive  also  allows  a  special optional derogation for Member State whose national legislation already in force “takes account of its reception capacity to impose a waiting period of up to three years between the date of application and the issuing of the residence permit for the family members (Article 8, second subparagraph). This derogation was requested by Austria  to protect its quota regulation with respect to the entrance of family members. Austria is in fact the only country that implemented this optional derogation and it is the therefore the only Member State where family members may have to wait 3 years before being allowed to join the sponsor (COM (2008) 690 final). Still, this was already an improvement on the Austrian legislation, which before the implementation of the Directive allowed for even longer waiting periods (Brandl 2007, 3). In all other countries the Member States must authorize  the  entry  of  the  family members  immediately  after  an  application  has  been accepted  and  must  facilitate  the  acquisition  of  the  necessary  visa  (Article  13  FRD). Member  States may  take  a maximum of nine months  time  to  consider  the  application before taking a decision (Article 5(4)). In  terms  of  procedural  conditions,  one  provision  is  especially  worth mentioning.  Art.  5(3)  states  that  the  application  for  family  reunification  should  be submitted while the family member is living outside the territory of the Member State, and  requires  that  the  family members  wait  for  the  decision  outside  the  territory.  An optional  derogation  allows Member  States  to  adopt more  favorable  provisions  in  this respect,  but  the  application  from  abroad  is  the  general  principle.  This  requirement  of applying from abroad might seem like an innocuous procedural provision, but in reality it represents a tremendous disadvantage for many migrants because it serves to block                                                         133 Literally: evidence of „accommodation regarded as normal for a comparable family in the same region and which meets the general health and safety standards in force in the Member State concerned“. 134 A derogation to this provision establishes that, in the case of refugees, integration measures may only be required after family reunification has been granted, therefore not as a condition which has to be fulfilled in order for the person to be entitled to family reunification in the first place, but as an ex‐post requirement. 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easy passage from one type of  legal status (e.g. student or asylum seeker) to the more favourable status of family member. The situation is especially tragic for asylum seeker who—even after marrying a potential sponsor—are effectively blocked from benefiting from  this  Directive,  because  they  would  theoretically  have  to  return  to  the  country where  they  suffer  persecution  in  order  to  file  an  application.135  This  is  especially problematic  in  countries  that  make  use  of  the  ‘quota  derogation’  that  allows  for  a waiting period of up to three years.  Family member’s conditions: The  first  set  of  conditions  refers  to  the  relationship  (of  parentage  and  dependence) between the family member and the sponsor. Member States must grant a right to enter and reside to  the  following  family members (if all conditions are  fulfilled):  the spouse, the  minor  unmarried  children  of  the  sponsor  together  with  the  spouse,  the  minor unmarried children of the sponsor who are dependent on him/her, the minor unmarried children of  the  spouse who are dependent on him/her  (Article 4(1)).136 These are  the only  relatives  to  whom  family  reunification  must  apply  in  all  Member  States.137  In addition, Member States may also opt to grant family reunification under the conditions specified in the Directive to the following relatives: dependent parents of the sponsor or of  the  spouse  who  do  not  enjoy  proper  family  support  in  the  country  of  origin,  the unmarried adult children of the sponsor or of the spouse who are unable to provide for their own needs on account of their state of health (Article 4(2)). Furthermore, Member States may opt to recognize registered partnerships and treat the registered partner in                                                         135 This is the case in Austria, where asylum seekers are effectively prevented from benefiting from the Directive’s rights because they would have to go back to their country of origin to apply for family reunification. This problem, which emerged with the entry into force of the 2005 version of the settlement act—Niederlassungsgesetz 2005—became subject of much media attention due to the activistm of an NGO called Ehe Ohne Grenzen (see: http://eheohnegrenzen.sosmitmensch.at/). In 2007, a case was brought to the European Court of Justice by the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof which dealt with a similar problem, although the legal basis was the EU Citizenship Directive, since the case concerned a Turkish asylum seeker who married a German woman living in Austria. The Court decided in favor of the Turkish asylum seeker that legal status is not a precondition for being able to use the right to family reunification and ordered the Austrian law to be changed. (See: Case C‐552/07 Deniz Sahin v Bundesminister für Inneres. On the implications for Austria see: http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=33397) 136 Obviously, the children of the sponsor or spouse with another partner must be under custody of him/her in order to be able to enter through family reunification. In case custody is shared, the other parent must give his/her approval. 137 More favorable conditions apply for refugees, especially unaccompanied minor refugees, but these will not be reviewed in detail here. See Chapter V of the Directive. 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equal conditions as a spouse (Article 4(3)). Finally, Member States may also allow family reunification to the unmarried partner of the sponsor with whom he/she has an attested long‐term  relationship.  In  this  case,  the  children  of  the  partner  shall  also  be  granted family  reunification  under  the  same  prerequisites  of  the  children  of  a  spouse,  as mentioned above (ibid).   Besides  the  conditions  required  from  the  spouse  of  having  enough  income, accommodation and sickness insurance for the family, and the prerequisites in terms of relationship  to  the  spouse  named  above,  there  are no  general  conditions  for  family reunification  with  which  family  members  must  comply.  There  are,  however,  three 
optional conditions that Member States may impose. First, Member States may impose a  minimum  age  limit  on  the  sponsor  and  on  the  spouse  in  order  to  prevent  forced marriages.  This  age  limit may  not  be  higher  than  21  years  old  (Article  4(5)).  Second, Member States may reject the application for family reunification of minor children who are over 15 years old at the time they submit the application, but only if this was already foreseen  in  national  legislation  at  the  time  of  approval  of  the Directive  (Article  4(6)). This  was  the  case  in  the  national  legislation  in  force  at  the  time  in  Austria,  but  was changed with  the  act  that  implemented  the Directive  (Brandl  2007).  According  to  the Report  by  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the Directive,  no Member  States made use of this possibility in the Directive, and since this derogation was subject to a standoff clause it cannot be implemented a posteriori, so that this less favorable rule is now effectively prohibited by European law (COM (2008) 610 final, 5). Third, Member States may require children over 12 years old arriving unaccompanied to comply with integration conditions (Article 4(1)(d) FRD).  Rights of family members: Once their application for family reunification has been accepted, the family member is in  principle  entitled  to  (i)  be  admitted  into  the  territory,  (ii)  be  given  a  renewable residence permit of at least one year, (iii) access to education and vocational training in the same way as the sponsor, (iv) access to employment and self employed activity in the 
same  way  as  the  sponsor.  The  fact  that  the  right  to  employment  is  relational,  that  is, depends on  the  right of  the  sponsor, means  that  there  can by  three different  forms of access to the labor market for family members: no access at all (if  the sponsor doesn’t have  it  either),  access only with a work permit,  or  free access  (COM (2008) 610  final, 13).  The  spouse  and  children who  have  reached majority  have  also  (iv)  a  right  to  be 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given autonomous residence permit, independent from the sponsor, after no longer than 5 years, as  long as  the  family relationship  is  still  intact. Several optional derogations apply  that  limit  these  rights.  As  we  have  seen,  the  right  to  immediate  entry  into  the territory  may  be  delayed  in  Member  States  that  adopt  quotas.  Another  derogation establishes  that  the  right  to  employment  may  also  be  delayed  for  up  to  12  months (Article  14(2)).  A  more  favorable  derogation  allows  Member  States  to  grant  an autonomous  residence  permit  before  the  regular  waiting  time  in  cases  of  separation, divorce, widowhood, and other difficult circumstances (Article 15(3)). The  residence  permit  of  the  family  member  may  be  withdrawn  and  an application  for  renewal  rejected  only  if  the  conditions  are  no  longer  satisfied,  or  the permit  of  the  sponsor has  expired,  or  the  family  relationship  is no  longer  intact,138  or there has been  fraud,  including a marriage/adoption of convenience, or on grounds of public policy and security and public health (Article 16 and 6).  A number of safeguards apply. In the case of a decision on grounds of public policy/security, the same safeguard applies  concerning  the  severity  of  the  offense  and  the  ties  to  the  homeland  as  in  the above Directive  (Article  17  and 6(2)).  Furthermore, when  renewing  the permit  of  the family  member,  the  Member  States  must  take  into  account  the  contributions  of  the family  members  to  the  household  income  in  terms  of  fulfilling  the  requirement  of sufficient  resources  (Article  16(1)(a)).  An  additional  safeguard  is  that Member  states must take into account the best interest of the child when evaluating an application for family  reunification  (Article  5(5)).  Moreover,  the  Directive makes  explicit  mention  to Article 8 ECHR, which recognizes  the right  to  family  life as a human right,  stating  that measures  concerning  family  reunification must  not  violate  the  Convention  (Preamble §2).  Summary and Analysis In sum, as the discussion above makes clear, the Family Reunification Directive is a piece of legislation riddled with exceptions and derogations, so that it is almost impossible to say that it creates a harmonized right to family reunification in the EU. In this context it must be noted that the Family Reunification Directive has been extremely criticized by both  academics  and  policy  makers  for  establishing  a  very  low  level  of  family                                                         138 Meaning that either the family relationship has broken down, or the sponsor and his/her family members no longer live in a real martial or family relationship, or where it is found that the sponsor or the unmarried partner is married or is in a stable long‐term relationship with another person. 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reunification rights and allowing for very restrictive conditions. The Directive is widely seen  as  a  piece  of  legislation  that  merely  codifies  the  existing  minimum  standards already present in the Member States, rather than raising these standards. Nevertheless, the value of the Directive might be considered to be precisely this codification of existing standards. The whole Directive can be considered as a safeguard for migrants  in  terms  of  establishing  a minimum  set  of  rights  and  a maximum  set  of conditions—in other words, a bottom line under which Member States cannot fall—and therefore preventing further deterioration of family reunification rights. In other words, the Directive really only provides the lowest common denominator, it does not create a homogenous situation across all Member States. Accordingly, as a general derogation to the whole Directive, Article 3(5) states that Member States are free to adopt or maintain any more favorable provisions.  In terms of weaknesses, besides the lack of binding character due to the presence of so many derogations, the most problematic aspects of the Directive are the following: 
• The requirement of having ‘reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence’  is  left undefined.  In some countries,  this  is  implemented in  a  way  that  leads  to  long  residence  requirements  before  the  third‐country nationals becomes entitled to family reunification (COM (2008) 610 final, 4). 
• The definition of the family is very limited. The Directive allows for an interpretation of the family where the only relationship that is really protected is marriage. The spouse is the only person who has an almost unconditional right to family  reunification  according  to  the  Directive.  But  even  this  right  is  not  totally unconditional, since Member States are free to impose an age limit of 21, which is by  no  means  very  low.  What  is  really  problematic,  however,  are  the  various conditions  that may  be  imposed  on  children.  In  the worse  case  scenario,  family reunification is only granted to minor children who are dependent, unmarried, and educated  or  gifted  enough  to  pass  an  integration  test,  and who moreover might have to wait for 2 or 3 years since the date of application before being able to join the parent(s). 
• The right to family reunification is weakened by the unreasonable long waiting periods that may be  imposed on the sponsor before qualifying  for  family reunification, on the  family members before being authorized to enter (including children), and on the family members already in the territory before getting access to the labor market. 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• The  ‘integration conditions’  remain  totally undefined and may also be applied from abroad. Again, the idea that certain people might be prevented from exercising a right to family life on the basis of having failed a language or civics test seems to strongly contradict the principle of proportionality. 
• The vaguely formulated income requirement could open up a door for abuse by governments wishing to restrict the right to family reunification.   Nevertheless,  the  last  two  points—integration  conditions  and  income requirement—have been (or are currently being) subject to judgments of the European Court  of  Justice.    As  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  the  Directive  was  challenged  by  the European Parliament before the European Court of Justice for violation of human rights. Although  the Court  ruled against  the European Parliament,  it at  least emphasized  that integration conditions must be applied in a way that is conform with human rights and left the way open for the Court to set more definite limits to Member States’ discretion in the  future.139 As  for  the  income  requirement,  in  a very  recent  judgment  the European Court  of  Justice  has  interpreted  these  provisions  narrowly  in  a way  that  dramatically restricts  the  discretion  of  the  Member  States  in  this  area.  Case  C‐578/08  concerns  a Moroccan  national  who  applied  for  family  reunification  to  join  her  husband  in  the Netherlands.  The  application  was  refused  because  the  husband,  who  is  currently unemployed  and  receiving  unemployment  benefits,  did  not  fulfill  the  income requirement  of  EUR  1.441,441  net  per  month  for  two  persons  as  specified  in  Dutch legislation for family formation. This corresponds to 120% of the minimum wage in the Netherlands. The opinion of Advocate General Sharpson delivered on 10 December 2009 is categorical in its evaluation that: “Article 7(1)(c) does not authorize Member States to require  resources  greater  than  those  necessary  to maintain  the whole  family without recourse to social assistance”.140 Moreover, the Advocate General goes on to argue that an  occasional  receipt  of  social  assistance  also  cannot  deprive  a  person  of  the  right  to family  reunification:  “the mere  possibility  of  being  ale  to  claim  certain  types  of  social assistance  in  exceptional  circumstances  (…)  cannot  be  a  ground  for  systematically rejecting  an  application  for  family  reunification.”141  The  Judges  have  followed  the                                                         139 Case C‐540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 27 June 2006, ECR I‐5769 140 Case C‐578/08, Rhimow Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Opinion of Advocate Feneral Sharpston delivered on 10 December 2009, §59 141 ibid § 70. 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opinion of  the Advocate General,  thus significantly reducing the room for discretion of Member States when applying income conditions. As  long as the  income level  is above the threshold that makes a person (or family) automatically eligible for social assistance, the right to family reunification must be granted. 
 
The Blue Card Directive (BCD) “Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of  third‐country  nationals  for  the  purposes  of  highly  qualified  employment”  regulates the conditions under which Member States may admit third‐country nationals into their territory as  ‘highly qualified’ workers and grant them the status of  ‘Blue Card holders’, as well as the rights to which such persons are entitled, including the right to move to a second  Member  State,  and  the  rights  that  may  be  enjoyed  there  (Council  Directive 2009/50/EC).  Special  conditions  for  family  reunification  are  also  regulated  in  the Directive, including the rights of the family members once admitted.142  Settlement Rights – conditions for entry and stay: The main  conditions  for  acquiring  the  status  of  EU Blue  Card  holder  are:  (i)  a work contract or a binding job offer valid for at least one year, with (ii) a gross annual salary above a certain threshold to be defined by each Member State, but which must be higher than 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned, and (iii) higher  professional  qualifications  (Article  5(1)  and  (3)  BCD).  ‘Higher  professional qualifications’ are defined in the Directive as the completion of a post‐secondary higher education lasting at least three years or, by way of derogation, evidence of five years of relevant  professional  experience  (Article  2(g)).  In  addition,  the  third‐country  national must not pose  a  threat  to public  policy,  security  or health. The  third‐country national may also be asked to provide an address, and must show (under equal conditions with EU  citizen)  that  he/she  fulfills  the  conditions  necessary  for  exercising  the  given profession  in  accordance  to  national  law  (Article  5(1)  and  (2)).  A more  favorable 
                                                        142 The following third‐country nationals are excluded from the scope of this Directive because their status is regulated by other instruments: refugees; asylum‐seekers; applicants for, or beneficiaries of, subsidiary protection; long‐term residents exercising their right of free movement; family member of EU citizens exercising their freedom of movement; seasonal workers; posted workers; citizens of countries with which the Community has a preferencial agreement (Article 3(2) BCD). 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optional  derogation  provides  that  in  situations  of  particular  scarcity  of  certain professions, the salary threshold may be reduced to 1.2 times the average (Article 5(5)). If all of these conditions are fulfilled, the Member State should in principle admit the  third‐country  national  and  grant  him/her  the  status  of  Blue  Card  holder. Nevertheless,  the  (in)famous  ‘quota  derogation’  applies,  as  well  as  other  optional 
derogations  that give Member States  some  leeway  to  restrict  access  to  the Blue Card Status  by  giving  preference  to  other  categories  of  workers—national,  EU  citizens,  EU long‐term residents wishing  to move  to  a  second Member State,  and  lawfully  residing third‐country nationals—or by applying specific procedures  to  fill  in a vacancy on  the basis of an examination of  their  labor market  (Article 8(2‐5). Member States may also reject  an  application  on  the  grounds  of  ethical  recruiting  to  avoid  brain  drain  in developing  countries,  or  if  the  employer  has  been  sanctioned  for  undeclared/illegal employment in the past (ibid). In principle, the application may also be submitted from within  the  territory  of  the  Member  State,  although  an  optional  derogation  allows Member  States  to  require  that  the  application  be  submitted  from  abroad  in  case  this requirement was already present  in national  legislation at  the  time of  adoption of  the Directive  (Article  10).  Once  granted,  the  permit  may  be  withdrawn  in  case  the conditions are no longer fulfilled, in case the person becomes a threat to public policy or security,  or  in  case  the  person  is  no  longer  able  to  sustain  him  or  herself  without recourse to social assistance (Article 9).   Equal Treatment Rights: The holders of a Blue Card are immediately entitled to equal treatment in the following areas:  (i)  working  conditions,  (ii)  freedom  of  association  and  affiliation  including membership  in  workers  or  professional  organizations,  (iii)  education  and  vocational training, (iv) recognition of diplomas, certain branches of social security, (v) transport of pensions when moving to a third country, (vi) access to goods and services (vii) access to  the whole  territory  of  the Member  State.  As optional  derogations Member  States may restrict access to study grants and to procedures for obtaining housing.  Blue Card holders do not have equal treatment in access to the labor market. During the first two years, they may only change to a different occupation or employer if the  Member  State  authorizes  the  change.  After  two  years,  the  Blue  Card  holder  has access  to  other  highly  qualified  jobs without  the  need  for  previous  authorization,  but must  communicate  the  change  (Article  12(1)  and  (2)).  As  an  optional  derogation, 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Member  States  may  adopt  more  favorable  conditions  in  terms  of  access  to  the  labor market (Article 4(2)). The Blue Card holder has the right  to become unemployed once for up to 3 consecutive months without having his/her permit withdrawn. During this period the person may apply for new employment and the Member State must allow the person to stay  in  its  territory until  the authorities consider whether authorization will be  granted  for  the  new  employment  (Article  13).  As  an  optional  derogation, Member States  may  adopt  more  favorable  provisions  concerning  temporary  unemployment (Article 4(2)). After  18 months,  Blue  Card  holders  and  their  family  are  entitled  to move  to  a 
second Member State  for  the purpose of highly qualified employment without  losing the  status  of  Blue  Card  holder  in  the  first  Member  State  during  the  time  of  the application procedure. The conditions are essentially the same as  for the first Member State, and the quota derogation applies as well. If the application of the Blue Card holder is  rejected,  the  second  Member  State  must  immediately  readmit  the  third‐country national.  Family reunification rights: Blue  Card  holders  are  allowed  to  bring  in  their  family  members  by  way  of  family reunification  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Family  Reunification  Directive discussed above, but under more  favorable conditions  in a number of  areas  (Article 15).  Specifically,  Blue  Card  holders  must  be  granted  a  right  to  family  reunification immediately  (as  opposed  to  up  to  two  years  residence  requirement  in  FRD)  and  the residence  permit  for  the  family  members  must  be  given  within  a  maximum  of  six months from the date in which the application was lodged (as opposed to a maximum of 3  years  in  FRD).  Integration  conditions  and measures  abroad  are  ruled  out,  although Member  States  may  require  that  the  family  member  of  a  Blue  Card  holder  fulfill integration measures after having been admitted  to  the  territory of  the Member State. Once  in  possession  of  a  residence  permit,  family members  are  entitled  to  immediate access  to  the  labor  market  (as  opposed  to  up  to  a  one‐year  waiting  period  in  FRD). Moreover,  for  the  purposes  of  calculating  the  five  years  necessary  for  acquiring  an autonomous  residence  permit  (i.e.  independent  from  the  Blue  Card  holder),  family members may cumulate the periods of residence in different Member States. 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Long‐term residence: Blue Card holders are entitled to apply for long‐term residence in accordance with the provisions  of  the  Long‐Term  Residents  Directive  discussed  above,  but  under more 
favorable conditions  in a number of areas (Article 18). Specifically, Blue Card holders are  allowed  to  cumulate  periods  of  residence  in  different  Member  States  for  the purposes of proving five years of residence in order to qualify for long‐term residence, although  the  last  two  years  must  have  been  spent  in  the  Member  State  where  the application for long‐term residence is lodged. Moreover, for the purposes of calculating continuous residence, periods of absence from the territory of the Community of up to 12 consecutive  months,  or  18  months  in  total,  shall  be  tolerated  (as  opposed  to  6 consecutive months and 10 months  total absence  from  the Member State’s  territory  in the LTRD). When the Blue Card holder acquires  long‐term residence, a special  remark stating  “former  Blue  Card  holder”  shall  be  inscribed  in  his/her  permit,  and  the more favorable  provisions  regarding  family  reunification  and  transport  of  pensions  shall continue to apply. Moreover, for persons holding this status, the period of absence from the  territory  of  the  Community  allowed  without  losing  the  status  shall  be  of  24 consecutive  months  (as  opposed  to  12  in  LTRD).  More  favorable  provisions  in  this respect are also possible. An optional derogation allows Member States  to  restrict  the longer  periods  of  absence  to  cases  where  the  third‐country  national  is  returning  to his/her country of origin for employment, study or voluntary service.  Summary and Analysis As  the  description  above  makes  clear,  the  Blue  Card  Directive  offers  third‐country nationals who  qualify  for  the  acquisition  of  this  status  a  substantial  amount  of  rights from  the  very  beginning  of  their  stay. Moreover,  it  facilitates  acquisition  of  long‐term residence  by  tolerating  longer  periods  of  absence  and  allowing  for  the  cumulating  of residence in different Member States, thus taking a much more positive attitude towards mobility. From the perspective of post/trans‐national citizenship, the fact that residence in  different Member  States  can  be  cumulated  in  order  to  acquire  the  equal  treatment rights  reserved  for  long‐term  residents  is  also  remarkable  for  another  reason.  It represents  a  further  detachment  of membership  rights  from  a  particular  nation‐state. The detachment of membership rights from affective or objective ties to a nation‐state (evidenced by a longer period of residence) was already contained in the LTRD, which foresees  the  possibility  of  long‐term  residents  moving  to  a  second  Member  State  on 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conditions  of  equal  treatment.  Nevertheless,  the  decouplement  of  rights  from attachment  to  the  nation  is  even  stronger  in  the  Blue  Card  Directive.  Similarly,  the facilitated conditions for family reunification—especially the absence of waiting periods and the  fact  that Member States cannot  impose  integration conditions  from abroad on family members—also represent very significant improvements in the rights situation of those third‐country nationals who qualify.  Obviously,  the  important  question  is: who qualifies?  In  terms of weaknesses  of the Directive from the perspective of membership rights, the most problematic aspects of the Directive are twofold: first, by making explicit derogations from the LTRD and the FRD, the Blue Card Directive obviously creates rights hierarchies.143 Moreover, as Peers (2009)  points  out,  the  fact  that  the  Directive  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that Member States keep national schemes for recruiting labor migrants also contributes to creating  hierarchies,  because  such  national  rules  can  set  either  higher  or  lower standards than the Directive, or even some combination of higher and lower standards. Additional weaknesses  are  the  limited  scope of  the Directive which prevents  refugees and other categories of immigrants to benefit from the Directive should they qualify, and of course the option given to Member States to restrict access to the labor market until the  acquisition  of  long‐term  residence.  In  Part  II  we  will  see  exactly  how  these limitations and strengths fare in comparison to the other Directives.  Proposal for a Single Permit Directive In October 2007 the Commission tabled a “proposal  for a Council Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third‐country nationals to reside and work in  the  territory  of  a  Member  State  and  on  a  common  set  of  rights  for  third‐country workers  legally  residing  in  a Member  State”  (COM  (2007)  638  final).  This  proposal  is still being negotiated  in  the Council. Until  the entry  into  force of  the Treaty of Lisbon, this  Directive  fell  under  the  rule  of  unanimity.  Significant  disagreements  between Member  States  concerning  especially  the  scope  of  the  Directive  have  prevented  its adoption so far. Nevertheless, with the move to qualified majority voting in the Council and  co‐decision with  the Parliament  as of 2010,  the  chances  that  the proposal will  be adopted without  losing too much of  its original character has  increased tremendously.                                                         143 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Directive also covers a period that is not covered by the LTRD, namely the rights of highly qualified workers between the time of entry and the acquisition of permanent residence. Here the appropriate comparison would be with the ‘Single Permit and Common Set of Rights’ Directive, which is still under negotiation. 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Since  it  is  impossible  to  know  which  amendments  will  come  out  of  the  co‐decision procedure,  this  discussion will  consider  the proposal  as  originally  put  forward by  the Commission.   The Proposal  for  a  Single Permit Directive  aims  to  regulate  two  things.  First,  it would  regulate  the administrative procedure by which Member States  issue  residence and  work  permits,  in  order  to  facilitate  and  harmonize  admission  procedures throughout  the  EU.  Importantly,  the  proposed  Directive  would  only  regulate  the procedure  for  admission,  not  the  conditions  for  admission  of  third‐country  nationals, which would still remain at the discretion of the Member States. Second, the proposed Directive aims to grant a common set of rights to all third‐country nationals present in the territory of the Member States who have access to the labor market and who have not yet acquired long‐term residence. As proposed by the Commission, these two parts of the Directive are independent. Any third‐country national who has been given access to  the  labor  market  of  the  Member  State  would  be  given  the  common  set  of  rights, independently  of  whether  this  person  has  a  ‘single  permit’  or  any  other  kind  of residence permit.144 Only  this  second part of  the proposed Directive will be described below, since the procedural aspect is not of interest for the research question. The Directive would not apply  to  family members of EU citizens and  long‐term residents because they have a more privileged status. It would also not apply to seasonal workers, posted workers and short‐term temporary migrants such as trainees and intra‐corporate transferees, because they are not considered part of  the  labor market of  the Member  States.  Finally,  it  would  also  not  apply  to  asylum  seekers  (Article  3(2)). Moreover,  the  Directive would  be without  prejudice  to more  favorable  provisions  for EEA  nationals  and  citizens  of  countries  with  which  the  EU  has  an  Association Agreement, as well as any more favorable provisions of national legislation concerning the rights of third‐country workers (Article 13).                                                            144 However, some Member States (especially Germany) have opposed this aspect of the proposal and have argued for a change in the scope of the Directive so that only single permit holders would be entitled to the common set of rights defined in the Directive. The last revised version of the proposal tabled by the Czech Presidency took these concerns into account, but was vetoed by Spain at the highest political level, that is, in the Council of Ministers. From then on, and until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, negotiations had remained stalled (Source: Interviews; see also CD 9617/09,). 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Equal Treatment: The proposal establishes that third‐country workers shall be given equal treatment with nationals  of  the  host  Member  State  with  regards  to  the  following  areas:  working conditions,  freedom  of  association,  education  and  vocational  training,  recognition  of diplomas and qualification, social security, transport of pensions, tax benefits, as well as access  to  goods  and  services  including  procedures  for  obtaining  housing  and  the services  offered  by  employment  offices  (Article  12(1)).  The  Commission’s  proposal would  allow  for  two  important  optional  derogations.  First,  Member  States  would  be allowed to restrict equal treatment with nationals with regards to study grants (Article 12(2)(b)).  Second,  Member  States  would  be  allowed  to  restrict  equal  treatment  with nationals in access to public housing to cases where the third‐country national has been staying or has  the  right  to  stay  in  the  territory of  the Member  State  for  at  least  three years (Article 12(2)(c)).  Summary and Analysis If adopted, the Proposal for a Single Permit Directive would complement the Long‐Term Residents Directive by granting a wide range of equal treatment rights to third‐country nationals  before  they  acquire  permanent  residence.  The  sole  criterion  for  actual entitlement would be having a legal status that grants access to the labor market of the Member State. Although it  is not possible to know whether the proposal will  in fact be adopted and whether additional conditions will be imposed, it is clear that this Directive would  be  a  very  important  instrument  in  expanding  migrants’  rights  and  further decoupling socio‐economic rights from citizenship status.   
EU Citizenship Directive (EUCD) “Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within  the  territory  of  the  Member  States”  regulates  the  conditions  under  which  EU citizens may  reside  in  a  second Member  State  and  the  rights  that  they  are  entitled  to there, the conditions under which they are entitled to permanent residence in a second Member  State  and  the  rights  attached  to  this  status,  as  well  as  the  conditions  under which  they are entitled  to  family  reunification and  the  rights of  their  family members who are third‐country nationals (Directive 2004/38/EC). Although this Directive dates 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from  2004,  the  rights  contained  therein  mostly  predate  the  Directive.  The  Directive summarizes  and  amends  existing  legislation,  enlarging  the  rights  of  EU  citizens  and bringing the provisions in line with existing judgments by the European Court of Justice. This Directive does not apply to EU citizens who remain within the territory of their own Member State.  Family Reunification The  Proposal  for  a  Directive  entitles  EU  citizens  to  family  reunification  with  the following  family  members,  independent  of  their  citizenship:  (i)  the  spouse;  (ii)  the registered partner  (if  the host Member  State  recognizes  registered partnerships);  (iii) the direct descendants of the EU citizen or of the spouse/partner who are under the age of 21 or who are dependent; (iv) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending lines of the  EU  citizen  or  of  the  spouse/partner  (Article  2  EUCD).  In  addition, Member  States must  facilitate  the  entry  and  residence  of  the  partner  of  a  Union  citizen  with  whom he/she  has  a  duly  attested  relationship  and  of  any  other  family  members  who  are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen, or where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen. In these  cases,  the  Directive  foresees  that Member  States must  “undertake  an  extensive examination  of  the  personal  circumstances  and  shall  justify  any  denial  of  entry  or residence to these people” (Article 3(2)).  Settlement Rights 1: Entry and Residence EU citizens and their family members who accompany or join them have a right to enter and  reside  on  the  territory  of  any Member  State  for  up  to  three months without  any conditions  (Article  6).145  Further,  EU  citizens  also  have  a  right  to  reside  for  a  period longer than three months under certain conditions for the purpose of employment/self‐employment,  to  study,  or  for  any  other  reason  (i.e.  as  economically  inactive  persons). The  conditions  differ  according  to  the  purpose  of  residence  (Article  7).  For  those migrating  for  employment/self‐employment,  the  sole  condition  is  to  present  an employment  contract  or  evidence  that  they  are  self‐employed.  Persons  who  are temporarily unable to work due to certain grounds—an illness or accident; involuntary unemployment after having worked for a certain period of  time and registered as  job‐                                                        145 The only requirements are to hold a valid ID card or passport and report their presence. 
  252 
seekers  at  the  relevant  employment  office;  or  to  pursue  vocational  training—shall  be entitled  to  the  same  conditions  as  workers  and  be  allowed  to  reside  as  long  as  they provide evidence that they are in one of the situations above. For those migrating for the purposes  of  studies,  the  conditions  are:  enrollment  at  an  educational  institution, possession  of  comprehensive  sickness  insurance,  and  a  declaration  that  they  have sufficient resources for themselves and the family not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the Member State. Member States may not set a specific amount of resources needed and may not require proof, just a declaration. For those migrating as inactive persons for any other reason, the conditions are: to provide evidence of having sufficient resources for themselves and the family not to become a burden on the social assistance  system  of  the  Member  State  and  possession  of  comprehensive  sickness insurance. In this case, Member States may not require that the sufficient resources be higher  than  the  threshold below which nationals become eligible  for  social  assistance. Family members of EU  citizens who  fulfill  the  conditions  for  residence  above  shall  be allowed to accompany them and be granted the same rights (Article 7(1)(d) and (2)). Before the acquisition of permanent residence, that is, during the first five years of residence,  EU citizens who are employed or  self‐employed persons  (or  can provide evidence that they are seeking employment) and their family cannot be expelled except on grounds of public policy and security. Students and inactive persons and their family can  be  expelled  if  they  no  longer  fulfill  the  necessary  conditions  specified  above  or become an “unreasonable burden” on the social assistance system of the Member State. Expulsion  cannot  be  an  automatic  consequence  of  recourse  to  social  assistance, however.146  If  the  family members have been  living  in  the Member State  for  a  certain time,  the  death  of  the  Union  citizen,  or  the  termination  of  marriage  under  certain conditions, shall not lead to withdrawal of their residence permit (Article 12 and 13).  Settlement Rights 2: Permanent Residence Union citizens who have resided legally for a continuous period of five years within the territory  of  a  Member  States  and  their  family  members  are  automatically  entitled  to permanent  residence  (Article  16(1)  and  (2)).  More  favorable  conditions  apply  in                                                         146 Member States must examine the specific situation of the individual in order to decide whether this person has become an „unreasonable burden“ on the social assistance system. In any case, temporary recourse to the social assistance system must be allowed, so that an expulsion cannot be the automatic consequence of recourse to social assistance. (Preamble §21 and Art. 14 (3).) 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exceptional circumstances, such as when a person achieves the age of retirement before the  five  years  are  completed,  or  becomes  incapacitated  to  work,  etc.  (Article  17). Permanent  residence  is  no  longer  subject  to  any  criteria  and  shall  only  be  lost  by absence  from  the  territory  of  the  hot  Member  State  for  a  period  exceeding  two consecutive years (Article 16(4)). For the purposes of calculating continuous residence, absences  of  less  than  six  months  a  year,  or  12  consecutive  months  for  important reasons—such as childbirth, illness, studies or posted work—shall be tolerated (Article 16(3)).  Absences  for  compulsory  military  service  shall  be  allowed  for  as  long  as required.  After  having  acquired  permanent  residence,  EU  citizens  and  their  families enjoy expanded protection against expulsion, which is only possible on serious grounds of public policy or security. If the EU citizen has resided on the territory of the Member States  for  over  ten  years,  the  degree  of  protection  is  even  higher,  and  an  expulsion decision is only possible either on imperative grounds of public policy or security, or if the citizen in question is a child and the expulsion would be in the best  interest of the child (Article 28). 
 Equal Treatment: Union citizens and their  family members who have a residence permit  for  longer  than three months are entitled to equal treatment with nationals in all areas within the scope of the Treaty, except where specifically provided otherwise in the Treaty or in relevant secondary  legislation, and subject  to  the  following exceptions:  social assistance during the  first  three months  residence  or  longer  in  case  of  job‐seekers;  study  grants  for  EU citizens  residing  as  inactive  persons  or  students  and  their  families  (Article  24(1)  and (2)).  Union  citizens  and  their  family  member  who  have  permanent  residence  are entitled  to  equal  treatment with  nationals  in  all  areas within  the  scope  of  the  Treaty, except  where  specifically  provided  otherwise  in  the  Treaty  or  in  relevant  secondary legislation, without any exceptions (Article 24).  Summary and Analysis The  European  Citizenship  Directive  is  provided  here  for  comparison  purposes  and because  it  regulates  the  rights  of  one  particular  category  of  third‐country  nationals, namely family members of Union citizens exercising their freedom of movement. What is  striking  about  this Directive  in  comparison  to  the other ones discussed,  is  that  it  is 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and Security, Brussels, April 2009 18. Representative of the Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union – Justice and Home Affairs Unit, Brussels, April 2009 19. Representative of the European Commission‐ Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security, Brussels, April 2009 20. Representative of the European Parliament Secretariat – Research Unit, Brussels, April 2009 21. Representative of the European Trade Union Confederation, Brusels, April 2009 22. Former official of the European Commission‐ Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security and former member of the Task Force for Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, April 2009 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EDUCATION:   03/05 – 05/10   University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria Doctorate in Political Science, Advisor: Sieglinde Rosenberger 10/03 – 07/04    Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria Masters in Advanced International Studies (MAIS), Advisor: Anton Pelinka Received scholarship based on merit for 50% of the tuition. 10/02 – 07/03  Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Vienna, Austria Special Programme in International Studies (SPIS), with Honours 09/98 – 05/02  Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service, Magna Cum Laude 03/95 – 12/97  Centro Educacional Anísio Teixeira, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil High School, with Honours 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:  05/10 – 05/12  University of Vienna – Dpt. of Political Science, Senior Researcher Research Project: “Living Rooms: The Art of Mobilizing Belongings” 03/06 – 02/10  University of Vienna– Dpt. of Political Science, University Assistant 03/05 – 07/05  Delegation of the European Commission in Vienna, Internship  06/02 – 07/04  Raiffeisen International Funds Advisory, Client Service Manager 09/02  United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Internship 01/00 – 05/00  D.C. Schools Project, Volunteer Tutor 09/99 – 12/99  Georgetown Political Database of the Americas, Research Assistant 
TEACHING: 




A lecture series of the Dpt. of Political Science of the University of Vienna. 2007‐2008  Co­organizer of PoWi 04 Lectures A Lecture series of the Austrian Political Science Association. 2007‐2008  Member of the Editorial Board of the IPW Working Papers A publication of the Dpt. of Political Science of the University of Vienna. 2006 – 2007  Member of the Editorial Board of PolitiX The magazine of the Dpt. of Political Science of the University of Vienna. 
ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS: 
 07/07 – 08/07  University of Essex, Colchester, UK Essex Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis. 09/03  École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), Paris, France Exchange programme in international relations. 09/00 – 05/01  Villa Le Balze, Florence, Italy Study abroad programme in Italian history, politics, culture and language. 06/00‐08/00  Princeton University and Normal University of Beijing, Beijing, China Summer school “Princeton in Beijing” in Chinese language and culture. 06/98 – 07/98  Parsons School of Design, New York, USA Summer school in graphic design and computer graphics. 01/98 – 05/98  American University, Washington DC, USA Courses in international relations, history, literature and political science. 
LANGUAGES: 
 
• Portuguese:  Native speaker 
• English:  Fluent  
• German:  Proficient (Certificate: ÖSD Mittelstuffe) 
• French:  Proficient (Certificate: DALF) 
• Italian:  Proficient (Certificate: GU Proficiency) 
• Spanish:  Proficient (Certificate: GU Proficiency) 
• Chinese:   Intermediate 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PUBLICATIONS:   
1. Academic Publications and Presentations 
 
Journal Articles (forthcoming 2010). "Religious Organizations as Political Actors in the Context of Migration: Islam and Orthodoxy in Austria." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. (with Sieglinde Rosenberger and Kristina Stoeckl) 
Edited Volumes (2010). (ed.) Schwerpunktsheft: Theorien in der Praxis. Wien, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 1/2010. (with Anna Durnová and Thomas König) 
Book Chapters (forthcoming). "Immigrant Religions as Public Religions in Austria." F. Foret and X. Itçaina (eds.) Politics of religion, religious politics: Western Europe at the crossroads. London: Routledge.  (with Sieglinde Rosenberger and Kristina Stoeckl) (forthcoming). “Immigrant Integration in Austria.” International Approaches to Integration and Inclusion. J. Frideres (ed.) Montreal/Kingston, McGill‐Queens University Press. (with Sieglinde Rosenberger)  (2009). Religious citizenship as a substitute for immigrant integration? The governance of diversity in Austria. Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU. S. Carrera, K. Groenendijk and E. Guild. Aldershot, Ashgate. (with Sieglinde Rosernberger) (2009). Religious citizenship versus policies of migrant integration: the case of Austria. International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity. P. Bramadat and M. Koenig. Montreal & Kingston, McGill‐Queen's University Press: 259‐292. (with Sieglinde Rosenberger) 
Monographies  (2004). Assessing European Democracy. Vienna, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, unpublished master thesis. 
Conference Presentations (2009) Panel: “Religious Actors and Ideas in Migration Policy and Politics” ECPR General Conference 2009, University of Potsdam, Germany, 09‐13.09.2009 (Panel Chair together with Sieglinde Rosenberger) (2008) “Religious citizenship versus policies of immigrant integration: the case of Austria”. 13th International Metropolis Conference, Mobility, Integration and Development in a Globalised World, 27‐31.10.2008, Bonn, Germany (2008) “On the Limits of Borders: Globalization, Migration and the Re‐articulation of the Discourse of the Nation”. International Political Theory Conference, University of St. Andrews, June 12‐13, 2008. 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(2008) “Equality in Diversity? The European Social Model, Anti‐Discrimination, and the Rights of Third‐Country Nationals”. ESPAnet Annual Conference 2008: “Cross‐border Influences in Social Policy”, University of Helsinki, Finland, September 18–20, 2008 (2008). “Religious Organizations as Political Actors in the Context of Migration: From Institutional Partners to Representatives of Migrants? “ECPR Joint Session of Workshops 2008, University of Rennes, 11‐16 April 2008. (with Sieglinde Rosenberger and Kristina Stöckl)  (2007). “The ‘European Social Paradox’: The Development of a Rights‐based Social Policy in the EU and the Case of Third‐Country Nationals”. ESPAnet Young Researchers Workshop: “The European Social Model and Beyond”, University of Göttingen, December 6‐8, 2007. (2007). “Social and political integration versus religious citizenship: the case of Austria”. 4th Challenge Training School, Brussels, 23‐24 November.  (2007). “On the Limits of Borders”. 8th Essex Graduate Conference in Political Theory, University of Essex, Colchester, UK, 21‐22 June 2007. (2007). “Reinventing group presentations through 'position papers': An original method to teach argumentation and stimulate discussion among a large group of first year students.” Training for First‐Time University Teachers, Bratislava, Slovakia, January 15th‐16th 2007. (2003) “Participation and Sustainable Development: the Case of Participatory Budget in Porto Alegre”.World Student Community for Sustainable Development (WSCSD) Annual Meeting, 19‐22 March 2003, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan 
 
2. Non­Academic Publications 
 
Student Journals (2007) „Die ‚S1’ Stelle: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der aktuellen Unipolitik für NachwuchswissenschatlerInnen“. Politix 23/2007, Schwerpuktheft „Hochschulpolitix“. (with Paul Just) (2007) „ECPR – Möglichkeiten für JungwissenschaftlerInnen“,, Politix 23/2007, Schwerpuktheft „Hochschulpolitix“. (2007) „Erfahrungsbericht: Training for First Time University Teachers”, Politix 23/2007, Schwerpuktheft „Hochschulpolitix“. (2002). "The Balkans: a Term in Constant Semantic Metamorphosis." Living Cultures: The Georgetown Journal of Culture and Politics 3(1). 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Ausbildung:  03/05 – 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Doktorat in Politikwissenschaft, Universität 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10/03 – 07/04: Master in 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